THE CRYSTALLIZATION OF A MORAL PANIC:
A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF ANGLOPHONE CANADIAN PRINT MEDIA
DISCOURSE ON ARABS AND MUSLIMS PRE- AND POST-9/11

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To my wonderful husband, Matt, for his unwavering support and undying faith.
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ABSTRACT
This study examines the effects of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on Anglophone Canada, specifically its print media, and how that media can be used as both a window into and a mirror of societal trends. This study uses content analysis to look for evidence of a terrorism “moral panic” with Arab/Muslim “folk devils.” The data is analyzed using keyword word counts as well as a modified Critical Discourse Analysis to examine discourse strands before and after 9/11. This study finds that Anglophone Canadian print media discourse shifted after 9/11, indicating a terrorism moral panic with racialized Arabs/Muslims as folk devils. This moral panic and the attendant folk devils, as well as the trends in the data, are strikingly similar to their American counterparts, leading to the conclusion that Anglophone Canadian print media were influenced by American print media, most likely due both to American media’s prominent international position and Anglophone Canada’s ongoing internal struggle between recognizing its similarities with and declaring its differences from the United States.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION:

CANADA AND 9/11

On September 11, 2001, Americans were shocked and stunned by a highly-coordinated terrorist attack that toppled a New York City landmark, damaged the nerve center of the U.S. military, and killed thousands of innocent people in the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania. The 9/11 attack, as it came to be known, changed the United States (U.S.). This study examines the effects of 9/11 on Canada, arguably the country to which the U.S. is most closely culturally aligned. It is impossible to look at every possible ramification of 9/11 on Canada in a study of this size. Therefore, this study focuses on Anglophone Canada, as it is the segment of the state that struggles the most to differentiate itself from the U.S. This study focuses on print media (specifically newspapers and magazines) and how they can be used as both a window into and a mirror of societal trends.

The trend specifically examined in this study is that of the increased conflation of Arabs and Muslims post-9/11 into a “racial project.” A racial project is what does the “ideological ‘work’”¹ of linking structure and representation within racial formation theory. In other words, a racial project is “the sociohistorical process by which racial

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categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.”\(^2\) Racial projects thus connect the meaning of race in a given circumstance with the organization of social structures and everyday experiences based on that meaning. Racial projects are articulated through discourse and behavior in society, and their formation and maintenance can be studied by examining societal discourse.

It is argued here that the racial project of the conflation of Arabs and Muslims began before 9/11, but that 9/11 engendered a “moral panic” in Anglophone Canadian society that acted as a catalyst to speed up the process of racialization. Stanley Cohen coined the terms “moral panic” and “folk devil” in the 1960s.\(^3\) Even though the terminology may sound old-fashioned, moral panics and folk devils are relevant concepts for understanding the place of terrorism and the racial project surrounding Arabs and Muslims in Anglophone Canada. Cohen explains that a moral panic is not an actual panic in which chaos and mob rule ensue, but rather that the term is an analogy.\(^4\) According to Cohen, there are “three elements needed for the construction of a successful moral panic. . . . a suitable enemy: a soft target, easily denounced, with little power and preferably without even access to the battlefields of cultural politics. . . . a suitable victim: someone with whom you can identify, someone who could have been and one day could be anybody. . . . a consensus that the beliefs or action being denounced were not insulated entities (‘it’s not only this’) but integral parts of the society or else could (or would) be

\(^2\) Omi and Winant, 55.


\(^4\) Cohen, xxvii.
unless ‘something was done.’

Anglophone Canada experienced a successful moral panic in the aftermath of 9/11. The “suitable enemy” was the increasingly racialized group Arabs/Muslims. The suitable victims were all the Americans killed in the World Trade Center. Even though Anglophone Canadians hold firmly to their non-Americanness, there are enough similarities that it is not a stretch for Anglophone Canadians to imagine that “it could have been me.” The consensus was that the beliefs/actions being denounced (“Islamic terrorism”) reach back throughout history to all of the negative interactions between Islam and the West.

The terrorism moral panic that Anglophone Canada experienced post-9/11 was both reflected in and reinforced by print media wherein Arabs and Muslims became “folk devils,” in other words, “the personification of evil susceptible to instant recognition based on ‘unambiguously unfavorable symbols.’” Cohen calls folk devils “visible reminders of what we should not be.” The “folk devil is stripped of all positive characteristics and endowed with pejorative evaluations.” Folk devils by their nature lose their humanity.

Qualitative evidence for this moral panic includes a significant increase in unanswered negative language directed at Arabs and Muslims in the Anglophone Canadian print media in the year post-9/11; quantitative evidence includes a significant increase in negative language directed at Arabs and Muslims.

5. Cohen, xi.


8. Hier and Greenberg, 140.
increase in articles that use the term Arab or Muslim along with the term terrorist. Because this project looks for evidence of the moral panic in newspaper and magazine articles, it is restricted to Anglophone Canada, which shares much of its news with the Anglophone American print media and much of its culture with the Anglophone U.S. Further study of this issue could explore both Francophone Canadian attitudes and the influence of Hispanophone U.S. culture and media.

The 9/11 attack did not occur on Canadian soil and did not target Canadians, and thus it did not have a significant immediate effect on Canada. 9 Very few Canadians died in the 9/11 attacks, the numbers of which are not at all comparable to the numbers of Americans lost, 10 and since all the significant events took place on American soil, the effects on a neighboring country’s attitude towards the ethno-religious group that perpetrated the attacks should not be assumed to change.

This study begins with some background that puts the later findings in context. This chapter, in particular, discusses Anglophone Canadian “non-Americanism”—which is not the same thing as anti-Americanism, because it has no negative connotation—and the tension created by Anglophone Canada being pulled in the opposing directions of emulating the U.S. and trying to retain its own identity. The chapter then briefly discusses the position of Arabs and Muslims in the West, and in Canada in particular, followed by the research questions framing this study. This leads to an exploration of the media’s role

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9. The only possible exception to this is the immediate effect on a few towns near airports that were called on to care for passengers of planes that were diverted when U.S. airspace was shut down during the immediate aftermath of the attack.

10. Twenty-four Canadians died in the 9/11 attack, which ranks Canada fourth in the number of casualties by country (the UK and India both suffered more casualties).
in the formation of moral panics and racial projects, in addition to an explanation of what constitutes a racial project and a moral panic, how these concepts connect to one another, and how they serve as a framework to discuss the changes that 9/11 brought about in Anglophone Canada. Finally, the chapter gives an overview of the results of the study and previews what further chapters explain in detail.

Non-Americanism vs. Emulation

This study demonstrates that 9/11 catalyzed a terrorism moral panic which was both fed and reflected by the Anglophone Canadian print media using Arabs/Muslims as folk devils. In order to combine these two distinctive groups into one folk devil, a racialization process took place that the Anglophone Canadian print media also fed and reflected. To grasp how this new “race” became socially constructed in Canadian society, one must understand that Anglophone Canadian society is constantly being pulled between a Canadian identity that includes Francophone Canada and an Anglophone North American identity that includes the United States, yet excludes Francophone Canada and Hispanophone U.S. and Mexico. Anglophone Canada historically has struggled between emulating the U.S. and emphasizing its distinctiveness from the U.S. so that its own culture is not engulfed. This concept has been famously described by former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau as “sleeping with the elephant.”¹¹

Since at least the British North America Act,\textsuperscript{12} if not earlier, Canada has been automatically included in the West’s idea of itself, as Canada is a European settler country,\textsuperscript{13} and thus influenced by Western ideas and traditions. Anglophone Canada, specifically, is influenced by American ideas, but not necessarily hostage to them. According to Lipset, “the United States is quite different from Canada,” because it is “an ideological nation whose left and right both take sustenance from the American Creed,” while Canada, on the other hand, is a nation that “lacks any founding myth, and whose intellectuals frequently question whether the country has a national identity.”\textsuperscript{14} Winter investigated Canadian newspaper discourse in looking at Canadian identity formation. What she found was that within her “sample of newspaper articles, there is an abundance of references to the United States. Almost every second article mentions the U.S. at least once. These references rarely involve elaborate comparisons. The fact that they can be elusive reveals that commentators assume a shared knowledge about Americans. Only when representations of the United States contradict what is collectively accepted are more elaborate explications given.”\textsuperscript{15}

As alluded to in Winter’s quote, Canadians, especially Anglophone Canadians, who are most likely to be mistaken for Americans, have created a defensiveness referred

\textsuperscript{12} The British North America Act of 1867, regarded as Canada’s founding document, created the federal dominion and much of the governmental structure of Canada.

\textsuperscript{13} A European settler country is one in which the population of the country, as it formally entered the interstate system, was composed predominantly of people of European descent.


to in this study as “non-American.” The concept of non-Americanism is differentiated from anti-Americanism or un-Americanism in that it does not imply negativity or being opposed to the United States, rather it is simply an attempt to differentiate from the U.S. and Americans, most significantly in cultural terms. Lipset points out that “Canadians have continued to define themselves by reference to what they are not—American—rather than in terms of their own national history and tradition. There is no ideology of ‘Canadianism’ that is comparable to ‘Americanism.’”

As Winter explains, the idea that some may see Anglophone Canadians as virtually indistinguishable from Americans “is unsettling for Canadians who have long taken pride and comfort in being different from Americans.” In fact, she contends that Anglophone Canadian identity as both “national” and “multicultural” is tied to implicit and explicit comparisons to both the U.S. and Québec/Francophone Canada. Thus, non-Americanism is solely part of the Anglophone discourse, and further separates it from Francophone discourse. As Winter clarifies: “comparisons with the United States are a fact of life for Canada—or, to be precise, for English Canada. Being a minority nation, French Canadians’ point of reference is not the United States but le Canada anglais and,

16. Non-Americanism may, in fact, be unique to Anglophone Canadians, as no other group is as culturally similar and thus potentially vulnerable to assimilation without a concerted effort at differentiation.


18. This refers to people worldwide, who have difficulty telling Americans and Anglophone Canadians apart without the iconic Canadian flag patch on a traveler’s bag.

19. Winter, 481.

20. Winter, 482.
to a certain extent, *la France*. By contrast, English Canadians do not have the luxury to ‘overlook’ their American neighbor.”21 In fact, Winter claims Anglophone Canadians are “haunted by their commonalities with Americans.”22

This study takes into account that inherent tension in Anglophone Canadian identity between desiring to emulate Americans and desiring to differentiate from Americans. This societal tension appears in the qualitative data examined: in the year before 9/11, the emphasis was on non-Americanism as Anglophone Canadian print media stressed the Canadian multicultural ideal and excoriated anyone who dared to stereotype visible minorities. In the year after 9/11, the emphasis shifted as Canada became engaged in the War on Terror and the terrorism moral panic took hold, painting folk devils that looked remarkably like the American versions.

**Arabs and Muslims**

Initially, the intent of this study was to look at the Anglophone Canadian print news media discourse on Arabs, with the assumption that any racialization would occur with “Arab” as its nexus. Though not everyone with Middle Eastern roots is Arab (Iranians and Israelis being prime examples), and not everyone who is Arab or Middle Eastern is Muslim,23 nor do all Muslims have Middle Eastern roots,24 upon examining the

21. Winter, 486. All Canadian spellings in quotations have been standardized to the American spellings.

22. Winter, 487.

23. The majority of Arabs in both the U.S. and Canada are Christian.

evidence closely, it is clear that there is a good deal of semantic blurring between the concept of “Arab” and the concept of “Muslim,” so it becomes useful to discuss both (overlapping) groups, in terms of providing context as well as in terms of data analysis and the collection of quantitative data. The history and roles of Arabs and Muslims in the West are explored in more detail in the data and analysis chapter.

For the most part, neither Arabs nor Muslims have been looked on with much favor in the West. Though in many countries Muslims are seen as a homogenous other, in some countries, or in some situations, “it is Arabs who are the particular objects of discrimination, . . . because of extremist activities in the Arab world, while other Muslims are seen as less culpable.” Said addresses the roots of the current situation: “Three things have contributed to making even the simplest perception of the Arabs and Islam into a highly-politicized, almost raucous matter: 1, the history of popular anti-Arab and Anti-Islamic prejudice in the West, which is immediately reflected in the history of Orientalism; 2, the struggle between the Arab and Israeli Zionism, and its effects upon American Jews as well as upon both the liberal culture and the population at large; 3, the almost total absence of any cultural position making it possible either to identify with or dispassionately to discuss the Arabs or Islam.” Note that Said combines Arabs and Muslims essentially into one group, stopping just short of conflating the two. This is rooted in the West’s historical demonization of both groups.


Canada, as a pro-immigration country that officially welcomes diversity, has the potential to view Arabs and Muslims somewhat differently than do other Western countries, specifically the U.S. Karim examined Canadian census figures, and discovered that the Muslim population rose 153% between the 1981 and 1991 censuses. He quotes Zohra Husaini regarding the 1981 census: “It is particularly significant that at the university level, the percentage of Muslims is twice as high as that of other immigrants and close to three times as high as the total Canadian population.” Even with this growing demographic influence, Karim explains that Canadian Muslims “have far less strength in Canadian politics than members of the Jewish community, whose population numbers they have recently overtaken, or the even smaller Sikh community, which has ministerial presence in the federal and the British Columbia cabinets.”

27. Karim H. Karim, “Crescent Dawn in the Great White North: Muslim Participation in the Canadian Public Sphere,” in Haddad, 262. According to Statistics Canada, in the 2001 census, the Muslim population in Canada was 579,640 (or approximately 2% of the total population), which was a rise of 128.9% over the 1991 census. Statistics Canada, “Selected Religions, for Canada, Provinces and Territories - 20% Sample Data,” http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/products/highlight/Religion/Page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo=PR&View=1a&Code=01&Table=1&StartRec=1&Sort=2&B1=Canada&B2=1#doctop (accessed May 13, 2011). Calculating with the given percentages indicates that the Muslim population in 1981 was approximately 293,910. In contrast, out of a total population of 29,639,030, as of the 2001 census, with the option of multiple responses, only 334,805 people (or approximately 1% of the total population) indicated Arab ethnicultural origins (143,630 Lebanese, 71,705 Arab, 41,310 Egyptian, 22,065 Syrian, 21,355 Moroccan, 19,245 Iraqi, and 15,495 Algerian. The data did not include responses that totaled less than 15,000 people.). Statistics Canada, “Selected Ethnic Origins, for Canada, Provinces and Territories - 20% Sample Data,” http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/products/highlight/ETO/Table1.cfm?T=501&Lang=E&GV=1&GID=0 (accessed May 13, 2011). The U.S. numbers are quite different. In 2001, there were 1,104,000 adult Muslims out of a population of 207,983,000 adults, which is approximately 0.5%. U.S. Census Bureau, “Table 75: Self-Described Religious Identification of Adult Population,” The 2011 Statistical Abstract: The National Data Book, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/population/religion.html (accessed August 6, 2011). Similarly, in 2000, the total population of the U.S. was 281,421,906 and people with Arab ancestry (including the subcategories of Egyptian, Iraqi, Jordanian, Lebanese, Moroccan, Palestinian, Syrian, Arab/Arabic, and Other Arab) only totaled 1,202,871, or 0.4%. U.S. Census Bureau, “QT-P13: Ancestry: 2000,” http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_QTP13&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U (accessed August 6, 2011).

been more prominent in politics than Muslims, yet they are still frequently conflated with Arabs and Muslims when fears of terrorism surface.

Karim believes that “the failure to elect substantial numbers [of Muslims] may be a result of the difference in origin and in religious views as well as the ‘anti-democratic, anti-West and pro-terrorist’ image of Muslims among the Canadian public.”

He goes on to say that “such fears are not misplaced; a national survey [taken in 1991] that inquired into the comfort level of respondents with various groups in Canada ranked Muslims, Arabs, and Indo-Pakistanis almost at the bottom of the list.”

Karim also mentions that the foreign affairs minister refused to appoint Canadian Muslims as ambassadors to Muslim countries. It is difficult to determine causality: it may be that Muslims are discriminated against and thus do not achieve much political prominence, or it may be that Muslims’ lack of political prominence leads to them being seen as less-than-equal citizens.

In his discussion of the Arab/Muslim conflation that occurs so regularly in American and Canadian discourses, Karim points out that “‘Arab’ has been conflated with ‘Muslim’ to such an extent that native Christianity in the Middle East has almost completely disappeared in dominant [West]ern discourses.”

It has also apparently disappeared in the discourse of Arabs in Canada, both regarding those who were born in


Canada and those who have immigrated there. In addition, he explains that “apart from crisis coverage about Muslims . . . mainstream Canadian television still shies away from including images of Islam in its day-to-day programming.”

The conflation of Arabs and Muslims has been happening for decades, but appears to be more common post-9/11. This study argues that September 11 was the catalyst that started the wholesale transfer of attributes that had historically been imposed on the Orientalized Arab from the Arab to the Muslim. By the end of the time period for the data analyzed in this project, confflation was still more common than a completed transfer (where Arabs would be just another tile in the Canadian mosaic, and Muslims would be completely Orientalized). It seems that today, almost a decade after the events of 9/11 there may be more differentiation made between the groups, with Muslims receiving more demonization than Arabs. This is a subject for further study.

Research Questions

On 9/11, the U.S. fell victim to a serious, surprise attack which invoked a terrorism panic in the populace with Arabs/Muslims targeted as the “bad guys.” This study asks whether Anglophone Canada followed suit, or whether the pull of Canadian multiculturalism and distinctiveness proved too much for the tendency towards emulating the U.S.

Given what is known about Anglophone Canada’s attitude towards Arabs/Muslims leading up to the events of 9/11, this study argues that 9/11 served as a catalyst


to crystallize those attitudes into a moral panic on terrorism that utilized Arabs/Muslims (as one racialized group) as folk devils, rather than allowing them to remain as two distinctive tiles in the Canadian mosaic.

Utilizing a comparative content analysis of Anglophone Canadian newspapers pre- and post-9/11, coupled with a quantitative comparison of key words and their linkages, this study is able to show a change in Anglophone Canadian media discourse regarding Arabs and Muslims. In fact, this study contends that the newspaper evidence indicates that a moral panic of terrorism took hold in Canada with Arabs/Muslims as folk devils, which parallels the U.S. situation. This study contributes to knowledge in that it shows that the Anglophone Canadian discourse surrounding Arabs/Muslims, rather than staying steady, as might be anticipated by the entrenchment of both multiculturalism and non-Americanism, changed significantly to resemble U.S. discourse in the year following 9/11.

**Media’s Role in Creation and Reflection**

The media—both print and broadcast, as well as newer forms of media—play a role as both a window onto society and a mirror of society, thus much can be learned about a society by studying its media outputs. This study argues that Anglophone Canadian print media outputs participated in the creation of the terrorism moral panic and the resulting racial project wherein Arabs/Muslims were painted as folk devils. It does not argue that the media outputs were *in themselves* the moral panic or *caused* the moral panic, but rather that they reflected what was happening in society and interactively assisted in its creation.
An example of print media’s influence in society is offered by Hier and Greenberg, who assume “that news coverage acts as a ‘discursive space’ in which social agents struggle to penetrate the narratives around which news is constructed. By studying [news] coverage of [Chinese] migrants [to Canada], [they] learn a great deal about how Canadians construct and reconstruct their collective national identity—in particular, how they designate who is and who is not a true ‘Canadian.’” The same approach is taken here with the position of Arabs and Muslims in Anglophone Canada.

How the media present a situation has a lasting impact on how the public interprets it, because most people learn about any given situation from the media, and thus base their reactions on the “processed” or “coded” images and messages the media present. In the immediate aftermath of learning about a serious issue or incident, “people become indignant or angry, formulate theories and plans, make speeches, write letters to the newspapers,” and thus a moral panic can be created. If the media plant the idea that the disaster is not a one-time occurrence, that idea can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The objects of moral panics are not immune to media coverage, and thus can either purposely or accidentally live up to the image presented of them. News stories about “non-events,” such as “there were no attacks today,” only serve to heighten the sense of panic.

35. Hier and Greenberg, 138.
This chain of events occurred in Anglophone Canada post-9/11 with Arabs/Muslims as the “folk devils.” Most Anglophone Canadians learned about the 9/11 attacks from the media. They also learned about subsequent suspicious situations and false alarms from American media reports delivered with very little filter directly to Canadian media outlets. The media’s “processed” or “coded” messages included terms like “fundamentalist” and “terrorist” paired with the ethnic and/or religious designation of this new folk devil.

As mentioned above, the media do not simply reflect the attitudes of a society, but also have a role in creating them. As Erickson and Hathaway explain, “The role of the media in constructing social problems can exist quite separately from objective reporting of scientific facts.” This is true of both news media, as well as entertainment media, as seen in the tropes of Arabs in Hollywood movies and television described by Shaheen. These two formats interact with each other in the creation of new images. The image of concern in this study is the negative one of Arabs and Muslims.

Media do not just create, in fact, it can be argued that they create rarely, and mainly reflect societal mores. However, the reflection is rarely perfect—it is more akin to


a reflection in a funhouse mirror, where the image becomes distorted by being frozen in
time by the media source. This frozen image is then reflected back to the society, and is
then taken as truth, since it came from an authoritative source. Erickson and Hathaway
argue that, “In our ‘administered society,’ . . . the media work to reflect the dominant
ideology, acting to provide a stable ‘symbolic canopy’ . . . in the face of cultural
pluralism. In moral panics theory this process is abetted by the scapegoating. . . of ‘folk
devil[s]’ . . . onto which deeply rooted social fears and anxieties are projected.”41

Moral Panics

This study argues that Anglophone Canadian news media post-9/11 show strong
evidence of a moral panic around terrorism, with Arabs/Muslims as folk devils. Cohen
contends that moral panics are not unusual or unexpected events. He explains that they
happen, if not regularly, often enough that their existence (as opposed to their content)
should not come as a surprise. He clarifies that they come about when a “condition,
episode, person or group of persons” becomes defined as a threat to the values, morals,
and interests of a society. The entity then is stereotyped by the media, and “the moral
barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people.”
The appropriate “experts” come up with solutions, and the society figures out how to deal
with the problem, usually by returning to previously-used coping mechanisms. The entity
eventually fades away. “Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in
folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting

41. Erickson and Hathaway, under “Discussion.”
repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way the society conceives itself.”

The situation as reflected in the Anglophone Canadian media fits this description well: the episode of a terrorist attack was defined as a threat to the values, morals, and interests of Western society. The media then stereotyped Arabs/Muslims (reviving some older stereotypes). In the time period covered in this study—up to two years after 9/11—the experts had not completely come up with their solutions, but Anglophone Canadian society was beginning to figure out how to deal with the problem by leaning towards its tried-and-true coping mechanism of generally emulating the U.S.’s approach.

Cohen points out that despite the overly dramatic name, moral panics are real, and should be taken seriously. “Calling something a ‘moral panic’ does not imply that this something does not exist or happened at all and that reaction is based on fantasy, hysteria, delusion and illusion or being duped by the powerful.” Goode and Ben-Yehuda created a model they call the “grassroots model of moral panic” in which a moral panic cannot be caused purely by the media or government officials, but rather must echo some concerns the mass public already has, and play on those concerns. This model of a moral panic is consistent with what is contended here, that the media reflected and in amplifying, aided in the creation of the moral panic and the ensuing racial project.

It is argued here that the folk devil of Islamic terrorism is the conflated group Arabs/Muslims. As is true of any folk devil, the group is instantly recognizable by

42. Cohen, 1.
43. Cohen, viii.
44. Hier and Greenberg, 156.
unalterable physical characteristics, such as complexion, but in this case, members are also recognizable by clothing (hijabs), names, and accents. Hier and Greenberg note that “the nucleus of any moral panic is not the object of its symbolic resonances—not the folk devil itself. Rather, the folk devil serves as the ideological embodiment of the moral panic. When transmitted through the media, folk devils are revealed to the general public in a narrow and stereotypical fashion; they are constructed as wrongdoers and deviants, as threats to the social fabric necessitating immediate custodial intervention.”

The concept of a folk devil is not exactly the same as the concept of an “enemy image.” As Keen explains it, enemy images come about through mass paranoia created in a situation of war, in which the enemy must be envisioned as radically different from and lesser than the in-group in order to justify killing him/her. Folk devils, on the other hand, are not natural enemies. A moral panic arises due to a social event, not a war, and the embodiment of the moral panic—the folk devil—is not the citizen of the enemy state, but rather the type of person who symbolizes the deviance of the moral panic to society. The creation of an enemy image facilitates killing during wartime; the creation of a folk devil facilitates profiling and a cry for increased law enforcement during peacetime.

Enemy images are based on national images. As Boulding explains, national images are, for the most part, “formed mostly in childhood and usually in the family

45. Hier and Greenberg, 140.


47. It can be argued that 9/11 took the United States, and possibly Canada from peacetime to wartime, but even in war, the enemy image is directed outward, toward those with whom the country is at war. During wartime on the home front moral panics are quite common, such as the moral panic during World War II that resulted in the creation of a Japanese-American folk devil who was interned.
group. It would be quite fallacious to think of the images as being cleverly imposed on
the mass by the powerful. If anything, the reverse is the case: the image is essentially a
mass image, or what might be called a ‘folk image,’ transmitted through the family and
the intimate face-to-face group, both in the case of the powerful and in the case of
ordinary persons.”48 He also mentions that “a particular national image includes a rough
scale of the friendliness or hostility of, or toward, other nations,”49 in other words, a
degree of enemy image that may shift with world events. Moral panics, on the other hand,
occur suddenly, and are not based on a culturally inherited image of the folk devil; rather,
the folk devil emerges as the focal point of the moral panic once the panic has taken hold.

