WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS IN COUNTERTERRORISM THROUGH COMMUNITY
POLICING AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY

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To Derya, Safiye, and Yusuf
ABSTRACT

Policing terrorism in diverse communities is a major challenge for law enforcement in countries facing a significant, omnipresent, and continuous threat from domestic terrorism. Community policing, a policing innovation that has dominated policing for a few decades in democracies around the world, has been heralded as a primary tool for the police in their counterterrorism role as it relates to the policing of diverse communities. Community policing, when applied to counterterrorism, is expected to increase perceptions of police legitimacy and cooperation with the police among the minority communities that attract much police attention because of the suspicion that they are harboring terrorists. This study, using secondary data and employing a cross section non-experimental design, provides a test of these hypotheses through an impact assessment of various community policing interventions of the Turkish National Police with the local Kurdish juveniles in the province of Şırnak, where the police citizen relations are shaped predominantly by the counterterrorism role of the police.

Previous research on police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police links the outcomes of legitimacy and cooperation to the perceptions of procedural justice, that is, the perceptions that the police demonstrate fairness in making decisions (i.e., listening to people before making decisions) and their treatment of the individuals they come into contact with (i.e., showing respect and treating with dignity). This theory, which has enjoyed strong empirical support in a general crime context, has recently been extended to the counterterrorism context in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. In addition to evaluating the impact of community policing interventions on perceived legitimacy and the willingness to cooperate, this study tests whether procedural justice is related to these outcomes in the counterterrorism context of Turkey. Finally, this study investigates the nexus between community policing and procedural
justice and tests whether procedural justice mediates the effects of community policing on the outcomes of perceived legitimacy and the willingness to cooperate. The results suggest that community policing initiatives have a robust significant positive effect on willingness to cooperate with the police and that perceived procedural fairness is a key antecedent to perceived police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate. In addition, the results provide partial support for the hypothesis that procedural justice mediates the effects of community policing interventions on perceived legitimacy and the willingness to cooperate.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Police play a central role in countering terrorism (Bayley and Weisburd, 2009; Forst, in press). They are expected to fulfill a myriad of tasks that fall primarily under their role in preventing and responding to terrorism and mitigating its effects once it occurs (Maguire and King, 2011; Braithwaite, 2011; Greene, 2011; Innes, 2006; Thacher, 2005). However, how the police go about dealing with these responsibilities matters, particularly with communities that are the targets of counterterrorism efforts, due to possible repercussions of counterterrorism efforts such as reduction of police legitimacy and withholding of much needed cooperation and information sharing, which may have vital consequences with regard to the prevention of future terrorist attacks at the very least from a pragmatic point of view. Of course, stereotypical, tough, and unjust policing measures that do not conform to the expectations placed on the police in modern democracies may lead to greater social problems than non-cooperation. Such problems may include alienation of minority groups, radicalization of individuals and groups, and deepening of interfaith or interracial conflicts among others.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, how the police should engage in counterterrorism has attracted much scholarly attention in the US. This focus has also spilled over to other countries where the threat of terrorism is an integral part of the security landscape such as the UK (Briggs, 2010; Innes, 2006; Klausen, 2009) and Turkey (Lum, Haberfeld, Fachner, and Lieberman, 2009; Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011), as well as other countries with no reported significant cases such as Australia (Pickering et al., 2008a; 2008b). In the midst of the debate on policing terrorism is the relevance of community policing to counterterrorism. This focus on community policing emerged because it is argued that policing in the US, where the bulk of research into policing
concentrates, has entered a new era as a result of the 9/11 attacks, what might be called the “homeland security era”, leaving behind the previous era and policing paradigm which was focused primarily on community policing (Oliver, 2006). The catastrophic attacks of 9/11 and subsequent increased involvement of the local police departments as the first line of defense in homeland security matters brought forth numerous challenges and led to discussions among practitioners and the scholars about how local police could best fulfill their designated but ambiguous role (Brown, 2007; Forst, in press; Henry, 2002; Maguire and King, 2011; Thacher, 2005; Waxman, 2009). The scholarly treatment of the matter focused on whether community policing was still relevant in the face of the challenge of countering terrorism (Brown, 2007; Chappell and Gibson, 2009; Friedmann and Cannon, 2007; Greene, 2011; Haberfeld, King, and Lieberman, 2009; Lyons, 2002; Morreale and Lambert, 2009; Murray, 2005; Pelfrey, 2005; Scheider and Chapman, 2003). Community policing advocates almost unequivocally suggested that police departments would be able to garner the cooperation of minority communities in policing terrorism, among other objectives such as addressing hate crimes, by increasing the level of perceived trust and legitimacy. Applying the principles of community policing is thought to produce numerous benefits in relationships with minority communities (Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, and Miller, 2006; Khashu, Busch, Latif, and Levy, 2005; Ortiz, Hendricks, and Sugie, 2007; Spalek, 2010).

Focusing on legitimacy and cooperation with the police as outcomes community policing can serve to improve, a second domain of research has linked these outcomes (i.e., legitimacy and cooperation) to the perception that police demonstrate fairness in making law enforcement decisions and treat individuals fairly during police-citizen encounters. Tyler (2006) refers to these types of fairness as procedural justice. Tyler (2011) argues that police can get community
members to cooperate with the police utilizing two competing models: instrumental and
normative. The former is based on the belief that community members will cooperate with the
police out of self-interest. With its roots in rational choice theory, this model holds that
community members will have a greater propensity to cooperate with the police if they believe
that the police are effective in fighting crime; that the police effectively capture and bring to
justice perpetrators; and that the police may direct unwelcome policing tactics disproportionately
on the communities that withhold their cooperation with the police (Huq, Tyler, and Schulhofer,
2011a; 2011b; Schulhofer, Tyler, and Huq, 2011; Tyler, Schulhofer, and Huq, 2010; Tyler,
2011). In contrast, the latter model holds that community members cooperate with the police
because they believe that the police are legitimate authorities entitled to being obeyed and
trusted. The normative model links legitimacy as a strong predictor of cooperation to the
perceptions that police act in procedurally just ways; that is, they demonstrate fairness in making
decisions and treatment of citizens during encounters. These competing theories, first introduced
to explain compliance with the law and then cooperation with law enforcement (Tyler and Huo,
2002; Tyler and Fagan, 2008), have recently been extended to the counterterrorism framework in
the USA (Schulhofer et al., 2011; Tyler et al., 2010), the UK (Huq et al., 2011a) and Australia
(Cherney and Murphy, 2013). Strong evidence for the normative model has been reported.

A closer reading of these two domains of research, community policing and procedural
justice theory, yields several gaps that have not been adequately addressed in prior research. The
first of these gaps is whether community policing increases perceptions of police legitimacy and
willingness to cooperate with the police in a counterterrorism context. Although community
policing is one of the most researched substantive topics in criminology and criminal justice
studies, police legitimacy in particular and attitudes toward police have rarely attracted empirical
attention in the domain of research on community policing. Scarce evidence provides support for the positive effects of community policing on perceptions of police (Mazerolle, Bennett, Davis, Sargeant, and Manning, 2013; Reisig and Giacomazzi, 1998; Ren, Cao, Lovrich, and Gaffney, 2005; Schafer, Huebner, and Bynum, 2003; Skogan and Hartnett, 1997). Moreover, in the growing body of literature on community policing as it applies to counterterrorism, much of the evidence regarding its impact on trust and legitimacy of the police appears to be anecdotal rather than based on sound empirical investigation (Henderson et al., 2006; Khashu et al., 2005; Ortiz et al., 2007). There surely is a need for rigorous empirical research into whether community policing can make a difference in perceived police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police when applied to minority groups that are the targets of counterterrorism efforts.

The second gap is whether police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police are a function of perceptions of procedural justice, defined in terms of quality of decision making and quality of treatment, among minority groups that are disproportionately affected by the law enforcement counterterrorism policies. Prior research in the general law enforcement setting finds a very strong relationship between perceptions of procedural justice and outcomes such as perceived legitimacy, compliance with the law and willingness to cooperate with the police. There have been recent efforts to extend the theory to counterterrorism within the USA (Schulhofer et al., 2011; Tyler et al., 2010), the UK (Huq et al., 2011a), and Australia (Cherney and Murphy, 2013), where Muslim communities have been the focus in relation to the counterterrorism efforts. These replications also found strong evidence for the hypothesized effects of procedural justice. However, these studies focused solely on Muslim community members’ perceptions. There is a need for replicating the model in other countries where the terrorism threat is ethnicity-based and separatist rather than from immigrant communities. In
addition, one would argue that terrorist attacks in the countries studied are of a low frequency nature. Would the theory still hold in a policing setting marked with a high frequency of terrorist attacks and where the treat of terrorism and police response primarily shape mundane police-citizen interactions? These questions warrant new studies conducted in other counterterrorism contexts such as Turkey, a country where ethnic terrorism perpetrated by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has been omnipresent for the last three decades, claiming thousands of lives.

The third and final gap appeals more to theoretical concerns rather than practical. The two domains of research stated above, community policing and procedural justice judgments, overlap because at the very least they share the same potential outcomes, including perceived legitimacy of the police and cooperation with law enforcement, as prime concerns. Despite this overlap, studies in both domains rarely make reference to the nexus between community policing and procedural justice as they relate to crime in general and terrorism in particular (Forman, 2004; Greene, 2011; Hawdon, 2008; National Research Council, 2004). In fact, one could argue that community policing is a manifestation of procedural justice that encompasses fairness in decision-making and interpersonal treatment (Hawdon, 2008). Community policing, despite variations in interpretation and focus (Greene, 2000; 2011), aims to activate citizens as decision makers in matters that relate to crime and disorder and increase the frequency of positive and informal police-citizen contacts among others. Policing practices in community policing as such are inherent manifestations of what Tyler (2006) terms as “procedural justice”, that is, showing fairness in decision making and interpersonal encounters. Accordingly, if community policing programs make a difference in the level of trust and willingness to cooperate, is this a direct effect of exposure to community policing programs/interventions or are there other factors such as perceptions of procedural justice that mediate the effects of community policing? In other
words, if exposure to interventions based on community policing improves perceptions of police and willingness to cooperate, is this because it leads to the belief that the police make fair decisions and treat citizens impartially, with dignity and respect which in turn increases the belief that police are legitimate and trustworthy authorities with whom they should cooperate in matters that relate to crime and terrorism?

This dissertation aims to fill these voids in prior research using non-experimental survey data from Turkey with Kurdish youth living in an environment where the police-citizen interactions are primarily shaped by the counterterrorism functions of the police. Specifically, I address the following research questions in this dissertation:

1. Do community policing programs increase perceptions of legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police in a counterterrorism context?  Do these programs increase the sense that police are more accessible and less remote?

2. Does the theory that procedural justice improves police legitimacy and thereby willingness to cooperate with the police hold in a policing environment of counterterrorism?

3. Is the effect of community policing, if any, on legitimacy and cooperation mediated by perceptions of procedural justice?

The theoretical model to be tested is presented in Figure 1. In this model, community policing is hypothesized to improve perceptions of procedural justice, which in turn improves perceptions of legitimacy and then leads to an increase in willingness to cooperate with the police. However, the model allows for the possibility that community policing may have direct

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1 A competing explanation here would be that community policing increases willingness to cooperate because people make acquaintances with individual police officers and view them more accessible notwithstanding the perceptions of legitimacy and fairness. Unfortunately, the data do not permit testing this alternative hypothesis.
effects on legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police in addition to the indirect effects via procedural justice.

Figure 1. Theoretical model.

Statement of the Problem

This study will address the research questions posed above using individual level data on a sample of Kurdish youth in the terrorism-stricken part of Turkey. This section aims to give background information on the terrorism-related problems facing Kurdish children and the policing context of the study location.

Although the counterterrorism efforts of Turkey have historically been reliant on military and paramilitary tactics (Lum et al., 2009), recently there has been a shift towards the adoption of community policing tenets in counterterrorism efforts that encompass wide-ranging tactics
such as establishment of partnerships with minority communities, civic organizations and stakeholders as well as specific interventions geared towards specific groups of people at risk for involvement in terrorism (Dikici, 2008; Ekici, 2008; Gozubenli and Akbas, 2009; Özeren and Cinoğlu, 2010; Sevinç, 2013; Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011; Yıldız and Şahin, 2010). Particular attention under the rubric of these efforts has focused on reaching out especially to children and juveniles deemed at risk for exposure to terrorist propaganda and future involvement in terrorism (Dikici, 2008; Gozubenli and Akbas, 2009; Sevinç, 2013; Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011; Yıldız and Şahin, 2010), in an effort to increase the level of trust in and perceived legitimacy of the police, with the expectation that when minors trust the police and perceive them as legitimate authorities, they will be more resilient to terrorist propaganda, more likely to comply with the law and cooperate with the police and develop a stake in civil society.

This particular focus on Kurdish minors is based on a threat assessment in relation to the strategic objectives of the PKK terrorist organization that is highly active particularly in the predominantly Kurdish populated eastern and southeastern part of the country, as well as large cities such as Istanbul, Izmir, and Mersin, where sizeable Kurdish communities reside. The PKK is an ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist organization that has a Marxist-Leninist communist orientation that aims to separate the predominantly Kurdish populated eastern and southeastern Turkey. In order to fulfill this grand objective to found an independent Kurdistan, the PKK has claimed more than 40,000 lives from Turkish and Kurdish origin since its foundation by Abdullah Ocalan in the early 1980s. The PKK has always maintained an interest in children and

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2 The conception of community policing in Turkey suffers from the pitfalls that have been reported in the US. Most notably, community policing in Turkey goes hardly beyond public relations when compared to the pure model. One would argue that two dimensions of community policing receive more attention among police executives: community engagement and problem-solving (e.g., adoption of Compstat). Organizational change such as decentralization, despecialization, and flattening of organizational hierarchy are by no means within the landscape of community policing implementation in Turkey.
focused their recruitment efforts on youngsters (Dikici, 2008; Stohl, 2002). For example, Stohl (2002, para. 4) states the following:

In 1998, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) was believed to have 3,000 child soldiers in its forces, more than ten percent of which were girls. Reports indicate that the PKK has used children since 1994 and developed a children’s battalion named Tabura Zaroken Sehit Agit. A child as young as seven was reported in the PKK’s ranks.

In recent years, the PKK devised a new use for the Kurdish children and has started to push them to the front lines in violent public demonstrations (Dikici, 2008; Özeren, Sever, Yilmaz, and Sözer, 2014; Seviç, 2013; Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011; Yıldız and Şahin, 2010) more systematically following a series of crackdown operations in several cities between December 2009 and June 2010 on the members of Democratic Confederation of Kurdistan (KCK), a parallel Kurdish administration that encompasses the PKK (Davies, Larson, Haldeman, Oguz, and Rana, 2012; Eker, Iltas, and Akdeniz, 2011). An unprecedented number of children and adolescents, even as young as 11 year olds, started to actively participate in the illegal public demonstrations of the PKK, where those adolescents, some covering their faces with scarves, blocked the streets with burning tires and garbage bins and hurled stones, rocks, Molotov cocktails, fireworks, and homemade explosives at police officers (Eker et al., 2011), with the inducement of adults. As a result, hundreds of Kurdish adolescents in various cities were apprehended by law enforcement officers and processed through the criminal justice system with charges of terrorism. These cases, in which children were accused of terrorism, were heard before adult courts as stipulated by the Law on Combating Terrorism. Some of those adolescents were sentenced to years of imprisonment for the charges, which triggered a major public concern for those youngsters for several reasons that have to do with the Law on Combating Terrorism.

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3 Video footages of a public demonstration showing adults delivering cigarette packages to the youngsters in the demonstration location aired on national news.
(“Turkey’s Anti-terrorism Law”, n.d.), which was later amended on July 25, 2010 after continuing uproar from activists and human rights groups.

The imprisonment of children taking part in violent protests raised several concerns. First, although the children did not engage in a direct act of terrorism, they were charged with terrorism because the definition of terrorism in the Law on Combating Terror is broad enough to cover peripheral activities that are committed within the context and in the name of a terrorist organization\(^4\). Accordingly, participation in violent protests that were conducted by the PKK as evidenced by the slogans that praise Abdullah Ocalan, the captured founder of the PKK serving a lifetime imprisonment sentence, and flags of the PKK carried by the demonstrators falls under the terrorism crime as defined by the Law on Combating Terrorism (Eker et al., 2011). A second concern was related to the trial of the accused children in adult courts. The Law on Combating Terror stipulated that children aged between 13 and 17 shall be tried as adults in adult courts for the crimes that fall within the purview of the stated law. A third concern was with regard to the proportionality of the sentences. According to a letter\(^5\) communicated to Thomas Hammarberg, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Turkey on July 1, 2010, 206 children were in correctional facilities for engaging in terrorism, all of whom were released after the above-mentioned amendment. The highest imprisonment sentence given was 7 years and 6 months and the lowest 6 months. These imprisonment terms were perceived to be unjust for a simple act of throwing stones or explosives at the police

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\(^4\) The Turkish Law on Combating Terror defines terrorism as “Any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular, and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by means of pressure, force, and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat.”

officers. It was argued that charges of terrorism for participation in violent protests, treatment of juveniles as adults, and disproportionate sentences as a manifestation of a deterrence-based, heavy-handed response of the government would only serve to aggravate the depth and breadth of the problem by further radicalizing them. Children who were labeled as terrorists would face the stigma associated with the label attached to them throughout their life, feel alienated from the government and security forces due to feelings of victimization and grievances, become more resolute in their inclination towards the PKK, and voluntarily become members of the terrorist organization in the future to the extent of engaging in armed conflicts. This would also hold true for other Kurdish minors sympathizing with the imprisoned children out of shared ethnic background and kinship. It has been claimed that putting children at the front lines of violent demonstrations and inducing them to throw harmful objects at the police was a calculated strategy of the PKK as a recruitment tool\(^6\) (Özeren et al., 2014) in an era where the popular support for the PKK was low (Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011).

The police were aware of this strategy. A case study of the 11 public demonstrations in Diyarbakır province that took place over a 14-month period covering the year 2009 and the first two months of 2010 revealed that the police exercised their power to arrest in a conservative and selective fashion (Eker et al., 2011). A review of the police video footage of the public demonstrations revealed that the police had arrested only about 1.4 percent of the protestors, when the estimated number of protestors in demonstrations and the number of arrests in relation to each demonstration was taken into account. In addition, an interview with a high-level police

\(^6\) Kydd and Walter (2006) call this strategy of terrorist organizations as *provocation*, which they define as “an attempt to induce the enemy to respond to terrorism with indiscriminate violence, which radicalizes the population and moves them to support the terrorists” (p.51). The difference here is that the PKK manipulated punitive Turkish penal code’s indiscriminate harsh response to radicalize the Kurdish youth, which served the same outcome as identified by Kydd and Walter (2006). Although narrower in focus, this strategy can be dubbed as *police-assisted radicalization*. 
A prevalent problem in the region happens to be poor record keeping at hospitals and high rates of home deliveries that result in a gap between the official records and biological age. Thus, despite the fact that many of those who were arrested appear to be juveniles based on official records, they are in fact adults (aged 18 and above) based on the biological age. On the other hand, the police do not have a viable means to prove the real age of those apprehended unless the court orders a physical determination by health professionals.

Public, media, and activist group concerns over the long imprisonment sentences for “stone-throwing kids” have resonated with the political will, and an amendment by the Turkish Parliament softened the Law on Combating Terrorism as it relates to children under the age of 18. The amendment addressed the concerns stated above and put into effect that the Law on Combating Terrorism would no longer apply to minors (under 18); that all minors would be heard before juvenile courts regardless the type of crime they are accused of; and that alternatives to imprisonment such as postponement of the promulgation of sentence, conversion of the sentence into optional sanctions or postponement of sentence would be applicable to minors who commit acts of terror as defined in the Law on Combating Terrorism. As a result, the minors who were in penitentiary facilities were released.

What has been the impact of this amendment on the actual levels of children involvement in violent protests? A report prepared by the Counter-terrorism Department within the central organization of the TNP sheds important light on the extent of the problem in selected cities with

particular emphasis on the effects of an amendment in relation to the criminal justice policies as they apply to juveniles participating in violent public protests in the name of terrorist organizations (Counterterrorism Department, n.d.). The report focuses on the effect of the amendment on the prevalence of violent protests, the use of explosives by children, and prosecution and conviction rates of children with charges of terrorism in relation to violent protests by comparing 15 months average of prevalence rates before and after the amendment (roughly April 2009 – July 2010 vs. August 2010 – October 2011) in 10 cities including Adana, Batman, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, İstanbul, Mardin, Mersin, Muş and Şanlıurfa. The study, although weak in design due to an inability to isolate the effect of the amendment from other concomitant factors, finds an increase of 78 percent in the number of violent protests in which children participated, an increase of 49 percent in the number of children prosecuted for participation in violent protests, a decrease of 60 percent in the conviction rate, and an increase of 112, 1547 and 684 percent in the use of Molotov cocktails, fireworks, and improvised explosives for assault respectively based on a comparison of 15-month aggregates before and after the amendment. The report concludes that the amendment aggravated the problem of violent protests by children in the name of terrorist organizations through eliminating the deterrent effects of incarceration and opening up opportunities for the manipulation of children by the terrorist organization.

The limits of deterrence-based policies in counterterrorism have been addressed extensively in previous research (Braithwaite, 2011; Crenshaw, 2001; Lafree, Dugan, and Korte, 2009; Pickering et al., 2008a; Tyler et al., 2010; Tyler, 2011). Although stated from different perspectives, the general point made is that policies that aim to deter participation in terrorism such as use of force and incarceration may aggravate the problem of terrorism rather than preventing it. Although relaxing of criminal justice responses might have encouraged the
children to participate in violent demonstrations, this increase could also be interpreted as a manifestation of an underlying trend that may have started with the perceived heavy-handed response of the government, that is, incarceration of children, and out of resulting resentment and frustration.

The report (Counterterrorism Department, n.d., p.2) also states, based on information obtained in operations on the PKK, that children who were constantly involved in public protests were recruited by the PKK to fight in the rural areas as they grew older. It is further stated that children who were released from the prison by the amendment were met as heroes in their community and among peers, which may also partially explain the surge of children to the violent protests subsequent to the amendment (p.4). The report finally underscores the importance of reaching out to children by the police in a multilateral fashion to include other governmental agencies, civic organizations, and communities in an effort to save the children from falling prey to the terrorist organizations (p.4).

Concurrent with the growing threat to the Kurdish children from the terrorist organization, the Turkish National Police, as part of an overall strategy to diverge from a model of sole reliance on deterrence, have increased efforts to reach out to the Kurdish minors with a variety of programs and activities that derive their inspiration from community policing as a preventive strategy (Dikici, 2008; Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011; Yıldız and Şahin, 2010). The primary aim of those activities and programs, conducted by the community policing and counterterrorism divisions within each provincial police department (Özeren and Cinoğlu, 2010), is to forge better relations with the local youth doing away with the stereotypical image of police in the eyes of the youth as an oppressive arm of the Turkish government, thus, increase perceptions of legitimacy in an effort to prevent them from succumbing to the propaganda of the
terrorist organizations. These programs were inspired by similar programs implemented in the US by local police departments directed towards youth in the form of awareness-raising, informational, and recreational interventions with the aim of forging better police – youth relationships (Forman, 2004; Presman, Chapman, and Rosen, 2002; Slowikowski and Connelly, 1999; Trojanowicz, Pollard, Colgan, and Harden, 1986).

**Study Context**

This study addresses above-stated research questions using secondary data collected by the Şırnak Police Department through a survey administered to students attending grades six through twelve in nine public schools in the city center of Şırnak in June 2013. Şırnak is a province in southeast Turkey bordering Syria and Iraq. The overall population of the province (il), composed predominantly of people from Kurdish origin, is about 466,982 according to 2012 statistics ranking 43rd largest among 81 provinces (Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), 2013) while that of the city center (merkez ilçesi), where the sample was drawn from, is 63,298. About 57 percent of the population in the city center is male. The province (il) has an area of 2,769 square miles. The city center (merkez ilçesi) has an area of 723.56 square miles, about twice the size of Fairfax County in Virginia.

The province of Şırnak ranks very low among other provinces in terms of economic development indicators such as gross value added score (TUIK, 2013). Şırnak has the highest unemployment rate in Turkey with 15.3 percent according to the statistics for the year 2011. The average unemployment rate for Turkey was 7.9 percent for the same year. About 32 percent of the residents of Şırnak are holders of a green card, which is issued to those who are under the

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8 Provinces in Turkey are comparable to states in the US. Each province is composed of a city center with the same name of the province as well as other cities comparable to counties in the states. Each city is composed of towns and villages.
poverty line for free medical services (Bayhan, 2011). Şırnak has the second lowest literacy rate with 89.58 percent and the second lowest divorce rate with 0.18 percent according to 2012 statistics (TUIK, 2013). The province also ranks high among other provinces as a source for domestic migration movements.

The city of Şırnak features a policing context in which law enforcement and public relations are shaped in relation to counterterrorism. The primary threat to security and public order in the city stems from terrorist activities of the PKK against security forces, civilian public officials such as teachers, and civilians who oppose the PKK and condemn its activities. According to statistics held by the Şırnak Police Department, there were a total of 808 incidents categorized as terrorist activity in 2012 and 2013 in Şırnak. These activities included mostly violent protests, arson, assault, bombing, murder, criminal threats, and seizure of firearms and explosives. Forty-two people were reported as injured as a result of terrorist activities of the PKK only in the last 8 months of the year 2013. A total of 115 minors were detained by the police in 2013 for charges of involvement in terrorist activity.

While it may be true that the threat perception and pressing issues for the local people may be different from those of the police, it would be fair to assume that the primary daily concern for the police officers is the threat to their life from attacks by the members of the PKK, given the past incidents of attacks in Şırnak on police officers. The police killed two terrorists on May 3, 2012 in Şırnak city center when they attacked a Special Forces patrol vehicle. PKK terrorists attacked a police station and riot police headquarters with rocket launchers on August 19, 2012, wounding one police officer. Another attack on October 29, 2012 by the PKK terrorists

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9 By most definitions of terrorism in the literature, attacks on security of forces of a state are not typically categorized as terrorist activity but guerrilla warfare. Yet, such attacks fall under the definition of terrorism according to the Turkish Penal Code. In addition, the emphasis here is on the violent activities of the PKK, a terrorist organization recognized as such by other countries including the US, as the primary factors that shape police and public relations in Şırnak.
led to the death of one police officer and wounding of two other police officers. The above incidents are examples of recent violent activity against security forces that illustrate the extent of threat from PKK-related terrorism in the city of Şırnak. Such attacks on the police translate to a vigilant self-preservation mindset among the police, fortifying police buildings and treating civilians with the suspicion that they may be members of the terrorist organization undertaking reconnaissance or planning an immediate attack. The PKK have been carrying out attacks not only on the security forces but schools and students. On October 9, 2012, PKK supporters attacked several schools with improvised explosives and Molotov cocktails wounding several students in the İdil town (ilçe) in the province of Şırnak. Therefore, for a portion of population in Şırnak, it is fair to assume that terrorism is on the top of the list as a security concern.

Previous research finds that public confidence in the Turkish Police is relatively high in comparison to the levels reported in the European Union, other neighboring countries in the region, and selected Muslim countries (Cao and Burton, 2006). For example, Cao and Burton (2006) found, based on the European Values Survey and the World Values Survey, that about 71 percent of the Turkish respondents in 2000 reported having a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in Turkish police, placing Turkey in the top five countries (top 33 percent) in the European Union with respect to public confidence in police and top three (top 30 percent) among the other countries with predominantly Muslim populations including Turkey’s neighbors. Despite the high levels of trust reported in Turkey in the aggregate, the policing context of Şırnak is likely to feature low levels of legitimacy and trust in the police. Several reasons can be listed for this argument.

Firstly, police officers serving in Şırnak are not from the city itself and are viewed as outsiders. Unlike in the United States, governance in Turkey is highly centralized, and this holds
true for the Turkish National Police (TNP). Personnel management in this highly centralized system dictates that officers may not work in the same city that they are from (based on birth and residence records) unless it is a metropol with a population higher than 1 million residents. For the local people in Şırnak, this means that officers serving in their city are viewed as outsiders who are not to be trusted. Secondly, Şırnak is a province listed within the compulsory geographic rotation under the personnel management strategy of the TNP. It is worth noting that other law enforcement organizations institute mandatory rotation policies. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has a three-year rotation policy, whereas some local police departments in the US require that police reside in the communities they serve. Mandatory rotation policies are usually based on concerns of corruption and favoritism, while mandatory residence requirements are usually based on concerns that the police will not be sufficiently committed to jurisdictions in which they do not reside. In this system of geographic rotation, the eastern and southeastern provinces are categorized into 6 years, 4 years, 3 years and 2 years of compulsory service based on the criteria of economic development and security. Officers are at least twice rotated to the underdeveloped east from the west during their career with the TNP. The period of compulsory service in Şırnak is 2 years. Accordingly, officers rotated to Şırnak view their presence in the city as being temporary and transitional. This short period of service would not be enough to forge lasting and sustainable relationships based on mutual trust with the local people notwithstanding the lack of motivation to do so on the part of the officers. Thirdly, officers in Şırnak have minimal informal contact with the local people. They tend to live in well-protected government apartments dedicated solely to police officers. These apartments are protected with armed guards around the clock and feature amenities such as day care, playground, and market minimizing the requirement to leave the safe and secure environment. Accordingly, casual contact with the local
people is minimal, thus contributing to the lack of trust and legitimacy. In addition, officers serving in Şırnak, as is the case with other eastern and southeastern provinces, have low levels of trust in the public due to an inability to distinguish between the terrorists, their supporters, and non-supporters of the PKK among the people with whom they come into contact. The security context requires officers to treat everybody as a potential suspect who might be undertaking reconnaissance or planning an attack on police officers. In fact, there have been past instances of assassinations of unsuspecting police officers serving in the region by terrorists in plain clothes\textsuperscript{10}. This mutual lack of trust creates a vicious circle of mistrust between the public and the police.

The fourth reason that people in Şırnak may lack trust in the police relates to the ethnic divide between the officers and local people. Şırnak is a province with a majority of its people of Kurdish origin. Law enforcement as a profession appeals to people of Turkish origin. There exist Kurdish police officers too but their number is minimal as compared to Turkish officers\textsuperscript{11}. In addition, the majority of people in Şırnak, particularly elderly with no schooling, speak Kurdish only while most officers do not speak the language, contributing to the lack of communication between the police and local people, thereby, to the lack of trusting relationships.

The fifth reason for lack of trust and legitimacy is related to the past experiences of local people with law enforcement (Gozubenli and Akbas, 2009). In the 1980s and ’90s, the region where Şırnak is located was declared under a state of emergency as a result of a high number of attacks on security forces and civilians that resulted in tens of thousands dead. In this time period, certain government officials including some members of the TNP, gendarmerie, and the military are known to have engaged in extralegal practices (Davies et al., 2012) such as torture, inhumane treatment, forced evacuations of villages, and extrajudicial killings against the

\textsuperscript{10} PKK members in the mountain camps have distinct attire.
\textsuperscript{11} The Department of Personnel in Turkey does not hold ethnicity information of the personnel.
terrorists, their families, and people suspected of supporting them. Such practices have engendered grievances among local Kurdish population against all government officials who are serving in the region (Alkan, 2009a; 2009b; Ekici, 2008; Gozubenli and Akbas, 2009; Sevinç, 2013). Therefore, it is safe to assume that the local people in Şırnak also distrust the police regardless of the fact that the police in Turkey have taken important steps with regard to respect for human rights and democratic policing.

Finally, the presence of a terrorist organization that is manipulating every opportunity for propaganda purposes puts trust and legitimacy at stake. In an ordinary crime context, the policing game as it relates to trust and legitimacy can be set up between two actors of police and citizens. However, in a terrorism context, another party, the terrorist organization, emerges as another actor in the game. It is in the interest of a terrorist organization that communities are distrustful of law enforcement. Terrorists have a lot at stake when the public trust the police and cooperate with them. Accordingly, terrorist groups will manipulate every opportunity to widen the gap between the police and the minority communities the terrorists purport to represent.

Counterterrorism activities of the police such as killing of terrorists in skirmishes, crackdown operations on terrorist cells, and capturing of active supporters such as financers, however legitimate, present opportunities open to manipulation and portrayal as manifestations of discrimination and oppression through supporters, the media, and nowadays to a large extent on the internet.

Based on the above reasons, the policing environment of Şırnak falls squarely under the “low bridging (capital), high bonding (capital)\textsuperscript{12}” environment under Hawdon’s (2008) typology.

\textsuperscript{12} Bridging capital refers to the social capital a community has for those from outside, while bonding capital refers to the social capital that bonds a community together. Hence bridging capital is the type of social capital between, while bonding capital within.
The author defines neighborhoods marked with low bridging capital and high bonding capital as follows:

*Low bridging, high bonding.* These neighborhoods will be the most difficult to police. The low levels of bridging capital will dampen the perceived legitimacy of the institution of policing. In addition, the high bonding among the residents creates an environment that protects “insiders” from “outsiders”. Officers, as outsiders, are not likely to be trusted, further deteriorating the lack of legitimacy with which they enter a situation. In fact, officers in these neighborhoods are likely to be approached with latent, if not manifest, hostility. They are outsiders who represent a perceived illegitimate impersonal social order. They have “no business” being here and “no right” to impose their will on residents. In these situations, the emphasis is primarily on issues of procedural justice. Officers must “earn” the residents’ trust by respecting not only individual residents, but also the neighborhood’s culture and traditions. Residents of this tightly knit neighborhood will quickly share stories of any officer misconduct or disrespectful behavior, thereby further eroding any sense of legitimacy in the police as an institution (p.194).

Hawdon (2008) further argues that the type of policing that should be pursued in such communities is community policing. “In these neighborhoods, community policing will not only be the most effective style of policing but possibly the only style that will not inflame the already tense police-resident relationship (p. 195)”.

Şırnak Police Department has been implementing several initiatives with juveniles as part of a strategy to forge better relations with the local youth. These programs include the following activities: out-of town cultural tours, within-town cultural tours, visits to police facilities, presentations on police services, organizing sports tournaments, financial assistance to 100 students for private lessons in preparation for university exams, clothing assistance to children from needy families, conferences, and family visits on religious festivals.
Significance of the Research

This study makes potentially important contributions to the literature by addressing the three identified gaps above, which have received only scant attention in past research. The first of these gaps relates to the effect of community policing on the perceptions of legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police in a counterterrorism context. The second gap is the dearth of cross-national evidence on the salience of procedural justice to the enhancement of perceptions of police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate. The third gap identified is if procedural justice is an intervening variable that mediates the effects of community policing on attitudes toward police, combining both perspectives of community policing and procedural justice into a single model. Answering these research questions also makes contributions to the growing body of research on attitudes toward the police among juveniles (Hassell and Freiburger, 2011; Murphy and Gaylor, 2010).