A moral panic cannot spring up out of thin air. There must be some sort of
cultural inclination towards viewing a situation or action as potentially dangerous and
some group as potentially “bad” and responsible for the danger. Terrorism is inherently
dangerous, and terrorism in the name of Islam has been primed in the Western mind as a
real, tangible possibility. Similarly, Islam has been primed in Western minds for
centuries, and Arabs in American and Anglophone Canadian minds for decades, as
potentially “bad” and responsible for acts of terrorism, thus arguably creating an enemy
image of Arab and Muslim societies.

49. Boulding, 447.
The concept of enemy images is centered around the idea of nations that are hostile to one another, and thus generate an enemy image. In the case of moral panics and folk devils, the demonization is unidirectional—the moral panic has no mirror image because the folk devils do not view the rest of society as enemies. Moral panics take place within a society, rather than between societies. Moral panics are the mainstream society’s reaction to a deviant (subcultural) group. Anglophone Canada’s reaction to Arabs/Muslims is not due to an enemy image, because Canadian Arabs and Canadian Muslims are not separate societies, but rather subcultures within the multicultural Canadian society that are seen as “deviant” due to their difference from the mainstream. At times, these “deviant” subcultures are brought to the attention of the mainstream culture due to events that trigger a moral panic, as happened with 9/11 and the terrorism moral panic. Canadian Arabs/Muslims are somewhat unique among “deviant” subcultures in that, due to their religion and/or ethnic heritage, they can be easily linked in popular portrayals to cultures that are already part of an enemy image held by Westerners. The enemy image the West holds of Arabs and Muslims thus helps to solidify the domestic folk devil created by the terrorism moral panic.

Cohen explains that “during moral panics and media frenzies,” the one-in-a-million case is “compressed into general categories of crime control.” He goes on to explain that the foundation of the crime control is based on too few cases to be able to legitimately generalize; however, the generalizing takes place, and too many people are

50. This leads to the idea of a “mirror image,” in which what nation A thinks about nation B is reflected almost exactly in what nation B thinks about nation A. See Urie Bronfenbrenner, “The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations,” in Weaver, 419-424.
targeted, resulting in injustice.\textsuperscript{51} Though one can argue that steps to deal with terrorism are beyond the pale of “crime control,” the same mechanisms hold, as government-sanctioned law enforcement officials are represented in the media as attempting to control and/or eliminate the problem, and in doing so focus on Arabs/Muslims using racial profiling, thus targeting innocent people, resulting in injustice.

Moral panics do not require that media coverage acts in lock-step, argue Erickson and Hathaway. They explain that “in our ‘multi-mediated’ social world, today’s ‘folk devils’ . . . find themselves articulately defended in the same mass media that castigates them.”\textsuperscript{52}

Racial Projects

Even though racial formation theory\textsuperscript{53} was originally conceived of to explain the change in the U.S.’s racial politics with the advent of the Civil Rights Movement,\textsuperscript{54} it is equally powerful in explaining how a multi-national ethnic group (Arabs) that partially overlaps with a major world religion (Islam) can become constituted as a race in Anglophone Canada.

As Winant and Omi explain, their original intent in theorizing racial formation as they did was to “[challenge] approaches that treated race as epiphenomenal to supposedly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{51} Cohen, x.
\item Erickson and Hathaway, under “Introduction.”
\item Howard Winant, \textit{Racial Conditions: Politics, Theory, Comparisons} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).
\end{itemize}
more fundamental axes of stratification and difference: ethnicity, class, and nation."  

They also intended “to emphasize the politicization of the social as an issue that links the micro and macro levels of racial formation [because] race always operates at the crossroads of identity and social structure.” They emphasize the completely interwoven nature of the personal and the political when it comes to racial formation: “one key idea underlying this concept—of what might be called building blocks in racial-formation processes—is that there can be no racial representation, no signification on race, that does not immediately and necessarily invoke social structures, power relations, lived experiences of identity and difference.”

Winant explains that “racial formation theory looks at race as a phenomenon whose meaning is contested throughout social life” in which “race is both a constituent of the individual psyche and of relationships among individuals, and an irreducible component of collective identities and social structures.” In other words, race acts at all levels, from the individual up to the societal, not as a monolith, but rather as a part of identity that is constantly contested and evolving. That contestation is manifested in a racial project, which “is simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics and an effort to organize and distribute resources along particular racial lines.” In the most recent explication of their theory, Winant and Omi “stress that

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55. Winant and Omi, 1565.
56. Winant and Omi, 1565.
57. Winant and Omi, 1569-1570.
58. Winant, 23.
59. Winant, 24; emphasis removed.
in real life no sharp distinction can be made between the micro and macro levels of
identity or conflict. Focusing on racial identity, . . . we can see that it is lived both by
individuals and by groups, while simultaneously shaped by social structure and collective
action.”

Racial projects are difficult to define and perceive because it is challenging to
detect the inner workings that create and sustain them. As Winant and Omi explain:

We argue that racial projects large and small—from mass actions or
comprehensive legislation (examples located at the macrosocial level) to speech
acts or personal experiences of prejudice or discrimination (examples located at
the microsocial level)—accrete over historical time to shape both the racialized
social structure and our psychic structure as racial subjects. The linkages between
racial signification and racialized social structure are ongoing and intrinsic as well
as unstable and conflictual. Any claim to a racial identity necessarily connects the
claimant to others making similar claims and to the sociohistorical system in
which that identity acquires meaning. This equation works in reverse as well:
when social, political, or economic institutions allocate resources along racial
lines, they necessarily assign individuals and groups to racial categories. They are
“signifying” race—even when denying that they’re doing so.

In the case of Arabs/Muslims in Anglophone Canada, 9/11 offers a window into the
historical accretion of the racial project. This study argues that 9/11 acted as both a
catalyst to speed up the process and a spotlight on what was already happening. Racial
projects are not immediate actions upon people, but a set of ideas, of ways of reacting to
people and ways of regarding their actions and viewing them differently from everyone
else. “Conscious or unconscious, acknowledged or denied, the racial organization of
everyday life is omnipresent: where we live, the work we do, what we eat and what we
wear, the language we speak and the idioms we use, the television programs we watch; in

60. Winant and Omi, 1570n5.

61. Winant and Omi, 1567.
short, nearly every aspect of our everyday lives is shaped in crucial ways by race.”62 This study uses the concept of the solidifying racial project surrounding American and Canadian Arabs/Muslims, specifically as seen by Anglophone Canadians, to further explain the moral panic that ensued in Anglophone Canada in the year after 9/11.

Karim quotes Stuart Hall in explaining the way the current discourse surrounding Arabs and Muslims in the West (and Canada in particular) is naturalized to become an undisputable racial project:63

We must remember that this is not a single, unitary, but a plurality of dominant discourses: that they are not deliberately selected by encoders to “reproduce events within the horizon of the dominant ideology,” but constitute the field of meanings within which they must choose. Precisely because they have become “universalized and naturalized,” they appear to be the only forms of intelligibility available; they have become sedimented as the “only rational, universally valid ones” . . . that these premises embody the dominant definitions of the situation, and represent or refract the existing structures of power, wealth and domination, hence that they structure every event they signify, and accent them in a manner which reproduces the given ideological structures—this process has become unconscious, even for the encoders.64

The Approach

The literature review chapter deals with the central research question and its ancillaries: Did Anglophone Canadian print media reflect a moral panic feeding into a racial project that conflated Arabs and Muslims post-9/11? Is this an example of Anglophone Canadian non-Americanism being swamped by Anglophone Canadian

62. Winant and Omi, 1568.

63. Neither Karim nor Hall discusses the concept of a racial project.

emulation of the U.S.? Is there any evident tension between the moral panic and the pre-9/11 state of calm in the post-9/11 data?

The chapter contextualizes these questions by defining the various debates in the relevant literature. One debate surrounds Anglophone Canadian identity and its connection to both Francophone Canadian identity and American identity. Another debate swirls around the place and status of so-called visible minorities in Canada. Yet another debate circulates around the effects of media conglomeration on Canadian society. Perhaps most significantly, a further debate rages over the true effects of 9/11 on Canada and Canadians.

The data for this study were examined in two different ways, both focused on content analysis. The methodology chapter details both the quantitative and qualitative content analysis processes. The quantitative data (key words) were collected from a larger number of print media sources\(^65\) over a longer period of time\(^66\) and from both Canada and the U.S. in order to show trends in the usage of certain key terms related to the hypothesis that there was a terrorism moral panic that ensued in Anglophone Canada post-9/11 and included Arabs and Muslims as folk devils. The qualitative data were collected from a smaller sample of printed news media sources, and were analyzed using a modified Critical Discourse Analysis to verify the trends that were evidenced in the quantitative data.

\(^{65}\) The quantitative data were collected from eight newspapers each from the U.S. and Canada. The qualitative data were collected from four newspapers and one newsmagazine from Canada.

\(^{66}\) The qualitative data cover the year before 9/11 and the year after 9/11. The quantitative data cover that period plus an additional year post-9/11.
The data and analysis chapter explores the results of the quantitative and qualitative approaches and the implications of those results, putting them into historical and theoretical context. The quantitative data show quite clearly, with only few minor exceptions, that terrorism was much more frequently cited in Canada post-9/11, and Arabs and Muslims were much more frequently mentioned in articles that cited terrorism post-9/11 than they were pre-9/11. This shows not only a preoccupation with terrorism, but a linkage in Anglophone Canadian discourse between terrorism and Arabs/Muslims, indicating the terrorism moral panic had taken hold with Arabs/Muslims as folk devils. The Anglophone Canadian results are consonant with the American results, though the American results show a much larger swing post-9/11. The qualitative results support the quantitative results, registering more negative discourse strands and knots with less contestation of that negativity post-9/11 than pre-9/11.

Conclusions

Due to Canada’s comparatively smaller population and the U.S.’s significant domination of international media, American ideas and attitudes are bound to exert some influence on Anglophone Canadian discourse. This study takes as a given that the U.S. entered into a panic surrounding terrorism due to the events of 9/11. This panic engendered a racial project around Arabs/Muslims that has played out in the media. It is argued here that Anglophone Canadian print media show evidence that Anglophone Canada emulated the U.S. in entering into a moral panic catalyzed by 9/11 with Arabs/Muslims as folk devils, thus crystallizing a racial project around Arabs/Muslims in Anglophone Canada.
Even though there was a sense of difference or distinctiveness about Arabs/Muslims in Anglophone Canada pre-9/11, they were not necessarily seen as any different than any other tile in the Canadian mosaic. However, after 9/11, the racial project instigated by the U.S.'s reaction to its attack created a moral panic in Anglophone Canada that far outweighed the seriousness of the threat. Arabs/Muslims became the folk devils in the moral panic, and, to some degree, reasonableness went out the window, and took multicultural ideals with it.

In conclusion, this study shows that a notion that may be held by a typical (American) layperson is confirmed. A person on the street in the U.S. would likely say that Anglophone Canadian print media, in (imperfectly) reflecting Anglophone Canadian society, would show evidence of a terrorism moral panic post-9/11 with Arabs and Muslims as folk devils, because the U.S. was in the throes of a terrorism panic that demonized Arabs and Muslims. Sufficient contestation of the notion of Anglophone Canada blindly emulating American cultural tendencies exists, however, that the subject was worthy of being studied and verified.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This study shows that a terrorism moral panic occurred in Anglophone Canadian society after September 11, 2001 with Arabs/Muslims racialized into folk devils. This moral panic was both reinforced by and reflected in the Anglophone Canadian print media. September 11 served as a catalyst to push along the process of racialization of Arabs/Muslims that was already occurring and combined it with influence from the U.S. media and culture to create this specific moral panic with these specific folk devils. This chapter contextualizes the central questions in this study by examining four interconnected concepts.

The place of the media in Canadian society is examined in order to understand the print media’s role in the creation, maintenance, and reflection of the terrorism moral panic. The roles that multiculturalism and visible minority status play in Canadian culture and identity are addressed to paint a picture of how Arabs and Muslims are situated in the society in such a way that they can be racialized, how that racialization comes about, and how the racial project is instantiated in the society. The tension within Anglophone Canadian identity in its struggle between a federal Canadian identity and an identity indistinguishable from American identity is explored to understand how Anglophone Canada relates to the U.S. and how that affects Anglophone Canada’s internal relations to visible minorities. The impact of 9/11 on Canadian national identity is discussed to
determine how 9/11, which took place in the U.S., was able to catalyze a change in Canadian society, and what that change was.

The exploration of these concepts begins with a look at media conglomeration in Canada to help explain how print media impacted the terrorism moral panic that evolved post-9/11. The Anglophone Canadian print media have assisted in solidifying the cultural norm of multiculturalism, and in that process, they have normalized visible minorities as a category, and therefore, as a group apart from “Canadian-Canadians.” Anglophone Canadian media are heavily influenced by U.S. media due to shared language and a substantially shared culture. Beyond that, however, the U.S. is a much larger market, so Anglophone Canadian print media take advantage of the economies of scale, and utilize U.S. wire stories frequently, perpetuating the ties to the U.S. that create tension in Anglophone Canadian identity. The Anglophone Canadian print media relied especially heavily on U.S. print media stories in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, leading to arguments playing out in the print media about what the relationship between the two countries is and should be, and whether that relationship must change post-9/11.

After looking at media conglomeration, this chapter examines the role of so-called “visible minorities” in Canada and how they fit into the multicultural ideal and the “vertical mosaic” reality. Anglophone Canadian identity is at times so tenuous in its differentiation from U.S. identity that the nodal point of the separation comes from identification with the concept of multiculturalism. This distinctive Canadianness marked by multiculturalism encountered a tension between national security and visible minority safety post-9/11 when it was faced with hegemonic U.S. culture, national security, and foreign policy priorities.
The chapter continues by addressing Anglophone Canadian identity overall, and the inherent tension between being subsumed by American identity and uniting with Francophone Canadian identity. The tension Anglophone Canada felt between being swallowed by an American-style “North American community” and trying to survive with its own identity was heightened by 9/11. This chapter goes on to explore the effects on Canada of 9/11, both politically and culturally and how Anglophone Canadian familial feeling towards the U.S. led to a sense of the “inevitability of integration.”

The Media

Because this study deals with the Anglophone Canadian print media’s role in creating and sustaining the terrorism moral panic, it is important to understand the media’s role in Canada. The initial assumption is that media in Canada act much like media elsewhere; however, the Canadian media landscape differs from that in many countries, as Jiwani explains, “In a nation whose geographic size is enormous and whose population lives on a miniscule percentage of the total land mass, the role of the national media assumes even greater import when considering issues of social cohesion and the construction of an imagined community. . . . The news media are a crucial conduit through which representational discourses about the self and other are communicated.”

She goes on to specify that “the Canadian landscape is also marked by intense media concentration, wherein news stories (and entertainment media) are provided by a few


conglomerates, and where local stories are often refracted through the lens of the monopoly that governs that local subsidiary.” Jiwani’s first point only makes sense in the context of her second point. Though the news media may hold the key to “representational discourses of the self and other,” they would do so in a very localized way in a geographically large, sparsely populated society that did not suffer from media conglomeration.

In addition to the obvious effects of media conglomeration, Taras also explains that the preference for non-objectivity in journalism has grown: “an increasing number of journalists have become ardent political activists. Where objectivity was once the gold standard on which the professional credibility of journalists rested, today the rules seem to have changed. Some journalists have been able to enhance their status by openly championing partisan positions and causes.” For example, CanWest Global was until recently a very successful corporation, while at the same time a vehicle for the Asper family’s neo-liberal campaigns against the welfare state and the center-left Canadian consensus. Never patient with the Fourth Estate convention that even private media companies are a public trust, CanWest Global has severely tested customary principles relating to a newsroom’s independence from the owner, the ideological diversity of reportage and opinion, and CRTC [Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission] regulations limiting foreign ownership. It has acted on the potential always available to a media company—to get rich and advance the views of its owners—but generally curbed by the tradition of editorial autonomy.

69. Jiwani, 51. The Canadian media landscape changes quite frequently, with buyouts and mergers occurring at an alarming rate. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, the history of media conglomeration is not addressed here.


One could argue that in an age of a plethora of media sources, it matters little if the majority of Canadian newspapers have a strong ideological bent. However, unlike the U.S., in which most people obtain their news from television, Canadians still read newspapers. In fact, “almost 8 out of 10 adults living in markets where daily newspapers are available read either a printed edition or visited a newspaper website each week.”

A 2004 report by the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications discussed the fact that, “in 1998 . . . about 11.2 million people were reading newspapers each week in Canada’s top 17 markets. By 2002, this figure was up to 11.6 million readers.” The report also notes that “49% of all Canadians (15+) read a newspaper every day.” Daily newspaper readership varies by age; in 2002, only 45% of 18-24 year olds stated that they had read a newspaper “yesterday,” while 62% of people 65 years and older had read one “yesterday.” When the timeframe is expanded, the percentages are much higher. A low of 77% of 25-34 year olds stated they had read a newspaper in the previous week, and a high of 84% of 50-64 year olds claimed to have read a newspaper in the past week. These data indicate the influence that newspapers continue to have in Canada.


74. Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications, under “Readership.”

75. Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications, “Table 4.”
Taras points out that “people still trust newspapers and see their contents as a kind of truth. They turn to the newspaper for basic information—news about local events, sports scores, want ads, business news—and are largely unaware of the political diet that is being served up along with these other dishes.” 76 As Ismael and Measor explain, “Public accountability has been edged out of the process as the Canadian media is increasingly immune to public review processes, industry or government ombudsmen, and civil society organizations.” 77 This conglomeration and unwillingness to incorporate alternative viewpoints could help solidify Anglophone Canadian identity. Wilson-Smith, though, notes that media contribute to the Anglophone Canadian identity crisis. “But the problem goes deeper: journalism both influences a community’s values, and reflects them. Canada’s English- and French-speakers have sharply different views about their relationship with each other. The media reflect that rift, sometimes subconsciously.” 78

Thus, the media conglomeration in Canada is one of the major factors behind the moral panic surrounding Arabs/Muslims post-9/11, as dissenting voices are virtually unheard from, thus allowing only the dominant voices to prevail. When the dominant voices instigate a racial project around a particular racial group, it is destined to take hold, as there is almost no viable contestation.

76. Taras, under “The Right-Wing Information Infrastructure.”


The Vertical Mosaic, Multiculturalism, and Visible Minorities

This study addresses the place of Arabs/Muslims, a distinctive ethno-religious group that was racialized in the process of being turned into folk devils for the terrorism moral panic fed by the Anglophone Canadian print media. In order to understand how that can happen in a society such as Anglophone Canada, there must be an exploration of how race and ethnicity are articulated in the society.

Though historically many of Canada’s approaches to race and ethnicity have been influenced by the United States, many also arose out of the facts that Canada is largely a society of immigrants and that the British and French were Canada’s original charter (settler) groups. Porter contends that “the relations between the French and the British have no doubt been the most important reason for the ideology of ethnic pluralism.”

Though the British tended to hold more sway, both groups have influenced immigration policies; however, often they did not agree with one another. The French were against further British immigration, as well as being dissatisfied with any other non-French immigration because the immigrants tended to take on the English-Canadian way of


80. Porter, 60.
The ideas of social Darwinism extended anti-immigrant feeling and the concept of “entrance status” heightened those sentiments.

In addition to the charter groups, Canada was also historically home to Aboriginal groups and Afro-Canadians. According to Monture,

early relations between both colonial powers, the British and the French, and Aboriginal peoples were based on a mutual respect often determined by the needs of the colonizers, who, for example, sometimes needed the knowledge of Indigenous peoples about the land in order to survive and later required their military strength to help win colonial battles. . . . Eventually, colonial relations required that First Nations were characterized as inferior as this idea justified not only the taking of Aboriginal land but also child welfare and educational policies that resulted in the taking of Aboriginal children from their homes and placing them in residential schools where they were forbidden from speaking their languages or following their cultural practices.

Though Canada was part of the slave trade, there were no slaves in Canada by 1834, and the number of blacks in Canada was negligible until immigration laws changed in 1962, allowing in a large influx of former British colonials, many of whom were of African descent.

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81. Porter, 60.
82. Porter, 61.
83. “Entrance status” refers to the fact that immigrants tend to enter the society with a lower social status, and until the processes of assimilation instituted by the charter group(s) have been completed, they remain there. Depending upon the degree of difference between the immigrant group and the charter group(s), the immigrant group may remain in that status no matter what they do, because they are seen as inassimilable. Porter, 63-64.
85. Slavery was abolished in 1834, but obsolete in many places long before that, mainly because the plantation system—the major driving force behind continued enslavement in the U.S.—was never instituted in Canada due to differing climates. Robin W. Winks, The Blacks in Canada: A History (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1971), ix.
The first Prime Minister of Canada, Sir “John A. MacDonald articulated the vision of the Canadian nation-building project when, in a speech to Parliament, he proclaimed that Canada was a white man’s country. Constructing a white settler nation was an inherently racialized activity, marginalizing Indigenous peoples from the emerging nation-state, continuing to recruit white settlers to occupy lands appropriated from them, and implementing immigration and citizenship policies that excluded those racialized as non-white.”

Following the lead of the U.S., which instituted the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, Canada had a Chinese Immigration Restriction Act by 1885. This Act did not completely exclude Chinese immigrants; however, they were forced to pay a $100 entry tax which was raised to $500 in 1904 under pressure from British Columbia. Also similar to the U.S., Canada negotiated a “gentlemen’s agreement” with Japan to restrict immigration. This agreement, signed in 1908, limited Japanese immigration to less than 1,000 per year. A more subtle method of non-white immigrant exclusion was an

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86. Enakshi Dua, “Exploring Articulations of ‘Race’ and Gender: Going Beyond Singular Categories,” in Hier and Bolaria, 177.


88. Man, 238.


90. Lauren, 63.

imitation of the Natal Immigration Act of 1897 “which allowed immigration officers to exclude any person who was unable to write a declaration in a prescribed European language.” Since immigration officers had leeway to choose the language, those who were “undesirable” could easily be excluded without referencing race.\(^9\)

After British Columbia’s Supreme Court found the Canadian immigration quota for Asian Indians invalid, the province instituted a regulation stating that immigrants must arrive in Canada from their country of origin via one continuous journey. In 1914, an Indian businessman challenged the inherent racial basis of this ruling by chartering the *Komagata Maru*, a Japanese ship, from Calcutta to Vancouver. The ship full of Indians was not permitted to discharge its load, and was sent away.\(^9\) Anti-immigrant feelings ran so strongly that the Asiatic Exclusion League was able to touch off riots in Vancouver’s “Little Tokyo” and Chinatown in 1907.\(^9\) The Immigration Act of 1910, instituted due to West Coast anti-Asian pressures, prohibited “the entry ‘of immigrants belonging to any race deemed unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada,’” effectively excluding all non-whites.\(^9\) As late as World War II, Canada’s doors were firmly shut to those not considered white. Canada “had possibly the worst record of all countries in the Western world in providing sanctuary to European Jewry.” In fact, the only Jews who were

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93. Tinker, 20; Winks, 300; Howard, *Struggle*, 94.


95. Lauren, 60.
allowed in were “enemy aliens” sent by Great Britain to live in internment camps. As Satzewich explains,

potential immigrants in early 20th-century Canada were evaluated on the basis of a racialized hierarchy of desirability, with immigrants ranked as “preferred,” “non-preferred,” and “inadmissible.” Although immigrants from the European periphery were generally regarded as “non-preferred,” they were nevertheless admitted to Canada. This was unlike the case of inadmissible groups like immigrants from China and India, who were subjected to near blanket exclusion. The latter groups were regarded as racially inferior and non-white. Peripheral Europeans, while also regarded as racially inferior, were perceived by many elite Canadians to be capable of assimilation and cultural change. They were, therefore, deemed to be less of a threat to the reproduction of settler capitalist relations. It is not exactly clear what considerations made them less of a threat, but it is possible that their common or emerging whiteness played a role. In addition, although southern and eastern Europeans faced prejudice, racism, and discrimination, they did not face the same scale of racist exclusions that were faced by Chinese and East Indian workers who managed to arrive in Canada before near complete bans on their further immigration were implemented.

Nehru began chipping away at the so-called “White Canada” policy in the late 1940s by applying pressure to “grant concessions to immigrants from India, Pakistan, and Ceylon.” However, this policy was not overturned until 1962, when the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration changed immigration regulations to be based on an immigrant’s “merit, without regard to race, color, national origin or the country from which he comes.” She recognized that times were changing as more colonies gained


98. Lauren, 208.

99. Winks, 443.
independence, and the balance of power shifted within the United Nations.\textsuperscript{100} Canada also needed to tap into skill bases elsewhere, because “educational facilities ha[d] never caught up with the kind of society that ha[d] been emerging in Canada during the century.”\textsuperscript{101} Both skilled and unskilled workers entered Canada under the new regulations, but because of the correlation between their countries of origin and their skill level, much of the entrance status in the vertical mosaic was reinforced. Their children could ostensibly climb the social ladder, as long as they adhered to “Anglo-conformity.”\textsuperscript{102} According to Zong, “in 1967, Canada changed its immigration policy by adopting a ‘point’ system to screen independent immigrants. The point system provided an equal opportunity for immigration.”\textsuperscript{103}

Helmes-Hayes and Curtis claim that that though entrance status still has a place in modern Canada, it is less confining today than it was in the middle of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century; the chances of moving out of that status and into the mainstream are better, partly due to the change in immigration policy which has altered racial and ethnic makeup in Canada.\textsuperscript{104} In 1961, 95\% of immigrants came from Europe and the U.S.; between 1981-1991, only 30\% did. Because of this rapid change, most of today’s non-white population

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100. Lauren, 246.
101. Porter, 56.
103. Li Zong, “Recent Mainland Chinese Immigrants and Covert Racism in Canada,” in Hier and Bolaria, 112.
104. Helmes-Hayes and Curtis, 16.
\end{flushright}
is foreign born,¹⁰⁵ and “foreign-born Canadians now make up 18.4% of the population.”¹⁰⁶ The new policy has also altered education levels, often starting immigrants at a higher-than-entrance status. This leads to resentment from native-born Canadians who may feel the newcomers have not paid their dues by working their way up.¹⁰⁷ Because education and social mobility have greatly improved since the change in immigration policy, “by the second and especially the third generation, minorities reached and sometimes surpassed the level of socioeconomic attainment of Canadians of British origin.”¹⁰⁸ However, “structural barriers such as unequal opportunity, devaluation of foreign credentials, and racism ha[ve] caused systematic exclusion and occupational disadvantages for professional immigrants.”¹⁰⁹ Patel explains that “significant strides have been made since the 1960s to address racism in Canadian society and public policies. This is true to the extent that many (white) Canadians now believe that racism is not a major problem (although survey results are not always consistent on this). The openly espoused racist ideology and formal legislative systems of the past have been replaced by non-racist policies and an aura of equality. However, policy has yet to

¹⁰⁵ Breton, 102.
¹⁰⁶ Man, 235.
¹⁰⁷ Breton, 102.
¹⁰⁸ Breton, 86-87.
¹⁰⁹ Zong, 120.
address covert, subtle, or unpremeditated forms of racism that have persisted after the
decline of explicit racist policies and procedures.”\textsuperscript{110}

Canadian society is sometimes described as a “vertical mosaic.” This term was
coined by John Porter, who explained that “in a society which is made up of many
cultural groups there is usually some relationship between a person’s membership in
these groups and his [sic] class position and, consequently, his chances of reaching
positions of power. . . . the Canadian people are often referred to as a mosaic composed
of different ethnic groups,”\textsuperscript{111} thus the term “vertical mosaic” conveys, as Helmes-Hayes
and Curtis explain, “the idea that Canada was best understood not as an egalitarian
melting pot but as a fixed hierarchy of distinct and unequal classes and ethnic groups.”\textsuperscript{112}

Today, however, rather than a vertical mosaic, one most often hears Canadian
society described as multicultural, since multiculturalism is viewed as a strong Canadian
value. Then again, Ayres declares that, actually, “multiculturalism in Canada has
variously described a social reality, a policy, an ideology, and a process of goal
achievement.”\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Canadian Dimension} offers the historical explanation: “Around the time
of Quebec’s Quiet Revolution of the mid-sixties, the Liberal Party of Canada took the
strategic decision to promote multiculturalism both as a counterweight to Quebec
nationalism and as a genuine means for ‘visible minorities’ to identify with the dominant

\textsuperscript{110} Dhiru Patel, “Public Policy and Racism: Myths, Realities, and Challenges,” in Hier and
Bolaria, 258.

\textsuperscript{111} Porter, xii-xiii.

\textsuperscript{112} Helmes-Hayes and Curtis, 8.

\textsuperscript{113} Jeffrey M. Ayres, “National No More: Defining English Canada,” \textit{The American Review of
political project in the Canadian state.”

Grabb and Curtis point out that “it is commonly assumed that, over the years, Canadian society has typically encouraged ‘multiculturalism,’ or the idea that virtually all minority-group members are free to maintain ethnic, racial, or cultural identities that are separate from their Canadian identity.”

Multiculturalism is not just a vague Canadian ideal, but, in fact, has been the official federal government policy since 1971. Citizenship and Immigration Canada explains the policy thusly:

By [adopting multiculturalism as an official policy], Canada affirmed the value and dignity of all Canadian citizens regardless of their racial or ethnic origins, their language, or their religious affiliation. The 1971 Multiculturalism Policy of Canada also confirmed the rights of Aboriginal peoples and the status of Canada’s two official languages.

Canadian multiculturalism is fundamental to our belief that all citizens are equal. Multiculturalism ensures that all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging. Acceptance gives Canadians a feeling of security and self-confidence, making them more open to, and accepting of, diverse cultures.

Though multiculturalism is federal policy, the concept can lead to a “separate but unequal” existence, in which visible minorities are viewed as beneficiaries of multicultural policies and thus white Canadians come to resent that supposedly elevated or special status.


116. Breton, 94.

Grabb and Curtis explain that “there are numerous examples of the formal entrenchment of multiculturalism in Canada in recent decades. . . . However, the best illustration is probably the Multiculturalism Act of 1988, which made Canada the first nation in the world to grant official statutory powers and legal protections to distinct cultural minorities.”¹¹⁸ In contrast to official government pronouncements, Winter explains that “in the early twenty-first century . . . [multiculturalism] has come to be a powerful social imaginary in dominant discourses.”¹¹⁹ Anglophone Canadians’ self-representation as tolerant, humane, and non-American enforces the concept of multiculturalism, and causes the Canadian “‘mosaic’ of distinguishable ethnic groups [to play] an important role. The non-assimilation of minority groups is used to underline Canada’s distinctiveness vis-à-vis the American ‘melting pot’ and staged as a demonstration of Canada’s compassionate character.”¹²⁰ Winter suggests, however, that multiculturalism actually arose less out of innate cultural compassion and more out of the pragmatism of a population “demographically incapable and ideologically unwilling to assimilate incoming populations regarded as culturally and racially inferior.”¹²¹ Winter is not the only critic of a starry-eyed view of multiculturalism. As Kobayashi points out:

> it is the denial of difference inherent in liberal notions of distributive justice that fuels our collective imagination to search for identical situation as the basis for establishing social justice. Canadian institutions are nearly all premised upon the notion of identical situation. Even our policy of multiculturalism, together with

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¹¹⁹. Winter, 484.

¹²⁰. Winter, 488.

¹²¹. Winter, 488.
the various legislative mechanisms which support it, are based upon specifying human rights that guarantee equality to the individual regardless of that individual’s possession of group-making traits such as gender or “race.”

Thus, Kobayashi sees multiculturalism as colorblindness: not so much all-inclusive as it is an equalizing force, refusing to use group identity, rather than forcing it upon a group. This formulation misses the key points that both Aboriginals and visible minorities are categories dealt with in multiculturalism policy, as are a wide variety of ethnic groups. Canada offers federal support of so-called “heritage language” instruction and other “heritage” cultural activities, effectively grouping Canadians by ethnicity in support of the multicultural ideal.

Breton also argues with Kobayashi:

On the contrary, there are several instances of group-based organization or practices in Canadian society. The segmentation of the society into French and British was constitutionally established with the British North America Act, and through a number of public programs. The segmentation on the basis of Aboriginality was legally established with the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the Indian Act of 1850 and its subsequent modifications, and the maintenance of a separate government department. The right to public support for denominational schools is established in the Constitution. Employment equity legislation seeks to assure a certain representation of groups in the workforce of different institutional sectors.

Breton, however, misses the point by looking back into history too far. It is not fair to compare a post-Multiculturalism Act Canada to a Canada under the “White Canada” policy that excluded non-white immigrants until 1962.


123. Lipset makes the point that “the extent of the [Canadian] government’s willingness to support this policy [multiculturalism] was reflected in the 1973 establishment of a cabinet ministry with the exclusive responsibility for multiculturalism. In addition, the government has provided funding to ethnic minorities for projects designed to celebrate and extend their cultures.” Lipset, “Historical Traditions,” 144.

124. Breton, 93.
One component of both the idealized multicultural image and the mosaic tile image is the concept of “visible minority.” “The term visible minority is used by Statistics Canada to subsume a number of different ethnic groups. Among those included in this category are people who identify themselves as Asian, South Asian, West Asian, Chinese, Arab, Filipino, Lebanese, Vietnamese, Caribbean, African, and Latin, Central, or South American. Statistics Canada treats aboriginals as a separate category.”  

Some claim that visible minority status in Canada is primarily a statistical convenience, as Walks and Bourne explain, since it “derives primarily from an interest in equity issues, concerns regarding discrimination, and the need for information on social change and diversity that is not provided by standard ethno-cultural classifications.”  

However, in practice, “visible minority” is used as a marker of difference from mainstream Canadian society. The term “visible minorities” implies that there are also invisible minorities who should not be dismissed. In fact, it potentially implies that everyone holds some sort of minority status.

Jones explores the intersection of official multiculturalism and the place of visible minorities in Canadian society: “Increasingly multiculturalism is being perceived in terms of color, focusing on ‘visible minorities.’ This, of course, is a particular perception implicitly accommodated in the language of Canadian public policy and reflected as well in certain of the social demands of the minority constituency. The common currency is

125. Grabb and Curtis, 198.

acceptance of ‘cultural diversity’ or ‘cultural pluralism’ and the search for solutions to its resulting challenges.”  

She continues: “Ethnic minorities, including ‘visible minorities,’ have been convenient points of official intervention aimed at advancing the goals of multiculturalism. These communities have been, and continue to be, important transmission belts of the values, messages, symbols, and ideas on which multiculturalism and its preferred strategies thrive.”

Multiculturalism has different meanings for members of the majority than it does for visible minorities. “Thus, for visible minorities multiculturalism translates into demands for the recognition of their cultural differences. It represents a desire to integrate into Canadian society and to be accepted as full members of it. It means ensuring their survival as a distinct community without becoming a ‘separate society.’”

Officially, visible minorities have all the same rights, privileges, opportunities, and claims on Canadianness as those who are not visible minorities; however, they tend to be the frequent victims of marginalization and discrimination. Jones claims that “minority groups, especially visible minorities, become easy targets for blame in cases of economic depression, employment crises, conflict of language/cultural rights, school and playground conflicts, concerns regarding integration, lack of national unity, and so


129. Jones, under “Introduction.”
Though one might think the media would support official multiculturalism, Ismael and Measor explain that the media exacerbate negative views of visible minorities, and that after 9/11, the Canadian media followed the American lead: “In response to the attacks in New York and Washington, much of the focus of Canadian media coverage quickly turned from the attacks themselves to an examination of the alleged perpetrators, and by extension the actions and beliefs of immigrants and visible minorities within Canadian society. While the racist notions inherent within the denigration of Canada’s immigration policies were supported by calls in the media to target those originating from Muslim and Arab countries for security purposes, long-standing commitments to civil liberties enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were ignored.”

Even though mainstream Canada does not always treat visible minorities equally, Nakhaie has determined that “visible minorities possess a ‘warm feeling’ toward Canada alongside similar feelings for their own ethno-racial communities,” indicating that they feel included in Canadian society. Indeed, “on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being the lowest, 5 the highest), a sense of belonging to Canada is 4.25 for visible minorities compared to 4.4 to 4.5 for the British and other Europeans, 4.3 for the Jews, and 3.9 for the French.”

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131. Ismael and Measor, 115.


133. Nakhaie, under “Introduction.”
However, visible minorities are overrepresented among immigrants, thus finding themselves in a double-minority status. “Among recent immigrants a clear demarcation exists between those classified as visible minority and the British or French charter groups. These differences tend to persist even after education and other social capital characteristics are accounted for.”

Evidence does indicate that visible minorities are less likely to vote in federal, provincial, and municipal elections; on average, they participate in the electoral process about 15 to 20 percent less than do charter groups or other Europeans. The voting gaps between visible minorities and the British is substantially higher among the second generation (those born inside Canada) than among the first (those born outside Canada). The gap between third generation visible minorities and the British is, however, much reduced (to about 6%). Moreover, voting participation is modestly associated with income, and the strength of that association is roughly twice as much for visible minorities as it is for the British.

Jones condemns mainstream Canada’s lack of inclusion of visible minorities in its multicultural ideal: “One need only look at the employment practices of police departments, fire departments, government services, universities, the media, and private companies to see that visible minorities are consciously or unconsciously denied full participation in almost all Canadian institutions. Visible minorities are, in fact, the invisible members of our society.” In sum, Jones’s point is to “emphasize that there are systemic roadblocks that continue to militate against the full participation of ‘visible minorities.’”

134. Nakhaie, under “Introduction.”


137. Jones, under “Concluding Observations.”
Some may say that visible minorities simply need more assistance in their integration into Canadian society; on the other hand, one argument holds “that the designation ‘visible minority’ in Canadian public policy language is nothing more than rationalization for the ideology of bigotry, and that it has been divisive of community, idealizes white objects and symbols, and therefore self-defeats the goals of genuine multiculturalism.”

Arat-Koc claims that: “Canadian identity is defined by those who position themselves as ‘ordinary Canadians’ or Canadian-Canadians—as opposed to ‘ethnic’ or ‘multicultural Canadians’—both referring to a category of unmarked, ‘non-ethnic,’ white Canadians. They are the ones who claim the final authority to define inclusions and exclusions in the nation.”

Thus, it is evident that the vertical mosaic continues to exist, and that visible minorities, though officially part of the multicultural ideal, are actually placed somewhere in the lower part of the vertical mosaic. Because the category of visible minorities exists low on the vertical mosaic, and because Arabs (and by extension, Muslims) are incorporated within it, it becomes easier to vilify and racialize the group, turning them into folk devils for the terrorism moral panic.

**Anglophone Canadian Identity**

This study shows that a terrorism moral panic was catalyzed by 9/11. That moral panic was influenced by the consolidated and biased Anglophone Canadian print media


that easily turned the Arab/Muslim visible minority status into a marker of a folk devil. To fully grasp the whole process, one must understand the components of Anglophone Canadian identity. Some may claim that Anglophone Canada is not an identity group, thus one must examine Canadian identity and the history behind its consistent segmentation into Anglophone and Francophone.\textsuperscript{140} Anglophone Canadian identity is in constant tension between unity with Francophone Canada and the similarities shared with American identity. This tension is exacerbated by the fact that the U.S. is a neighbor, dominant regional power, and dominant world power.\textsuperscript{141} Anglophone Canada has hesitated to identify too strongly with the U.S. for fear of being subsumed. However, 9/11 changed that tendency to some degree, as Canada noted its vulnerability and the commonalities that situate it firmly in the West.

A common perception of Canada is that it is very much like the United States, and that Canadian identity and American identity are virtually identical. However, not only is Canada not like the U.S. for a host of reasons,\textsuperscript{142} Canada contains two (at least) distinct societies, one of which shares some similarities with the U.S., and one of which is quite

\textsuperscript{140} The terms “English Canadians” and “French Canadians” are used frequently in the literature, and they are historically accurate, referring to the original British and French settler populations. However, as Canada’s diversity increases, not everyone who speaks English and belongs to Anglophone Canadian culture has British ancestry, just as not everyone who speaks French and belongs to Francophone Canadian culture has French ancestry, so it is more accurate to use the terms Anglophone and Francophone to designate the two groups. This study uses Anglophone and Francophone except when quoting directly.

\textsuperscript{141} Grabb and Curtis, xi.

\textsuperscript{142} See Lipset’s work for a detailed analysis of the differences. A good summary is Lipset, “Historical Traditions.”
different. Grabb and Curtis theorize four societies in North America.¹⁴³ These four are Anglophone Canada, Francophone Canada, the Northern U.S., and the Southern U.S. They find that “these internal divisions involve a distinctively more liberal Quebec within Canada and a demonstrably more conservative southern region of the United States. The remaining two sub-societies, i.e., the northern United States and English Canada, tend to stand in between the other two on this conservative-liberal ‘morality continuum.’”¹⁴⁴ However, this similarity between Anglophone Canada and the Northern U.S. breeds a desire for differentiation, labeled “anti-Americanism” by some, “pro-Canadianism” by others,¹⁴⁵ but most accurately, and, therefore, in this study, called “non-Americanism.”

Recall that Winter noted that the idea that there is very little distinction between Anglophone Canadians and Americans “is unsettling for Canadians who have long taken pride and comfort in being different from Americans.”¹⁴⁶ She argues that Anglophone Canadian identity as both “national” and “multicultural” is tied to comparisons with both Americans and Francophone Canadians.¹⁴⁷ She explains that “many English Canadians . . . are haunted by their commonalities with Americans. As both societies appear to be kindred, if somewhat different, branches from the same Old English tree, English

¹⁴³. Grabb and Curtis. Though it is often considered part of North America, they purposely exclude Mexico from their formulation.

¹⁴⁴. Grabb and Curtis, 165. Lipset agrees here: “The evidence indicates that francophone Canadians vary more from their anglophone co-nationals than the latter do from Americans.” Lipset, “Historical Traditions,” 147.


¹⁴⁶. Winter, 481.

¹⁴⁷. Winter, 482.
Canadians face the possibility of fusion as well as the threat of assimilation.” Winter demonstrates “how images of ‘America’ and ‘Québec’ impact upon the multicultural reconstruction of Canadian nationhood. . . . Images of Canadianness are constructed as much in international comparisons as in intra-national ones.” She describes a situation in which “the omnipresent comparison with ‘Americans’ allows—or forces—‘English Canadians’ to come into being as a group. Their representation as a distinctive, culturally united entity downplays internal social and political differences.” Bow explains the peculiar nature of Anglophone Canadian non-Americanism: “Ironically, given the origins of Canada and the United States as ‘twins separated at birth,’ their essential and enduring similarities, and their long history of peace and cooperation, one might argue that the Anglophone Canadian experience has been as close as one can get to anti-Americanism in its ‘pure’ form. It is, in other words, probably as close as we get to an anti-Americanism which persists—even flourishes—without being sustained by profound political or cultural differences, anticipation of violence or direct coercion, or even deep-seated grievances.” Rondinelli explains that “if indeed we can acknowledge that the desire to be different is not new in Canadian nationalist discourse—some have

148. Winter, 487.
149. Winter, 499.
150. Winter, 499.
151. Brian Bow, “Anti-Americanism in Canada, before and after Iraq,” American Review of Canadian Studies 38, no. 3 (2008): 341. Bow is clearly referring to non-Americanism as defined in this study, rather than true anti-Americanism, based on the definition he gives: “Anti-Americanism is not the same thing as disagreement with American values or policies. A person can emphatically reject something that the United States says or does, and even harbor profound resentment toward the people who made those choices, without necessarily having anti-American views. Anti-Americanism is an attitude toward the United States and its people which is profoundly mistrustful—a prejudice that colors the way a person interprets Americans’ choices, and consistently attributes them to negative values and purposes.” Bow, 341.
convincingly suggested that this desire is *constitutive* of [Anglophone] Canadian national identity.”

Lipset argues with the formulation of Canada and the U.S. as twins separated at birth, claiming that

Canadian society has been a more class-aware, elitist, law-abiding, statist, collectivity-oriented, and group-oriented that of the United States, and that these fundamental distinctions stem in large part from the defining event that gave birth to both countries, the American Revolution, and from the diverse ecologies flowing from the division of British North America. The social effects of this division have been subsequently reflected in, and reinforced by, variations in literature, religious traditions, political and legal institutions, and socioeconomic structures that have been created in each country.

Grabb and Curtis refer to Lipset’s ideas as a myth: “It could be argued that, regardless of whether or not there were fundamental differences between the core principles and outlooks of Canadians and Americans during the formative years of their respective societies, as long as we cling to the recurring myth that such differences existed, the impact on our present sense of the two peoples is the same as if the myth were in fact true.” It is this “myth” that keeps the tension on Anglophone Canada as it is pulled between its similarity to the U.S. (at least the Northern U.S.), and its confederation with Quebec.

Ayres, on the other hand, claims that Anglophone Canada is distinct, but that discussion thereof is taboo:

152. Rondinelli, 20.


154. Grabb and Curtis, 133.
I would assert that there exists today an English Canadian national community, one recognizable through various symbolic collective representations. This national community—for strikingly clear political reasons—is rarely spoken of in contemporary English Canadian political discourse, much less considered from the position of symbolic representation in the constitutional order. The “nation” in Ottawa’s mind necessarily includes Quebec, and to admit otherwise would challenge the very basis of the federalist vision of ten equal provinces and two territories. 

In Latouche’s words, “Nobody ever talks of English Canada. Not even English Canadians.”

Both Ayres and Latouche have a point—Anglophone Canadians tend not to refer to themselves as such, unlike Francophone Canadians, who embrace and celebrate their identity. The difference is, however, that Anglophone Canadians, when thinking of Canada, tend to think of Anglophone Canada. But this is not to say that there is a true sense of distinctiveness from the U.S.; rather, Anglophone Canadians tend to be defensively Canadian, marking themselves as non-American and Francophone-inclusive. The loss of Quebec would shatter that vision and create an untenable position of such similarity to Americans that the Anglophone Canadian identity might cease to exist (or at least, that is the fear). Potvin points out that Anglophone Canadians tend to be very uncomfortable with the potential of Quebec’s separation from Canada or even special status in Canada.“The fear that Quebec’s self-determination might lead to balkanization

155. Ayres, 182. Since this was written, one of the two territories has been split, creating Nunavut, thus there are now ten equal provinces and three territories, with the added complication that the newest territory has three official languages: English, French, and Inuktitut, and thus a position in the country’s language/culture debate that is somewhat reminiscent of Quebec pre-Quiet Revolution.

and the absorption of Canadian regions by the United States led some thinkers to favor a reinforcement of the central state.\textsuperscript{157}

Even though some theorists point out the similarities between American and Anglophone Canadians, Howard’s interviews of 78 middle-class Anglophone Canadians in the Hamilton, Ontario area came to some definite conclusions regarding Canadian identity and its difference from American identity:

These Canadians tended to identify themselves in contrast to Americans. Not being Americans—having better qualities than Americans, being accepted in Europe more readily than Americans—was important to them. Indeed, as one respondent put it, being Canadian is “mainly making sure you’re not American.” Many of the respondents held quite negative stereotypes of Americans, who were generally viewed as louder, more aggressive, more pushy, more arrogant, and more competitive than Canadians. One respondent called Americans “outgoing and . . . blatantly bizarre.” Canadians, said another, are “not ostentatious like our neighbors.” The respondents referred frequently to the extent of inner-city crime and decay in the United States, as evidence that Canada is a better place to live. Several of the black immigrants specifically stated that Canada was a better place for them to live, as blacks, than the USA.\textsuperscript{158}

As Anglophone Canadian identity struggles against American identity and struggles to define its non-Americanness, the role of visible minorities in the Canadian mosaic has shifted. Arat-Koc claims that

there has been a campaign to increasingly identify Canadian identity along civilizational lines, as part of “Western civilization” and in a “clash of civilizations” framework. This reconfiguration seeks to situate Canada internationally as an unconditional partner of the United States in foreign policy; internally, it has led to a re-whitening of Canadian identity and an increased marginalization of its nonwhite minorities. Such an emphasis in national identity may appear to be a retreat from multiculturalism as the policy in effect in Canada


since the 1970s; alternatively, it may represent a crystallization of certain inequalities, as well as inherent ambiguities and tensions, present in liberal multiculturalism even in the best of times.\(^\text{159}\)

This realignment of Anglophone Canada with the West in general and the U.S. in particular helped create the terrorism moral panic and crystallize the inequalities that allowed the creation of an Arab/Muslim folk devil.

**Canada and 9/11**

This study argues that 9/11 changed the discourse in Anglophone Canadian print media to align more with the U.S.’s focus on terrorism and negative views of Arabs and Muslims. This was related to a change that took place in the entire society. Immediately after 9/11, Canada was faced with a choice. As George W. Bush phrased it, “Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”\(^\text{160}\) As the U.S.’s culturally most similar ally and nearest neighbor, Canada had to determine where it stood, what that meant for Anglophone Canadian identity, and what that meant for visible minorities. As described above, historically, Anglophone Canada has struggled with its role vis-à-vis the U.S. After 9/11, this relationship became more complicated as the U.S. pressured Canada to align with the U.S.’s foreign policy choices.

Canada could well have stood its ground and refused to bend to the U.S.’s pressure, as some European countries did. However, Gilbert claims that very shortly after

\(^{159}\) Arat-Koc, 32.

9/11, Canadian “‘experts’—analysts, policy makers, politicians, and academics”\textsuperscript{161} were predicting the inevitability of increased integration with the U.S.\textsuperscript{162} She notes that, “in large part, this discourse has emerged in response to the clampdown on the U.S. border in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11.”\textsuperscript{163} She goes on to explain that “it is not simply that the United States has pressed Canada to change its domestic policies, but that the cooperation between the two countries that has ensued in areas such as security and immigration ha[s] effectively established the conditions to make deeper economic integration more feasible and more likely.”\textsuperscript{164} In addition, the Canadian business community pressured Canada for an “extension and deepening of the trade relationships set out in Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) and NAFTA.”\textsuperscript{165} Dhamoon and Abu-Laban point out that “the Canadian economy was dramatically impacted by the closure of the U.S.-Canada border in the days following September 11, and business groups in Canada (along with their counterparts in the United States) sought to ensure the security of the border in order to maintain the flow of goods and services.”\textsuperscript{166} Gilbert and Dhamoon and Abu-Laban paint it as an inevitable movement on Canada’s part, when, in reality, there was a great deal of internal contestation of the shift. Canadian skepticism of

\begin{flushright}
161. Gilbert, 208.
163. Gilbert, 203.
164. Gilbert, 204.
165. Gilbert, 204.
\end{flushright}
U.S. foreign policy goals continued as Anglophone Canadians asserted their multiculturalism and argued over the racism inherent in the U.S.’s new security policies.