This study uses data from Turkey to answer the research questions. There is scant research in public attitudes toward police in Turkey (Alpkan and Palacı, 2008; Cao and Burton, 2006; Delice and Dağlar, 2011; Delice and Duman, 2012; Karakus, McGarrell, and Basibuyuk, 2011) and this study is one of the very first efforts to study attitudes toward police among juveniles in the terrorism-stricken part of the country. Moreover, despite the growing attention paid to the community policing initiatives as part of counterterrorism efforts, I have found no published study that evaluates the impact of such initiatives on juveniles’ perceptions of police legitimacy and their willingness to cooperate with the police. Therefore, this study yields important empirical evidence for the literature, evidence that could also be of use to police executives engaged in the planning and implementation of such initiatives.
Definitions of Key Terms

Terrorism: The definition of terrorism varies in legislation across the globe and in academia. This study does not aim to provide an analysis of terrorist attacks (i.e., using attacks as the unit of analysis) but an analysis of the impact of community policing implementation and procedural justice theory on the outcomes of legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police in a jurisdiction where attacks on certain groups of civilians and security forces face an omnipresent threat by a terrorist organization, the PKK, which enjoys widespread public support from within the jurisdiction. Therefore, a definition of terrorism is not crucial to the validity of the results. However, following the general tendency in terrorism research to provide a definition of terrorism. I adopt the definition provided by Forst (2009, p.5):

Terrorism is the premeditated and unlawful use or threatened use of violence against a noncombatant population or target having symbolic significance, with the aim of either inducing political change through intimidation and destabilization or destroying a population identified as an enemy.

Legitimacy: The definition of legitimacy adopted here is as follows: “a property of an authority that leads people to feel that that authority or institution is entitled to be deferred to and obeyed” (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003, p. 514).

Procedural Justice: Procedural justice refers to “the fairness of processes through which the police make decisions and exercise authority” (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003, p. 514). As I further discuss in Chapter 4, procedural justice comprises of two dimensions: quality of decision making, and quality of interpersonal interaction.

Organization of the Following Chapters

This chapter introduced the specific research questions that warrant the current study on police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police and the study context for the area
from which the data to answer the identified research questions were gathered. The following three chapters introduce a review of the literature. Chapter 2 introduces a discussion of the role of community policing in counterterrorism particularly focusing on how police organizations can perform their expected role in countering terrorism employing the basic tenets of community policing. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of community policing implementation in Turkey particularly as it applies to Kurdish children and youth. Chapter 4 outlines the link between community policing and procedural justice with particular emphasis on their hypothesized effects on police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police. This chapter concludes with the introduction of research hypotheses to be tested. Chapter 5 describes the data to be used to test the research hypotheses and discusses threats to internal validity, external validity, statistically validity, and measurement validity and reliability. Chapter 6 presents the quantitative findings from exploratory factor analysis (EFA), confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation modeling (SEM). Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation with a discussion of the findings, limitations to the study, and suggestions for future research.
CHAPTER 2
COMMUNITY POLICING AND COUNTERTERRORISM

Introduction

This chapter addresses the question of whether community policing and counterterrorism policing are compatible. Most of the studies reviewed focus on the policing context of the United States since scholarly debate on the issue concentrated mostly on the counterterrorism experience of this country after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Nonetheless, these discussions are relevant to the counterterrorism context within other countries such as Turkey because the conclusions and lessons learned are universal and applicable to the other countries composed of diverse ethnic communities. This chapter first aims to provide a working understanding of what community policing is. Having covered the definitional issues, it situates the basic contributions of community policing in the role of police in counterterrorism.

Definition of Community Policing

Community policing is a nebulous phrase and has come to mean different things to different people. It is difficult to define community policing because it is a complex and comprehensive policing style that can hardly be captured in a single definition. The definition by Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) captures the essentials of community policing:

Community Policing is a new philosophy of policing, based on the concept that police officers and private citizens working together in creative ways can help solve contemporary community problems related to crime, fear of crime, social and physical disorder, and neighborhood decay. The philosophy is predicated on the belief that achieving these goals requires that police departments develop a new relationship with the law-abiding people in the community, allowing them a greater voice in setting local police priorities and involving them in efforts to improve the overall quality of life in their neighborhoods. It shifts the focus of police work from handling random calls to solving community problems (p. 5).
Although the origins of community policing is attributed to Sir Robert Peel, who founded the Metropolitan Police in London in 1829, community policing as we know it today emerged in the US around the 1980s largely in response to criticisms directed at the police around that time and over the preceding two decades. The need for and the move towards community policing arose from a legitimacy crisis in American policing entrenched in traditional policing, a reactive style of policing that distances the police from communities and focuses on crime fighting (Kelling and Moore, 1988). Of course, in the historical context of policing the US, traditional policing was the result of a reform movement to professionalize the police who used to be perceived as the coercive arm of the politicians and were notorious for their involvement in high levels of corruption. Much like traditional policing was a reform movement to professionalize and distance the police from politics, such was community and problem-oriented policing to move the police closer to their customers, namely the communities they serve.

**Interpretations**

Community policing has been conceived in highly flexible terms. Greene (2000) contends that community policing has three particular interpretations that have emerged in time with their separate focus and prescribed role for the police: community oriented policing (COP), problem oriented policing (POP) and zero tolerance policing (ZTP). Although COP is in tandem with the POP and there exist major overlaps between the two, the difference appears to be a matter of focus in policing priorities. While COP focuses on community engagement and forging better relations with the communities through which police mobilize average citizens in the coproduction of safety (Trojanowicz and Bucquieu, 1990), POP, first proposed and introduced by Goldstein (1979, 1990), focuses more on the resolution of the underlying causes of recurring problems plaguing the communities and affecting the quality of life. On the other hand, ZTP,
which is rooted in the broken windows paradigm (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) suggests relentless enforcement of even minor infractions of the rules and laws so that police can prevent disorder and crime before they take hold within the community. ZTP appears to be more in tune with the traditional policing with an aggressive law enforcement focus and is commonly associated with the militarization of police (Kraska, 2007), a counter-movement to community policing that existed simultaneously with the wider adoption of community policing within the police institutions. Throughout this dissertation, I will be referring to COP and POP when I use the term community policing.

Community policing can be best explicated in terms of its core tenets and dimensions. Yet, there does not appear to be a single classification. For example, Bayley (1994) identified the core dimensions of community policing as consultation, adaptation, mobilization, and problem solving. Cordner (2000) identified them as philosophical, tactical, strategic, and organizational, whereas Maguire and Katz (2002) identified patrol officer activities, management activities, citizen activities, and organizational activities. Generally, three dimensions emerge when cross-cutting issues are taken into account: community engagement and partnerships, problem solving, and organizational change. I will use these three dimensions to organize how community policing can contribute to counterterrorism policing objectives after I explicate the role of police in counterterrorism.

**The Role of Police in Counterterrorism**

Having explicated what community policing is, it is important to delineate the role of the police in counterterrorism so that we may answer the question how community policing can serve counterterrorism objectives. The responses of governments to terrorism, which can be broadly termed as counterterrorism, involve many policy alternatives from social policies to
policing and war. Yet, policing is an integral part of any counterterrorism effort in democracies founded on the rule of law. Terrorism is a crime by nature, and police are tasked with bringing to justice perpetrators of terrorism. Police in democracies are required to perform a variety of tasks in countering terrorism. It should be acknowledged that there is variation across the globe in terms of the extent to which police organizations are involved in counterterrorism (Bayley and Weisburd, 2009; Lum et al., 2009; Haberfeld et al., 2009). While for some countries such as Turkey and the UK, with long histories of domestic terrorism experience, counterterrorism has always been within the mandate of the police, some police departments as in the case of the US may have only minimal involvement in counterterrorism despite a greater emphasis placed on involving the local police departments in counterterrorism (Forst, in press). Some factors may account for this variation in involvement such as threat assessment, governance, geography, and resources among others (Bayley and Weisburd, 2009; Lum et al., 2009). For example, in the US, where policing is highly decentralized, local police departments that serve small communities and do not have sizeable Muslim-American communities and attractive targets for terrorism may only have a superficial or selective involvement in counterterrorism efforts, for example, devoting resources more to the protection of critical infrastructure than investigative or intelligence gathering efforts (Maguire and King, 2011; Thacher, 2005). Therefore, the tasks of the police in counterterrorism in their entirety I delineate below apply only to police departments that are fully engaged in counterterrorism, such as municipal police departments in the US (e.g., New York Police Department and Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, DC) and centralized police departments across the globe such as in Turkey.

“Terrorism is crime in the extreme” (Forst, 2011, p. 274). Terrorism is defined as crime in the penal code of any democracy, and violations are subjected to punishment with a sentence
typically following criminal justice proceedings. In addition, terror attacks also by their nature involve other crimes such as homicide and arson (Forst, 2009). In that sense, terrorism requires more police attention than many other types of crimes. Accordingly, typical crime fighting strategies and tactics, such as preventive efforts and investigative tools, are also applicable to terrorism (Wilkinson, 2011). On the other hand, incidents of domestic terrorism are rare, and the nature of terrorism and its perpetrators differ tremendously from other types of crimes and criminals, complicating things for the police particularly in terms of prevention and response.

One source of distinction between terrorism and crime is the goals each aims to achieve. Terrorism is typically perpetrated to realize political objectives such as “regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, and status quo maintenance” (Kydd and Walter, 2006, p. 52) through strategies such as attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding (p. 51). Unlike ordinary street criminals, terrorists perpetrate their acts for a higher purpose that is the source of political objectives the organization strives for rather than personal material gains, at least from the point of view organizational objectives rather than individual. This higher purpose is so motivating for their adherents that they are willing to die for it. The implication for the police is that commonplace preventive efforts might not prove to be adequate to deter terrorists who are willing to make the ultimate sacrifice for their cause.

When terrorism is viewed as a communicative action, a means of “sending a message” to the adversary, terrorist attacks fall under two categories based on the target selection: symbolic crimes and signal crimes (Innes, 2006). Terrorism as a symbolic crime refers to cases where a target of symbolic significance is selected for attack that represents the adversary. This symbolic target can be individuals (i.e., non-combatant civilians such as government officials who represent an adversary), places (e.g., Washington, DC as the capital of US) or buildings (such as
HSBC Bank in Istanbul, which was attacked by the Al-Qaida in 2003, representing the UK or the west at large). On the other hand, terrorism as a signal crime refers to attacks that result in mass casualties that purposefully aim to engender widespread and high levels of fear among the target populace (Forst, 2009; 2011). Innes (2006) states that since most terrorist attacks have elements of both symbolic and signal crimes, it is more useful to think of these characteristics on a continuum than as mutually exclusive categories. That is to say, one characteristic usually is dominant on the other in a given terror incident.

Unlike common crimes, terror attacks when successful tend to create a highly visible mayhem that requires police and other public services to respond in coordination to mitigate and recover from. In fact, terrorists engage in terrorist attacks with the purposes of receiving media attention and inflicting extreme fear among a populace defined as the enemy (Forst, 2009) through which they gain leverage and power to achieve their political goals (Hoffman, 2006). Moreover, terrorist attacks can also engender or deepen interracial, inter-ethnic, inter-religious, and/or intra-religious conflicts in societies leading to a social turmoil that turns into a vicious circle that is propelled by mutual acts of hate for the other between groups in conflict. These characteristics of terrorist acts and their perpetrators all suggest that police have a crucial but a much more challenging role in policing terrorism than ordinary crime.

**Models for Counterterrorism Policing**

What does the police role involve in countering terrorism? Thacher (2005) envisages the police role in counterterrorism as a two-dimensional model that is composed of *offender search* and *community protection* functions, the former referring to “emergency response and protective security for potential targets” (p. 636-637) and the latter “investigative efforts to locate those who have committed or intend to commit terrorist acts” (p.637). Innes (2006) adds that these two
functions can be performed prospectively (pre-crime) and retrospectively (post-crime). The typology developed by Innes (2006) is presented in Table 1. Prospective counterterrorism functions are performed before incidents of terrorist attacks in a proactive manner while retrospective functions after, in a reactive manner. Offender search functions are typically associated with investigative efforts that are predominantly dependent on the collection and analysis of actionable intelligence to deter and disrupt terrorist activities and prosecute members of terrorist organizations (prospective) and to identify perpetrators of a successfully executed terrorist activity for prosecution and criminal justice proceedings (retrospective).

Table 1

*Four Strands of Counterterrorism Activity, adopted from Innes (2006, p. 227)*

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Offender Search</th>
<th>Community Protection</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prospective</td>
<td>Identifying and surveillance of the activities of “high-risk” groups and their members; disrupting activities of potential threat groups; investigating and prosecuting acts preparatory to terrorism</td>
<td>Target hardening and creating a “harsh environment” for the conduct of terrorism; public resilience and preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective</td>
<td>Investigating, arresting, and prosecuting suspects allegedly involved in committing an attack</td>
<td>Monitoring community tensions; public reassurance through “perceptual interventions”</td>
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</table>

Community protection in prospective manner involves target hardening and preparing communities against terrorist attacks that might occur despite prevention efforts as well as preparing and fine-tuning emergency response plans with first responder organizations and training communities on responses to terrorism (Innes, 2006). Terrorist attacks typically engender backlashes on communities that are held responsible for the attack as was the case in the US after the 9/11 attacks where Muslim Americans and other minority communities taken for
Muslims such as Sikhs experienced hate crimes. Community protection in retrospective manner, therefore, involves police taking action to prevent backlashes to suspect communities and interfaith or interethnic tensions following successfully executed terrorist attacks (Innes, 2006). In addition, retrospective community protection entails police to provide reassurance to communities through increased presence in public spaces and the utilization of mass media. (Innes, 2006).

Another conceptual model on police role in counterterrorism is presented by Greene (2011). The model is a three dimensional and time-bound such as the following: primary (Time 1), secondary (Time 2), and tertiary (Time 3) intervention. Primary intervention refers to prevention efforts corresponding to prospective roles under Innes’ (2006) model. Secondary intervention occurs in the immediate aftermath a successfully executed terrorist attack in the form of emergency response whereas tertiary interventions involve mitigation of the effects of attacks. “Time 1 represents activities associated with gathering intelligence to prevent or interdict terrorism, Time 2 represents emergency responses to terrorism events, and Time 3 represents efforts to mitigate the effects of terrorism or in some sense to recover” (p. 236).

In addition to the models by Innes (2006) and Greene (2011), it is also important to state the highly simple British model of counterterrorism summarized as PREVENT, PURSUE, PROTECT, and PREPARE usually shortened as 4P model. In another study, Bayley and Weisburd (2009) have identified a somewhat more detailed list of police activities as their responsibilities within the context of counterterrorism such as the following which tends to mesh with the Greene’s (2011) time-bound model:

(1) Covert detection
(2) Disruption/dismantling of terrorist plots
(3) Risk analysis
(4) Target hardening
(5) Community mobilization for prevention
(6) Protection of important persons and infrastructure
(7) Emergency assistance at terrorist incidents
(8) Order maintenance when terrorism occurs
(9) Mitigation of terrorist damage
(10) Criminal investigation of terrorist incidents (Bayley and Weisburd, 2009, p.87)

**Traditional vs. Community-based Counterterrorism**

It greatly matters how and in which manner police perform their tasks in countering terrorism as well as what tasks they prioritize over others for the outlook of police, particularly among minority communities. Are the police employing aggressive, preemptive, and vigilant tactics such as stop and search, treating minority communities as suspect, undertaking covert intelligence gathering tactics, or trying to recruit informants among minority communities? However legitimate and justifiable such tactics may be, their overuse, which is how traditional police response to terrorism manifests itself, brings to forth the risk that not only minorities but majority communities will question the trust they afford the police (Huq et al., 2011b).

Moreover, such tactics, once get hold in an organization, they have a tendency to pervade into the everyday practice of policing, leading to the greater militarization of the police (Kraska, 2007). In that sense, much like community policing is defined in terms of how it is different from traditional policing within the context of ordinary crime (see Greene, 2000), it is possible to differentiate counterterrorism policing that is based on community policing from that based on a traditional one. In this section, I will explicate the characteristics of traditional counterterrorism policing and community-based counterterrorism policing in the next sections based on the previously identified three dimensions of community policing.

Historically, the response of countries across the globe to emerging threat from domestic or transnational terrorism has been reliant on the use of hard power. The traditional approach to
counterterrorism typically is predicated on the use of hard policing methods and tactics such as “the use of informants, covert policing operations and police officers, the use of stop and search, surveillance and other means” (Spalek and MacDonald, 2012, p. 20) as well as “surreptitiously searching homes, and detaining people for extended periods of time without filing charges or granting them access to legal counsel” (Brown, 2007, p. 240). With its emphasis on covert policing tactics, traditional counterterrorism policing focuses on the actors of terrorism, namely terrorists, to the neglect of underlying causes that provide a fertile ground for the proliferation of terrorism (Sevinç, 2013).

Traditional counterterrorism policing is militaristic in nature (Murray, 2005; Pickering et al., 2008a) with its emphasis on the use of hard power such as tactical operations on terrorists and their supporters. This model typically manifests itself in the use of “war on terror” rhetoric to define the general nature of the engagement of police with terrorism and terrorists.

Traditional counterterrorism policing focuses on criminal intelligence that is used to build a case against terrorists for criminal justice proceedings (Innes, 2006). This type of policing is more in tune with offender search functions (Thacher, 2006) which are performed prospectively to prevent future terrorist attacks and/or retrospectively to capture those who are responsible for incidents of terrorist attacks (Innes, 2006). In order to obtain criminal intelligence, police often resort to covert intelligence gathering means and sources such as informants, undercover agents, physical surveillance, and the interception of communication. This is particularly the case due to the secrecy on which terrorists rely to avoid detection. Quite expectedly, obtaining secret information requires the use of methods that violate secrecy within the constraints of the rule of law. On the other hand, secret investigative methods tend to come bundled with social costs, particularly as they concern the police-community relations.
Traditional counterterrorism is deterrence based. Police focus on criminal investigations of terrorism to bring those responsible to justice on the underlying belief that punishment will deter not only those subject to criminal justice proceedings (primary deterrence) but also other current or potential terrorists (secondary deterrence) who, based on the assumption that they are rational calculators, will weigh the costs (long imprisonment terms) against benefits, material or non-material, they may accrue from engaging in terrorism. The hopeful outcome is that costs will outweigh benefits and likely terrorists will be deterred. The deterrent effect of punishment rests on the qualities of punishment, which needs to be severe (severity), swift (celerity), and certain (certainty). While research finds a limited effect of deterrence policies on ordinary crimes, it is only wishful thinking to expect such policies to deter terrorism (Clarke and Newman, 2007). “Those who are willing to die for their beliefs are unlikely to be deterred by the risk of death or punishment” (p. 10). In addition, deterrence often backlashes by inducing defiance (Braithwaite, 2011) and leads to more attacks and greater support for terrorists by inducing perceived or real grievances (Brown, 2007; Lafree and Hendrickson, 2007). For example, Timothy McVeigh bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in revenge for the federal raid on the Branch Davidian compound. Deterrence policies were found to be counterproductive in several studies (Ciftci, 2013; Lafree et al., 2009; Unal, 2012).

Traditional counterterrorism is reactive. Traditional counterterrorism in that sense deals with the symptoms of terrorism rather than the root causes that engender terrorism. Of course, although one would suggest that dealing with root causes is far beyond the purview of police, it is important that police also become a part of the larger efforts to address the root causes along with other public and civil organizations.
The following table, adopted from Pickering et al. (2008a), provides a summary comparison of traditional and community-based counterterrorism approaches.

Table 2

*Comparison of Traditional and Community-based Counterterrorism Approaches, adopted from Pickering et al. (2008a)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Traditional Counterterrorism Model</th>
<th>Community based Counterterrorism Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Aim</strong></td>
<td>Eradicate terrorism through force</td>
<td>Increased trust and legitimacy between community and police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emphasis</strong></td>
<td>Covert intelligence and reliance on coercive powers</td>
<td>Dispersed community/police interaction Diverse contributions to democratic policing Decrease sense of insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community engagement</strong></td>
<td>Trough covert contact or operations</td>
<td>Increased community liaison of all operational members Partnerships with minority community leaders and individuals Enhanced quality of interaction Diverse forums of interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community</strong></td>
<td>Sectarian</td>
<td>Utilization and expansion of community interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prevention of terrorist incident</strong></td>
<td>Through police led intelligence gathering</td>
<td>As a result of increased trust and legitimacy appropriate community intelligence made available to police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CT capacity of operational members</strong></td>
<td>CT specialized function of elite sections of police organization</td>
<td>All operational members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational approach</strong></td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Ideally decentralized Diffuse with some centralization otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intended outcomes</strong></td>
<td>Increased alienation and suppression of targeted groups</td>
<td>Increased legitimacy and public cooperation Decreased or aligned sense of insecurity (fear of terrorism) Social cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unintended outcomes</strong></td>
<td>Alienation of suspect communities Decreased legitimacy within suspect communities</td>
<td>Perception that the police are soft on terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There may be a demand for traditional counterterrorism from the politicians and members of the majority communities especially in the aftermath of terrorist attacks (Murray, 2005; Pickering et al., 2008a, p. 10). The tendency to put the blame on law enforcement agencies for...
failing to obtain intelligence regarding terrorist attacks before they occur is a driver for law enforcement to concentrate on traditional responses that focus on intelligence gathering and tactical operations. On the supply side, action-oriented police culture also favors this model (Murray, 2005).

Overreliance on traditional reactive responses introduces a number of problems. Traditional counterterrorism policing methods are resource-draining. Taking wiretapping as an example, it takes a number of officers around the clock to monitor the communication of a single target not mentioning the infrastructure and equipment required. The allocation of resources disproportionately to traditional counterterrorism policing then takes up resources that could have been put into use to respond to other problems that communities are more concerned about (Hasisi, Alpert, and Flynn, 2009). The diminishing levels of public satisfaction resulting from inattentiveness to more pressing community concerns by the police threaten the legitimacy of the police.

Such practices as covert investigative methods and tactical operations as well as ethnic profiling will lead to the perception on the part of the communities that they are being singled out, discriminated against, and treated unfairly by the government, further contributing to the alienation and marginalization of these groups. Huq et al. (2011a) found that police practices that target and harass Muslim communities were negatively related to perceptions of legitimacy of police among Muslim communities in the UK. As a result, traditional counterterrorism is likely to create a fertile ground for increasing public support for terrorism on the one hand (Pickering et al., 2008a), and reduce community trust and legitimacy of the police as well as cooperation on the other (Huq et al., 2011a; Lyons, 2002).
Of course, covert investigations and use of force should not be abandoned altogether (Vila and Savage, 2011). There will be situations that will necessitate the use of such policing methods and tactics. But it is important to be cognizant of the limits of traditional policing and their implications on police – community relations, particularly with the communities that are the targets of counterterrorism policies, as well as the inflation of popular support for terrorists when overreliance on traditional policing prevails. Community-based counterterrorism that is rooted in community policing may avoid the trappings of the traditional militaristic counterterrorism policing (Friedmann and Cannon, 2009) while never coming short of achieving the tasks and responsibilities outlined in the previous section. The next section addresses how the three core dimensions of community policing, organizational adaptation, problem-solving, and partnerships can help achieve counterterrorism objectives.

**Dimensions of Community Policing and their Relevance to Counterterrorism**

In this section, I will elaborate on the three dimensions of community policing -- problem solving, organizational change, and partnerships -- and how each dimension can serve to the fulfillment of the counterterrorism functions identified previously. In doing so, I put much of the emphasis on the partnerships dimension and discuss it after the two other dimensions.

**Problem Solving**

The problem solving dimension of community policing is borrowed from the problem-oriented policing, which “is considerably more focused on discrete crime and social-order problems” (Greene, 2011, p. 216), unlike community policing, which is generalized. Problem oriented policing has been generally considered in tandem with community policing. The overlap between the two types of policing is that problem-oriented policing usually involves
communities in the identification and prioritization of pressing community problems as well as their interventions and assessment.

Problem solving is a cornerstone of community policing. Problem solving has typically been conceived in terms of resolution of the recurring problems (i.e., specific types of crimes or quality of life matters) and the underlying reasons for crime and disorder (e.g., shabby vacant houses) in a given community. Problem solving typically is a cyclical four-stage process composed of Scan, Analyze, Respond, and Assess (SARA). Police departments employing problem-solving are encouraged to scan and detect underlying causes of crime and disorder in their jurisdiction, preferably in consultation with community members, as well as utilization of police statistics; analyze and understand the root causes of community problems and produce innovative solutions; then implement and assess the effectiveness of solutions. The process is cyclical in that assessment of phase is linked back to other stages when an applied solution fails to bring about the desired outcome or simply to apply lessons learned to the resolution of other problems.

Based on the available empirical evidence on the effectiveness of community policing, Greene (2011) contends that “it may be this platform (community engagement) that policing terrorism most vitally needs – one focused on fear management, response, and mitigation, rather than prevention” (p. 223), which are the deliverables of community policing.

Greene (2011) posits that community policing strategies might not help much with regard to the prevention of terrorism. Such skepticism is justified given the empirical evidence that community policing has been most successful in community engagement and fear of crime than prevention of crime in the US. One might be hesitant to propose a direct theoretical causal relationship between prevention of terrorism and community policing when one thinks in terms
of falsifiable hypotheses that can be tested with empirically rigorous research because terrorism does not lend itself easily to empirical testing particularly when it comes to prevention for various reasons, but most notably due to the very infrequent nature of terrorism (Forst, 2009; Lum and Koper, 2011; Lynch, 2011), except for few countries experiencing high volume of terrorist attacks. On the other hand, community policing and problem solving can have indirect contributions to the prevention of terrorism, which may not be quantitatively captured. For example, problem solving methodology can inform prevention and preparation efforts, particularly regarding the identification of high risk targets, assessment of vulnerabilities, and the assignment of priorities for resources (Pelfrey, 2005; Scheider and Chapman, 2003). Beyond the difficulty of measuring the benefits of problem solving, this dimension is also considered a useful approach to dealing with community fear of terrorism (Scheider and Chapman, 2003).

Despite the focus on recurring underlying problems in the traditional sense of problem-solving policing, one could argue that it can also be applied to new and emerging problems, particularly as they relate to terrorism, that a department comes across within its area of responsibility. Police departments can contribute to counterterrorism efforts in important ways through a philosophy of problem-solving. What we know is that terrorist attacks are highly rare and unpredictable in terms of both spatial and temporal order. On the other hand, we can foresee that some terrorist attacks will occur in the aftermath of certain provocative incidents, although we may not be able to predict exactly when and where the attack will occur. For illustrative purposes, it would be helpful to examine the case of Terry Jones, the Florida-based pastor who publicly burnt the Quran, the holy book of Muslims, with his congregation in a way to protest Islam and Muslims they indiscriminately held responsible as a whole for the 9/11 attacks. In this globalized world the distinction between the local and the global has blurred. Local incidents
tend to have global implications especially when the incidents relate to groups of people and their sentiments. The Arab Spring sparked off with the suicide of an unemployed young man by burning himself to protest the Tunisian government. The airing of a movie in the US that depicted the Prophet Muhammad in an insulting way led to the killing of the US ambassador to Libya along with three other Americans when angry mobs over the movie breached the US embassy in this country, which is clearly a terrorist act based on the definition adopted in this study. The same happened after Terry Jones publicly burnt Qurans in Gainesville, Florida. The local incident of burning Quran in Florida on March 21, 2011 was the cause of an attack by the Afghani locals who were thought to have links to Taliban on the United Nations compound in Mazar-i Sharif in Afghanistan, killing seven UN personnel. Given the repercussions of such local incidents in other parts of the world, or possibly where provocative incidents occur, creating avoidable conflicts and terrorist attacks that result in human loss of life, the local police conducting their business in terms of problem solving and community policing would consider ways to discourage and prevent such incidences. The most recent act of Terry Jones who set out to burn 2,998 Qurans to mark the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks was interrupted by the local sheriff through arrest for the charges of carrying inflammables illegally and a visible weapon. We are unaware of any efforts the local police made to prevent the provocative activities of Jones other than the recent arrest, which was clearly a traditional policing response that provides justifications for the claims that departments that employ problem solving still resort to traditional solutions such as law enforcement rather than creative and innovative ones. On the other hand, this example illustrates how problem solving can help prevent future terrorist attacks in an indirect way through handling of situations that are precursors to terrorism.
While the example above is a highly specific example where a problem-solving philosophy could be instrumental to the prevention of reactive terrorist attacks, it can also have wider and more general implications such as in terms of police-minority community relations. Problem-solving can be particularly useful to gaining the trust of the minority communities by the provision of quality service (Lum et al., 2009; Lum and Koper, 2011). When police departments engage in problem solving to resolve the problems of the minority communities, they imply that minority communities are viewed as a part of the society deserving security services from the police as much as majority communities do. Such fairness (Bradford, 2012) would run contrary to the anticipated fears of minority communities that police would differentially and discriminatorily treat them simply out of stereotypical generalizations from terrorists to communities they claim to represent. Consequently, the perception that police do not succumb to stereotypes and demonstrate fairness in service delivery (Bradford, 2012) should increase legitimacy of the police as well as trust leading to greater willingness to cooperate with the police to counter terrorism together.

The problem-solving orientation also emphasizes organizational learning and applying lessons learned to future problems. Remember that the problem-solving process is cyclical, in that assessment of the efficacy of the interventions connects back to the scanning or later phases so that effective solutions can be applied to similar problems. Greene (2011) contends that this orientation should enable police to apply lessons learned from the mitigation of the effects of terrorism to prevention strategies (p. 237-238).

**Organizational Adaptation**

Organizational change typically involves decentralization, despecialization, flattening of organizational hierarchy, permanent beat assignments, and increasing discretion of street level
officers (Wells and Maguire, 2009). These elements of organizational change provide a solid basis for community policing to flourish. In terms of prevention, it is argued that officers permanently assigned to neighborhoods might be able to identify signs of an attack before it occurs (Scheider and Chapman, 2003; Kappeler and Gaines, 2009). In addition, officers working in the same neighborhood over time gain the trust of community members who will be more willing to share information with the police out of trusting relationships formed.

Decentralization, which requires officers to be spatially dispersed, can prove to be useful particularly in the immediate aftermath of an attack because such geographic dispersion enables officers to respond quickly to incidents (Kappeler and Gaines, 2009). Community policing also makes better first responders out of officers by inducing them to be more familiar with the community and providing them with an opportunity to use discretion, thus, practice decision-making skills, which may prove to be crucial to the effectiveness of responses to terrorist attacks when swift and right decisions need to be made (Scheider and Chapman, 2003; Kappeler and Gaines, 2009). Flattened hierarchy should also improve the efficiency of organization responding to a terrorist attack because it allows for a faster communication within the organization with fewer bureaucratic barriers (Scheider and Chapman, 2003; Kappeler and Gaines, 2009). Scheider and Chapman (2003) also contend that repeated officer-citizen contacts as a result of emphasis placed on permanent beat assignments will enable officers to detect and respond to community fear of terrorism.

**Partnerships and Community Engagement**

A cornerstone and the most relevant dimension of community policing to counterterrorism role of police is community engagement and partnerships. Partnerships have historically been established with community groups and businesses, as well as other public
agencies that are stakeholders in addressing community problems such as crime and disorder. I will first address the issues surrounding partnerships with community groups, particularly with out-groups. I will discuss how partnerships can contribute to the policing of terrorism as well as factors that condition their success. I will conclude this section with a discussion of agency partnerships and their relevance to counterterrorism.

**Community Partnerships**

Customers of police services within a counterterrorism context can be broadly categorized into majority and suspect minority communities, which may be, advertently or inadvertently, harboring terrorists. Ideally, police should forge partnerships with both groups and tailor the objectives to the needs and concerns of each group. The composition of the population in a given jurisdiction will vary. For example, in the US, the majority of the jurisdictional units such as cities and towns have no Muslim American communities or so few that they are not identifiable as a group, whereas major cities have sizeable Muslim Americans to the extent that they may have civic organizations, cultural centers, and mosques. An example that may not have been observed in the US is that suspect communities may constitute the majority in some cities, as in the case of Turkey, where Kurdish communities are the majority in eastern and southeastern provinces. The general point being made here is that the nature, objectives, and priorities of partnerships should also vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction based on the demographic make-up of the population being served and their needs.

Most police departments implementing community policing already have existing partnerships with the communities they serve, which can be utilized and expanded to include counterterrorism concerns, providing economies of scale. For the majority communities, police can aim to raise community awareness (Greene, 2011), reduce fear (Forst, 2011), educate them
in the identification of indicators of terrorist attacks (Hasisi et al., 2009), and emphasize social cohesion (Pickering et al., 2008a; 2008b) through addressing the hatred of out-groups that are likely to follow in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. Partnerships with out-groups can prove to be more challenging than those with the majority groups due to their alienation and vulnerabilities. Partnerships with out-groups, while addressing the very same objectives that are of salience to the majority groups, should also address their concerns such as protection from hate crimes and upholding of their constitutional rights (Friedmann and Cannon, 2009; Greene, 2011; Henderson et al., 2006; Lyons, 2002; Ortiz et al., 2007) as well as aim to promote mutual trust, increase perceptions of legitimacy, and thereby cooperation with the police in counterterrorism endeavors. There are several examples of partnerships implemented by the local police in the US with sizeable Arab and Muslim minority communities (Henderson et al., 2006; Khashu et al., 2005; Ortiz et al., 2007). These partnerships have also proven to be effective means to identify and attend to community concerns such as hate crimes, provide reassurance, inform communities about government counterterrorism policies (Thacher, 2005), which have helped build trusting relationships, promote police legitimacy, and increase eagerness to cooperate with the police (Henderson et al., 2006; Khashu et al., 2005; Ortiz et al., 2007). How the police carry out partnerships in the field, the micro-level interactions with community partners, and strategic engagement choices have been addressed in the form of case studies elsewhere (Ramirez, O’Connell, and Zafar, 2004). On the other hand, one thing to highlight is that police should make an effort to widen the net of outreach. While it is important that police form partnerships with organized community groups such as societies, charities, or other civil organizations and institutions such as schools, it is equally important to reach out to the most silent voices in
Partnerships and Intelligence

One way of looking at partnerships is to consider them as an intelligence-gathering tool. Information that can be obtained from communities does not necessarily have to be related to crimes and perpetrators. Innes (2006) emphasizes that information on non-criminal matters that is held within communities is also of value such as community make-up, groups present in a given neighborhood, knowledge of influential community leaders, and tensions between community groups, which can be broadly termed as community intelligence.

Innes (2006) raises the issue of whether the police should forge restricted but strong ties with key community members or dispersed but weaker ties with at-large community members. Innes (2006) favors the latter approach, a wide network of ties with community members which also bounds to be composed of weaker ties due to volume of ties, or in other words, the number of community members involved. The basic argument Innes (2006) puts forward is that individuals may have partial terrorism-related information which would form a picture and make sense only when combined with the partial information held by other individuals in the community. Accordingly, the more community members involved, the more complete the information police can possibly gather.

Viewing partnerships as information gathering tools is not without critics. Intelligence gathering is considered a slippery slope by some authors (Greene, 2011; Forst, in press). A focus on developing information sources within minority communities will lead to the perception that police are infiltrating their communities (Brodeur, 2011). Lyons (2002) cautions that partnerships with Muslim communities should aim to rebuild trust, with a genuine interest in
attending to their concerns and respecting their way of life. Similarly, Greene (2011) argues that “local-police protection of perceived out-groups and their constitutional liberties will become an important tool in maintaining community engagement, particularly in marginalized communities” (p. 235). In view of these commentaries, police should first aim to build trust within minority communities through increased contact and community protection, which should serve as a catalyst for voluntary information sharing with the police on the part of the community members (Lyons, 2002).

**Partnerships and Social Capital**

Community policing is viewed as a mechanism for building social capital (Forst, 2009). Social capital can be defined as “features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” (Putnam, 1995, p.664-665). The literature on social capital distinguishes between two types of social capital; bonding and bridging (Hawdon, 2008). The former refers to the type of social capital within identifiable communities (i.e., trust in people from within the communities) whereas the latter refers to the type of social capital between communities (i.e., trust in people from other communities).