Along these same lines, alterations to the way Canada approaches importation and immigration could well have stopped at the border, but instead, these changes went beyond the border. Coutu and Giroux claim that September 11 altered the approach of the Supreme Court of Canada. Before 9/11, it made decisions with an eye to international human rights law and the vision of Canada as a country that bases the values it lives by on that law. In contrast, post-9/11, the Supreme Court of Canada was much more willing to deport people to almost certain torture (blatantly violating international human rights treaties to which Canada is a party), based on a more formal interpretation of Canadian law. Coutu and Giroux explain that “the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001 and the war on terrorism that followed have induced a pervasive sense of insecurity in Canada, as elsewhere, and brought about a shift of public policy towards a confinement of security risks in a global era.”

In the polity, as in the legal sphere, there has been an obvious shift of paradigm, from liberty to security. In December 2001, Canada passed an Anti-Terrorism Act. As far as human rights and freedoms are concerned, the Anti-Terrorism Act is a far cry from the draconian measures of the American Patriot Act, with its military tribunals, incommunicado confinement, preventive detention without charge, and potentially expeditious application of the death penalty. Nevertheless, the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act remains, in nature, an emergency legislation. In particular, there has been a clear change of mind, within the Supreme Court of Canada, regarding the authority of international human rights law, at least where


168. Coutu and Giroux, 313.
highly sensitive security matters are involved, such as deportation of political refugees suspected of being linked with terrorist organizations.\(^{169}\) Coutu and Giroux explain that this is because “being a *de facto* strategic part of the American sphere of military, economic, political and cultural hegemony, Canada has little scope for independent policy when dealing with the US Government.”\(^{170}\) In actuality, Canada has much more ability to make independent policy than it utilized immediately post-9/11. It began to flex its policy muscles a few years after 9/11, when internal pressure to maintain its image as a morally upright country pushed it to stand up to the U.S. a number of times.

Coutu and Giroux go on to explain that “this may not be apparent in day-to-day life, but, since 11 September, the concept of emergency, and the notion that an exceptional state of affair[s] exists, have been a major influence on our political world.”\(^{171}\) Tucker explains that “Canada is deeply vulnerable, not just to terrorism, but to an American fear of terrorism that perhaps many Canadians believe for one reason or another that they should—or must—share with their American neighbors. . . . The fact that Canadians have not as yet forged . . . a response reflects in part at least a diminished Canadian sovereignty vis-à-vis the United States, and constitutes potential grounds for a renewed ‘lament for a nation.’”\(^{172}\)

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169. Coutu and Giroux, 313.
170. Coutu and Giroux, 314.
171. Coutu and Giroux, 315.
After 9/11, Arat-Koc explains that “the civilizational discourse on Canadian identity emphasized essential similarities with Americans, but involved a critique of what were considered to be the deficits of Canadians compared with qualities attributed to Americans.”

Things were different before 9/11, when “Canadians were ambivalent about their differences with Americans. They proudly attribute[d] to themselves the qualities of peacefulness and tolerance, but admire[d] the American’s patriotism and sense of national identity.” However, “after September 11, the Canadian Right began to define unconditional identification with the U.S. state and its policies as central to the new Canadian identity. Right-wing columnists played an important role ideologically in policing and disciplining those—including Canadian politicians—who did not toe the line.”

This statement is hyperbolic, as the right wing did not succeed in convincing the entire country that it should follow the U.S. in lockstep.

Though Canada did not follow the U.S. in lockstep, it also did not see itself as separated or separable from the events of the world, as the Supreme Court of Canada declared in the *Suresh* decision, quoted by Coutu and Giroux: “It may once have made sense to suggest that terrorism in one country did not necessarily implicate other countries. *But after the year 2001, that approach is no longer valid.*” Gilbert claims that Canada and the U.S. “have responded to the terrorist attacks of September 11 in very


175. Arat-Koc, 36.

176. Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1 RCS 3, para. 87 (Supreme Court of Canada 2002), quoted in Coutu and Giroux, 328. Emphasis added by Coutu and Giroux.
different ways. Whereas the United States adopted nationalist strategies to push ahead their globalizing ambitions . . . Canada has sought to capture the continental scale.”

Rondinelli agrees that 9/11 has changed the way that Canada views itself. She suggests that “Canada’s legislative, political and ideological commitment to the ‘war on terror’ has complicated our understanding of the Canadian nation,” and explains that “the more essential moment arises when we note that the condemnations of the U.S.’s abuse of power in the ‘war on terror’ are accompanied by narratives that claim, for example, that ‘the United States is very much Canada’s world next door’ . . . a reminder of the U.S.’s place (however ambivalent or divergent) within the social relations that reproduce the idea(s) of Canada. The tension . . . is therefore situated between narratives of Canadian nationhood and the U.S.’s presence within it.”

Rondinelli explains that after 9/11, “the mainstream media explored what they believed to be the nation’s changing form, as cultural and political divisions emerged over questions of the place and significance of nationalist upsurges in Canada. Although questions were raised about the consequences for the nation of increased participation in the U.S.-led ‘war,’ the overwhelming majority suggested that 9/11 ‘ended the old nationalism’ in Canada and signaled a necessary unity in the face of a common threat.” Rondinelli summarizes that post-9/11, Canada’s “ambivalence has emerged most forcefully. The nation is simultaneously represented as threatened and vulnerable to acts of ‘terror’ while at the

177. Gilbert, 212.


179. Rondinelli, 86.
same time vulnerable to the U.S.’s actions in its ‘war.’” Jiwani, on the other hand, explains that 9/11 allowed Canada to align with the U.S. without seeming to. “In terms of securing the national mythology, these representations” of the Orientalized Other, with the oppressed female who needs rescuing from the violent male “served to invoke condemnation and horror from Western audiences. In so doing, they re-entrenched the familiar binaries that positioned the West, and particularly Canada as distinct from the U.S., as a nation that was not immediately involved, and hence moderate, and one whose interests lay solely in rescuing the oppressed.” Thus, post-9/11, Anglophone Canada was faced with even more tension between non-Americanism and cultural and political unity with the U.S. in an anti-terrorism alliance, thereby instantiating the terrorism moral panic.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, the terrorism moral panic that the Anglophone Canadian print media fed and reflected that included Arabs/Muslims as racialized folk devils occurred due to a number of interacting factors. The curtailed viewpoint on Canadian society offered by a highly conglomerated media colored how Canadian identity was portrayed and affected how the nation saw itself and its internal constituencies, including Anglophone Canadians and visible minorities. The media’s narrow approach affected how visible minorities were viewed and discussed, how Anglophone Canadian identity was both solidified and tied to U.S. identity and Francophone Canadian identity, and how

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180. Rondinelli, 98.

181. Jiwani, 64.
Canada saw itself in the wake of 9/11. Anglophone Canada’s discomfort with its own identity, and tension between its similarities with the U.S. and its desire to stay unified with Francophone Canada encouraged the similarities between the U.S. and Canadian moral panics. The foreign policy necessity of increased integration with the U.S. economically post-9/11 increased the pull towards cultural unification with the U.S. all the while Anglophone Canada struggled to keep its distinct identity by leaning on the concept of multiculturalism as the most evident item differentiating it from the U.S. Meanwhile, the media conglomeration in Canada shut out dissenting voices and allowed the moral panic to take hold. Only Anglophone Canada’s emotional and philosophical investment in multiculturalism managed to keep the moral panic at bay at all, though the positioning of Arabs/Muslims within the category of visible minorities allowed them to be more easily othered and thus turned into folk devils.

The four interconnected concepts explored above are investigated both broadly and deeply in the remainder of this study. The next chapter describes how a broad view of the changes in Anglophone Canadian print media word usage can be compared to changes in U.S. print media word usage to explore the idea that Canadian discourse was influenced by U.S. discourse. The chapter also explains how a deep, nuanced examination of the usage of one key word can paint a portrait of an altered discourse that indicates the onset of the terrorism moral panic.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This study demonstrates the difference in Anglophone Canadian print media discourse pertaining to Arabs and Muslims before and after 9/11, determining that this difference indicates the rise of a terrorism moral panic post-9/11 that utilizes Arabs/Muslims as folk devils. Print news discourse is examined both quantitatively and qualitatively in this study. This chapter describes the methods employed to obtain and analyze the data that are examined in detail in the next chapter.

This study aims to be both unbiased and efficient. In choosing English-language Canadian newspapers with the highest circulation, it was possible to examine a representation of the Anglophone Canadian print news discourse as a whole, thus reducing bias in the quantitative data. By looking only at the instances of articles that use the term “Arab” in a Canadian or U.S. context (rather than the whole) for the qualitative data, the study is more efficient.

This study also aims to be both reliable—such that if someone else were to analyze the same texts s/he would come to the same conclusions—and valid, i.e., “the

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the measurements reflect what the investigator is trying to measure.” In other words, Anglophone Canadian print media discourse surrounding Arabs and Muslims was examined and used as the basis for conclusions, rather than using something else and attempting to extrapolate.

**Discourse**

This study uses discourse as data in a quantitative and qualitative content analysis, but in order to analyze discourse and determine its role in the creation of moral panics and folk devils, one must understand what discourse is. Scholars analyze discourse, rather than simply language “because the concept of discourse implies a concern with the meaning- and value-producing practices in language rather than simply the relationship between utterances and their referents.” According to Henry and Tator,

> a discourse is a way of referring to or constructing knowledge about a particular topic of practice: a cluster or formation of ideas, images, and practices that provide ways of talking about forms of knowledge and conduct associated with a particular topic, social activity, or institutional site in society. A **discursive formulation** defines what is and is not appropriate in our formulation of, and our practices in relation to, a particular subject or site of social activity; what knowledge is considered useful, relevant and true in that context; and what sorts of persons or subjects embody its characteristics.

A discursive formation is “the totality of ordered relations and correlations of subjects to each other and to objects; of economic production and reproduction; of cultural symbols

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183. King, Keohane, and Verba, 151.


and signification; of laws and moral rules; and of social, political, economic, or legal inclusion or exclusion."186

In examining discourse, one does not look simply at an utterance or piece of writing, but how it was uttered/written, how it fits into the context of the society, and what its impact is on the listener/reader. There are many things that an individual cannot know from first-hand, experiential knowledge, so he or she relies on a mediating force (e.g., the media) for information. Texts also do not stand alone. They create a discourse by their interaction and their relation to one another, via either implicit or explicit reference. Analyzing a text thus requires understanding this context. As Derrida explains, “The relationship between manifest text and the other texts to which it is connected is the ‘original text’ as a palimpsest on pre-texts. The act of reading is then analogous to those X-rays that uncover, concealed beneath the epidermis of one painting, a second painting, painted by the same painter or another.”187 Thus, an examination of the discourse must look at what the media is saying, how it is received, how the message changes or stays the same, and what is processed and not processed.188 In fact, it matters less what the author’s intent was, and more what the effect of the text was on the readers/listeners in determining how the text works to create or dismantle a moral panic and/or a racial project.


188. Iver Neumann, “PhD Seminar” (lecture, American University, Washington, DC, March 22, 2004).
Discourses are pivotal in the social construction of both moral panics and racial projects because they “exercise power as they transport knowledge on which the collective and individual consciousness feeds. This emerging knowledge is the basis of individual and collective action and the formative action that shapes reality.”\(^{189}\) Thus, the way in which the discourse exercises power, and the results of that exercise are other components to be examined in determining how moral panics and racial projects form and change. “Generally speaking, the media—especially the print media—reflect the ideological positions of their elite owners; their editorials, features, and even news stories replicate the assumptions, beliefs, and values of those owners. In other words, the discourses and representations in many newspapers founded on conservative ideologies are ‘accurate’ to the extent that they reproduce the hegemonic perspectives of their owners.”\(^{190}\) Henry and Tator explain that the media’s “misrepresentations” of racial/ethnic minorities are not truly misrepresentations, because they “reflect the values and belief systems of the media owners and their audiences. Often, however, these constructions are inaccurate, biased, unbalanced, and unfair, and do not reflect the real lives and activities of real people.”\(^{191}\) The media are not being purposefully malicious in their representations; in fact, they are accurately reflecting the positions of their owners and subscribers, who happen to have a different social construction of minorities than the minorities do of themselves.


\(^{190}\) Henry and Tator, 7.

\(^{191}\) Henry and Tator, 7.
Henry and Tator make a clear link between discourse and social construction.\textsuperscript{192} They explain that “discourse is not just a symptom of the problem of racism. Essentially, it reinforces individual beliefs and behaviors, collective ideologies, public policies and programs, organizational planning processes, practices, and decision making. Discourse is language put to social use, and it is often invisible to those who use it.”\textsuperscript{193} Thus, since Canadian society is heavily influenced by a highly conglomerated print media, the discourses contained in newspapers are key elements in the social construction of moral panics and racial projects.

Neumann explains that there are liminal moments in which discourses can shift. The shift happens after the fact, but becomes instantiated as a time-delimited shift.\textsuperscript{194} This project argues that the liminal moment for the terrorism moral panic and Arabs/Muslims as folk devils in Anglophone Canada was 9/11.

**Methods**

The data collection and analysis methods in this study were both quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative data relied on *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 2003*\textsuperscript{195} for Canadian newspaper circulation data. As this study focuses on Anglophone Canadian print media, only the Anglophone newspapers listed in the top ten for 2001

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{192} Social construction can refer to many things. In terms of this study, it most usually refers to racialization—the process, in racial formation theory, of a race being created and accepted as such by society—or moral panics, which are socially constructed reactions to traumatizing situations.
\item \textsuperscript{193} Henry and Tator, 12-13.
\item \textsuperscript{194} Neumann.
\end{itemize}
were selected, which resulted in eight newspapers.\footnote{196} A key word count was performed on the following newspapers: \textit{Toronto Star}, \textit{Globe and Mail}, \textit{National Post}, \textit{Toronto Sun}, \textit{Vancouver Sun}, \textit{Vancouver Province}, \textit{Gazette} (Montreal), and \textit{Edmonton Journal}. They were each searched individually, using LexisNexis Academic.\footnote{197} The three time periods (September 12, 2000-September 11, 2001, September 12, 2001-September 11, 2002, September 12, 2002-September 11, 2003) were examined in order to obtain a picture of the differences in the concentration of discourse on Arabs and Muslims, and whether those key words were used in the same articles as the word “terrorism” or “terrorist”\footnote{198} and how that relationship did or did not change over time. In order to put the Anglophone Canadian data into context with U.S. discourse, a parallel analysis was performed of eight of the top ten highest-circulation newspapers in the U.S. for 2001 according to \textit{World Almanac and Book of Facts 2003}.\footnote{199} Those newspapers are: \textit{USA Today}, \textit{Wall Street Journal},\footnote{200} \textit{New York Times}, \textit{Washington Post}, \textit{New York Daily News}, \textit{Chicago Tribune}, \textit{Los Angeles Times}, \textit{Seattle Times}, and \textit{San Francisco Chronicle}.

\footnote{196}{Due to the highly conglomerated nature of Canadian print news media, alternative print news media did not appear to be influential.}

\footnote{197}{The terms searched (using a Boolean search) were: “Arab”; “Arab AND terrorism OR terrorist”; “Muslim”; “Muslim AND terrorism OR terrorist” for September 12, 2000-September 11, 2001, September 12, 2001-September 11, 2002, and September 12, 2002-September 11, 2003.}

\footnote{198}{This includes any discourse whatsoever, not just discourse on Arabs and Muslims in Canada or the U.S.}

\footnote{199}{\textit{World Almanac}, 278.}

\footnote{200}{LexisNexis Academic only offers abstracts of the \textit{Wall Street Journal}, so those were searched, rather than the full newspaper.}
This data provides a context for the qualitative data. An analysis of the data appears in the next chapter.

The qualitative data sources included the *Toronto Sun, Toronto Star,* and *Globe and Mail.* They were selected using Erickson and Hathaway’s reasoning:

Canada’s largest city, Toronto, has two local major daily newspapers (the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun*) and one paper that is national in the scope of its reporting (the *Globe and Mail*). The *Star* and *Sun* are often characterized in terms of their distinctive political slant on social issues, one more liberal and the other more conservative, respectively. The *Globe and Mail* is well regarded for its even-handed, factual reporting of the news and widely touted as Canada’s “newspaper of record.” Accordingly, taken together these three high-circulation dailies in Toronto . . . provide insights into the spectrum of Canadian print media reporting.

The *Gazette* (a major Anglophone newspaper based in Montreal) was included in the analysis to reflect the Anglophone Quebec perspective. *Maclean’s,* Canada’s leading newsmagazine, was also included to provide examples of more in-depth coverage.

The assumption upon first approaching this study was that any racialization that took place would have the ethnicity “Arab” as its focus; therefore, that word was chosen for the qualitative content analysis portion. LexisNexis Academic was used to search in the headline, lead paragraph, and terms for the word “Arab” for September 12, 2000.

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201. LexisNexis Academic only offers the *Chicago Tribune* as part of the Global News Wire, which apparently does not search every *Chicago Tribune* story (based on the unexpectedly low number of results from each search for the first two years searched).

202. *Los Angeles Times* and *New York Newsday* are in the top ten, but are not included in American University’s LexisNexis Academic subscription for this time period, so therefore are not included in the analysis.

203. Erickson and Hathaway, under “Methods.”

204. Because of the effects of media conglomeration in Canada discussed in a previous chapter, it is likely that these newspapers offer similar, if not identical, content to what is available across the country. To be certain, further study could focus on newspapers in the less populous regions of Canada, as well as the *National Post,* which is considered the more right-wing national paper.
through September 11, 2001 and then again for September 12, 2001 through September 11, 2002 in the *Toronto Sun, Toronto Star, Gazette,* and *Maclean’s.* Because the *Globe and Mail* was not available in full text on LexisNexis at the time the search was run, Westlaw was used to search for “Arab” in the full text for the same two time periods. The decision was made to make the cut at September 11, 2001, because reports about the events of 9/11, and thus any affected discourse, would not have appeared until September 12.

After the basic data was obtained, the articles were sorted, and only those dealing with Canada and/or the U.S. were retained in the analysis. Each article was analyzed for discourse strands and knots, and categorized. A few remained uncategorized, because they did not fall into one of the major identified strands. The September 12, 2000 September 11, 2001 articles were analyzed separately from the September 12, 2001 through September 11, 2002 articles in order to keep the analysis focused on the strands specific to the time frame. After each time period was analyzed, the two were compared to determine what had and had not shifted in Anglophone Canadian print media discourse. The results are described in the next chapter.

### The Process of Data Analysis

In order to obtain a full picture of the discourse during the analysis of qualitative data, one must analyze not only what was written, but how it was written, which words were chosen or not chosen, and how ideas were framed. Henry and Tator have cautionary words for those studying news discourse: “when we are analyzing specific linguistic...”

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205. Discourse strands and knots are described below.
practices or superstructures of news making, it is important for us to note the twin processes of selection and combination that precede writing. Before a word hits the page, journalists and editors select what readers will get to read; and by combining the information that they do include in a certain manner, they also influence how it will be interpreted."\(^{206}\) This indicates that what is left out is equally as important as, if not more important than what is written in a news article.

Henry and Tator mention that quotes are used strategically in news stories to insert opinion into a story while the reporter ostensibly remains “objective.” By only quoting officials, for example, not members of the ethnic community in question, the newspaper implicitly sides with the officials (and encourages its readers to, as well).

“According to van Dijk, news discourse represents mainly a ‘white’ elite point of view: ‘Minority group speakers or sources are often found less credible because they are seen as partisan, whereas white authorities, such as the police or the government, are simply seen as ethnically “neutral,” even in the definition and evaluation of ethnic events.’”\(^{207}\) Erickson and Hathaway generalize even more, explaining that “the importance of ‘claims makers’ in the moral panics literature directs attention to the sources of information in media stories.”\(^{208}\)

In addition to quotes, Hier and Greenberg point to the importance of headlines in examining newspaper articles. “Headlines serve to attract readers’ attention; they do a

\(^{206}\) Henry and Tator, 74-75.

\(^{207}\) Henry and Tator, 76.

\(^{208}\) Erickson and Hathaway, under “Methods.”
great deal to sell newspapers and their ideas. So it can only [be] expected that news 
reports about minorities will reflect prevailing ideological values and also reflect the 
attitudes toward ethnic groups of the newspaper’s core audience—and that headlines will 
reflect the same.”^{209} The difference between supposedly factual news and overtly 
editorial articles should be noted, as well. Erickson and Hathaway explain that “unlike 
‘hard news,’ opinion discourse problematizes, prompting others to take sides and 
revealing the normative dimension of news issues.”^{210}

Karim identifies a limit to the current analysis and a subject for possible further 
study. He discusses the important role of headlines and pictures that accompany 
newspaper articles. According to Karim, even when the article subverts the dominant 
discourse, the picture chosen to accompany it, the way the headline is phrased, or which 
articles appear prominently near it may support the dominant discourse.^{211} This subtle 
discourse manipulation is a complaint the Canadian Islamic Congress reiterated in their 
annual reports on the state of Canadian media.^{212} They complained, for example, about 
how often articles were presented with pictures of women in hijabs when women were 
not mentioned in the article. Because the newspaper articles collected for this study were 
retrieved exclusively from electronic databases, the pictures accompanying the articles

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209. Hier and Greenberg, 144.

210. Erickson and Hathaway, under “Methods.”


were not viewed, and even though the headline is appended, the surrounding headlines are not, and the placement of articles in the context of other articles is also not known.

Articles that vehemently demonize cannot be left out of this analysis or their effect minimized. As Norton explains, “It would be foolish to assume that the best evidence can be obtained from the most objective sources. The best evidence on instances of demonization, on racism, on religious belief, and on revolutionary passion can often be obtained from the least objective sources: the sources that express or exemplify them.”

Thus, the data collected for this study were very often not objective, and included articles that express blatant racism. According to Wodak, such discriminatory discourse should be analyzed using the following questions:

1. How are persons named and referred to linguistically?
2. What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to them?
3. By means of what arguments and argumentation schemes do specific persons or social groups try to justify and legitimize the exclusion, discrimination, suppression and exploitation of others?
4. From what perspective or point of view are these labels, attributions and arguments expressed?
5. Are the respective utterances articulated overtly?
6. Are they intensified or are they mitigated?  

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To perform the qualitative data analysis, this study uses a modified Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) methodology. CDA differs from other types of content analysis in that its role is not simply to read and understand what texts say, or where a discourse leads, but to gain a perspective on how discourses contribute to and explain social phenomena, most specifically, social problems. Henry and Tator explain that “CDA is a multidisciplinary approach to the study of language use and communication in the context of cultural production. It is a type of research that mainly studies how social power, dominance, and inequality are produced, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political arenas of society.”

Van Dijk, one of the pioneers of CDA, explains that “instead of focusing on purely academic or theoretical problems, it starts from prevailing social problems, and thereby chooses the perspective of those who suffer most, and critically analyzes those in power, those who are responsible, and those who have the means and the opportunity to solve such problems.” Language, rather than being seen as simply a medium to communicate ideas, is viewed as a social practice, and CDA puts a strong emphasis on the context of language use, rather than simply words.

CDA fits into moral panic theory and racial formation theory because it “aims to investigate critical social inequality as it is expressed, signaled, constituted, legitimized


and so on by language use (or in discourse)." Morality panic theory and racial formation theory are both also concerned with inequalities, and how discourse helps to create and sustain them.

CDA looks at discourse qua power relations, and how texts affect how a society behaves. It is not possible to fully describe the social processes and structures that give rise to the production of every data point (news article) analyzed for this study; however, it is possible to take data points/articles as a whole for each time period (pre-9/11 and post-9/11) and describe the social processes and structures in place in each period. Rather than simply assuming the social situation is given, this study endeavors to find a view of the whole picture, thus determining how the social situation affected print media discourse and how print media discourse affected the social situation. CDA offers the tools and language to do that, and moral panic theory and racial formation theory offer the framework into which to place the analysis.

In the application of CDA, discourse is viewed as a collection of discursive planes, each dealing with a broad topic, such as the plane of science, the plane of politics, the plane of education, and so forth. These planes “impact on one another, relate to one another, use each other and so on.” A number of discourse strands operates on each plane. These strands are “thematically uniform discourse processes.” In other words, on the politics plane, the discourse strands all deal with politics, though each deals with

220. Jager, 47.
different aspects of politics (one may deal with minority politics, one with presidential politics, one with Korean politics, etc.). These strands are the objects of analysis. On occasion, the strands can become entangled (when the Korean politics strand and the U.S. politics strand come together for one item of discourse, for example), leading to discursive knots, which can also be the objects of analysis.\(^{221}\) In this study, the various discourse strands and knots are identified and described in order to create an overall picture of the domestic (Anglophone Canadian) Arab/Muslim discourse plane.

Once the objects of analysis (the news articles) have been selected, there is a prescribed way to begin the search for strands, which is to select key words that can be traced through the discourse. The keyword “Arab” was chosen as a search term, but words such as “Muslim” and “terrorist” were also noted when they arose. Neumann warns that some terms are so “obvious” that they are rarely used, but rather socially understood by the creator and recipient of the discourse. Those words are still a part of the discourse, coloring the discourse, but a simple search for them will turn up nothing.\(^{222}\) This is especially true in speech that is guarded and designed not to offer any obvious offense, but still manages to make the message clear to the intended recipients.\(^{223}\)

Henry and Tator explain that “it is very difficult to trace a direct causal relationship between media coverage of an event and its policy and legislative

\(^{221}\) Jager, 48.

\(^{222}\) Neumann.

\(^{223}\) An example of this is discourse over “illegal immigrants” in the U.S., which “everyone” knows refers to illegal Mexican immigrants, not illegal Norwegian immigrants.
consequences. Most often, that relationship is inferred or implied. Thus, in this study, the conclusion cannot be that the media caused the moral panic but only that they reflected and potentially impacted the moral panic to which the society fell victim. The following chapter details the data and its analysis leading to that conclusion.