“Bonding capital holds people together in groups while bridging capital connects people across diverse groups” (Hawdon, 2008, p. 189). Hawdon (2008) argues that policing styles should differ from community to community depending on these two types of social capital. He suggests that police adopt a community policing style as opposed a legalistic or order maintenance (zero-tolerance) style in communities characterized with high bonding capital and low bridging capital.

This analysis by Hawdon (2008) provides a useful framework to understand the nature of relations between the police and the minority communities in the context of counterterrorism and the choice of appropriate policing style. Minority communities tend to have greater bonding
capital based on their shared characteristics such as ethnicity, nationality, and/or religion that differentiate such communities from the majority communities. Of course, no community, even a minority community, is monolithic. Despite the tendency to view Muslims in a location as a single community, surely there exist multiple groups in Muslim communities along sectarian, ethnic, cultural, and political lines. The same holds true for ethnic groups such as Kurds in Turkey. A Kurdish community may comprise multiple groups along cultural, linguistic, religious, and sectarian lines and may or may not have bridging capital with other Kurdish groups. A second feature of minority communities is that they tend to lack bridging capital with the police who typically represent the majority communities. Moreover, terrorist groups aim to widen the gap between the communities they claim to represent and the police, alienate them from the majority communities to create a social space where they will always find frustrated new recruits (Pickering et al., 2008a). Of course, there is likely to be variation in the level of bridging capital among minority groups.

Two conclusions follow from this analysis. First, community policing, with its emphasis on partnerships that promote dialogue, is the ideal policing style to promulgate bridging capital with the minority communities in a counterterrorism context. A similar point based on the same justification is made by Pickering et al. (2008a):

… it [community policing] provides a basis upon which members of different communities can feel ‘included’ in the counter-terrorism process, a development that is critical to negating the deliberate strategy employed by terrorists of driving a wedge between mainstream society and its institutions and those who they seek to represent. To this end, community-policing strategies that are inclusive of culturally, religiously and linguistically diverse communities are most likely to foster the types of relationships that will facilitate enhanced community-police dialogue and cooperation (p. 25).
Second, police need to be aware that minority communities are not monolithic and should strive to reach out to all identifiable sub-groups (Briggs, Fieschi, and Lownsbrough, 2006; Greene, 2011; Lyons, 2002). Moreover, it is possible that partnerships that bring together various minority groups can help build bonding capital within minority groups. Such engagement not only is a requirement for democratic policing but also can go a long way to promote voluntary cooperation with the police and sharing of actionable intelligence, which is essential to the prevention of terrorism.

With regard to the prevention of terrorism and emergency response, community partnerships can involve educating the community members on detecting and reporting indicators for an imminent terror attack and on what they should do following a terrorist incident. Such efforts can also be augmented by distributing reader-friendly fliers that help raise awareness (Hasisi et al., 2009). Partnerships with schools and educating school children on prevention of terrorism and response with careful planning without inducing unrealistic levels of fear can also be considered as part of efforts to inform public. Such information sessions might prove invaluable particularly with regard to the public response in terror attack sites. For example, the possibility that a second bomb might have been placed as a trap in a nearby area where the first bomb detonated might not occur to everyone, who would prefer to rush toward the first detonation site in an humanitarian urge to help victims. Public education should allow the communication of such important information to community members particularly living and working in the vicinity of high risk targets.

Partnerships can also serve important functions with regard to the mitigation of harm after terrorist attacks. Partnerships provide opportunities for ameliorating strained relationships resulting from the increased law enforcement attention to communities suspected of harboring
terrorists. For instance, in the US, the relationships between Muslim Americans, particularly of Arabic descent, and law enforcement have been strained in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks due to federal policies instituted in response to the attacks which included passing of the USA Patriot Act, voluntary interviews with recent Middle Eastern immigrants, and immigration enforcement at the local level (Henderson et al., 2006; Thacher, 2005). Certainly, such policies targeting Muslim-American communities coupled with increasing hate crimes have given rise to uneasiness over concerns about their security, civil liberties, and place in American society (Henderson et al., 2006). A similar experience was observed in the UK after the 7/7 attacks in London.

Partnerships offer opportunities to the members of the suspect communities to make contributions to the breaking of stereotypical judgments about themselves that typically arise when catastrophic terror attacks engender an “us vs. them” mentality among the members of the communities and cultures that are on the receiving end of terror attacks (Ramirez et al., 2004). Obviously, the 9/11 attacks in the US perpetrated by the Al-Qaida have stirred the sentiments of even the most open-minded Americans, who would have appreciated that majority of Muslims denounce acts of terrorism. Given this, it is incumbent on members of suspect communities (e.g., Muslims in the US and Kurds in Turkey) to contribute to the efforts to do away with this stereotypical image. In fact, Henderson et al. (2006) found that Arab-American communities in the US were more active than the local police in reaching out.

Lyons (2002) argues that “community-police partnerships work best when they are structured to encourage information sharing, composed of citizens from those communities often least willing to assist the police, and actively encourage citizen participation at all stages of the neighborhood problem-solving process” (p. 532). He goes on to identify several implementation
shortcomings of partnerships from past experiences in Seattle and Chicago within the context of ordinary crimes, which may continue to plague partnership efforts with minority groups in a counterterrorism context. These identified problems are unidirectionality of communication from police to citizens, non-representative community groups in partnerships, failure to include citizens in all stages of problem solving, and resorting to traditional rather than innovative solutions. Similar issues have been raised by Greene (2011). The success of partnerships with minority groups will depend on such factors largely deemed within the control of police as well as other contextual factors that may lend themselves to immediate control of police.

Agency Partnerships

A department that adopts the philosophy of community policing will come across problems that simply go beyond their purview, capabilities, or jurisdictions, thus demanding cooperation and partnerships with other public and civil organizations to address these problems. Police departments forge partnerships with other agencies in horizontal and vertical fashions. Horizontal integration refers to the type of partnerships that police agencies form with other governmental and nongovernmental agencies such as fire department, social services, prisons, local businesses, civic organizations, and other law enforcement agencies serving in the same or neighboring jurisdictions. The list is not exhaustive. It includes any stakeholder organization that a given police department needs to cooperate with in a non-hierarchical fashion. On the other hand, vertical integration refers to the type of partnerships that police departments form with other superordinate public agencies established at a higher or lower hierarchical levels, such as those established with the state police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Homeland Security by the local police departments within the context of the US.
Greene (2011) contends that interagency partnerships are more suited to the secondary and tertiary role of the police, namely emergency response and mitigation of harm in countering terrorism, rather than the primary role of prevention. Partnerships with first responder agencies such as emergency medical services and fire departments are particularly crucial for an effective response to terror incidents (Pelfrey, 2005). While partnerships with local businesses have their intrinsic value in and of themselves for improved perceptions of police and willingness to cooperate with the police in general, such partnerships can also produce leads that can be brought to the attention of the police by businesses such as car rentals, banks, and aviation schools among others about suspicious people and activities that may signal terrorism.

Alliances with external organizations, particularly other law enforcement agencies under the umbrella of vertical integration, are important mechanisms for information sharing (Friedmann and Cannon, 2009; Greene, 2011). Of course, information sharing is a soft spot of police departments across the globe because information is a source of power that police departments have a reluctance to share with others (Greene, 2011). This is true both in a decentralized system composed of multitude of agencies and a centralized system with a single national agency but multiple jurisdictions. With this caveat in mind, a community focus and resulting increase in intelligence means that more information will be made available to other jurisdictions.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed provided a detailed answer to the question of whether community policing can serve the interest of counterterrorism policing. It can safely be concluded that community policing has a lot to offer in countering terrorism in all phases of the police response to terrorism, whether reactive or proactive. A major contribution of community policing arises
when it comes to engagement with minority communities targeted by counterterrorism policies. The next chapter will focus on community policing implementation, particularly in the terrorism-stricken part of Turkey, by the Turkish National Police, highlighting the differences in the interpretation of community policing, which impacts how it is applied differently in the counterterrorism context from the commonly understood version in the US.
CHAPTER 3
COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE

Introduction

The primary terrorist threat in Turkey originates from the PKK while there exist a multitude of terrorist organizations of relatively smaller sizes and of different ideologies compared to the PKK. PKK is a Kurdish-identity-oriented, Marxist-Leninist terrorist organization that aims to separate the portions of eastern and southeastern Turkey populated predominantly by Kurds. Since its foundation in the 1980s, the PKK has claimed more than 40,000 lives including civilians, security forces, and insurgents. The Turkish response to terrorism, until the mid-90s, primarily drew upon the deterrence approach to counterterrorism, which entails the use of draconian, heavy-handed, and often unlawful methods to dissuade people from engaging in terrorism and/or siding with terrorists. Such an approach created a vicious cycle of reproduction of terrorism through humiliation, victimization, injustice, and grievances experienced by the Kurds particularly in the east and southeast Turkey where the PKK gained ground in virtual (i.e., public support) and literal (i.e., controlled zones) sense (for a detailed description and analysis of the Turkish responses to the PKK terrorism, see Ciftci, 2013; Kim and Yun, 2008; Unal, 2012).

Recently, the TNP has switched to a “winning hearts and minds” approach (Sevinç, 2013; Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011; Yıldız and Şahin, 2010) that concentrates on addressing the root causes of terrorism and prevention of radicalization in general rather than neutralization of actors engaged in terrorism. With the realization that despite the increase in neutralized terrorists the PKK was able to quickly recruit new members and survive particularly manipulating the heavy-
handed responses of the security forces, the Turkish police, as part of a general government strategy to depart from hard power methods, started to use investigative methods at its disposal based on the “rule of law” as well as to address the root causes that perpetuate terrorism. In that sense, the TNP has been implementing community policing in the terrorism-stricken part of the country as a framework that informs the strategies the TNP uses to engage with the Kurdish communities, particularly the youth who are the primary targets of the recruitment and radicalization efforts of the PKK, which emphasizes building of trust and legitimacy.

In this section, I first introduce the general state of community policing implementation in Turkey with a focus on how the Turkish interpretation differs from that of the United States. I further discuss the implementation of community policing in relation to the counterterrorism role of the TNP highlighting the need for rigorous research to assess whether community policing has accomplished what it has promised to deliver.

**Community Policing in Turkey**

Community policing is in its early stages in Turkey. Traditional policing continues to be the dominant paradigm (Karakus et al., 2011) despite the increasing trend towards community policing on the policing spectrum. While this is the case, one would argue that policing is never one hundred percent traditional or community-based. Historically, before the official recognition of community policing in the TNP in 2006, several systematic and unsystematic implementation of community policing principles were in place, albeit not in the entirety of the term community policing suggests in the western literature. For example, hiring of neighborhood watchmen from the local communities to patrol the neighborhoods, which was abandoned in the 90s, is forwarded as an example of a systematic policy of the TNP that resonates with the community policing paradigm (Sevinç, 2013). Several police chiefs are known to have implemented policies
such as “open door” to get the police closer to the communities they serve, which can be offered as an example for unsystematic implementation. Deceased police chief Gaffar Okkan is one tragic example of police professionals who had earned the respect and trust of the Kurdish communities in the province of Diyarbakir, a stronghold of the PKK. His policing style was unusual for his era, when Kurdish communities were treated as supporters of terrorism rather than citizens to serve. Even so, he was assassinated by the members of the Turkish Hezbollah in 2001.

The official introduction and recognition of community policing in the TNP occurred in 2006 with a twinning project, as part of European Union (EU) Accession process, in partnership with Spain to bring the policing regulations and policies in conformity with those of the EU prior to a prospective accession. Within the context of the twinning project, specialized community policing units were created in 10 major provinces in 2006 and in all the remaining provinces in 2009 with the introduction of a regulation on community policing that lays out how community policing will be implemented in the TNP (Gozubenli and Akbas, 2009; Gökkaya and Doğan, 2010; Sevinç, 2013). These units were staffed with personnel selected among volunteers who were later trained in community policing.

One interesting thing to note is that community policing movement in the TNP did not commence upon the demands or expectations of the communities, but rather as a top-down reform within the police organization (Alaç, 2011; Bahar, 2002; Gül, 2011). A possible explanation for this lack of interest in the Turkish community to take the initiative to get involved in the co-production of safety can be attributed to the fact that the Turkish citizens tends to accept the non-participatory and centralized governance structure that was adopted from the

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13 Twinning is an initiative of the European Union for capacity building in the candidate countries before accession to the EU.
French system. While decentralized governance is localized, allowing communities to take part in policy making, centralized governance by its very nature vests the decision-making authority with bureaucracies spatially remote from the citizens blocking the opportunities for citizen participation.

Community policing in TNP is performed by specialized and dedicated units. Each provincial police department has a dedicated community policing unit. Specialized community policing officers working in these units wear a uniform that is different from the generic one. Officers who are to work in these specialized units are selected among volunteers who meet certain personal and professional criteria. Selected officers are subjected to basic (60 hours) and in-service (6-10 hours) training (Zeyrek, 2010) on the philosophy of community policing, interpersonal communication skills, and problem-solving. These officers are assigned specific responsibility areas and respond to the chief of police in charge of the community policing unit. They do not perform traditional law enforcement tasks such as preventive patrol or responding to calls for service. Yet, they still retain traditional law enforcement powers such as arrest or use of force they are required to perform by law when they come across a situation that necessitates law enforcement reaction. Community policing officers at the street level interact informally (i.e., make casual contact) with the citizens in their assigned responsibility area, reach out to local business owners, visit schools, and organize community meetings to disseminate information about police services, increase awareness against victimization for predatory and opportunistic crimes, identify people in need of financial assistance, gather information about community problems and disturbances and pass such information to the relevant police units for consideration and subsequent follow-up with other public agencies. Activities that target schools
and students are also given a high priority by these officers, which is the main interest of this study and thus, separately discussed.

Partnership with public and civic groups is one of the key elements of community policing that is critical to its success. One form of partnerships with such groups is security advisory councils composed of the representatives from several public and civic institutions such as municipalities, universities, education department, health department, social services department, and NGOs along with the members of the TNP who meet a few times a year under the supervision of the governor to discuss matters that relate to the security in a given province, prioritize security needs, and adopt action plans based on the identified needs (Altundaş, 2010). The composition of these advisory councils varies based on whether it is in a province (il) or provincial district (ilçe) (Altundaş, 2010).

In addition to security advisory councils, The TNP also participates in ad hoc partnerships that are formed in a specific context for a short period of time. There are reports that community policing departments of the TNP, particularly in the eastern and southeastern Turkey, are partnering with opinion leaders, religious leaders, tribal leaders, and significant public figures who grew up in the region (Sevinç, 2013; Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011; Yıldız and Şahin, 2010). Partnerships with community leaders mostly aim to use the public trust in these figures as a mediator to expand the net of outreach and reach out to larger communities that might distrust the police.

**Turkish Interpretation of Community Policing**

A study on 12 leading police departments in the US in the implementation of community policing report significant deviations from the idealized version of the community policing in all dimensions (Maguire and Wells, 2009). Moreover, Maguire (1997) and Maguire et al. (2003)
found that some organizational changes in municipal police departments in the US in the 1980s and ’90s such as increases in organizational hierarchy were in contrast to what community policing proponents advocated. These findings are particularly striking given the long tradition of community policing in this country. Community policing as we know it today has been theorized and refined in the US as a pervasive policing philosophy, tactic, and strategy. In addition, community policing has been the norm in the US for over three decades giving its name to an era in the history of policing. The variation in the implementation of community policing has been attributed to a number of organizational and environmental factors that hinder positive change. On the other hand, one would also argue that this variation emanates from the nature of community policing which is a highly complex policing style and demands daunting changes that cannot be fulfilled over a short period of time. One can also add to the list that the flexibility inherent in community policing so that community policing can be tailored to the specific policing environments as a source of such variation in implementation (Haberfeld et al., 2009).

The point made here is that there will always be different interpretations which may at times challenge the very basic foundations on which community policing is envisioned. As such, the Turkish version of community policing is likely to be different from its versions in other countries. Of course, the current level of research on the subject in Turkey does not allow us to make thorough cross-national comparisons. Yet, some obvious differences do emerge at first glance, particularly as they relate to the “organizational adaptation” dimension.

The TNP conception of community policing manifests itself in a most obvious way in the Turkish phrase that refers to community policing as “toplum destekli polislik” which can be translated to English as “community-supported policing”. The use of “supported” instead of “oriented” connotes a superiority attached to the police over the community in decision-making
rather than a status of equal partners with community members. The phrase basically implies that the police seek the support of the community in the implementation phase of unilaterally identified policies, policing priorities, tactics and strategies chosen by the police rather than the involvement of the community in all stages of the problem-solving process. A source of this identified unwillingness to incorporate the community in decision making process might be related to the highly centralized structure of the Turkish National Police which reflects the governance model of the Turkish Republic modeled after the French model. Unlike the United States, where law enforcement is highly decentralized, local provincial police units in Turkey respond to the central organization rather than communities they serve. Local agencies do not have high levels of discretion in policy making and implementation that they can enjoy and share with the local communities. Accordingly, local agencies, which are composed of officers from other locales\textsuperscript{14} instead of from within the community, align their policies with that of the central organization, which is more concerned with law enforcement, crime suppression, and public relations than citizen involvement in the decision-making process in matters of community security.

An implication of such a passive conception of the community is that community policing is implemented for the purposes of public relations rather than as a manifestation of an effort to empower the community and involve them in the co-production of security. Another subtle meaning of this conception is a reluctance to change, tendency to maintain the status quo while getting the public support for unilaterally adopted policies -- serving old wine in new bottles.