CHAPTER 4

DATA AND ANALYSIS

This study explores the change in Anglophone Canadian print media discourse regarding Arabs and Muslims before and after 9/11. The data presented in this chapter clearly show that both the quantity and quality of discourse changed. The quantitative data are presented in the context of analogous quantitative data from the United States to demonstrate the similarities and suggest that Anglophone Canadian print media were at least paralleling, if not following the lead of U.S. print media. The qualitative data use a smaller sample of Anglophone Canadian print media to look more in depth at the content of stories, comparing the discourse strands before and after 9/11.

The quantitative data involve a count of articles containing specified words for eight Anglophone Canadian and eight American newspapers for the year before and two years after 9/11. The terms “Arab” and “Muslim” are counted separately, and they are also counted for overlaps with the words “terrorism” or “terrorist.” The results are detailed below.

For the qualitative data, four Anglophone Canadian newspapers and one Anglophone Canadian newsmagazine were examined for the year before and the year after 9/11. Each was searched for the term “Arab.” Articles not related to Canada or the U.S. were eliminated from the analysis, and the remaining articles were read for content and categorized into discourse strands and knots. These strands and knots are explored in
This chapter details the results of the quantitative and qualitative data and analyzes them in the context of the theories of moral panics and racial projects and the thesis that Anglophone Canadian print media both reflected and helped reinforce a terrorism moral panic, catalyzed by the events of 9/11, that involved racialized Arabs/Muslims as folk devils.

**Quantitative Data**

**Anglophone Canada**

The Anglophone Canadian quantitative data rely on keyword frequency. For the year before 9/11, the year after 9/11, and the year after that, the number of articles containing the word “Arab,” the word “Muslim,” and each of those words in combination with the words “terrorism” or “terrorist” was recorded. The tables and charts below show that even though the number of articles containing “Arab” and “Muslim,” both on their own and in combination with “terrorism”/“terrorist” varied widely from source to source, those numbers consistently rose dramatically for each source in the year following 9/11, and, with one exception, fell again after September 11, 2002, but not back to their pre-9/11 rates. The exception is the *National Post*, in which only “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” followed the pattern, while the number of articles in all the other categories rose again in the year following September 11, 2002 (see figure 1 and table 1). There was a rise in every category in every newspaper for September 12, 2001 through September
11, 2002, and in many cases the rise was quite dramatic. This is visually represented in the figures below.

Figure 1. Keyword frequencies in the *National Post*

The smallest percentage change between 9/00-9/01 and 9/01-9/02 was a 59.8% rise in the use of the word “Arab” in the *Edmonton Journal* (see figure 2 and table 2), and the largest change was a 9071.4% rise in the use of the word “Muslim” with either of the words “terrorism” or “terrorist” in the *National Post* (see figure 1 and table 1). When all of the sources were added together, there was a 124.1% rise in the use of the word “Arab,” a 183.6% rise in the use of the word “Muslim,” a 678.1% rise in “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist,” and a 761.2% rise in “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” from

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225. Hereafter, the years will be referred to as 9/00-9/01, indicating September 12, 2000 through September 11, 2001; 9/01-9/02, indicating September 12, 2001 through September 11, 2002; and 9/02-9/03, indicating September 12, 2002 through September 11, 2003.
Table 1. Keyword frequencies in the *National Post*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>604.9</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>647.2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Arab and terrorism</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>4,875.0</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>-53</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>4,433.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>8.45</td>
<td>59.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>51.27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>2,275.6</td>
<td>1,546</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>1,505</td>
<td>3,670.7</td>
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<td>Muslim and terrorism</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>9,071.4</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>260</td>
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<td>12,785.7</td>
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<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>58.34</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the year before 9/11 to the year after it (see figure 3 and table 3). This is a clear indication not just of more interest, and possibly more benign stories about Arabs and Muslims, but a shift in discourse to a much stronger association between terrorism and both Arabs and Muslims.

Figure 2. Keyword frequencies in the Edmonton Journal

The data from 9/02-9/03 were compared to both 9/01-9/02 and 9/00-9/01. As noted previously, the National Post is an exception, in that usage of most of the keywords increased in 9/02-9/03 over 9/01-9/02 (see figure 1 and table 1), while every other newspaper's usage declined. The smallest decline in keyword usage is a 6.2% reduction of the use of the word “Arab” in the Vancouver Province (see figure 4 and table 4). The

226. Because the total number of published articles for each year is unknown, it is not possible to determine the statistical significance in the rise of keyword usage, though most of the data is likely to be statistically significant, given that newspapers probably publish roughly the same number of articles per year, and the rise in keyword usage is large.
Table 2. Keyword frequencies in the *Edmonton Journal*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keyword</th>
<th>9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>-114</td>
<td>-14.0</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab and terrorism</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>416.7</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>-276</td>
<td>-49.5</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>161.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>21.18</td>
<td>68.47</td>
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<td></td>
<td>40.23</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>1,485</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>114.6</td>
<td>1,271</td>
<td>-214</td>
<td>-14.4</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>83.7</td>
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<td>Muslim and terrorism</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>1,062</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>477.2</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>-481</td>
<td>-45.3</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>215.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>26.59</td>
<td>71.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45.71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
largest decline is a 55.1% decline in the use of the word “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” in the Toronto Sun (see figure 5 and table 5). Overall, the decline was 14.3% for “Arab,” 12.3% for “Muslim,” 46.3% for “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist,” and 37.3% for “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” (see figure 3 and table 3). When 9/02-9/03 is compared to 9/00-9/01, it is clear that the decline in the second year following 9/11 does not completely compensate for the rise in the year following 9/11. The results of these calculations are significant, because none of them shows a decline nor a near-equality in 9/02-9/03 over 9/00-9/01. The smallest difference is a 37.5% rise in the use of the word “Arab” in the Edmonton Journal (see figure 2 and table 2), while the largest difference is an astounding 12,785.7% rise in the use of the word “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” in the National Post (see figure 1 and table 1). Excluding the National Post, due to the fact that its usage rose, rather than declined in 9/02-9/03 over
Table 3. Keyword frequency totals for Anglophone Canadian newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>3,299</td>
<td>7,392</td>
<td>4,093</td>
<td>124.1</td>
<td>6,333</td>
<td>-1,059</td>
<td>-14.3</td>
<td>3,034</td>
<td>92.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab and terrorism</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>4,902</td>
<td>4,272</td>
<td>678.1</td>
<td>2,632</td>
<td>-2,270</td>
<td>-46.3</td>
<td>2,002</td>
<td>317.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>19.10</td>
<td>66.31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>41.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,110</td>
<td>11,655</td>
<td>7,545</td>
<td>183.6</td>
<td>10,222</td>
<td>-1,433</td>
<td>-12.3</td>
<td>6,112</td>
<td>148.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim and terrorism</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>8,026</td>
<td>7,094</td>
<td>761.2</td>
<td>5,031</td>
<td>-2,995</td>
<td>-37.3</td>
<td>4,099</td>
<td>439.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>22.68</td>
<td>68.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49.22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9/01-9/02, the largest rise is 505.6% in “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” in the 
Vancouver Sun (see figure 6 and table 6). Overall, the increase was 92% for “Arab,” 
148.7% for “Muslim,” 317.8% for “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist,” and 439.8% for 
“Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” (see figure 3 and table 3). These figures show that 
after the initial shock of the 9/11 attacks wore off, there was still a residual effect, 
indicating a sustained moral panic.

![Figure 4. Keyword frequencies in the Vancouver Province](image)

In order to obtain a more complete picture, the data were examined in an 
additional way. The percentage of articles using the word “Arab” that also used the word 
“terrorism” or “terrorist” was calculated, as was the percentage of articles using the word
Table 4. Keyword frequencies in the Vancouver Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keyword Type</th>
<th>9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>145.5</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>130.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab and terrorism</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>723.8</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>-94</td>
<td>-54.3</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>276.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>62.91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30.62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>189.0</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>-63</td>
<td>-12.0</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>154.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim and terrorism</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>646.8</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>-167</td>
<td>-47.6</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>291.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>25.97</td>
<td>67.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5. Keyword frequencies in the *Toronto Sun*

“Muslim” that also used the word “terrorism”/“terrorist.” The percentage of articles containing “Arab” or “Muslim” that also contained “terrorism”/“terrorist” rose dramatically in the year following 9/11, and then fell in the following year (even for the National Post), but not to as low as pre-9/11 rates. The smallest rise in the percentage of articles using both keywords in 9/01-9/02 over 9/00-9/01 was the Gazette’s rise of 40.76 percentage points from 24.13% to 64.89% of articles using “Muslim” also using “terrorism”/“terrorist” (see table 7). The largest rise was the Globe and Mail’s 52.07 percentage point rise from 20.23% to 72.3% of articles using “Muslim” and “terrorism”/“terrorist” (see table 8). Overall, “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” rose 47.21

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227. That is, either “Arab” or “Muslim” is the denominator, and “terrorism”/“terrorist” is the numerator.

228. All of these results are statistically significant. Statistical significance was calculated using the Professional Research Consultants online Statistical Significance Calculator, available at http://www.prconline.com/education/tools/statsignificance/index.asp.
Table 5. Keyword frequencies in the *Toronto Sun*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keyword Combination</th>
<th>9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>178.0</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>-161</td>
<td>-26.0</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>105.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab and terrorism</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>844.4</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>-234</td>
<td>-55.1</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>324.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>20.18</td>
<td>68.55</td>
<td>41.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>236.1</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>-254</td>
<td>-22.4</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>160.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim and terrorism</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>908.8</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>-342</td>
<td>-42.4</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>481.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>23.67</td>
<td>71.04</td>
<td>52.72</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
percentage points, from 19.1% to 66.31% and “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” rose 46.18 percentage points, from 22.68% to 68.86% (see table 3).

For 9/02-9/03 over 9/01-9/02, the smallest decline was a decline of 7.57 percentage points, from 65.91% to 58.34% of articles using “Muslim” and “terrorism”/“terrorist” in the National Post (see table 1). The largest decline was a decline of 32.29 percentage points, from 62.91% to 30.62% in usage of “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” in the Vancouver Province (see table 4). Overall, “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” declined 24.75 percentage points, from 66.31% to 41.56% and “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” declined 19.64 percentage points, from 68.86% to 49.22% (see table 3). This trend indicates that the moral panic had taken hold, and was continuing to operate, though it had been normalized to some degree.

The year 9/02-9/03 once again showed a rise from the 9/00-9/01 baseline. The
Table 6. Keyword frequencies in the *Vancouver Sun*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>171.5</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>-109</td>
<td>-14.5</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>132.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab and terrorism</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>866.7</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>-248</td>
<td>-47.5</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>407.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>19.49</td>
<td>69.41</td>
<td>42.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>1,349</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>241.5</td>
<td>1,070</td>
<td>-279</td>
<td>-20.7</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>170.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim and terrorism</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>991.0</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>-432</td>
<td>-44.5</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>505.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>22.53</td>
<td>71.98</td>
<td>50.37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7. Keyword frequencies in the *Gazette* (Montreal)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keyword Combination</th>
<th>9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>1,162</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>-157</td>
<td>-13.5</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab and terrorism</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>414.1</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>-400</td>
<td>-52.2</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>145.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>21.26</td>
<td>65.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24.13</td>
<td>64.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>1,974</td>
<td>1,029</td>
<td>108.9</td>
<td>1,709</td>
<td>-265</td>
<td>-13.4</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim and terrorism</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>461.8</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>-500</td>
<td>-39.0</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>242.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>24.13</td>
<td>64.89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45.70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24.13</td>
<td>64.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8. Keyword frequencies in the *Globe and Mail*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>1,403</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>117.5</td>
<td>1,114</td>
<td>-289</td>
<td>-20.6</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab and terrorism</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>808.7</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>-484</td>
<td>-51.7</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>338.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>15.97</td>
<td>66.71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>2,076</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>160.8</td>
<td>1,563</td>
<td>-513</td>
<td>-24.7</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim and terrorism</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1,501</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>832.3</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>-735</td>
<td>-49.0</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>375.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>20.23</td>
<td>72.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
smallest difference was a rise of 11.87 percentage points, from 18.75% to 30.62% for use of “Arab” and “terrorism”/“terrorist” in the *Vancouver Province* (see table 4). The largest difference was a rise of 42.82 percentage points, from 8.45% to 51.27% for the use of “Arab” and “terrorism”/“terrorist” in the *National Post* (see table 1). Overall, “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” rose 22.46 percentage points, from 19.1% to 41.56%, and “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” rose 26.54 percentage points, from 22.68% to 49.22% (see table 3). These data show that the moral panic was still holding on, as the usage of “terrorism”/“terrorist” in the same articles as “Arab” or “Muslim” continued to be much higher than pre-9/11 levels.  

**United States**

To put the Canadian findings into context, a similar analysis was performed of the highest-circulation newspapers in the U.S. The patterns noted in the Canadian data were even more pronounced in the American data. That is, the numbers of articles using the keywords “Arab” and “Muslim” rose dramatically in the year after 9/11 and then fell the following year, but not all the way to their pre-9/11 rates. In addition, the percentage of articles that used both “Arab” and “terrorism”/“terrorist” or “Muslim” and “terrorism”/“terrorist” also rose dramatically in the year following 9/11, and then fell the next year, but not to as low a point as they had been pre-9/11. The only exception in the American data is the *Chicago Tribune*, which shows a dramatic rise in 9/02-9/03 for every keyword (see figure 7 and table 9). However, it must be noted that LexisNexis Academic only

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229. A table illustrating all of the Canadian newspapers surveyed is available in the appendix.
offered *Chicago Tribune* results from the Global News Wire, which probably does not search every article, and, based on the inconsistent data, seems to have different parameters for different years.

Figure 7. Keyword frequencies in the *Chicago Tribune*

The smallest percentage change between 9/00-9/01 and 9/01-9/02 was a 75% rise in the use of the word “Arab” in the *Chicago Tribune* (see figure 7 and table 9), and the largest change was a 5740% rise in the use of the word “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” in the *Wall Street Journal* (see figure 8 and table 10). When all of the sources were added together, there was a 148.6% rise in the word “Arab” (compared to the Anglophone Canadian 124.1%), a 192.1% rise in the word “Muslim” (compared to the Anglophone Canadian 183.6%), a 513.2% rise in “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” (compared to the Anglophone Canadian 678.1%), and a 624.9% rise in “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” (compared to the Anglophone Canadian 761.2%) from the year
Table 9. Keyword frequencies in the *Chicago Tribune*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arab</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1,342.9</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>2,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arab and terrorism</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>740.0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent with both keywords</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muslim</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-75</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>12,100.0</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>2,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muslim and terrorism</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5,400.0</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent with both keywords</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
before 9/11 to the year after it (see figures 9 and 3 and tables 11 and 3). This demonstrates that the Anglophone Canadian and American data, overall, show a remarkably consistent trend; however, the Canadian usage of “Arab” and “Muslim” rose less overall, but the combination with “terrorism”/“terrorist” was more frequent.

![Keyword frequencies in the Wall Street Journal](image)

Figure 8. Keyword frequencies in the *Wall Street Journal*

The data from 9/02-9/03 were compared to both 9/01-9/02 and 9/00-9/01. As noted previously, the *Chicago Tribune* data offer an exception to the overall trend, in that usage of all of the keywords increased dramatically in 9/02-9/03, while all other

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230. Because the total number of published articles for each year is unknown, it is not possible to determine the statistical significance in the rise of keyword usage, though most of the data is likely to be statistically significant, given that newspapers probably publish roughly the same number of articles per year, and the rise in keyword usage is large.

231. For example, “Arab” increased from 4 in 9/00-9/01 to 7 in 9/01-9/02 to 101 in 9/02-9/03 and “Muslim” declined from 4 in 9/00-9/01 to 1 in 9/01-9/02 and rose to 122 in 9/02-9/03.
Table 10. Keyword frequencies in the *Wall Street Journal*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keyword</th>
<th>9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>259.6</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>-83</td>
<td>-49.1</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab and terrorism</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>3,400.0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-97</td>
<td>-92.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>166.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>62.13</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>1,273.3</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>-211</td>
<td>-51.2</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>570.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim and terrorism</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>5,740.0</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>-185</td>
<td>-63.4</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>2,040.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>70.87</td>
<td></td>
<td>53.23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
newspapers’ usage declined (see figure 7 and table 9). The smallest decline in keyword usage is a 15.3% reduction in the use of the word “Arab” in the Houston Chronicle (see figure 10 and table 12). The largest decline is a 92.4% decline in the use of the word “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” in the Wall Street Journal (see figure 8 and table 10). Overall, the decline was 24.3% for “Arab” (compared to 14.3% for Anglophone Canada), 24% for “Muslim” (compared to 12.3% for Anglophone Canada), 48.3% for “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” (compared to 46.3% for Anglophone Canada), and 42.4% for “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” (compared to 37.3% for Anglophone Canada) (see figures 9 and 3 and tables 11 and 3). Thus, though the trend was in the same direction, the U.S. appears to have reverted more to its pre-9/11 word choices. When 9/02-9/03 is compared to 9/00-9/01, it is clear that in the U.S., as in Anglophone Canada, the decline
Table 11. Keyword frequency totals for United States newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>3,681</td>
<td>9,150</td>
<td>5,469</td>
<td>148.6</td>
<td>6,924</td>
<td>-2,226</td>
<td>-24.3</td>
<td>3,243</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab and terrorism</td>
<td>1,143</td>
<td>7,009</td>
<td>5,866</td>
<td>513.2</td>
<td>3,625</td>
<td>-3,384</td>
<td>-48.3</td>
<td>2,482</td>
<td>217.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>31.05</td>
<td>76.60</td>
<td>52.35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,557</td>
<td>13,309</td>
<td>8,752</td>
<td>192.1</td>
<td>10,118</td>
<td>-3,191</td>
<td>-24.0</td>
<td>5,561</td>
<td>122.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim and terrorism</td>
<td>1,408</td>
<td>10,206</td>
<td>8,789</td>
<td>624.9</td>
<td>5,882</td>
<td>-4,324</td>
<td>-42.4</td>
<td>4,474</td>
<td>317.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>30.90</td>
<td>76.68</td>
<td>58.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in the second year following 9/11 does not completely compensate for the rise in the year following 9/11. The only exception is the Chicago Tribune, which saw a rise, rather than a decline in 9/02-9/03\textsuperscript{232} (see figure 7 and table 9). The smallest difference is an 11.6% rise in the use of the word “Arab” in the New York Post (see figure 11 and table 13), while the largest difference (excluding the Chicago Tribune) is a 2040% rise in the use of the word “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” in the Wall Street Journal (see figure 8 and table 10). Overall, the increase was 88.1% for “Arab” (compared to Anglophone Canada’s 92%), 122% for “Muslim” (compared to Anglophone Canada’s 148.7%), 217.1% for “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” (compared to Anglophone Canada’s 317.8%), and 317.8% for “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” (compared to Anglophone Canada’s 439.8%) (see figures 9 and 3 and tables 11 and 3). Thus, the U.S. data show a generally smaller rise than the Canadian data.

The data from American articles with both “terrorism”/“terrorist” and “Arab” or “Muslim” also echo the Anglophone Canadian data. The percentage of articles that contain “Arab” or “Muslim” that also contain “terrorism”/“terrorist” rose dramatically in the year after 9/11, and then fell in the following year (even for the Chicago Tribune), but not to as low as they were pre-9/11.\textsuperscript{233} The smallest rise in the percentage of articles using both keywords in 9/01-9/02 over 9/00-9/01 was the New York Post’s rise of 31.75

\textsuperscript{232} Once again, this may be due to faulty data.

\textsuperscript{233} Almost all of these results are statistically significant. The only exceptions are the rise from 9/00-9/01 to 9/02-9/03 in the percentage of articles using “Arab” that also use “terrorism”/“terrorist” in the Wall Street Journal and the rise from 9/00-9/01 to 9/01-9/02 in the percentage of articles using “Arab” that also use “terrorism”/“terrorist” in the Chicago Tribune. Statistical significance was calculated using the
percentage points from 46.49% to 78.24% of articles using “Muslim” also using “terrorism”/“terrorist” (see table 13). The largest rise was the Chicago Tribune’s 100 percentage point rise from 0% to 100% of articles using “Muslim” and “terrorism”/“terrorist” (see table 9). Overall, “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” rose 45.55 percentage points from 31.05% to 76.6% and “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” rose 45.78 percentage points from 30.9% to 76.68% (see table 11). Though the U.S.’s percentages rose less than Anglophone Canada’s, they were higher in both 9/00-9/01 and 9/01-9/02.

For 9/02-9/03 over 9/01-9/02, the smallest decline was a decline of 9.73

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234. In 9/01-9/02 there was one article in the Chicago Tribune that used the word “Muslim,” and it also used “terrorism”/“terrorist.”
Table 12. Keyword frequencies in the *Houston Chronicle*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/00-9/01 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>9/01-9/02</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Percent change 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/02-9/03</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>171.8</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>-201</td>
<td>-15.3</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>130.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab and terrorism</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>637.4</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>-478</td>
<td>-49.5</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>272.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>27.12</td>
<td>73.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>43.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>2,292</td>
<td>1,547</td>
<td>207.7</td>
<td>1,795</td>
<td>-497</td>
<td>-21.7</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>140.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim and terrorism</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>1,713</td>
<td>1,505</td>
<td>723.6</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>-693</td>
<td>-40.5</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>390.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>27.92</td>
<td>74.74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>56.82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 11. Keyword frequencies in the *New York Post*

percentage points, from 78.24% to 68.51% of articles using “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” in the *New York Post* (see table 13). The largest decline was a decline of 54.92 percentage points from 100% to 45.08% in usage of “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” in the *Chicago Tribune* (see table 9). Overall, “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” declined 24.25 percentage points, from 76.6% to 52.35% and “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” declined 18.55 percentage points, from 76.68% to 58.13% (see table 11). Though the U.S.’s percentages declined roughly the same number of percentage points as Anglophone Canada’s, they were higher in both 9/01-9/02 and 9/02-9/03.

The year 9/02-9/03 once again showed a rise from the 9/00-9/01 baseline. The smallest difference was a rise of 2.92 percentage points, from 6.38% to 9.3% for use of “Arab” and “terrorism”/“terrorist” in the *Wall Street Journal* (see table 10). This
Table 13. Keyword frequencies in the *New York Post*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/01-9/02 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>9/02-9/03</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/01-9/02</th>
<th>Number difference 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
<th>Percent change 9/02-9/03 vs. 9/00-9/01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>-259</td>
<td>-36.9</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab and terrorism</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>222.2</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>-284</td>
<td>-54.4</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>40.81</td>
<td>74.36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>135.9</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>-222</td>
<td>-25.4</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim and terrorism</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>297.1</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>-237</td>
<td>-34.7</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>159.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with both keywords</td>
<td>46.49</td>
<td>78.24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68.51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
difference is not statistically significant, which means this is the only newspaper in either sample for which usage returned to pre-9/11 rates. The largest difference was a rise of 45.08 percentage points, from 0% to 45.08% for use of “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” in the Chicago Tribune (see table 9). Overall, “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” rose 21.3 percentage points, from 31.05% to 52.35%, and “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist” rose 27.23 percentage points, from 30.9% to 58.13% (see table 11). The U.S.’s percentages rose slightly more than Anglophone Canada’s, making the already-existing gap in 9/00-9/01 even larger by 9/02-9/03.

The data show that the discourse on Arabs and Muslims “heated up” after 9/11, and, thus, it can be inferred that 9/11 was the catalyst for that change. The linkage between the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” and “Arab” or “Muslim” became more frequent in the year after 9/11 and did not fall back to their pre-9/11 levels in the following year.235

Comparison of the U.S. and Anglophone Canada

According to Ismael and Measor, in Canada immediately post-9/11, “investigative reports and exposés appraising Islamic radicals built on past reportage portraying Arabs as terrorists, as well as examining the resolve and invincibility of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in their war against the Soviet Union.”236 They go on to say that “Canadian

235. Because the quantitative data did not exclude overseas events, it is possible (though not likely) that overseas events account for the entire difference between the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 numbers. A table illustrating all of the U.S. newspapers surveyed is available in the appendix.

236. Ismael and Measor, 111.
media, in effect, found itself under the influence of media from the United States, and largely was left without the capacity to respond to increasingly bellicose U.S. media calls that ran counter to traditional Canadian political values.”

Ismael and Measor explain that “the expansion of such commentary was a clear consequence of the oversimplification and reductive characterization of the ‘threat’ posed by Al-Qaeda. The attack in New York was portrayed not as an attack on buildings but as assaults on the civilized world itself. The U.S. was portrayed not as another country, but as the representative of enlightenment values such as freedom and democracy, as the representative of civilization itself.”

They continue by explaining that “within days of the attacks, it was already conventional wisdom within the Canadian media that everything had changed.”

Karim discovered bias coloring the reflection of society in Canadian media. He explains that journalists engaged in three phases of reporting about 9/11. In the first phase, there was hesitancy to say the perpetrators might have been Muslim because of what had happened with the Oklahoma City bombing, when journalists and other opinion leaders jumped to the conclusion that the bomb had been planted by Muslims until it was discovered that the bombing was the work of the decidedly un-Muslim Timothy McVeigh. In the second phase of reporting, after the U.S. government said that the World Trade Center attack was carried out by al Qaeda, there was speculation about “Islamic

237. Ismael and Measor, 113.

238. Ismael and Measor, 113.

239. Ismael and Measor, 113-4.
terrorism.” In the third phase, there has been “a greater diversity of voices, including those of Muslims who were given the opportunity to discuss their religion and distinguish its principles from the worldview of terrorists who claimed to act in the name of Islam.”