\textsuperscript{14} Officers within the Turkish National Police cannot work in the same province they are from unless the province has a status of metropolis.
Another major issue is that community policing, as will be discussed later, is conceived as a set of programs and projects rather than as a philosophy that requires deeper changes within the organization. Although the conception of community policing at the philosophical level may be satisfactory under Cordner’s (2000) typology, one is confronted with the evidence that community policing manifests itself through programs and projects in the TNP. This may be the tendency because projects are visible and identifiable, thereby providing opportunities for the top management to take credit. Another reason for this tendency is the presence of economic incentives. A grant program under the Prime Ministry, SODES, provides grants to public and civic organizations for social projects that aim to socialize particularly youth in the underdeveloped eastern Turkey. Most of the projects undertaken by the police are funded with by the SODES (Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011).

Community policing implementation in Turkey has lagged behind particularly with regard to the organizational adaptation dimension. As outlined in the previous sections, the organizational adaptation dimension of community policing entails decentralization, despecialization, and flattening of the organizational hierarchy so that community policing as well as law enforcement is implemented by all officers who have the discretion and powers to solve the community problems by themselves.

Turkish policing, modeled after the French system, is highly centralized. In addition, there are many layers in the hierarchy, leading to an awkward bureaucratic structure where decision making is retained at the higher levels of the organization. High level officials are reluctant to delegate their powers because they are held responsible by the government for the actions of their subordinates, particularly when such actions have political repercussions. Those who delegate run the risk of losing their position.
Specialization emerges as another issue with regard to organizational change.
Community policing is carried out exclusively by dedicated units that do not necessarily have the ultimate discretion to make decisions on matters that are of concern to community members (Gozubenli and Akbas, 2009). Community policing officers do have an ephemeral presence in their assigned responsibility areas and are not directly responsible and accountable for mundane state-of-security and quality-of-life issues.

Community policing should ideally be taken up by the units that come into face-to-face contact the most with community members, which are the local police stations in the case of TNP (Gozubenli and Akbas, 2009). Local police stations are first responder units to calls for service in their jurisdictions. These stations (precincts) are the first point of contact with the police for the local citizens and are responsible for the state of security within their jurisdictions. They engage in crime prevention through foot and motorized patrols, respond to local calls for service and all security-related emergencies, secure crime scenes until crime scene investigation units arrive, and process official complaints placed by individuals against third parties to be directed to the prosecutors and specialized units depending on the type of crime under investigation. For example, if the crime in question is a vehicle theft case, police stations process the complaint, prepare the preliminary official documents such as the statement of the victim, and direct the case file to the criminal investigations division for investigation and follow-up.

By the very nature of their assigned tasks, police stations are the units closest to the public among all divisions of the TNP (Gozubenli and Akbas, 2009). On the other hand, we are not aware if community policing has ever been formally introduced to these units. Further, it is doubtful if community policing is what is expected of them. They are overwhelmed by multitude of tasks assigned to them and the units hardly have any time left for community outreach and
problem solving. The bureaucracy and paperwork involved take most of their time. For instance, the police have to take each individual taken into protective or judicial custody to hospital for a physical examination against any signs of torture and maltreatment by the police twice, once after arrest / custody and before transfer to another unit or release, which enormously consume personnel, equipment, monetary, and time resources. If community policing is to be carried out by the units most suited for it, there has to be an enormous leap in organizational change in the TNP as well as philosophical, strategic, and tactical changes.

Although police departments around the world take such a shortcut for various reasons, a simple explanation for the case of TNP is the magnitude of difficulty involved in achieving substantial changes in policing style quickly in a centralized police organization of more than 200,000 sworn officers, if not a failure in the understanding of community policing. Community policing is a highly demanding policing style. The difficulty does not lie in it per se but the resistance and barriers to its introduction and implementation in its fullest in a police department that is ultimately entrenched in traditional policing. While this task is a major challenge for smaller police departments such as local police departments in the US serving smaller communities, one would appreciate the complexity involved when he takes into consideration the sheer size of a centralized police organization such as the Turkish National Police aiming to implement community policing. In support of this point, similar problems were presented by Mouhanna (2009) concerning the implementation of community policing in France where police is highly centralized. A more viable approach to adopting community policing, then, is incremental rather than instantaneous. From this point of view, the current changes towards community policing in the TNP, albeit lacking in major elements, need to be welcome and seen as the early steps of a gradual change towards the full implementation of community policing.
**Community Policing and Counterterrorism**

Having provided background information about the community policing implementation in the TNP with a brief assessment on how it differs from the community policing conception in the western literature, this section aims to discuss the community policing implementation within the context of counterterrorism, particularly in the east and southeast Turkey, populated predominantly by the Kurdish minority and plagued by the PKK terrorism over the last three decades. This section explicates the objectives of community policing initiatives, provides synopses of initiatives and a review of the studies on community policing in Turkey, particularly in the context of counterterrorism with an emphasis on effectiveness of the initiatives.

**Objectives of Community Policing Initiatives**

Sevinç (2013) identifies two broad objectives as stated by the practitioners and executives engaged in community policing initiatives in counterterrorism. The first of these ultimate objectives is the rapprochement between the police and the Kurdish communities. Accordingly, the TNP engages in community policing initiatives to change the stereotypical image of police and prejudices held by the Kurdish communities, improve perceptions of police and the Turkish government with a particular emphasis on trust and legitimacy, increase feelings of solidarity and allegiance with the Turkish government, and contribute to the normalization of life.

The second stated broad objective relates to Kurdish youth in the region who face major challenges from crime and terrorism that flourish in an environment of weakened state authority. Broadly stated, the practitioners interviewed by Sevinç (2013) identify a major objective as to divert children and youth from crime and terrorism. Of particular concern is the prevention of
“leaving for the mountains” among youth through countering the recruitment efforts of the PKK by providing information that discourages romanticism and mysticism promoted by the PKK with regard to joining armed struggle. In addition, dissuading those who have joined the PKK is another problem addressed particularly by reaching out to those in the mountain camps through their family members (Dikici, 2008). The TNP also organizes initiatives in order to engage local youth in structured activities to keep them off the streets where they are likely to be exposed to criminal behavior and extremist ideologies. These structured initiatives also aim to provide opportunities for skill development that increases their future employment opportunities, which might also serve as a barrier to involvement in terrorism in the future.

An interesting finding in the Turkish literature is that community policing initiatives within the context of counterterrorism do not aim at intelligence gathering as an objective (Özeren and Cinoğlu, 2010; Sevinç, 2013). Sevinç (2013) reports that none of the officers he interviewed mentioned intelligence gathering as an objective of their community policing initiatives. This finding is in stark contrast to the emphasis in the literature on the intelligence gathering benefits of community policing, while some consider intelligence gathering as a slippery slope (Forst, in press). It can safely be argued that lack of an explicit interest in intelligence in a counterterrorism context where any terrorism-related information is crucial leads to the conclusion that the Turkish police are aware that a focus on intelligence gathering, to the detriment of much needed trust, would only communicate to the communities that their outreach efforts are driven primarily by pragmatic concerns rather than by a genuine interest to forge enhanced relationships. Although intelligence gathering is not an explicit or implicit concern for community policing initiatives, it needs to be noted that several individuals contacted

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15 The term “leaving for the mountain” is the turning point that separates terrorists from sympathizers. Those who leave for the mountains join the ranks of the PKK in mountain hideouts and camps where they are trained in ideology and guerilla tactics as full members of the PKK.
revealed useful information to police officers such as if a specific individuals is known to be leaving for the mountain soon (Sevinç, 2013; Yıldız and Şahin, 2010). Police acted on such voluntarily provided information in a problem-solving manner rather than employing their powers.

**Types of Initiatives**

Sevinç (2013) describes the community policing inspired interventions of the TNP for the purposes of counterterrorism under six general categories based on the nature of intervention\(^{16}\):

a) Informational activities  

b) Family visits  

c) Educational activities  

d) Vocational training (employment) activities  

e) Philanthropy  

f) Social and sports activities  

Informational Activities: Informational activities typically include seminars, conferences, or theatre shows with every age group, such as primary school kids, older youth, and adults for various purposes, depending on the target audience. For example, informational activities with primary school kids involve seminars such as traffic rules, citizenship, or introduction of police services, whereas seminars for youth include topics such as drug demand reduction, occupation selection, life skills, and the prevention of victimization. Some examples of seminars for adults include parenting, child health, prevention of domestic violence, or intra-family communication (Sevinç, 2013). These initiatives are conducted primarily by the community policing departments at schools, shops, theatres, and homes in person, as well as via handbooks or local newspapers.

\(^{16}\) Similar programs also were reported by Dikici (2008) as implemented in the province of Sanliurfa.
Family visits: Family visits are made for various purposes, such as casual visits, philanthropy, and problem solving. Problem solving visits historically include visits to the parents of PKK members in the mountain camps in an effort to have the family reach out to and convince their kids to surrender to the security forces to benefit from repentance laws (Dikici, 2008; Sevinç, 2013; Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011). For example, Dikici (2008) reports that about 12 PKK members in the mountain camps were convinced to surrender to police who reached out to their parents in the province of Sanliurfa. Experience suggests that mothers play a critical role in preventing their children from attending violent protests, leaving for the mountains, and dissuading them from terrorism (Sevinç, 2013). In addition, police frequently visit the family of children attending violent protests in an effort to bring the problem to the attention of families who lack the capacity to monitor the activities of their kids partly because families in the region traditionally have at least three or more kids. In addition to dissuasion from terrorism or violent protests, police, as part of problem-solving efforts, visit families for other problems, such as to convince them to send their children to school.

Educational initiatives: Such initiatives are also tailored towards the target groups. Within this context, selected successful students are provided with the opportunity to have free private lessons in preparation for nationwide entry exams to various high schools and universities. In addition, computer literacy and language courses are provided to students as well as other initiatives, such as educational material donations, building libraries, and donation of books to school libraries. A peculiar example is provision of private lessons to 90 female high school students in preparation for nationwide police recruitment exams in the province of Siirt. Another initiative is to assign police officers to schools. Under this initiative, police officers in two-person teams serve at their designated school during the day. Given the high illiteracy rates
in the region especially among adult females, literacy and handcrafts courses are provided to adults.

Vocational training activities: Unemployment rates among young are higher in southeastern Turkey than for the average of Turkey, which is proposed to be one of the structural problems that contribute to terrorism. Community policing departments in the region, in cooperation with the Turkish Employment Agency and charities for workforce enhancement, hold vocational training programs for young people to equip them with the skills that will increase their employment opportunities.

Philanthropy: Poverty is another structural problem, in addition to unemployment, in the east and southeast region of Turkey where community policing is dominantly employed for the purposes of counterterrorism. Police, local businesses, and charities provide donations of food, clothing, and financial aid to needy families in a private manner so as not to humiliate the families in their neighborhoods. While philanthropy is made largely for humane reasons, an expected benefit also is that it will reduce feelings of alienation from the mainstream communities as well as prevent manipulation of poverty by the PKK as a recruitment tool.

Social and sports activities: Social programs are usually in the form of tours to locations such as museums, historical and tourist places, or visits to significant public figures that are held in town or out-of-town. Out-of-town tours usually take place in historic places such as Gallipoli, emphasizing unity and solidarity between the Turks and Kurds. Another benefit of out-of-town tours to the west of Turkey is that the participants develop a firsthand experience that contradicts the propaganda of the PKK, which propagates that Kurds are unwelcome and subjugated by the Turks (Sevinç, 2013, p.144). On some occasions, teachers, imams, or neighborhood representatives also attend tours along with the children.
Social programs also include poetry, prose, and painting competitions on given themes. Those who rank high receive rewards such as out-of-town tours or visits to significant public figures such as businessman, public officials, artists, politician, and scientists who grew up in the southeast Turkey and are intended to serve as role models. Other social programs are attending to Ramadan meals; visits of condolences at funerals; visits on religious festivals; organizing picnics, exhibitions, and movie nights; reading campaigns; and visits to nursing homes, and orphanages.

The most common types of sports activities organized by the community policing departments are soccer tournaments and sports clubs for children and youth. These programs are intended to bring together the police and children around a structured activity to break down communication barriers and help children spend their leisure time in constructive activities in an effort to keep them away from trouble.

These activities are conducted by two particular divisions of the TNP: the community policing and counterterrorism departments. Community policing departments are employed by full-time specialized community policing officers. The primary assignment of specialized counterterrorism department is to investigate terrorism cases in cooperation with the intelligence department under the command of the public prosecutors. Such units also engage in more positive and proactive community outreach efforts. Sevinç (2013) found a distinction between the community policing and counterterrorism departments in terms of the nature of their engagement with community and youth outreach. Community policing departments tend to be generic in their outreach activities, with no expressed references to terrorism and counterterrorism, unlike counterterrorism departments. Sevinç (2013) found that initiatives that convey the intended message directly such as counterterrorism conferences trigger reaction from
the target group. Therefore, practitioners tend to focus on initiatives that are not directly counterterrorism-focused such as anti-drug conferences, social and sports activities, and competitions that are intended to forge a closer relationship between the police and the target groups. Akbulut and Beren (2012, p.281) refer to this strategy as “countering terrorism without reference to terrorism”.

The overall strategy of the TNP in its application of community policing in terrorism-stricken part of the country as manifested through the types of initiatives explained above is to show their human side to the community members and youth, particularly engaging the feelings of affection. A suggestion based on the same approach was made by Briggs et al. (2006) in relation to engagement with Muslim communities in the UK:

The police need to start by developing excellent relations with Muslim communities that are entirely unrelated to security or terrorism [to build trust]. The community needs to see the human side of the police force, to value its public service ethos, and begin to believe that they are there primarily to solve the community’s problems (p. 79).

Akerlof and Yellen (1994), in their game-analytic treatment of the inner-city gangs, argue that gangs have the opportunity to show their human side, unlike police, because they live within the communities and often aim to protect them from outsiders. Thus, community members may have a greater tendency to cooperate with familiar gangs than with alien police such as withholding information from the police that would incriminate members of a gang. Turkish police are outsiders for the Kurdish communities, a problem that arises particularly from the human resource management of the organization as explained in Chapter 1. In addition, they have minimal casual contact with the community members. Accordingly, the police need to create opportunities whereby they can informally get together with the community members as individuals rather than as faceless officers in uniform. Such philosophy is also embedded in the
conception of reciprocal action as put forward by Kahan (2002) as theory of community policing, which provides the simple explanation that people tend to reciprocate the type of behavior they are exposed to from others. Accordingly, if police make an effort to build trusting relationships with the communities, community members will reciprocate by affirmative action.

Police executives acknowledge that there is a trade-off between the quantity and quality of programs (Sevinç, 2013, p.143). While some practitioners favor increasing the number of programs to reach out to as many people as possible, other practitioners prefer increasing the quality, frequency, and strength of interaction with selected groups. Reaching out to as many people as possible detracts from the time that can be allotted to each person and therefore the quality of interaction. Yet, this approach allows for a direct positive experience with the police, albeit for a short period of time. On the other hand, increasing the quality of interaction requires more time for each person, limiting the number of people reached. The advantage of this approach is to form more trusting relationships with the selected groups. However, it appears that the prevailing preference is to strike a balance between quantity and quality based on the specific context of the environment.

One important finding in the literature (Sevinç, 2013) is that interventions need to be environment-specific. Simply imitating interventions that have been found to make positive impact elsewhere may prove to be counterproductive. For example, a movie depicting the case of 120 Kurdish kids from the province of Van who went to fight in the World War I to carry ammunitions to the front was perceived positively in one city. On the other hand, the same movie received a negative reaction among the target group in another city because it was perceived to be propagating the Turkish ideology.
Impediments to Partnerships

A defining feature of community policing is partnerships with citizen groups and community members. While reaching out to individual community members bears its own set of problems, finding peaceful organized community groups is not to be taken for granted due to their limited numbers. The primary reason is that the PKK has been highly successful in monopolizing the Kurdish movement disallowing different voices through threat or use of violence (Davies et al., 2012). Moreover, partnerships with community groups that oppose the PKK can have the unintended effects of inflaming intra-group conflicts.

Community policing as implemented by the TNP in countering terrorism typically assigns a leading role to the police in social policy. After all, the basic premise of community policing is that police in close cooperation with the communities identify community problems and quality of life issues which often necessitates mobilizing public and private organizations for resolution. Yet, there may be resistance from such organizations to the self-proclaimed leading role of the police as well as from within the police organization itself. This may be true particularly in the case of municipalities that are held by the BDP, a Kurdish-identity-oriented political party known to have close ties to the PKK. In addition, institutional rivalry between government institutions arising from the political divide can emerge as an impediment to effective cooperation.

Sevinç (2013) in his interviews with community policing practitioners in TNP found a cynical attitude toward community policing within the various ranks of the TNP. His interviews revealed that negative perceptions tend to prevail over positive perceptions. Such cynicism is a result of both the perception that community policing is soft on terror and the frustration that

\[ \text{Police in Turkey are composed of predominantly conservatives, whereas several other government institutions such as universities and judiciary have been the strongholds of leftists who have been historically in opposition to the police, and vice versa.} \]
efforts are not making a sizeable and immediate impact on the threat of terrorism. Nevertheless, community policing officers and executives report an increasing level of support from the police officers to community policing initiatives and their value (Sevic, 2013).

Another organizational impediment is the strict hierarchy and centralization that exists in the TNP (Uyaksil, 2006). Modeled after the French system, the Turkish policing suffers from all the ills of a centralized governance system. For one thing, public officials respond to the central government rather than the communities they serve. This is bad news for community policing because the management in provincial units give precedence to the demands of the central government over the local communities’ concern limiting the participation of communities in determining the policing priorities. In addition, the police tend to prioritize the protection of the state over serving citizens. This isn’t unlike the situation General Petraeus confronted in Iraq before he moved from “enemy centric” thinking to a “population-centric” strategy (see the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007).

**Factors Influencing the Success of the Initiatives**

The success of the programs may be dependent upon a number of factors: officers, target groups, type of program, involvement of local partners in the initiatives, and external factors.