It is not clear that the data presented back up Karim’s claims, though they seem to support Ismael and Measor’s. In comparing the data from the U.S. and Anglophone Canada, the keyword “Arab” consistently had the smallest percentage change in frequency; that is, for each time period comparison for both sets of data, when looking at the smallest rise or decline in usage, it was always the word “Arab,” while the largest change was always paired with “terrorism”/“terrorist” (in some instances it was “Arab,” in some, “Muslim”). The point spread between the least changed and most changed keywords for 9/01-9/02 over 9/00-9/01 was considerably larger for Anglophone Canada (from 59.8% to 9071.4% versus the U.S.’s 75% to 5740%), potentially showing more diversity in journalistic approach. However, in 9/02-9/03 over 9/01-9/02, not only was the spread considerably smaller, it was also much smaller than the U.S.’s (from 6.2% to 55.1% versus the U.S.’s 15.3% to 92.4%), which may indicate that Anglophone Canada was settling into the prevailing moral panic.

The overall numbers tell a somewhat different story. The change in frequency in 9/01-9/02 over 9/00-9/01 shows a definite ordering that is the same for both countries: the most changed is “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist,” the second-most changed is “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist,” followed by “Muslim,” and finally, “Arab.” It is

interesting, however, that the U.S.’s percentages are lower (by over 100 percentage points each) for both “Arab” and “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist,” but higher for “Arab” alone and “Muslim” alone. This indicates that the U.S. newspapers had more articles dealing with Arabs/Muslims overall, but fewer were related to terrorism, while Anglophone Canadian newspapers had a higher tendency to mention terrorism when mentioning Arabs/Muslims, demonstrating the strength of the linkage that supported the choice of folk devils for the moral panic. The numbers differ for 9/02-9/03 over 9/01-9/02. The U.S. has higher percentages across all categories, and the ordering, though the same for both countries, is different than the previous year. For this time comparison, the most changed is “Arab” with “terrorism”/“terrorist,” followed by “Muslim” with “terrorism”/“terrorist,” “Arab,” and finally “Muslim.” This indicates a continued preoccupation with terrorism, but somewhat of a shift of designation from Muslims to Arabs, supporting the thesis of a racialization of Arabs/Muslims as folk devils such that negative stereotypes about Muslims begin to be imputed upon Arabs.

In examining the percentage of articles using “terrorism”/“terrorist” with “Arab” or “Muslim,” a very similar rise occurs from 9/00-9/01 to 9/01-9/02. Anglophone Canadian and American newspapers showed a rise of between about 45 and 47 percentage points. However, the U.S. newspapers started out at a much higher percentage of terrorism-linked articles (around 31% for each keyword) than Anglophone Canadian newspapers (19.1% for “Arab” and 22.68% for “Muslim”), thus the American newspapers showed a much higher percentage in 9/01-9/02. The decline of terrorism-linked articles was also very similar for the two countries from 9/01-9/02 to 9/02-9/03:
for “Arab,” Anglophone Canadian newspaper usage declined 24.75% while U.S. usage declined 24.25%, and for “Muslim” Anglophone Canadian newspaper usage declined 19.64% while U.S. usage declined 18.55%. Once again, however, since the American percentages began higher, they also ended up higher. The parallel rise and decline supports the thesis that Anglophone Canadian print news media were influenced by American print news media discourse, specifically, the words chosen for articles related to Arabs/Muslims.

**Qualitative Data**

The qualitative data are divided into two parts. The first is September 12, 2000 through September 11, 2001, and the second is September 12, 2001 through September 11, 2002. For each part, the discourse strands were determined, and any knots were noted. This section details the findings.

**Pre-9/11**

There were 64 articles pre-9/11 in the *Toronto Sun*, the *Toronto Star*, the *Globe and Mail*, the *Gazette*, and *Maclean’s* that included the word “Arab” in a Canadian or U.S. context. Because there are so few articles, finding discourse strands is challenging. Four general strands emerged, but they are very broad. The strands are: diversity, discrimination, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Stockwell Day. Note that terrorism is not a strand before 9/11; in fact, the word was virtually absent from the domestic
discourse, only appearing a few times.\textsuperscript{241} Each strand is described below. Because each is so broad, there are times when articles fall into more than one strand, and thus create a discourse knot. The knots are also described below.

**Diversity Strand**

The strand of diversity relates to the general tendency in Anglophone Canadian discourse to discussions and expressions of multiculturalism. Exemplary articles could be pleading for tolerance, or they could be attempting to educate the public about the real role of Arabs and/or Muslims in Canadian society. For example, the Letter of the Day column in the *Toronto Sun* on October 21, 2000, was a call for tolerance for all people.\textsuperscript{242}

In some very benign examples, on October 12 and 15, the *Toronto Star* listed the Arab Canadian Heritage Festival in its upcoming events section,\textsuperscript{243} one upcoming music event was listed as “electric Arab urban singing,”\textsuperscript{244} and the Montreal Jazz Festival featured an act described as “when Arab and Persian traditions met.”\textsuperscript{245}

\textsuperscript{241} Terrorism is prevalent in the quantitative data pre-9/11 because that data does not exclude articles discussing events outside of Canada or the U.S., as the qualitative data does.


One article in the *Toronto Star* simply lists Arabs when describing diversity in Toronto.\(^{246}\) Similarly, in an article on the top student in the Halton school system, the student explained that his parents are Lebanese, so his family speaks Arabic at home and they “preserve the Arab culture.”\(^{247}\)

In an educational piece, the *Toronto Star* explained that “Arab Canadians total about 150,000 spread equally between Toronto and Montreal.”\(^{248}\) In an unusually clarifying way, the article went on to explain that there is a “larger Muslim community of about 500,000, an overwhelming majority of which lives in southern Ontario.”\(^{249}\) The article also explained that “half the Canadian Arabs are Christian,” and that Jews and Arabs in Canada get along very well, in a Canadian multicultural way.\(^{250}\)

Similarly, an article written by a self-described “Palestinian-Lebanese Canadian” explained how prevalent Christianity is in parts of the Arab world.\(^{251}\) In a response to that editorial, a letter to the editor explained that Canadians have been very welcoming to


\(^{249}\) “Jews, Muslims Co-Exist.”

\(^{250}\) “Jews, Muslims Co-Exist.”

Arab immigrants, and it is actually the Muslims in Palestine that discriminate against Palestinian Christians.\textsuperscript{252}

One article explained a special educational program at McGill University that encourages Israelis and Middle Eastern Arabs to study together in Canada.\textsuperscript{253}

A letter to the editor explained that an earlier article that said “Lebanese, Moroccans, Egyptians, Tunisians, Syrians, Palestinians, Armenians, and Iranians are all Arabs with their own traditions,” was incorrect about Armenians and Iranians being Arab.\textsuperscript{254}

A few brief articles that do not quite fit into this strand, but are tangentially related, stated that President Bush chose an Arab-American, Spencer Abraham, to be on his cabinet.\textsuperscript{255} In some other American-focused mention of Arabs, the \textit{Globe and Mail} predicted that Arab-Americans would vote for Bush,\textsuperscript{256} and the \textit{Toronto Star} explained: “[The Arab Middle East] was pleased with the ascension of [George W.] Bush, who was solidly supported by America’s emerging Muslim and Arab electorate, including Arab Christians.”\textsuperscript{257}

\begin{itemize}
\item[252.] “Canada Has Welcomed Arabs,” \textit{Gazette} (Montreal), December 27, 2000.
\item[254.] “Separate History,” \textit{Gazette} (Montreal), November 18, 2000.
\item[257.] ‘In ‘New’ Middle East, Saddam Isn’t the Enemy,” \textit{Toronto Star}, February 18, 2001.
\end{itemize}
As can be seen from these examples, diversity is a very benign discourse strand. The discrimination strand, on the other hand, contains more controversy.

**Discrimination Strand**

The strand of discrimination is just as broad as the diversity strand, but it mostly consists of articles in which the writer complained of discrimination, or the writer explained that others were complaining of discrimination. An example of this is a letter to the editor entitled “Racial Slurs Condoned by Lack of Condemnation.” The letter complained that two “influential and powerful members of the Toronto establishment have denigrated, stereotyped and insulted two racial minorities in the city—blacks and Arabs—who comprise 15 percent of the population of Toronto.” One of these two “influential and powerful” people was newspaper mogul Israel Asper, who reportedly claimed at a black-tie event that Israel was the only bastion of Western values in the Middle East. The letter continued: “It is evident that it is still fashionable for some leading citizens to utter racist remarks against Arabs, and it appears that the Toronto establishment generally condones such remarks.”

One editorial, apparently agreeing with the sentiment of discrimination by the “Toronto establishment” urged “members of the Muslim community” to stay objective regarding Israel “even with the flood of media attacks on Muslims, Arabs and Palestinians.”

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An article explained that “the president of the Montreal Taxi League has failed in his bid to launch a class-action defamation lawsuit on behalf of the city’s Arab and Haitian cabbies against a radio host who lambasted them on the air.”

A letter to the editor claimed the Arab-Canadian community was upset by a photo caption stating “face of war,” referring to a child with the Palestinian flag painted on his face.

A unique approach within the discrimination strand is to compare discrimination, such as in one letter to the editor that complained about Italians protesting their portrayal on the TV show *The Sopranos*, because other groups are routinely stereotyped on TV, such as “Arabs being portrayed as terrorists.” In a letter to the editor, one writer explained that Arabs are Semites, and so are unlikely to be anti-Semitic. As the writer said, “By the way, I am not anti-Semitic. In general, I like Arabs.”

One article described a photography show, “Faces of Morocco,” designed to help break down discrimination. “Arabs from North America are the most disliked community in the country and the Moroccan Federation of Canada wants that to change, says Rabia Chaouchi, a freelance journalist from Morocco living in Montreal.”

As can be seen from these examples, the discrimination strand covers a wide variety of situations. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict strand deals with much more focused discourse.

**Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Strand**

Due to the removal of international-focused articles from the analysis, the strand of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not include the conflict as discussed on a purely international level, but rather how that conflict relates to Canadians and Canadian politics. A sample article in this strand explained that Arab-Canadians were upset at Canada’s offer to accept a number of Palestinian refugees as part of a peace deal with Israel.\(^{265}\) An additional example is an article that discussed the fact that Arab-Canadians were upset over Ariel Sharon’s election in Israel.\(^{266}\) Yet another example is a letter to the editor that complimented the *Gazette* for reporting on Arabs and Muslims protesting the plight of Palestinians.\(^{267}\) One article discussed Arab and Jewish students at Concordia University and how they fall on different sides of the debate over Israel/Palestine.\(^{268}\)

An example that simply showed how iconic the Arab-Israeli conflict was is a sports article that discussed the suspension of a San Jose Sharks player by the commissioner of the National Hockey League. The article quoted the Sharks General


\(^{268}\) Kate Swoger, “Concordia Students to Debate Resolution,” *Gazette* (Montreal), November 16, 2000.
Manager, Dean Lombardi, as saying, “With our philosophies on sport and player relations, we have as much chance [of] getting together on common ground as the Arabs and Israelis.”

A few articles in this strand create a knot with the discrimination strand. In a response to the editorial mentioned previously that urged the Muslim community to be objective regarding Israel, a letter to the editor claimed that the author of the editorial needed to recognize all the bad things that Arabs have done to Israelis and to other Arabs. Another letter responding to the same editorial stated that the editorial author was not objective, and s/he needed to recognize how badly Palestinians had been treating Jews and that the media do not always portray the deaths from the conflict equally, tending to focus more on Palestinian deaths. In an article responding to critiques of her previous article published in the National Post, in which she had condemned support for Palestinians as hypocritical, Barbara Amiel explained that many people had accused her of being anti-Arab/Muslim, but, in fact, the Arab press is full of anti-Jewish/Israel items.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict strand also knots with the Stockwell Day strand. An article in the Toronto Star explained that recent violence upset both Jewish and Arab/
Palestinian Canadians, and that Stockwell Day proceeded to offend Arab Canadians and thus would most likely lose their vote.\textsuperscript{273}

\textbf{Stockwell Day Strand}

Stockwell Day entered the discourse at two different time periods, but the circumstances surrounding his place in the discourse are so similar that they can be considered the same strand; in fact, this entire strand could be seen as a giant discourse knot with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict strand.

At the time, Stockwell Day was the leader of the relatively new Canadian Alliance party. In October 2000, in a public comment, he criticized the federal government’s support of a UN resolution that condemned Israeli force against Palestinians.\textsuperscript{274} This was seen as courting the Jewish Canadian vote and throwing away the Arab Canadian vote.\textsuperscript{275} There were a number of articles written about this situation and various people’s reactions to it, including the National Coalition on Canadian Arab Relations’s (NCCAR) threat to sue Day.

In an article entitled “Chretien Calms Arab Canucks’ Fears,” the author explained that Prime Minister Jean Chretien met with the Arab-Canadian community and agreed to look at recommendations for dealing with the Mideast problem after having backpedaled on staunch support of the UN resolution. Stockwell Day, in contrast, cancelled a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{274} “Day Angers Muslims Blasted for Stance Favouring Israel,” \textit{Toronto Sun}, October 13, 2000.
\end{itemize}
conference call with Arab-Canadians. Another article explained that Arab-Canadians were upset at Day for his support of Israel, but Jewish Canadians were upset at Jean Chretien for his lack of support for Israel. Both groups claimed that the issue would not be central to them in the upcoming election. A month later, both men had tried to mend fences. Chretien met with NCCAR and the Canadian Arab Federation (CAF) to discuss Canadian support for the UN resolution and his reaction to Jewish groups, while Day ended up participating in a conference call with Arab groups, though the Arab groups were left with the impression that his mind had already been made up.

In May 2001, Day once again angered many people with similar remarks that put all the blame for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Palestinian violence. As Atif Kubursi, president of NCCAR put it, “The presumption here is ‘we Jews and Christians are being attacked by Muslims,’ inciting hate against Muslims.” Once again, the NCCAR threatened to sue Day. In an article by Maria McClintock, Day was declared to have “appointed himself a one-eyed judge” due to his inflammatory comments. The following day, as the articles continued regarding the impending lawsuit against Day, he...

began to lose the support of his party.\textsuperscript{282} NCCAR decided to sue Day for “libel and ‘incitement of hate against Arabs, Palestinians and Muslims,’”\textsuperscript{283} which was reported on May 10, 2001.\textsuperscript{284} As the story grew, a Canadian Alliance Minister of Parliament (MP), Keith Martin, apologized for Day’s remarks, but the NCCAR was not satisfied, because the apology did not come directly from Day.\textsuperscript{285} Day eventually tempered his remarks, but did not actually apologize, so the NCCAR continued to threaten to sue.\textsuperscript{286} Another Canadian Alliance member re-angered Arab-Canadians by suggesting that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was caused by violence only on the Palestinian side, and thus Canada should cut off all aid to Palestine until the violence stopped. NCCAR’s lawsuit threat continued.\textsuperscript{287}

Though most articles are easily categorizable into the various strands, there were a few that fell outside of the parameters of all of the strands.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{283} Norma Greenaway, “Day Facing Suit,” \textit{Gazette} (Montreal), May 10, 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{284} Anne Dawson, “Arabs to Sue CA Boss,” \textit{Toronto Sun}, May 10, 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{285} Maria McClintock, “MP Is Sorry, Day Is Not; Arab Group Wants Apology from Leader,” \textit{Toronto Sun}, May 11, 2001.
\end{itemize}
Uncategorizable

One uncategorizable article provides an interesting foreshadowing of political battles that many feel began post-9/11. In “Ban on Terrorist Funding Must Include Safeguards, Groups Warn,” the Canadian Arab Federation and other organizations demanded the right to appeal be built into a new law to ban organizations that allegedly fund terrorism.288

Another uncategorizable article is historical, yet links Arabs and terrorism. In their “From the Archives,” feature, the Globe and Mail cited an article originally printed 25 years earlier: “On Oct. 26, 1975, The Globe and Mail reported that Royal Canadian Mounted Police were investigating a conspiracy by at least 14 Arab Canadians to assist foreign agents in an act of terrorism at the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games.”289

Overall, it is striking how little mention of terrorism there is pre-9/11. This supports the interpretation of the quantitative data: pre-9/11, there was not much overlap between “Arab” and “terrorism” in articles, and it is possible that most, if not all of those dealt with international, rather than domestic stories. The image of Arabs and Muslims in pre-9/11 Anglophone Canada seems to be one of (somewhat uneasy) integration into the multicultural ideal, with only members of the extreme right-wing Canadian Alliance willing to take a stand against Arabs, and, in fact, only Palestinians in the Middle East, not Arab-Canadians.


Post-9/11

The executive summary of the survey of Arab Canadians done by the Canadian Arab Federation (CAF) in 2002 provides some context for the post-9/11 qualitative data. The report begins with the following broad statement: “The Canadian Arab community is one of the fastest growing ethnic communities in Canada. The majority of Arab immigrants arrived in the past three decades, mostly from regions marked by war and violence. Fleeing conflict and hardship, they have also had to deal with widespread negative stereotypes about their culture and/or religion in their adopted country. This has made the process of integrating into Canadian life and engaging in active citizenship elusive to many. Today, the greater part of the Arab Canadian community, while economically established, remains on the margins of mainstream Canadian society politically and culturally.”

The report goes on to explain that the typical Arab Canadian is proud of his/her heritage and the label of “Arab Canadian.” However, Arab Canadians have negative views of the way Canadians see Muslims. More than forty percent “believe that Canadians ‘don’t like Muslims’ and 84.6% believe Canadians think Muslims are violent.” Gubara explains that “after 9/11 the fears instilled in the public about

290. Canadian Arab Federation, executive summary of *Arabs in Canada: Proudly Canadian and Marginalized* (Toronto: Canadian Arab Federation, 2002). It is not clear precisely how many people were surveyed, but the survey claims to be representative.

291. Canadian Arab Federation, 1.

292. Canadian Arab Federation, 2.

293. Canadian Arab Federation, 2.
Muslims in the press are more disturbing and the resulting prejudices more frightening [than before 9/11]. It is no longer only about fear of cultural differences and customs that [they] are now labeled as ‘terrorists,’ in the minds of many and a threat to the fabric of Western society which must be stopped.”

These contentions are supported in the survey by the overwhelming 95.6% of respondents who believe that Canadians, in general, know little about Arab culture, the 86.1% who believe that “the Canadian media does not understand the Arab point of view,” and the 91.2% who believe that “the Canadian media at least occasionally negatively stereotypes Arabs.”

In contrast to the 64 pre-9/11 articles, there were 203 articles in the Toronto Sun, Toronto Star, Globe and Mail, Gazette, and Maclean’s that included the word “Arab” in a U.S. or Canadian context in the year after 9/11. There are eight topical discursive strands running throughout the post-9/11 articles and two language usage themes. The topical strands are: the Museum of Civilization exhibit; immigration; terrorism; concern about discrimination; stories of discrimination; stories of hate crimes; racial/ethnic profiling; and explanations of how Arabs are normal people/just like everyone else. The language-usage themes are: interchangeability of Arab/Muslim/Middle Eastern and using the term “Arab” or “Muslim” as a superfluous descriptor. The analysis begins with an explanation and examples of the topical strands, and then looks at language usage.


295. Canadian Arab Federation, 5.

296. To emphasize the difference between the topical discourse strands and the language usage strands, the language usage strands are referred to here as “themes,” rather than “strands.”
Museum of Civilization Strand

The Canadian Museum of Civilization in Hull, Quebec, had an exhibit that had been in the works for five years entitled “The Land Within Me: An Expression of Canadian Artists of Arab Origin.” It showcased the work of 26 Arab-Canadian artists, and was scheduled to open on October 18, 2001. A few weeks after 9/11, the museum announced that it would be postponing the show by six months in order to have time to add what it referred to as “context.” The artists involved balked at the idea that their work required context, and the Prime Minister, Jean Chretien, had strong words for the museum, to wit: “If it’s good for March, 2002, it’s good for October, 2001.” The museum quickly relented and opened the exhibit on time, without the extra historical context. This story, as minor as it may seem, resulted in multiple articles in every newspaper examined. It was a consistent part of the discourse for a few weeks shortly after 9/11, and thus most likely colored other parts of the discourse.

Immigration Strand

The immigration strand is often closely connected to other strands, such as profiling, Arabs as normal people, and discrimination concern. The immigration strand includes articles that discuss the people (primarily Muslims and Arabs) who were detained after 9/11 in the U.S. on minor immigration violations, and were still waiting, months later, for the U.S. government to determine their fate. Some of the detainees sued the U.S. government: “‘We want the world to know that we are treating students, tourists, 

people here for a short period of time, as criminals,’ Barbara Olshansky, a lawyer for the [Center for Constitutional Rights] told the New York Times. ‘We’re putting them into arbitrary detention, just like the worst totalitarian regimes we cry out all the time about in this country.’”

The Canadian government behaved similarly to the U.S. government, and the strand also deals with that, with some articles explicitly calling this behavior racial profiling:

“At one point we estimated there were up to 40 Arabic or Muslim people arrested locally after Sept. 11,” says Rashad Saleh, a leader of the local Palestinian community. Saleh is also a local businessman who has frequently posted bail for refugee claimants upon their release.

But not so much since Sept. 11 he says.

“Now,” he says, “everybody goes to jail.” . . . If the detained have one thing in common, it is that they all come from Middle Eastern countries.

Just this week an immigration official in Toronto confirmed that Citizenship and Immigration officers at ports of entry were working with a list of countries, supplied by CSIS [Canadian Security Intelligence Service], which the service has identified as “terrorist harboring” countries.

The official[,] Maria Perreault, said immigration officers were to “closely scrutinize” or “detain” all Arabs coming from those countries.

Terrorism Strand

The terrorism strand is so pervasive it is often hard to notice. As is evident in the quantitative data, “Arab” or “Muslim” and “terrorist” are quite frequently in the same article post-9/11. This strand often knots with the immigration strand, as can be seen in the previous examples. It also frequently knots with the profiling strand. In fact, the


terrorism strand, by its very nature, rarely stands alone. One of the most obvious consistent linkages of Arabs and terrorism comes from columnist Bob MacDonald, whose discourse is described in detail below, in the discussion of language usage themes.

Ismael and Measor explain how the terrorism strand knots with both the immigration strand and the profiling strand: “The radical Islamist, who only came to Canada to use its porous borders in an effort to conduct violent attacks against the United States, or support those who wished to do so, emerged as a common synopsis” after 9/11. They go on to explain that “such reportage directed Canadian fears and anger regarding the attacks in New York and Washington against the entire Muslim and Arab community. The opening caveat of ‘the Muslim community is not to blame’ was generally followed by a merciless reductionism that characterized all Muslim and Arab Canadians as within the enemy camp.” 300 Arabs and Muslims were singled out in the media for “being different. The lack of context, and the racist notions informing the reportage supplied those wishing to abet retribution with ample latitude.” 301

Concern about Discrimination Strand

There are a few articles in each publication that deal with American and Canadian Arabs worrying that they would become victims of discrimination due to guilt by association with the 9/11 attacks. These articles tend to appear relatively soon after September 11, 2001. This is in line with the findings by CAF, which reported that 24.8% 300. Ismael and Measor, 116.

301. Ismael and Measor, 117.
of their respondents “said they, or someone in their immediate family, have experienced 
racism first hand.” and 38% who are “uncomfortable” about the way other Canadians see 
them. 302 An example of an article in this strand was published on September 12, 2001:

Members of Montreal’s various Middle Eastern communities are bracing for a 
backlash. They say they fear they will be targets of racist harassment following 
yesterday’s incidents. It happened during the Gulf War, after the Oklahoma City 
bombing, and again last winter when the Islamic extremist Ahmed Ressam was 
arrested for his part in the New Year’s Day 2000 plot to bomb L.A. International 
Airport.

Even when Islamic terrorists aren’t making headlines, they say many 
Montreal Arabs face constant hassles to cross the border, suffer veiled jokes and 
lingering stereotypes and prejudices—whether or not they happen to be 
Muslim.303

Two days later, the reporting in this strand took on a more personal note:

It was with a heavy heart that I called Leila Nodarse. I had thought about her the 
previous afternoon, fearing that once again all Americans of Palestinian descent—
indeed, all Palestinians living anywhere in the world—would be condemned for 
terrorist acts not of their making or of their liking.

“The natural tendency is for people to ask, ‘Who did this?’” Nodarse told 
me. “But people immediately jump to conclusions, to tie it to a particular party. I 
don’t think people realize how much it hurts when they do that.”304

The worry continued into the following month:

Can I be at war with myself? Watching the World Trade Center collapse, then 
living through the aftermath, begs that absurd question. I’m American, with a 
Muslim name but nondescript appearance. No one takes me for Middle Eastern—
I was born in West Virginia, and I’m only a quarter Arab. But thanks to the 
peculiarities of history, and naming, I have an Arab-American identity. . . . I feel

302. Canadian Arab Federation, 5.

303. Susan Semenak, Michelle Lalonde, and Irwin Block, “Arabs Brace for a Backlash: Members 
of Middle Eastern Communities Prepare for the Outrage of the Intolerant,” Gazette (Montreal), September 

304. Myriam Marquez, “Fighting Demons of Intolerance,” Gazette (Montreal), September 14, 
excluded from the national unity that happens after such a tragedy. Why? As an Arab-American, I’m subject to reprisals. I’m nervous, wondering if I will somehow share the blame. Slurs, threats and even violence have already been leveled against anyone associated with Islam, and I wonder what will happen to me. I’m looking for work—will I be denied a job? What if a wider war breaks out? Will I lose my liberty?305

On March 23, 2002, more than six months after 9/11, the *Toronto Star* ran an article detailing the fact that Canadian Muslims and Arabs “still live in fear.”306 Unlike the earlier articles, this was not describing a fear of anticipated backlash, but a fear of continuing backlash. It is here that the articles that are indicative of a discourse strand about concern over discrimination that has yet to happen start to knot with the articles that indicate a discourse strand about discrimination that is presently occurring.