**Officers:** One factor that is likely to have a critical impact on the initiatives is the officers conducting programs. The success of the initiatives may depend on the sincerity and communication skills of the officers directing the initiatives as perceived by the target groups. A general characteristic of success stories appears to be the involvement of Kurdish officers in the programs who are perceived as insiders by the Kurdish participants (Gozubenli and Akbas, 2009).
Target groups: Several characteristics of the participants should moderate the effects of the initiatives. For example, girls are known to be more responsive to the programs than boys. In addition, the degree of radicalization which is a function of the extent of exposure to propaganda from the media, friends, neighbors, relatives, or even parents can be expected to lead to a variation in the success of the programs in terms of the realization of intended outcomes. Moreover, other socio-demographics and previous experiences with the police can positively and negatively affect the success of the programs.

Type of initiative (program): Some initiatives are less visible, immersive, and personalized than others (e.g. book donations to school libraries). Initiatives and programs that directly involve target groups for an extended period of time in communication with the police officers are more likely to bring about a positive change in the attitudes of the target groups. Yet, such programs are inherently time-consuming. A department that aims to reach out to as many community members as possible will need to strike a balance between immersive and cursory initiatives.

External factors: Police-community interactions do not occur in a vacuum. They are conditioned by factors external to the interactions. In this sense, experiences with officers out of the context of community policing initiatives can positively or negatively affect the success of initiatives (Gozubenli and Akbas, 2009). If the participants see congruence between their experiences with community policing officers and other officers, it can serve a multiplicative effect in terms of developing positive perspectives. In contrast, negative experiences such as unjust treatment or excessive use of force can potentially undo the effects of the initiatives. This is one reason for the calls that the community policing philosophy be adopted by all officers rather than specialized units.
Another external factor is the countering efforts of the PKK. A number of studies examining the impact of Turkish counterterrorism policies found that accommodative and liberal policies increased terrorist attacks and fatalities (Ciftci, 2013; Kim and Yun, 2006; Unal, 2012). A speculation that is grounded in Crenshaw’s (2000) organizational perspective in understanding terrorism is that terrorist organizations are more interested in their own survival as a group than the realization of their political objectives. This theoretical orientation suggests that terrorist organizations will respond in ways that will undo the effects of the interventions that shake the ground under terrorists. The same is true in the case of community policing initiatives. Community policing executives state that the PKK threatens the communities not to attend the programs and initiatives organized by the police (Sevinç, 2013). Sevinç (2013) reports that community members visiting police units are concerned that others might be spying on them and might report them to the PKK as a collaborator. It has been found that the PKK particularly targets those who have had a positive contact with the police for their propaganda purposes. On one instance where the police provided material assistance to a needy family, some PKK members visited the family right after the police left and told the family that they got the assistance from the police, thanks to the efforts of the guerilla in the mountains who made their voices heard; if it had not been for them, the police would not have considered helping needy families (Sevinç, 2013). It is also reported that the PKK spreads false rumors such as the police are brainwashing Kurdish kids. There are also reports that the PKK is imitating the police and visiting families with deceased members who were killed in skirmishes against the security forces to gain their trust and allegiance.

Among these external factors the political environment should also be stated. For one thing, counterterrorism strategies have political appeal. Several politicians use the emphasis
placed on accommodation policies of the government such as community policing to criticize the
government on the grounds that they are soft on terrorists and terrorism. Such political rhetoric
only serves to alienate the Kurdish communities, which may also negate the effects of
community policing initiatives.

Policing is only one of the multiple facets of response to terrorism. There are multiple
sets of response on macro level other than policing, such as social, political, economic, cultural,
and legal. Unal (2012) identified nine historical macro-level interventions of the Turkish
government in response to political violence induced by the PKK as the following: provisional
village guard system, proclamation of state of emergency, forced evacuation of villages,
recognition of “Nevruz”, Adana agreement with Syria, capture of Ocalan, the founder of the
PKK, legitimization of Kurdish language, abolition of state security courts, and repentance laws.
A recent counterterrorism policy of the current government is Democratic Opening process,
which was followed by a mutual ceasefire agreement between the government and the PKK.
Conceivably, these macro-level interventions as well as micro-level (daily) incidents will shape
the perception of the government and in turn that of the police among the Kurdish communities,
which can potentially augment or detract from the community-based responses of the police.
Liberal policies, such as official recognition of Kurdish language, have the potential to
supplement the community outreach efforts of the police by creating a positive atmosphere
whereas forced evacuations or sporadic local incidents such as accidental killing of cross-border
smugglers taken as terrorists can prove to be a hindrance.

**Current State of Research**

Community policing is in its infancy in Turkey and so is research on community
policing. The currently available research on community policing can be categorized into basic
descriptive research, and impact assessment. Basic research that aims to lay the foundations of community policing is more prevalent than impact assessment studies, possibly because of a need that has arisen due to the lack of reference sources in Turkish on community policing. This type of research typically discussed the basics of community policing based on the research that has accumulated in countries such as the US and the UK. This line of research delineates the definition of community policing and its application to the Turkish policing context (Bahar, 2002; Sözer and Ekici, 2010; Sözer and Ferzan, 2010) and its relevance to crime prevention (Sözer and Koksal, 2010), fear of crime (Dolu and Uludağ, 2010), problem-oriented policing (Sevinç and Demir, 2010), crime analysis (Gürer, 2010), citizen-police academies (Ekici, 2010), organizational change (Büker, 2010), the role of management (Gül, 2010), job satisfaction among officers (Yüksel and Altuntop, 2010), community policing training (Duman, 2010), and counterterrorism (Özeren and Cinoğlu, 2010).

Empirical research on community policing in Turkey is scant. Available research has examined Turkish police officers’ attitudes towards community policing (Boke, 2007) and assessed impact of community policing implementation on a number of outcomes (Alpkan and Palaci, 2008; Marangoz, Çelikkan, and Yavuz, 2011). Boke (2007) found that Turkish police officers who favored proactive policing, selective enforcement, and order maintenance policing (patrol officers should be expected to do something about public nuisance) had positive attitudes toward community policing, whereas those who were cynical of citizens had views to the contrary. It should be noted that the operational definition of community policing by Boke (2007) meshed with that of zero-tolerance policing.

Marangoz et al. (2011), in their study examining the impact of community policing implementation in the province of Canakkale, found that awareness of community policing
implementation was correlated with satisfaction with the police and expectations from the police. That study, one of the few that empirically investigated the effects of community policing, suffers from lack of academic quality because the authors only provided the survey instrument as an appendix and in no way described how they measured each of the study variables. For example, it is not clear how the authors define and operationalize the *expectations from police* variable.

Another impact assessment was undertaken in the provincial district of Zara in the province of Sivas by Alpkar and Palaci (2008). The authors employed a pretest-posttest design and surveyed the neighborhoods in Zara before and after the implementation of community policing initiatives for a 6-month period. Their results indicated that the implementation of community policing improved perceptions of police-citizen relationships and decreased neighborhood disturbances. However, this study also suffers from methodological problems. For example, there is no indication whether the pre-test and post-test scores were matched or were independent.

**Are the Initiatives Successful?**

There are a number of studies on the application of community policing in a counterterrorism context in Turkey (Dikici, 2008; Ekici, 2008; Özeren and Cinoğlu, 2010; Sevinç, 2013; Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011; Yıldız and Şahin, 2010). The majority of these studies tend to describe the types of initiatives the TNP units undertake in the eastern and southeastern part of the country (Dikici, 2008; Özeren and Cinoğlu, 2010; Sevinç, 2013; Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011; Yıldız and Şahin, 2010). However, there is a lack of quantitative evidence as to whether community policing initiatives in a counterterrorism context bring about a measurable change in terms of the intended outcomes, such as perceptions of police.
Despite the growing numbers of initiatives inspired by community policing and the considerable resources devoted to those initiatives, formal assessments to date are lacking. A tendency identified in the literature is to portray outputs rather than outcomes as a measure of success such as the number of programs implemented, people reached out, and crime prevention fliers and brochures distributed (Gökkaya and Doğan, 2010; Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011). As Sözer and Ferzan (2010) point out, such measures do not tell us anything about the effectiveness of the community policing initiatives. Beyond outputs, we only have anecdotal and indirect evidence available in support of the success of the initiatives from a few studies (Özeren and Cinoğlu, 2010; Sevinç, 2013; Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011; Yıldız and Şahin, 2010).

There is anecdotal evidence that community policing initiatives such as family visits or reaching out to kids who are known to be leaving for the mountains soon are preventing recruitment into the PKK and dissuading those in the mountains (Alkan, 2009b; Dikici, 2008). Some anecdotal evidence comes from the intelligence reports and logs kept by the terrorists and seized by the police during raids (Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011). These sources state that the tactics of the police that break with the traditional tendencies are influencing some militants to leave the organization and that terrorists perceive community policing initiatives as the primary threat from the police. Along these lines, Sevinç (2013) reports that some of the police executives who have been highly active in planning and implementation of the community policing initiatives are on the assassination list of the PKK as revealed in intelligence reports, indicating the extent of damage to terrorist organizations brought about by the initiatives.

Another indirect measure of success reported in previous studies is the substantial decrease in the numbers of people attending to violent protests of the PKK. In a similar vein, police executives report that they do not face much violence from kids in the form of stone-
throwing when they patrol in their cars in the protest-prone neighborhoods. Some police executives forward the argument that some kids never appeared on the violent demonstrations after the police approached and talked with their parents about their kids’ involvement in the protests (Sevinç, 2013). Although these findings contradict a previous finding by the Counterterrorism Department that violent protests skyrocketed since the “stone-throwing kids” amendment, it could be the case that violent protests have declined in some provinces involved in the Sevinç (2013) study or that following the substantial increase in the initial period after the amendment captured in the former study, a period of substantial decrease have ensued. Another alternative explanation could be that the officers interviewed by Sevinç (2013) reported only success cases, which are only exceptions and might not be representative of the general tendency. For the time being, there is no viable means to verify the findings of either study.

Community policing specialists and executives Sevinç (2013) interviewed in his study report that community policing initiatives led to increases in the number of applications for police recruitment exams from the Kurdish populated eastern and southeastern region and the number of calls for service, as well as decreases in delinquencies, truancies, and misdemeanors at schools. In addition, there are reports that the initiatives increased social cohesion among communities as evidenced by increased social relations among the communities of Turkish, Kurdish, and Arabic origin (Sevinç, 2013).

Previous studies also report evidence, in the form of testimonials by participants, that community policing initiatives are improving the perceptions of police among the Kurdish communities (Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011; Sevinç, 2013). For example, one community member is reported to have said that “if only we had police officers like you here in the past, we would not have suffered all that pain” (Sevinç, 2013).
Some are cautious to jump to the conclusion that initiatives are making a measurable positive impact particularly among the youth who are the prime targets of community policing initiatives (Sevinç, 2013; Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011; Yıldız and Şahin, 2010). It is not easy to undo the perceptions, particularly about the police, that have formed over decades through negative experiences and transmitted to the next generations. In addition, police executives acknowledge the limitation that while initiatives bring the police together with communities and youth for about two hours on average on each event, community members and youngsters are constantly exposed to the PKK propaganda in their homes, neighborhoods, and among friends. While anecdotal and indirect evidence are encouraging, it is open to question whether a measurable impact has been achieved in the aggregate. Surely, this is an empirical question that begs an answer.

Conclusion

This chapter attempted to provide a description of the community policing implementation in Turkey with a particular emphasis on how it differs from the generally conceived version in the US particularly along the organizational change dimension. It also provided a synopsis of community policing initiatives implemented as part of counterterrorism policies particularly targeting vulnerable groups to terrorist propaganda such as youth. Finally, it reviewed the current state of evidence on the effectiveness of those initiatives in general crime and terrorism settings. A fair assessment of the community policing implementation in the TNP is that despite the rapidly expanding experience base, efforts to expand the evidence base are lagging behind. Surely, there is a need for rigorous research into the effectiveness of community policing initiatives, particularly in terms of attitudes toward police such as trust and legitimacy. The next chapter will focus on the question of police legitimacy and public cooperation with
police, which represent the *raison d'ètre* of community policing. It will also explore the link between community policing and procedural justice theory, which is touted as the key antecedent of legitimacy and cooperation in the policing literature.
CHAPTER 4

LEGITIMACY AND PUBLIC COOPERATION

The discussion provided in Chapter 2 suggests that community policing can be employed effectively to counter terrorism. Community policing is particularly salient concerning the engagement with suspect minority communities that are targeted by counterterrorism policies based on the conviction that they may be sheltering terrorists intentionally or inadvertently. Counterterrorism policies disproportionately target such minority communities, and any treatment of counterterrorism policies, as they relate to out-groups in the literature, unmistakably threaten police legitimacy, trust, and cooperation with police. For instance, Tyler (2012) states that garnering community cooperation for the purposes of identification and prevention of terrorism must be the goal in counterterrorism policing. The general contention is that hardline counterterrorism approaches will lead to the deterioration of trust the out-groups afford to the police, and therefore, withholding of intelligence sharing and cooperation with the police (Briggs, 2010). In contrast, community policing, particularly with its emphasis on community outreach and partnerships, should improve perceptions of police, lead to an increase in police legitimacy, the flow of locally held information to the police, and cooperation in counterterrorism and other security matters. This emphasis on police legitimacy is, of course, a manifestation of the recent trend in the policing literature that links compliance with law, cooperation with police, and assessment of the quality of police performance to police legitimacy and its antecedent, procedural fairness (Skogan and Frydl, 2004). In this chapter, I will discuss legitimacy and cooperation as outcomes of community policing with a particular emphasis on the “procedural justice” theory of Tyler (2006) as an antecedent to legitimacy, and the understudied link between community policing and procedural justice.
Legitimacy

Policing has always struggled with legitimacy (Schulhofer et al., 2011). Police reform movements have invariably sought to improve the legitimacy of the police, usually following crises in policing manifesting the public dissatisfaction with the legitimacy of the police such as mass riots (Schulhofer et al., 2011). Counterterrorism also represents a crisis in policing calling for typically reactive traditional responses and concerns over police legitimacy. Counterterrorism tasks of the police, particularly with regard to the prevention dimension (primary interventions), present greater challenges to police legitimacy than ordinary crime. For one thing, counterterrorism necessitates information which is not readily available, therefore, needs to be collected typically using covert investigative and surveillance techniques such as wiretapping, use of informants and undercover agents, which by their nature expose police to collateral information as well as criminal. On the other hand, when police venture into intelligence gathering using such covert methods, communities afford less legitimacy to the police over concerns for the right to privacy of personal life (Greene, 2011) and honor (Thacher, 2005) because such efforts typically target identifiable groups such as minority communities as suspect, who might have already been alienated from public institutions and the majority communities for the suspicion that they are harboring terrorists. One can add to the list ethnic and racial profiling and discrimination as factors that increase fears of injustice among out-groups and diminish trust and police legitimacy.

Why focus on legitimacy? For one thing, legitimacy is a necessary feature of democratic policing which emphasizes policing by consent, transparency, and accountability. Moreover, legitimacy has consistently been found to be an antecedent to public cooperation with the police. A study in the US that focused on the relations between the Arab-American communities and
law enforcement including local and federal found that distrust of each other ranks on the top of the list among a number of barriers against better relations as identified by community leaders, and local and federal law enforcement serving jurisdictions with sizeable Arab-American communities (Henderson et al., 2006). Despite the centrality of trust, legitimacy, and cooperation with the police, the primary objectives of community policing endeavors, among minority communities in counterterrorism, we only have anecdotal or qualitative evidence with regard to the positive effects of community policing on these outcomes (Henderson et al., 2006; Khashu et al., 2007; Ortiz et al, 2007).

**Public Cooperation with Police**

It is no more than stating the obvious that police need the cooperation of the public. This holds true in the context of terrorism as much as, maybe, more so than it does in the context of traditional crime. Several characteristics of terrorism and its perpetrators render the public cooperation with the police crucial. Terrorist acts are highly infrequent and targets are geographically dispersed (Huq et al., 2011a; Schulhofer et al., 2011). Despite its low frequency, the impact terrorism has on society is profound. In addition, terrorists have the advantage of surprise on their side (Crenshaw, 2000). There is also the mostly taken-for-granted reality that terrorists will reside in communities that match their background to avoid suspicion as well as to conduct their recruitment and fund-raising operations. It is highly likely that minority community members will come to learn about who terrorists are and their activities most of the time, the type of intelligence that cannot be readily collected by the police by whatever technological means they may employ (Brown, 2007). All these factors suggest that public cooperation, particularly from moderate members of suspect communities, is in high demand for the prevention of terrorism. Of course, despite the prevention focus suggested here, public cooperation with the
police can take many forms. It includes not only sharing information regarding prospective and retrospective criminal information as well as working with the police in the coproduction of safety, which might include participating in community meetings and making an active contribution to solution of community problems.

There exist multiple cases illustrative of the benefit of public cooperation with the police on cases of terrorism. “Beltway Snipers” John Allen Muhammed and Lee Boyd Malvo, who terrorized the Washington DC in October 2002, killing 10 random people by sniping, were captured on a tip by a citizen who spotted the suspect’s car at rest stop (Brown, 2007). The Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, was captured after his brother tipped the authorities upon recognizing his brother’s writing style in the manifesto of the anonymous serial bomber that had made its way to news. A missed opportunity for public cooperation with the police for prevention was the 2003 Istanbul truck bomb attacks by al Qaida that targeted the HSBC bank, British Embassy, and two synagogues. Subsequent police investigations revealed that about 250 people who were not affiliated with the terrorist organization had partial information about the pending attacks that could have been of use for prevention, but they did not pass the information to the police or other authorities (McGarrell et al., 2007). There is also the unfortunate possibility that communities will cooperate with terrorists. For examples, Eric Rudolph, anti-abortionist and the Atlanta Olympic Games bomber, was captured seven years after the Olympic Game bombing in a remote area by an unsuspecting police officer. Given the manhunt by federal and local efforts, it is argued that he must have received help from locals who were more sympathetic to him and his cause than they are to the government (Brown, 2007). In fact, terrorism thrives on public support and cooperation whether it is from a small minority group or a large portion of specific communities. Accordingly, police have to compete against the terrorist groups to garner
the cooperation and support of the communities against the terrorists and insurgents. Community support is crucial to terrorists. The support terrorists seek from communities comes in many forms, such as manpower, funding, material, sanctuary, intelligence (Metz and Millen, 2004), and tolerance of activities (Paul, 2009).