**Discrimination Strand**

The articles that address discrimination begin to appear very early on, and describe a wide variety of instances of discrimination, ranging from dirty looks, name-calling, and misunderstanding to more serious harassment. As an example of the lesser forms of discrimination, one reporter found the following on the internet, claiming to be written by an American Airlines pilot (though American Airlines would not confirm it): “I demand to know, and I have a right to know, whether or not you love America. . . . I want to see Arab Muslims waving the AMERICAN flag in the streets. I want to hear you chanting ‘Allah Bless America.’ . . . I want to know where every Arab Muslim in this


country stands. . . . It is up to YOU to show ME.”\textsuperscript{307} Another example, left on the voicemail of the Canadian Arab Federation, highlights the traditional Israeli/Arab animosity: “‘When you Arabs die, I smile,’ says the man, the sounds of a television audible in the background. ‘The whole world is on the side of Israel. Believe it buddy. The only f---ing good Arab is a dead Arab. Thank you.’”\textsuperscript{308} When discrimination becomes very serious, it starts to blur into a hate crime.

**Hate Crime Strand**

In the discrimination strand, an article’s focus may not necessarily be on discrimination, but may mention it in passing to explain something else. Hate crimes, on the other hand, whether they are labeled as such in the news story, or simply referred to as “attacks” or “incidents of discrimination,” tend to dominate the story, for example: “In Hamilton, [Ontario] a Hindu temple was torched—police believe arsonists thought it was a mosque—while a 15-year-old Ottawa boy was beaten by a gang of 12 youths after they identified him as an Arab last weekend. . . . The mosque [in Hamilton] was vandalized early Saturday morning, and has also received a phone message threatening to kill Muslims. The mosque is less than 2 km away from the Hindu temple struck by arson.”\textsuperscript{309}


\textsuperscript{309} David Gamble and Brian Gray, “Plea from Arabs; Visit a Mosque as Bush Did, PM Urged,” *Toronto Sun*, September 20, 2001.
A few articles in this strand dealt with the plot hatched by members of the militant Jewish Defense League to bomb a mosque and the office of Darrell Issa, an Arab-American congressman. “The attack would have been the worst incident of anti-Muslim violence since the Sept. 11 attacks, which prompted a number of assaults on and abuse of U.S. Muslims as well as Sikhs and people of Middle Eastern appearance.”

Quite a few articles used language such as “many” or “numerous” attacks, some even went so far as to say “hundreds,” but none identified a specific number, whether because the number was unknown or because hate crime is hard to define, which it is. In Ontario, for example, an act can only be prosecuted as a hate crime if the perpetrator announced to witnesses that s/he planned to attack someone based on a protected category, then attacked that person and fled the scene. Rather than a definitional problem or difficulty obtaining data, another possibility is that the various authors were (consciously or unconsciously) attempting to create a sense of danger out of proportion to the actual situation. However, according to CAF’s report, one out of two Arab Canadians faces racism on a daily basis (though CAF does not cite hate crime numbers specifically).

A notable absence in the litany of articles dealing with discrimination and hate crimes is an article in the Globe and Mail which gives a detailed chronology of supposedly 9/11-related events from September 11, 2001 through September 5, 2002. Even though it mentions tangential events such as the anthrax scare and unrelated plane

312. Canadian Arab Federation, 5.
crashes, no incidents of discrimination or hate crimes (including the arson of the Hamilton Hindu temple, one of the most significant incidents in Canada) are mentioned.\footnote{Domini Clark, “Chronology,” \textit{Globe and Mail}, September 7, 2002.}

Hate crimes and discrimination are closely related to racial/ethnic profiling, which is a significant strand in itself.

**Racial/Ethnic Profiling Strand**

Racial/ethnic profiling differs from other types of discrimination in that it is discrimination by officials, rather than another individual. Neither the Canadian Human Rights Act nor the Canadian Multiculturalism Act mention racial profiling by name, but both make it an offensive act. The Human Rights Act defines “the prohibited grounds of discrimination” as: “race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion,” among others.\footnote{Canadian Human Rights Act, Revised Statutes of Canada 1985, in c. H-6, s.3.}

Discrimination under the Human Rights Act includes most major aspects of life, such as employment, housing, “provision of goods, services, facilities or accommodation,” signs, hate speech, harassment, etc.\footnote{Canadian Human Rights Act, c. H-6, s. 5-10, 12-14.} The Multiculturalism Act cites both the Human Rights Act and the United Nations (UN) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) as sources of non-discrimination law that Canada is bound by, and clarifies this by stating: “It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government of Canada to . . . ensure that all individuals receive equal treatment and
equal protection under the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity; encourage and assist the social, cultural, economic and political institutions of Canada to be both respectful and inclusive of Canada’s multicultural character.”

The articles that mention racial profiling do not always use the term, but often the description suffices. For example, “Canada has joined the United States in beefing up background checks on single male students and visitors from 26 Arab and Muslim nations in a bid to intercept suspected terrorists.” Some articles are able to point out the official nature of racial profiling without ever using the term:

The infamous [bill] C-36 frighteningly resembles laws enforced by notorious international dictators and racist regimes, such as apartheid in South Africa in the 1960s.

Innocent Muslims are being harassed in their homes, questioned by police without just cause and intimidated to become informants, said [Raja] Khouri [president of the Canadian Arab Federation], suggesting the anti-terrorism law should be abolished.

He said Arabs and Muslims have become “victims of psychological internment,” comparing their treatment to Japanese Canadians who were physically interned during World War II.

Often, however, racial profiling terminology figures prominently:

Canada’s Arab community is upset and angry that some foreign visitors to the United States will now be fingerprinted, photographed and monitored. . . . “What’s next: Are we going to be stamped on our foreheads? Will we have to wear a crescent sewed on our shoulders? Will airports be posted with warnings: ‘Arabs arriving?’” . . . “The officials can utter all the assurances they want, they are still going to profile certain people.” . . . “You have heard references to the ‘crime’:

316. Canadian Multiculturalism Act, Revised Statutes of Canada 1985, in c. 24, s. 3.


Driving while black,” [Faisal] Kutty [general counsel of the Canadian Muslim Civil Liberties Association] said, referring to the profiling allegedly used by some police officers to pull over black people driving better than average cars.

“Well, now you have: ‘Flying while Arab.’”

In contrast, some editorials praise racial profiling. For example, an editorial in the *Toronto Sun* stated:

Excuse us for asking, but why wouldn’t our border guards be told to keep a close eye on people coming here from 16 Mideast-area countries known as training grounds for terrorists?

Especially if they’re, oh, say, young Arab males with a specialized background in aviation or biological weapons or nuclear research?

Suddenly, in light of last week’s horrific terrorist hijackings and killings in the U.S., this is supposed to be rocket science?

Suddenly it’s supposed to be a big secret (and racist?) to tell Canada’s Customs officers to closely check out people coming into Canada from Afghanistan, Pakistan and 14 other countries known for being “zones of conflict or terrorist training centers.” Why?

In contrast to the racial profiling strand, the strand about how Arabs are normal tries to counteract these stereotypes.

**Arabs are Normal People Strand**

In what was apparently an effort to reassert Canada’s multicultural heritage and even out the skewing mosaic, a few articles were written about how much Arabs are a part of Canada and how they are ordinary people. For example, one article profiled Tarik Chelali, an Algerian Canadian on vacation in France who helped foil an attempted

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assassination of French President Jacques Chirac. As Chelali explained, “that just proves to people that Arabs are just like any other people. We’re not all terrorists.”

Another article, in a discussion about the human capital available in the Arab world, claimed that “any country receiving Lebanese, Syrian, and Egyptian immigrants, as Canada does, knows how smart, industrious and socially responsible these individuals can be.” This article knots the immigration and normal people strands, which is unusual, as the immigration strand most often speaks negatively about Arab immigration.

Naturally, some articles approach the issue of Arab/Muslim normality with a more humorous bent:

This week, I hugged my indispensable Lebanese hair-dresser before and after my blow-dry. Mr. Shah, my London chemist, hides behind the counter these days lest I invite him to dinner once more. I’m just following the examples of all our leaders who seem to be hugging every available member of the Islamic community in sight. Last Thursday’s news conference with U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft set the pace with his emotional (for him) thanks to the Arab, Sikh and Muslim volunteers who offered to translate in the WTC investigation. I do think this is splendid, but most of us know that about 99.9 percent of Arabs and Muslims are not terrorists and that it is wrong to assault any handy Arab because we’ve got a spot of “terrorist rage.”

Language Usage Themes

The language usage themes are more subtle than the topical discourse strands. Rather than these themes being the subjects (main or tangential) of articles, they address how the articles were written. Though often language usage themes show up in the same


articles as the strands listed above, that does not constitute a discursive knot, because they are different types of strands. Topical discourse strands deal with the topic of the article and language usage themes deal with the way a topic is described.

As can be seen in some of the examples above, one of the most common language usage themes is a confusion of the various terms Arab, Muslim, and Middle Eastern, with Arab and Muslim being interchanged or conflated most frequently, often by people who know the difference, such as Raja Khouri’s statement “innocent Muslims are being harassed in their homes.” 324 Raja Khouri was the president of the Canadian Arab Federation at the time (and happens to be Christian). Similarly, Faisal Kutty’s remark about “Flying while Arab” 325 is out of place, as he worked for a Muslim organization. Even setting aside the experts, most journalists completely conflated the two terms, and used them interchangeably. Rarely did they make a distinction or point out that the two groups were not coterminous. This sort of conflation aids in the racialization of the two into one group. The fact that the people who definitely know better than to conflate the terms (i.e., the experts), continue to do it, shows that the conflation has been integrated into Canadian discourse to such a degree that the experts have given up trying to explain the differences.

The other language structure theme deals with cases in which the term “Arab” or “Muslim” is used as a superfluous descriptor in articles that otherwise would not refer to Arabs or Muslims. The term “superfluous” is used purposely to point out the lack of

324. Duncanson and Murray.
325. Mascoll.
necessity of employing the term in the given situation. By using “Arab” or “Muslim” when it is not necessary, a writer promulgates a very subtle sort of discrimination. This discrimination may be completely unconscious, but it still serves the ideological end of distancing the group labeled “Arab” or “Muslim” from oneself, thus moving that group lower on the mosaic.

_Toronto Sun_ columnist Bob MacDonald is particularly guilty of the superfluous usage of the terms Arab and Muslim, almost always in the context of the terrorism discourse strand, referring to “Arab Muslim fanatics,”326 “Muslim fanatics” and “Arab hijackers,”327 “Arab Muslim terrorists” and “fanatical Muslim fundamentalists,”328 “Arab Muslim terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden,”329 “Arab Muslim mastermind terrorist Osama bin Laden,”330 “fanatical Arab Muslim terrorists,”331 and simply “Arab Muslim terrorists.”332  At no time are either of the terms “Arab” or “Muslim” necessary to designate who is being discussed (the 9/11 hijackers and/or Osama bin Laden). In fact, in

326. Bob MacDonald, “Bush and Blair Only 2 Who Dare; They’re Ready to Go Get Saddam,” _Toronto Sun_, September 8, 2002; Bob MacDonald, “Wake up, Canada!: A Year Later, and We Haven’t Learned a Thing,” _Toronto Sun_, September 11, 2002.

327. Bob MacDonald, “War on Terror Far from Over; Let’s Not Forget the Effort We Need,” _Toronto Sun_, September 1, 2002.


a few of his columns, mentioning the hijackers is not germaine to the point he is trying to make; for example, in the article in which he mentions “Arab Muslim terrorists” and “fanatical Muslim fundamentalists,” his point is that the Pope came to visit and attendance was below what was expected, most likely due to 9/11.\textsuperscript{333}

Less hyperbolic (and thus most likely less conscious, but not less damaging) superfluous uses of the term “Arab” also appear frequently. The 9/11 hijackers were very often referred to as Arabs, as were people who were detained at the border, and people the FBI was suspicious of (for instance, Arabs obtaining pilot’s licenses, Arabs obtaining permits to drive trucks containing hazardous materials, and so on). At first glance, this may seem natural, but the comparison between the 9/11 hijackers, who are consistently described as “Arab,” and stories referencing the Oklahoma City bombing, in which Timothy McVeigh was rarely referred to by ethnicity or race (and subsequent searches for accomplices did not request public vigilance for “white terrorists” or “American terrorists”) indicate that the racial marker is not natural. It is obvious that there is a different standard at work that sets Arabs/Muslims apart.

Ismael and Measor point out that racism against Arabs/Muslims existed before 9/11, but “what did change post-11 September was the level of intensity, and the sheer volume of anti-Arab, anti-Muslim . . . materials and opinions contained within the mainstream media.”\textsuperscript{334}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{333} MacDonald, “Voice of Hope.”
\item \textsuperscript{334} Ismael and Measor, 125.
\end{itemize}
Analysis and Conclusion

Canadian Arabs/Muslims did not wake up on September 12, 2001 and suddenly find themselves demonized and racialized. There is, rather, a historical precedent for demonizing them that this study argues was catalyzed into racialization by 9/11. Edward Said explains that Arab/Muslim demonization has continued and propagated unabated: “For no other ethnic or religious group is it true that virtually anything can be written or said about it without challenge or demurral.”\(^{335}\) Said quotes an Israeli report that explained: “There are good Arabs (the ones who do as they are told) and bad Arabs (who do not, and are therefore terrorists).”\(^ {336}\) As Belanger notes, “How a society chooses to describe another culture group directly reflects upon how we socially situate that group.”\(^ {337}\) This attitude towards Arabs is reminiscent of attitudes toward Native Americans during the American push westward. Originally, there had been “good Indians” (who helped whites, converted to Christianity, and assimilated to American culture), and “bad Indians,” who fought against the overthrow of their cultures. At a certain point, those good Indians virtually stopped existing in white perceptions, and they all became “Injuns,” such that the only good Indian was a dead Indian.\(^ {338}\) Shaheen points

\(^{335}\) Said, 287.

\(^{336}\) Said, 306.


\(^{338}\) The phrase is remembered as “The only good Indian is a dead Indian,” however, it was originally stated as: “The only good Indian I ever saw were dead.” It was spoken by General Philip Sheridan of the U.S. Union Army in 1868 to Tosawi of the Comanches. Larry Kibby, “The Only Good Indian,” http://www.indigenouspeople.net/gooddead.htm (accessed June 7, 2006).
out that “the only good TV Palestinian is a dead Palestinian,” because all Palestinians portrayed in television entertainment are terrorists.  

Esposito explains in the Foreword to *Muslims in the West* that “for some time, when speaking of Islam, the second largest of the world’s religions, experts and the media alike talked about Islam versus the West, often employing the language of conflict and confrontation. Islam was seen as a foreign religion, usually grouped with Buddhism and Hinduism in contradistinction to the Judeo-Christian tradition.”

As Said explains: “Not for nothing did Islam come to symbolize terror, devastation, the demonic hordes of hated barbarians. For Europe, Islam was a lasting trauma. Until the end of the 17th century the ‘Ottoman peril’ lurked alongside Europe to represent for the whole of Christian civilization a constant danger, and in time European civilization incorporated that peril and its lore, its great events, figures, virtues, and vices, as something woven into the fabric of life.”

It is only recently that Westerners have started realizing that there are quite a few Muslims in the West and that Islam belongs to the same heritage as the Judeo-Christian tradition. The reality that Islam is now second in number of adherents only to Christianity in almost every western country presents a very new set of

339. Shaheen, *TV Arab*, 44.
challenges, both to the Muslims who have chosen to make this move and to the host cultures that are increasingly feeling the pressure to accommodate their new citizens.”

As Huntington elaborates, “The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power.” By this reasoning, even Muslims who are no longer living in a Muslim environment are “convinced” and “obsessed,” requiring vigilance on the part of Westerners. Thus, George W. Bush’s infamous slip of the tongue when he spoke of his “War on Terror” as a “crusade” was not surprising, considering the West’s historical attitudes towards Arabs/Muslims. Said quotes Chateaubriand’s explanation of the Crusades, which sounds much like Bush’s ideas of his war: “The Crusades were not only about the deliverance of the Holy Sepulcher, but more about knowing which would win on the earth, a cult that was civilization’s enemy, systematically favorable to ignorance [this was Islam, of course—EWS], to despotism, to slavery, or a cult that had caused to reawaken in modern people the genius of a sage antiquity, and had abolished base servitude?”

343. Smith, 3.


Politics is not the only realm in which Arabs and Muslims are demonized. This image carries through into popular culture and media, as well.

In the films or television the Arab is associated either with lechery or bloodthirsty dishonesty. He appears as an oversexed degenerate, capable, it is true, of cleverly devious intrigues, but essentially sadistic, treacherous, low. Slave trader, camel driver, money changer, colorful scoundrel: these are some traditional Arab roles in the cinema . . . the Arab is always shown in large numbers. No individuality, no personal characteristics or experiences. Most of the pictures represent mass rage and misery, or irrational (hence hopelessly eccentric) gestures. Lurking behind all of these images is the menace of jihad. Consequence: a fear that the Muslims (or Arabs) will take over the world.\(^\text{347}\)

Karim quotes Jack Shaheen regarding television’s stereotypical portrayal of Arabs: “they are all fabulously wealthy; they are barbaric and uncultured; they are sex maniacs with a penchant for white slavery; and they revel in acts of terrorism.”\(^\text{348}\) As Shaheen points out, most people in Hollywood had never met an Arab, so all of their perceptions were based on stereotypes perpetrated by those that came before them in Hollywood,\(^\text{349}\) and most of the U.S. society’s images came from Hollywood. All of these were negative images in which Arabs were rich, greedy, uncivilized, oppressive to women, obsessed with sex and oil, rode on camels or in limos, enjoyed terrorism, and wore bedsheets on their heads.\(^\text{350}\) As Greider states in the foreword to Reel Bad Arabs:

Folk prejudice is ancient among different peoples, of course, and not likely ever to disappear entirely. But Jack G. Shaheen’s inquiry is about manufactured

\(^{347}\) Said, 286-287.


\(^{349}\) Shaheen, TV Arab, 4.

\(^{350}\) Shaheen, TV Arab, 4.
prejudice—a product that stokes feelings of distrust and loathing. We can argue at length about how much of this process is accidental and unintentional, how much is purposeful and politically motivated. But the larger point that Shaheen documents is the perpetuation of this malignancy among us at the center of American’s popular culture. Indeed, he argues that, as other groups have protested and won redress against prejudicial stereotypes, as the Cold War ended and the familiar bogeyman of Soviet Communists was retired, the stereotypical confinement of Arabs has actually grown worse in films.351

Shaheen mentions the Oklahoma City bombing as an example of the enduring Arab stereotype. “Though no American of Arab descent was involved, they were instantly targeted as suspects. Speculative reporting combined with decades of harmful stereotyping, resulted in more than 300 hate crimes against them.”352 Nimer reports that, in fact, there was a rash of attacks following the false accusations, promulgated in almost all the media, that Muslims bombed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995.Following the crash of TWA flight 800, similar speculations about a radical Muslim involvement in the downing of the plane were also reported but did not occupy the main headlines. A search of the Nexis computer database of United Press International, Associated Press, and Reuters during the forty-eight hours following the TWA crash yielded 138 articles containing the words “Muslim” and “Arab” in connection with the tragedy.353

Ismael and Measor explain that “the reductive view provided by Canadian media of the Muslim faith and the people who practice it is . . . defective.” They claim that Islam and events in Arab states are generally only portrayed or examined in mainstream Canadian media when they affect Canadians, or arise as stories examining staggering events of (often political) violence. The sensationalist coverage made in the public discourse within Canada equates Islam with terrorism, Palestinians with gunmen, and profession of the Islamic faith with


fundamentalism. The “expert” analysis provided by North American news media frequently depicts Muslims and Arabs as a monolithic community, by hastily retreating to opinions based upon the study of the Quran, and the various schools of legal interpretation arising from Islamic legal and philosophical scholarship, and bedu tribal society.”

Said explains that “since World War II, and more noticeably after each of the Arab-Israeli wars, the Arab Muslim has become a figure in American popular culture, even as in the academic world, in the policy planner’s world, and in the world of business very serious attention is being paid the Arab.” He points out the negative effects Arab-Israeli wars had on American attitudes before the U.S. went to war with anyone in the Arab world. The situation after the Persian Gulf War was worse than prior to it, and now, during the “War on Terror” the situation has been exacerbated. Each negative interaction seems to increase the negative aspects of the stereotype, while, symptomatic of a moral panic, positive interactions seem to have little or no impact on it.

Because television and cinema, especially U.S.-made television shows and movies, are so pervasive in Western society, these are the images both Americans and Anglophone Canadians see, and they spend more time looking at those than real life in some cases. These images must subconsciously influence all but the most self-aware and objective of journalists. One must wonder whether, if the only thing a journalist knows about Arabs s/he learned from television and movies, what the possibility is that s/he could do anything but assume that that is the way they are.

354. Ismael and Measor, 108.
Shaheen claims that “television is full of Arab baddies—billionaires, bombers and belly dancers. They are virtually the only TV images of Arabs viewers ever see.” Some of the stereotypes predate Hollywood altogether:

The popular caricature of the average Arab is as mythical as the old portrait of the Jew. He is robed and turbaned, sinister and dangerous, engaged mainly in hijacking airplanes and blowing up public buildings. It seems that the human race cannot discriminate between a tiny minority of persons who may be objectionable and the ethnic strain from which they spring. If the Italians have the Mafia, all Italians are suspect; if the Jews have financiers, all Jews are part of an international conspiracy; if the Arabs have fanatics, all Arabs are violent. One of the features of this Arab stereotype is that all Arabs are Muslim. Because Islam is also poorly understood and frequently misrepresented, it adds to the negative depiction of Arabs. “On TV entertainment programs, when performers refer to ‘Allah’ or Islam, viewers do not see devout worshippers. TV often shows Islam as a religion that permits a man to have many wives and concubines and condones beheadings and stoning people to death. Although ‘Allah’ means God, when performers say ‘Allah’ on TV it is usually with the intent of evoking laughter, cynicism, or the image of some vaguely pagan deity.” Shaheen explains that the news media are not immune from the prevalent stereotypes of Arabs.

Damaging portraits, notably those presenting Arabs as America’s enemy, affect all people, influencing world public opinion and policy. . . . Not only do these violent news images of extremists reinforce and exacerbate already prevalent stereotypes, but they serve as both a source and excuse for continued Arab-


358. Shaheen, The TV Arab, 16.
bashing by those filmmakers eager to exploit the issue. In particular, the news programs are used by some producers and directors to deny they are actually engaged in stereotyping. “We’re not stereotyping,” they object. “Just look at your television set. Those are real Arabs.”

Gerbner contends that television “molds American behavioral norms and values” more than any other medium. “And the more TV we watch, the more we tend to believe in the world according to TV, even though much of what we see is misleading.” Since the majority of Anglophone Canadian television comes from the United States, American television, by extension, molds Anglophone Canadian norms and values almost as much as it does American ones. Thus, the more Anglophone Canadians watch television, the more they believe in the world according to American television, and thus the closer to the American cultural norm they become. Therefore, both Americans and Anglophone Canadians were primed for the increased demonization of Arabs/Muslims that took place following 9/11.

Though virtually all Canadian newspapers were guilty of stereotyping Arabs and Muslims post-9/11, Ismael and Measor focus most of their wrath on the National Post, the well-known conservative national daily. “The media perspective evidenced such uniformity that it was difficult to discern one media organization from another. The National Post, clearly the leader of those seeking an aggressive response, carried barely a single critical word objecting to U.S. policy responses, except for calls for a swifter and more robust execution of government policy against ethnic minorities, immigrants, and

359. Shaheen, Reel Bad Arabs, 29.

those who expressed dissent within North American society.”

Belanger explains that it is an unfortunate reality that readers of Canadian newspapers tend to believe what they read rather than taking the time to investigate alternate theories. This is a reasonable response considering that consumers are relying on the expertise and integrity of journalists to properly guide them through the sea of facts and figures to seemingly sensible and easily absorbed conclusions. In this instance, blaming the audience for failing to further its own education about the issues is far too simplistic; according to Stuart Hall, the print media—beyond its function as a vehicle that presents contemporary discussion reflecting popular opinion—reflects not the opinions and the perceptions of the readers or the owners but rather those of the dominant classes from which the editors and administrators are recruited.

Ismael and Measor explain that “by reductively portraying these diverse societies into the caricature of ‘Islamic fundamentalism,’ and by frequently repeating the orientalist insistence that Islam is a threat to global stability, [the Canadian media] have, more deeply popularized the mythology surrounding the threat of the ‘other’ in the minds of Canadians.”

Karim claims that “there had emerged over the last three decades a set of journalistic narratives on ‘Muslim terrorism,’ whose construction is dependent on basic cultural perceptions about the global system of nation-states, violence, and the relationship between Western and Muslim societies. The dominant discourses about these issues help shape the cognitive scripts for reporting the acts of terrorism carried out by people claiming to act in the name of Islam.”

361. Ismael and Measor, 124.
363. Ismael and Measor, 126.
Karim points out that the “Islamic peril” is not as easily defined or as black and white as many journalists would have it. The Cold War ended, and the West needed a new enemy to replace the communist. The stereotypes that Edward Said explicated in the 1970s were reinvigorated and reinterpreted to be the newest danger. After 9/11:

Primary stereotypes of Muslims that had been [in] existence [for] hundreds of years were pressed into service. The term “Islamic” was used indiscriminately to describe acts of murder and destruction. Discussions of jihad frequently implied that the religion of Islam is endemically violent, disregarding similar behavior by adherents of other faiths or the centuries-long debate about jihad among Muslims. Decontextualized quotations from the Koran were used to support the view of Islam as a perverted creed. The medieval European tale of the “Assassins” was unearthed by several [West]ern media organizations to construct the Muslim genealogy of the September 11 terrorists. Journalistic images of disaster, heroism and grief draw on dramatic and ritualistic modes of narrative.

Thus, September 11, 2001 sped up the demonization and racialization processes for Arabs and Muslims that had begun years earlier. Since 9/11, Americans and Anglophone Canadians have been engaged in a moral panic in which Terror is the new Evil Empire.

Cohen explains that the “objects of normal moral panics,” as well as the discourses surrounding them are predictable:

They are new (lying dormant perhaps, but hard to recognize; deceptively ordinary and routine, but invisibly creeping up the moral horizon)—but also old (camouflaged versions of traditional and well-known evils). They are damaging in themselves—but also merely warning signs of the real, much deeper and more prevalent condition. They are transparent (anyone can see what’s happening)—

365. This is a major point made in Huntington.

366. The “Assassins” is an apocryphal tale in which a group of Nizari Ismailis (Shias) who were under attack used the technique of assassination, rather than confronting their enemies in battle. In the story, they were convinced to go on their suicide missions by being intoxicated with hashish, led to a beautiful garden full of beautiful women, and promised that that is what was waiting for them in heaven. Karim, Islamic Peril, 75.

but also opaque: accredited experts must explain the perils hidden behind the superficially harmless (decode a rock song’s lyrics to see how they led to a school massacre). 368

This explanation fits the moral panic of Islamic terrorism in Anglophone Canada: it is a new panic, not articulated before 9/11. It is also old, connected to the Orientalism and anti-Arab and Muslim sentiment in the West that can be traced back at least to the Crusades, if not earlier. Islamic terrorism is damaging in itself, but also a warning sign of the deeper and more prevalent condition of a loss of Anglophone Canadian identity through extreme multiculturalism. Islamic terrorism is transparent—everyone can see the evils of al Qaeda—but it is also opaque, as “sleeper cells” and “homegrown terrorists” may be lurking in anyone’s hometown.

Cohen additionally contends that “successful moral panics owe their appeal to their ability to find points of resonance with wider anxieties. But each appeal is a sleight of hand, magic without a magician. It points to continuities: in space (this sort of thing…it’s not only this) backward in time (part of a trend…building up over the years) a conditional common future (a growing problem…will get worse if nothing done). And for a self-reflexive society, an essential meta-message: This is not just a moral panic.” 369

Islamic terrorism resonates with Anglophone Canadian society in all of the ways listed: “this sort of thing” reminds Canadians of previous terrorist actions, such as hijacked airplanes in the 1980s; “building up over the years” takes the concept of those hijacked

368. Cohen, viii.

airplanes and points out that the 9/11 airplanes were also hijacked, and the terrorists escalated the results from the typical 1980s request to be flown to a particular location; “will get worse if nothing done” indicates a generalized feeling in the West that the “clash of civilizations” is coming, and Islamic terrorists will continue to escalate until they are able to take over the entire West unless the West steps in to stop them; “this is not just a moral panic” is constantly invoked, as Anglophone Canadians can point to all of the threats, real or imagined, taking place in the U.S. and overseas.

Cohen explains that “immediately after a physical disaster there is a relatively unorganized response. This is followed by the inventory phase during which those exposed to the disaster take stock of what has happened and of their own condition. In this period, rumors and ambiguous perceptions become the basis for interpreting the situation.” Cohen contends that this is true of social deviances, too. When a deviant group makes a sudden impact on the scene, the public reacts similarly to the way it reacts to a disaster. September 11, 2001 is situated uniquely in this framework, as it was both a physical disaster, and therefore lent itself to “rumors and ambiguous perceptions,” but it was also perpetrated by a group that became seen almost instantly as “deviant” in its approach to religious dedication and interreligious/intercivilizational war. This “double-whammy” led to a sudden, yet tenacious moral panic surrounding Islamic terrorism, with Arabs/Muslims as natural folk devils.


371. “Deviance” is used here as it is used in sociology, to refer, without moral judgment, to behavior or individuals that are outside of the mainstream.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION:

THE CRYSTALLIZATION OF A MORAL PANIC

Before September 11, 2001, Canada was not a multicultural utopia, but arguably, it was attempting to achieve that ideal. Things were not always perfect and smooth, but Canadian multiculturalism mostly kept the peace. Canadian multiculturalism is not like multiculturalism in many other countries. Rather than being a part of folklore or an unspoken part of the culture, it is mandated by law, taught to new immigrants and schoolchildren, and enforced on a daily basis. However, the Canadian multicultural mosaic began to show cracks after 9/11. Even though the events of 9/11 took place entirely on American soil, this study has shown that what happened in the U.S. had a significant impact on the Anglophone Canadian print media. The Arab and Muslim tiles in the vertical mosaic started both to blend into one and to stand out as the terrorism moral panic took hold and Arabs/Muslims became folk devils.

September 11 changed the United States, sending it into a terrorism moral panic. This study has shown that the terrorism moral panic was replicated in Anglophone Canada with Arabs/Muslims as racialized folk devils: a racial project of conflation and demonization. This study has also shown that the racial project of the conflation of Arabs and Muslims began before 9/11, but that the moral panic catalyzed by 9/11 in Anglophone Canadian society both crystallized and sped up the process of racialization.
The terrorism moral panic that Anglophone Canada experienced post-9/11 was both reflected in and reinforced by print media, as is made clear in the analyzed data. Qualitative evidence for this moral panic includes a significant increase in negative language directed at Arabs and Muslims in the Anglophone Canadian print media in the year post-9/11; quantitative evidence includes a significant increase in articles that use the term “Arab” or “Muslim” along with either of the terms “terrorism” or “terrorist.”

Given what is known about Anglophone Canada’s attitude towards Arabs/Muslims leading up to the events of 9/11, this study argues that 9/11 served as a catalyst to crystallize those attitudes into a moral panic on terrorism that utilized Arabs/Muslims (as one racialized group) as folk devils, rather than allowing them to remain as two distinctive tiles in the Canadian mosaic. Utilizing a comparative content analysis of Anglophone Canadian newspapers pre- and post-9/11, coupled with a quantitative comparison of key words and their linkages, this study is able to show a change in Anglophone Canadian print media discourse regarding Arabs and Muslims.

**Non-Americanism**

Anglophone Canadians have created a defensiveness referred to in this study as “non-American.” The idea that some may see Anglophone Canadians as almost identical to Americans is difficult for many Anglophone Canadians to handle, thus this study took into account the inherent tension in Anglophone Canadian identity between desiring to emulate Americans and desiring to differentiate from Americans whilst uniting with Francophone Canadian identity into a true Federal Canadian identity.
**Multiculturalism, Visible Minorities, and the Mosaic**

This study briefly described Canada’s racist history, focusing on the strong anti-non-white immigration sentiment that began in the 19th century and continued through more than half of the 20th century, resulting in a “White Canada” policy only overturned in 1962. In 1971, Canada attempted to shed its earlier self-image by adopting the policy of multiculturalism, which created the new category of “visible minority.” This study considered the role that visible minorities play in Canada and how they fit into the multicultural ideal and the vertical mosaic reality. Officially, visible minorities have all the same rights, privileges, opportunities, and claims on Canadianness as those who are not visible minorities; however, both before and after 9/11, they have tended to be the frequent victims of marginalization and discrimination. Thus, it is clear that visible minorities (including Arabs), though officially part of the multicultural ideal, are actually placed somewhere in the lower part of the vertical mosaic.

**Arabs and Muslims**

For the most part, neither Arabs nor Muslims have been looked on with much favor in the West. Canada, as a pro-immigration country that officially welcomes diversity, has had the potential to view Arabs and Muslims somewhat differently than do other Western countries, but has not always lived up to that ideal. It has been shown in this study that “Arab” and “Muslim” have been and are conflated quite regularly by experts, laypeople, and the media. The conflation of Arabs and Muslims has been happening for decades, but appears to be more common post-9/11.
Due to Canada’s comparatively smaller population and the U.S.’s significant domination of international media, American ideas and attitudes are bound to exert some influence on Anglophone Canadian discourse. Even though there was a sense of difference or distinctiveness about Arabs/Muslims in Anglophone Canada pre-9/11, they were not necessarily seen as outstanding compared to any other tile in the Canadian mosaic. However, post-9/11, that difference or distinctiveness was linked to the terrorism moral panic, effectively turning two groups into one and, in that process, into folk devils.

**Moral Panic**

The post-9/11 situation as reflected in the Anglophone Canadian media fits the description of a moral panic well: the episode of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil was defined as a threat to the values, morals, and interests of Western society. A moral panic cannot spring up out of thin air, which is why there is evidence of fear surrounding terrorism and the linkage between terrorism and Arabs/Muslims before 9/11.

Cohen explains in the introduction to the third edition of *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* that since the first edition came out, other theorists have refined his ideas more, and have come up with five aspects of a moral panic:

1. “*Concern* (rather than fear) about the potential or imagined threat;”
2. “*Hostility,*” or “moral outrage towards the actors (folk devils) who embody the problem and agencies,” which could include governments or supernational entities, “who are ‘ultimately’ responsible (and may become folk devils themselves);”
3. “*Consensus,*” or “a widespread agreement (not necessarily total) that the threat
exists, is serious and that ‘something should be done.’ The majority of elite and influential groups, especially the mass media, should share this consensus;”

4. “Disproportionality,” or “an exaggeration of the number or strength of the cases, in terms of the damage caused, moral offensiveness, potential risk if ignored. Public concern is not directly proportionate to objective harm;”

5. “Volatility,” where “the panic erupts and dissipates suddenly and without warning.”

All five of these aspects occurred in the Anglophone Canadian terrorism moral panic. Anglophone Canadians showed concern about the threat. Some were frightened, but more were worried about what terrorism would do to alter their society. There was hostility and moral outrage towards the Arab/Muslim folk devils; in fact, it was so great that it spilled over into hate crimes against people who were not in the folk devil group. Some amount of moral outrage directed at both al Qaeda and the U.S. was also evident. The outrage against al Qaeda was directed towards the organization’s part in creating and instigating terrorist incidents, and the outrage against the U.S. was due to what was seen as its heavy-handed approach to foreign policy, making enemies where Canada would have liked to have kept the peace. The widespread agreement came about through editorials in the print media and “experts” citing an inevitable integration with the U.S. in order to present a united front. Disproportionality was very evident, as Canada was not attacked, and very few Canadians died in the events of 9/11, so it is only through the moral panic process that Anglophone Canadians determined that they were in grave danger. The panic

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erupted very suddenly, immediately after the attack on 9/11, and spiked during the year after 9/11, beginning to dissipate in the year following that.

Cohen explains the typical progression of events for a moral panic thusly:

“dramatic event → public disquiet → moral enterprise → mobilization of control culture.”

This progression was evident in Anglophone Canada: the dramatic event was 9/11. There was public disquiet over terrorism, leading to a moral enterprise denouncing terrorism and its attendant folk devils. When the U.S. mobilized its control culture, requiring additional screening of people from particular (folk devil) countries, Canada went along with very little demurral.

Texts that come out of a moral panic have a tendency to try to make sense of the situation; they look for language with which to describe the situation, and causal theories to explain it. One way that texts attempt this is through metaphor. As the moral panic solidifies, there is a repetition of metaphorical themes that come to be seen as the “natural” way of describing the situation. This can “blur the boundaries between the literal and the non-literal.”

Similarly, “symbolization” is the concept wherein symbols used in moral panics are created. Cohen identifies three processes of symbolization. Initially, a word or phrase “becomes symbolic of a certain status.” Then an object or objects become symbolic of the word. Lastly, “the objects themselves become symbolic of the status (and the

373. Cohen, lxvi.

374. Cohen, xx. This happened, for example, with the term “Ground Zero.” Initially, the term was used metaphorically, to indicate that the former site of the World Trade Center looked like an atomic bomb had hit it. Within a very short timeframe, that became the name associated with that location.
emotions attached to the status).” This nearly happened to the folk devils of the terrorism moral panic. Arab/Muslim started to become symbolic of the status of “terrorist.” Then, certain “typical” physical attributes, such as beards, hijabs, and turbans, began to become symbolic of Arabs/Muslims. Those objects did not quite extend all the way to being symbolic of the status of terrorist, but they approached that status, as they created a sense of unease among air travelers.

It is important to note that moral panics cannot be permanent. Cohen says that a “permanent moral panic’ is less an exaggeration than an oxymoron. A panic, by definition, is self-limiting, temporary and spasmodic, a splutter of rage which burns itself out.” Cohen cannot definitively explain why or how moral panics end, but he puts forth four possible explanations: “(i) a ‘natural history’ which ends with burn out, boredom, running out of steam, a fading away; (ii) the slightly more sophisticated notion of cycles in fashion—like clothing styles, musical taste; (iii) the putative danger fizzles out, the media or [moral] entrepreneurs have cried wolf once too often, their information is discredited; (iv) the information was accepted but easily reabsorbed whether into private life or public spectacle—the end result described by the situationists as recuperation.”

As the terrorism moral panic did not end during the time span covered by this study, it is impossible to conclude which of these explanations might make the most sense in this case.

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375. Cohen, 27.

376. Cohen, xxx.

Both Thompson and Goode and Ben-Yehuda, though also unable to explain exactly how or why a moral panic ends, stress the criterion of disproportionality in determining the existence and maintenance of a moral panic. As Thompson explains, “the level of feverish concern characteristic of the moral panic phase is not likely to last, even if the problem itself is of long standing.” Thus, by measuring the disproportionality of the reaction to terrorism compared to the actual danger, the timing of the demise of the terrorism moral panic could be determined. Goode and Ben-Yehuda offer four indicators of disproportionality: “the figures that are cited to measure the scope of the problem are grossly exaggerated,” “the concrete threat that is feared is, by all available evidence, nonexistent,” “the attention that is paid to a specific condition is vastly greater than that paid to another, and the concrete threat or damage caused by the first is no greater than, or is less than, the second,” and “the attention paid to a given condition at one point in time is vastly greater than that paid to it during a previous or later time without any corresponding increase in objective seriousness.” If any or all of these indicators declined after 2002, then it may indicate the end of the terrorism moral panic.

379. Thompson, 9.
380. Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 43.
381. Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 44.
382. Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 44.
383. Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 44.
Goode and Ben-Yehuda warn that moral panics, though finite, can last from a few months to a few centuries.\textsuperscript{384} When a moral panic comes to an end, it can have virtually no lasting impact on the society, or it can leave a significant legacy “in the form of laws, agencies, groups, movements, and so on.”\textsuperscript{385} Thus, in calculating disproportionality to determine when and whether the terrorism moral panic has ended, one must be careful to separate out the “routinized”\textsuperscript{386} aspects, such as increased checks at airports.

**Racial Project**

Racial formation theory explains how Arabs and Muslims became constituted as one race in Anglophone Canada. As Ismael and Measor explain: “The blend of the xenophobic fears of the ‘other,’ and that of terrorism, provided media consumers in Canada with a clear path to the conclusion that Islam was a faith within which acts of unspeakable violence were acceptable and that terrorism was endemic to Muslim and Arab culture. This framed Arab and Muslim societies and individuals as somehow fundamentally different from the average Canadian.”\textsuperscript{387} Thus, Arabs and Muslims were conflated into one, demonized folk devil linked irrevocably to the terrorism moral panic. Because the terrorism moral panic leaves a legacy, rather than fading away entirely, the folk devil Arab/Muslim will remain one race in Anglophone Canada for the foreseeable future.

\textsuperscript{384} Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 226. They offer a case study of the “Renaissance witch craze” as an example of a moral panic that lasted nearly three centuries. Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 144-184.

\textsuperscript{385} Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 225.

\textsuperscript{386} Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 224-225.

\textsuperscript{387} Ismael and Measor, 124.
Canadian Arabs/Muslims did not wake up on September 12, 2001 and suddenly find themselves demonized and racialized; rather, the sense that Muslims and Arabs were somehow not like “us” has existed in the West for a very long time. News reporting and politics are not the only realms in which Arabs and Muslims are demonized; in fact, it can be argued that they are demonized to a greater degree in entertainment media. Because television programs and movies, especially U.S.-made television programs and movies, are so pervasive in Western society, these are the images both Americans and Anglophone Canadians see, and they spend more time looking at those than real life in some cases. It has been said that television “molds American behavioral norms and values” more than any other medium.\footnote{388}

The media—both print and broadcast, as well as newer forms of media—play a role as both a window onto society and a mirror of society. The place of the media in Canadian society was studied in order to understand the print media’s role in the creation, maintenance, and reflection of the terrorism moral panic. How the media present a situation has a lasting impact on how the public interprets it, because the public bases its reactions on the (potentially biased) images and messages the media present. Media do not just create, in fact, it can be argued that they create rarely, and mainly reflect societal mores. The Anglophone Canada print media reflected and helped to create the terrorism moral panic and the racialization of Arabs/Muslims into folk devils for that moral panic.

\footnote{388. House Select Committee.}
Canadian media have become highly conglomerated, narrowing the diversity of viewpoints readers are exposed to. In addition to the obvious effects of media conglomeramation, the preference for non-objectivity in journalism has grown. This study argued that the media conglomeration in Canada was one of the major factors behind the terrorism moral panic post-9/11, as dissenting voices were virtually unheard from, thus allowing the dominant, panic-supporting voices to prevail.

September 11 changed the discourse in Anglophone Canadian print media to align more with the U.S.’s focus on terrorism and negative views of Arabs and Muslims. Canada could well have stood its ground and refused to bend to the U.S.’s pressure, as some European countries did. Along these same lines, alterations to the way Canada approaches importation and immigration could well have stopped at the border, but these changes went beyond the border. Though Canada did not actually follow the U.S. in lockstep, it also did not see itself as separated or separable from the events of the world.

This study demonstrated the difference in Anglophone Canadian print media discourse pertaining to Arabs and Muslims before and after 9/11, determining that this difference indicates the rise of a terrorism moral panic post-9/11 that utilizes Arabs/Muslims as folk devils. Discourse constitutes the data in the quantitative and qualitative content analysis. In examining written discourse, one does not look simply at a piece of writing, but how it was written, how it fits into the context of the society, and what its impact is on the reader. Discourses are pivotal in the social construction of both moral panics and racial projects because the components of discourses (in this case, news articles) serve as social acts supporting the creation of moral panics, folk devils, and racial projects.
Data and Results

The collection and analysis of discourse in this study were both quantitative and qualitative. The qualitative data sources included four major Anglophone Canadian newspapers and one significant Anglophone Canadian newsmagazine. This study analyzed not only what was written, but how it was written and how ideas were framed, using a modified Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) methodology. CDA complements moral panic theory and racial formation theory because it looks at discourse in the context of power relations, and how texts affect how a society behaves. The qualitative data examined articles in depth for the year before 9/11 and the year after 9/11.

The quantitative data sources included the top eight (by circulation) Anglophone Canadian newspapers and eight of the top ten (by circulation) American newspapers. Keyword frequency and its change over time were calculated for individual newspapers as well as countries as a whole for the year before 9/11 and two years after 9/11.

The data and analysis chapter detailed the results of the quantitative and qualitative data and analyzed them in the context of the theories of moral panics and racial projects and the thesis that Anglophone Canadian print media both reflected and helped reinforce a terrorism moral panic, catalyzed by the events of 9/11, that involved racialized Arabs/Muslims as folk devils. The data show that the discourse on Arabs and Muslims changed in a more frequent but less-friendly direction after 9/11, and, thus, it can be inferred that 9/11 was the catalyst for that change.

The qualitative data are divided into two parts: pre-9/11 and post-9/11. There were 64 articles pre-9/11 chosen for analysis. Those 64 articles yielded four discourse strands: diversity, discrimination, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Stockwell Day. The
relatively benign strand of diversity involves the general tendency in Anglophone
Canadian discourse to discussions and expressions of multiculturalism. The strand of
discrimination is just as broad as the diversity strand, but primarily consists of articles in
which the writer complained of discrimination, or the writer said that others had
complained of discrimination. Due to the removal of international-focused articles from
the analysis, the strand of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not include the conflict as
discussed on a purely international level, but rather how that conflict relates to Canadians
and Canadian politics. A few articles in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict strand create a
knot with the discrimination strand, and others knot with the Stockwell Day strand. The
entire Stockwell Day strand could, in fact, be seen as a huge discourse knot with the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict strand. Though most articles are easily categorizable into the
various strands, there were a few that fell outside of the parameters of all of the strands.
Overall, it is striking how little mention of terrorism there is pre-9/11.

For the year after 9/11, 203 articles were chosen for analysis, yielding eight
topical discursive strands and two language usage themes. The discursive strands are: the
Museum of Civilization exhibit, immigration, terrorism, concern about discrimination,
stories of discrimination, hate crimes, racial/ethnic profiling, and Arabs are normal
people. The two language usage themes include the interchangeability of Arab/Muslim/
Middle Eastern and “Arab”/“Muslim” used as a superfluous descriptor.

The Museum of Civilization strand covers articles discussing an exhibit at the
Canadian Museum of Civilization in Hull, Quebec. The immigration strand is often
closely connected to other strands, such as profiling, Arabs as normal people, and
care about discrimination. The terrorism strand is so pervasive it is often hard to
notice. The terrorism strand knots with both the immigration strand and the profiling strand. There are a few articles in each publication that deal with American and Canadian Arabs worrying that they would become victims of discrimination due to guilt by association with the 9/11 attacks. These constitute the concern about discrimination strand. The articles that address discrimination begin to appear very early on, and describe a wide variety of instances of discrimination, ranging from dirty looks, name-calling, and misunderstanding to more serious harassment. In the discrimination strand, an article’s focus may not necessarily be on discrimination, but may mention it in passing to explain something else; meanwhile in the hate crime strand, the hate crime tends to be the central issue in the article. Racial/ethnic profiling differs from other types of discrimination in that it is discrimination by officials, rather than another individual. The articles that describe racial profiling do not always use the term. The strand about how Arabs are normal tries to counteract all the stereotypes played upon in the discrimination, racial/ethnic profiling, and hate crime strands.

The language usage themes are more subtle than the topical discourse strands. As can be seen in some of the examples in the chapter, one of the most common language usage themes is a confusion of the various terms Arab, Muslim, and Middle Eastern, with Arab and Muslim being interchanged or conflated most frequently, often by people who know the difference. The other language usage theme deals with cases in which the term “Arab” or “Muslim” is used as a superfluous descriptor in articles that otherwise would not refer to Arabs or Muslims. The Toronto Sun columnist Bob MacDonald is particularly guilty of the superfluous pairing of the terms Arab and Muslim, almost always in the context of the terrorism discourse strand.
Discrimination is the only commonality in comparing the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 discourse strands. Pre-9/11 it was one, broad strand. Post-9/11, however, discrimination is such a part of life that it becomes four strands: worry about being discriminated against, actually being discriminated against, hate crimes, and racial/ethnic profiling. This difference exemplifies the significant discourse shift caused by the events of 9/11 that resulted in the moral panic.

**Directions for Future Research**

A study of this scope leaves many open doors for future research. One direction is to expand the time frame, going further back before 9/11 and/or further forward after 9/11 to see whether the trends extend. A future study could also examine a larger sample size of newspapers to see if the findings hold, or examine a larger number of relevant keywords, such as investigating qualitative data using “Muslim” as a keyword. Further studies could also look at hard copies of newspapers to note the impact of the placement of articles and the pictures that accompany them. Additionally, a future study could expand to a qualitative examination of articles regarding events overseas. It could also look beyond print news media to television and internet news media, and even to entertainment media to see how prevalent the moral panic was. Another way to broaden the research is to look for evidence of the moral panic in government decisions or in actions taken by members of the public.

This study focused only on Arabs and Muslims, though it was mentioned briefly that some other groups were, at times, conflated with them. Future studies could explore the impact of the moral panic and the Arab/Muslim folk devil on Sikhs, Iranians, people
who are mistaken for Middle Eastern, and so forth. Another direction future research could take is to look at the differences between Francophone and Anglophone Canadian print media in their reactions to 9/11. Did the moral panic take place in Francophone Canada as it did in Anglophone Canada, or does the language barrier protect Francophone Canada from undue U.S. influence? Future studies might also qualitatively compare the U.S.’s print media content with Anglophone Canada’s, and perhaps compare Hispanophone U.S. print media with Anglophone U.S., Anglophone Canadian, and Francophone Canadian print media.

On a different note, another possibility for future research is to compare the Mexican reaction to 9/11 to the (Anglophone) Canadian reaction. An alternative idea is to focus more in depth on the phenomenon of non-Americanism, and explore how that manifests itself in Anglophone Canadian society and whether it is present elsewhere.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, through examining a sample of qualitative and quantitative data, it can be conclusively determined that Anglophone Canadian print media discourse shifted after 9/11 indicating a terrorism moral panic with Arabs/Muslims as folk devils. This moral panic and the attendant folk devils, as well as the trends in the data, are strikingly similar to their American counterparts, leading to the conclusion that Anglophone Canadian print media were influenced by American print media, most likely due both to American media’s prominent international position and Anglophone Canada’s ongoing internal struggle between recognizing its similarities with and declaring its differences from the United States.
### Table 14. Keyword frequencies in Anglophone Canadian newspapers

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Table 15. Keyword frequencies in United States newspapers

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*New York Post*

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