Viewed from the lens of support for terrorism and radicalization, communities under perceived or real external (i.e., occupation by a foreign force) or internal (i.e., oppression by a dominant ethnic group) threat can be illustrated as three concentric circles as shown in Figure 2 (Sadri, 2007). The outer circle represents the larger minority group who are non-radicals. People in this outer circle do not embrace terrorism as a means to express their political position in response to the external or internal threat. Inside this outer circle is the middle circle comprised of those who are sympathizers and/or supporters, those who have not been involved in terrorism but sympathize with the terrorists and/or provide active support to them. Finally, the inner circle comprises the people who condone and engage in terrorism as a means to achieve their political objectives. What this model illustrates is that minority group engendering terrorism is not uniform. On the contrary, those who resort to terrorism or support terrorism constitute only a small group.

How large these circles are will vary. Terrorist and extremist cultures (inner and middle circles) will actively try to expand so that they can take over the outer circle, whereby they can at least turn the whole minority community into sympathizers and collaborators, if not insurgents. On the other hand, outer circle most likely will not make an effort to contain the inner circles when left on their own. The implication for the government in general and the police specifically is that they take actions to enlarge the outer circle so that the middle and the inner circle can be kept to the minimum, which essentially entails de-radicalization of individuals and winning
hearts and minds, yet easier said than done. The other implication is that they insulate the borders between the circles in order that the extremist and terrorist cultures are contained and deprived of public support. This model brings to forth three key actors: the government, the terrorists, and minority communities. Of course, one would also list the majority community as an important actor, I will limit my discussion to the interactions among these three actors.

![Diagram](image)

*Figure 2. Cultural theories of [religious or secular] terrorism, adopted from Sadri (2007, p. 39).*

Another theory that has relevance to counterterrorism theory is the game theoretical model by Akerlof and Yellen (1994). The authors proposed their theory in relation to gang crime and modeled the level of inner city crime level as the outcome of an interaction among multiple players involving police, gang and community. As will be discussed below, their model, which in essence tends to mesh with the cultural model proposed by Sadri (2007), can be extended to counterterrorism with changes in the rudiments and the context.
Akerlof and Yellen’s (1994) theory highlights the importance of community values and public cooperation with police in controlling crime in inner city neighborhoods where most crimes are committed by territorial gangs. They argue that the level of public cooperation with police is influenced by not only the actions of the police but also those of gangs and consequently depends on factors such as “fear of retaliation, the likely consequences of a weakening of the local gang, perceptions about the fairness of penalties, and attitudes toward the police. (p.184)”

With respect to the actions of the gangs, community members are concerned about the likelihood of reprisals if the gang finds out about their disclosing of information to police. Moreover, they also give consideration to whether it is better to weaken the gang or not. Gangs try to create sympathy for themselves among the community through positive contributions, for instance, prohibiting sales of drugs to juveniles, protecting the community from other gangs, and organizing social events and fund-raising for special needs. They also try to keep the level of crime they commit in the neighborhood at a level that does not alienate the community. Accordingly, community members develop a tolerance for the crimes committed by the gang members and take into account the consequences of their cooperation with the police in terms of its effects on future crime levels in the neighborhood, which would increase due to overtaking of the turf by violent outside gangs. Akerlof and Yellen (1994) state that the actions of police also determine the level of cooperation with them. Harsher penalties perceived as unjust, victimizing practices such as prosecuting innocent people, and unethical behavior will lead to their alienation, undermining of trust in and legitimacy of police. The implication for law enforcement, as Akerlof and Yellen (1994) argue, is that they develop better communication
with communities to promulgate trust and legitimacy, instill strong community norms against crime, and build crime-resistant communities.

The theory and its implications are amenable to policing terrorism as well. Extending the model by Akerlof and Yellen (1994) to terrorism is justified especially from the perspective of spatial concentration of both groups. Ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations, just like territorial gangs, typically concentrate their operations in communities they declare themselves to be representing the interests of. They try to control a territory which they claim to be their own. Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), IRA and ETA are examples of such organizations. This is also true for international terrorist organizations despite the fact that they do not claim to control the territory. For example, members of Al-Qaeda are expected to live among Muslim communities as they will easily blend, avoiding identification. Therefore, the community can provide a natural anonymity to the terrorists since one cannot tell a terrorist from other law-abiding members of the community. The terrorists are aware that government cannot simply take harsh actions against the whole community as such actions will not only mean a lack of integrity in upholding democratic rights but also will only serve to further alienate the community and deepen grievances. One distinction between ethno-nationalist and transnational terror organizations with respect to territorial control is that the former will exercise its power far more openly than the latter. While ethno-nationalist terrorists have a motivation to expose themselves as a member of the terrorist organization as an indication of the sovereign power they possess, members of international terrorist organizations will have a high motivation to disguise themselves to avoid detection simply because of the lack of power due to their small numbers. This is to suggest that the proportion of the terrorist population in relation to the mainstream population matters in the modus operandi of terrorist organizations.
Another reason why terrorists will blend in the community has to do with the recruitment practices of terrorist organizations. Just as suggested by the organizational model to understand terrorists’ behavior (Crenshaw, 2000), terrorists will try to increase their sphere of influence in the community by radicalizing and recruiting other non-violent or mainstream members of the community. Achieving this simply requires them to be in contact with the potential prospective members\textsuperscript{18}. Although radicalization over the internet has been increasing in recent years, leading to greater decentralization of recruitment process, face-to-face interaction still maintains its importance due to its efficiency. Therefore, terrorists, regardless of where they undertake their attacks such as inside or outside the spatial area where the community lives, continue their day-to-day activities in supposedly friendly neighborhoods, which is a typical behavior of gangs.

Terrorist organizations, like gangs, are known to engage in various types of crimes ranging from small scale to more complex transnational crimes to increase funds for their operations. For example, it is well documented that PKK members engage in snatching, burglary, drug sale, extortion, racketeering and kidnapping domestically as well as engaging in trans-border crimes such as drug trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling. It is no wonder that community members somehow, as a witness or victim, come to know about those crimes. More importantly, they also come to know about who the terrorists are from their exposure to propaganda in addition to extortions or so-called “tax collections”. Yet, they refrain from sharing

\textsuperscript{18}This also makes the case for a routine activity perspective to the recruitment process. According to Cohen and Felson (1979), crime has three elements: a motivated offender, a suitable target and lack of capable guardians. Crime is more likely to occur when the two first elements converge in spatial and temporal order in the absence of guardians. Extending the model to the recruitment process, terrorists (motivated offenders) will seek to recruit new members (suitable targets) in the absence of capable guardians. The capable guardians in that case can cover several factors that would inhibit effective recruitment such as parental monitoring, willingness of community members to report suspicious activities, law enforcement presence, level of sympathy for terrorists, collective efficacy, etc. Community policing is important in instilling values in the community such as trust in police, respect for the government, disapproval of indiscriminate use of violence etc. that can inhibit widespread recruitment practices, especially with juveniles.
the criminal information they have with the police, for reasons eloquently explained by Akerlof and Yellen (1994) within the context of gang crime.

Combining our understanding from the cultural model outlined above, the group that is most likely to cooperate with the police is the one that does not provide support to a terrorist organization. People in this group are local victims of terrorism. They do not derive any utility from terrorism as they do not share the same values as members of the organization or those providing support. Moreover, they are often threatened against cooperation with the security forces, subjected to extortion in the form of so-called taxes, or coerced into joining the sympathizers’ demonstrations by closing their stores as in the case of PKK. Furthermore, they experience stereotyping and alienating practices of the mainstream society simply because they are from the community that perpetuates terrorism. Although one would expect that non-radicals would be willing to cooperate with the police, unfortunately, the level of cooperation derived from these non-radicals is far from satisfactory in most of the cases, which is a phenomenon Akerlof and Yellen (1994) explain.

Akerlof and Yellen (1994) argue that, in addition to the factors outlined above, the level of law enforcement monitoring can have an impact on the level of cooperation with the police. That is, when public see that the police put the information to effective use and apprehend criminals, there will be greater willingness among the public to provide information to police. By the same token, the perception of people with regard to how much security the police can supply given a high probability of retaliation from radicals and terrorists, is determined by how effectively the police are able to take action against the radicals and terrorists, based on intelligence as to people’s willingness to stand up against terrorists and cooperate with security forces. Thus, public cooperation with police is expected to be very low when radicals and
terrorists comprise a majority of the community and hold coercive power, and when official security forces are ineffective in providing security needs.

The implications of Akerlof and Yellen’s (1994) theory are clear. Community cooperation with police against terrorism is crucial and contingent upon the community values, which cannot be taken for granted. To the contrary, law enforcement has to actively strive to win the hearts and minds of the communities that contain extremist cultures. However, community values and public cooperation with police is complicated and conditioned by the behavior and capabilities of the terrorists and their sympathizers. Their capacity to retaliate and willingness to create sympathy for themselves and the ‘cause’ they strive to achieve work in sheer contrast to the positive actions of police. Therefore, the police, while on the one hand forging better relations with the community, on the other hand are required to engage with terrorists within the constraints of the rule of law in a way that matches the public’s perceptions of justice. Given this backdrop information on matters that condition minority communities’ cooperation with police in counterterrorism, one way through which police can increase willingness to cooperate is to employ community policing, as was outlined in previous chapters in detail, to improve perceptions such as trust and legitimacy.

**Procedural Justice Theory**

The key outcomes discussed here, legitimacy and cooperation, have been the key concerns of the procedural justice theory inspired by the work of Tom R. Tyler (2006), *Why People Obey the Law*, first published in 1990. Tyler (2006) posits that compliance with law can be understood from two perspectives: instrumental and normative. The instrumental approach suggests that compliance is a function of a rational calculation of costs and benefits associated with law-breaking. People prefer to comply with the law when the costs of non-compliance
exceed the benefits. This understanding is rooted in the Rational Choice Theory and deterrence. Accordingly, this understanding proposes that authorities, to induce compliance with the law, should increase the likelihood of detection of law-breaking behavior (certainty), severity of punishment, and the celerity with which punishment is applied. This approach aims to condition behavior through external stimuli, punishment. When the instrumental approach is extended to cooperation with the police from compliance with law, it is suggested that people will cooperate with the police out of self-interest. On a personal level, people can get the benefit of feeling safe and secure when they help the police identify terrorists and intervene in plots for terrorist attacks. On a community level, they may simply cooperate to “lower police intrusions into their community pre-emptively and avoid confrontations with police in their homes, on the streets, or in places of worship or community centers” (Tyler, 2012, p. 355). The instrumental model suggests that police can induce greater levels of cooperation by positive or negative reinforcement; that is, either rewarding cooperative behavior by showing that their cooperation pays off in terms of arrests, prevention, and thereby, feelings of safety, or “directing unwelcome policing resources and attention toward uncooperative communities” (Tyler, 2012, p. 355).

The normative perspective, on the contrary, posits that people comply with the law out of normative considerations. This perspective has two dimensions: personal morality and legitimacy. “Normative commitment through personal morality means obeying a law because one feels the law is just; normative commitment through legitimacy means obeying a law because one feels that the authority enforcing the law has the right to dictate behavior” (Tyler, 2006, p. 4). In contrast to the instrumental perspective, the normative perspective focuses on voluntary compliance with the law. The normative perspective has also been extended to explaining why people cooperate with the police in a general crime context (Sunshine and Tyler,
2003) and terrorism (Tyler, 2012). This perspective suggests that people cooperate with police because they believe police are legitimate authorities.

The key question is how police can increase their legitimacy in the eyes of community members, particularly among suspect communities whose cooperation against terrorists and their supporters is in high demand. Tyler (2006; 2012) argues that legitimacy can be enhanced through fairness in policing procedures, that is, “fairness of the processes through which the police make decisions and exercise authority” (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003, p.514).

Procedural justice typically has four dimensions or principles: “‘neutrality’ of decision making, treating citizen’s with ‘respect’, demonstrating ‘trust’ to citizens and allowing citizen’s participation or ‘voice’ throughout interactions (Tyler, 2008, p. 30)” (see also Goodman-Delahanty, 2010; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Murphy, 2011; Sargeant, Murphy, Davis, and Mazorelle, 2012, p. 21). In measurement, procedural justice is typically envisaged as comprising two dimensions: fairness of decision making and fairness of treatment. A procedurally just decision making process should at the very least ensure that the decision maker is willing to listen to and take into account the concerns and opinions of those will be affected by the decisions and policies made; maintains an honest, neutral, and transparent tone; explains his/her perspective on the issue rather than dictate it; and treats people with respect (Tyler, 2006; 2012).

Procedural justice concerns not only micro-level interactions where law enforcement decisions are made (i.e., police-citizen encounters such as traffic stops) (Şahin, 2014) but also macro-level policy making (i.e., community consultation in policy making) (Tyler, 2012). In support of this view, Sargeant et al. (2012) state that “legitimacy and procedural justice are important not only in one-on-one police-citizen encounters but also in the context of police engagement with communities” (p. 21).
Micro-level procedural fairness has implications for compliant behavior police elicit from individuals they come into contact with (i.e., compliance with police directives) (Mastrofski, Snipes, and Supina, 1996; McCluskey, 2003; McCluskey, Mastrofski, and Parks, 1999) as well as general compliance with the law (Paternoster, Brame, Bachman, and Sherman, 1997; Tyler, 2006; Tyler and Huo, 2002). Recently, procedural justice theory has also been extended to voluntary cooperation with the police among adults (Murphy, Hinds, and Fleming, 2008; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2004; Tyler and Fagan, 2008) as well as youth (Gau and Brunson, 2010; Hinds, 2009; Murphy and Gaylor, 2010; Reisig and Lloyd, 2009) and ethnic groups (Bradford and Jackson, 2010; Gau and Brunson, 2010; Murphy and Cherney, 2011; Tyler and Huo, 2002). These studies, as well as experimental research (Mazerolle, Antrobus, Bennett, and Tyler, 2013; Şahin, 2014), provide strong evidence for the procedural justice perspective in building police legitimacy, thereby eliciting compliant behavior and willingness to cooperate with the police.

A more recent extension of procedural justice theory as an antecedent of police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police is to counterterrorism (Cherney and Murphy, 2013; Huq et al., 2011a, 2011b; Schulhofer et al., 2011; Tyler, 2012; Tyler et al., 2010). Tyler (2012) discusses that the relationships among procedural justice, legitimacy, and cooperation, which received strong empirical support over two decades, are likely to be conditioned by several factors when the theory is extended to the relations between the minority communities and police in countering terrorism. First, the observed relationships among procedural justice, legitimacy, and cooperation may not hold in all cultures and societies, particularly under autocratic rule (Tankebe, 2009; Tyler, Lind, and Huo, 2000). Second, minority community members may not be willing to cooperate with the police against those of their own,
irrespective of the fact that they are terrorists simply out of feelings of kinship (Tyler, 2012). And third, Tyler (2012) argues that religiosity, particularly in the case of religiously-motivated terrorism, can condition the effects of procedural justice and legitimacy on cooperation. Tyler (2012) bases this argument on the fact that religious people may not be willing to defer to a government that is in conflict with a terrorist organization that subscribes to the same religion as they are and provides justifications for engagement in terrorism using religious doctrines such as jihad. However, this conviction is problematic because religiosity is being used as a synonym for extremism and radicalization. Terrorist ideologies, which exist in most religions (see Juergensmeyer, 2000), to which Taoism can be cited as an exception (Forst, 2009, p. 120-121), are typically an extremist interpretation of the religious doctrine which is not condoned by the mainstream religious majority. Accordingly, it is “degree of radicalization”, which reflects the degree to which the terrorist justifications are embraced, rather than religiosity that conditions the effect of procedural justice and legitimacy on cooperation. Contrary to the hypothesized relationship by Tyler (2012) with regard to conditioning effects of religiosity, a more likely hypothesis would be that religiosity may increase willingness to cooperate with the police irrespective of perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy, because pious people tend to denounce the killing of innocents and consider killing of one innocent soul as tantamount to killing of all humanity. They may be more willing, therefore, to take risks to contribute to the prevention of terrorist acts, which may include cooperation with the government.

What is the current state of empirical evidence in relation to the effect of procedural justice on legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with police in counterterrorism? The available evidence comes from four studies on Muslims in the US (Tyler et al., 2010; Huq et al., 2011b), the UK (Huq et al., 2011a), and Australia (Cherney and Murphy, 2013). The first study that
applied the instrumental and normative perspectives to understanding willingness to cooperate with police in counterterrorism by minority groups that are the targets of counterterrorism policies was undertaken by Tyler et al. (2010) in New York, through surveying 300 Muslim Americans. Multiple regression results indicated that perceptions of procedural justice have a direct effect on the willingness to cooperate with police in counterterrorism and alert them about terrorist threats, and an indirect effect through perceptions of legitimacy. That is, Muslim Americans who believe that the police treat them fairly in the making and implementing of counterterrorism policies report increased willingness to cooperate with the police. In addition, this belief increases their perceptions of police legitimacy, which in turn increases their willingness to cooperate with the police. The instrumental perspective that suggests that people cooperate with police because they believe the police are effective and make communities safer did not receive empirical support.

The New York study was replicated by the same authors in the UK using a sample of British Muslim residents in London (Huq et al., 2011a). Interestingly, this study found that perceptions of procedural justice directly influenced willingness to cooperate in counterterrorism and alert the police against terrorism-related risks rather than indirectly through legitimacy. In fact, legitimacy was not a statistically significant predictor of either of the cooperation variables. The UK study also failed to find any significant effect of instrumental consideration such as police effectiveness on the perceived legitimacy of the police and willingness to cooperate with police. A comparison of the New York with the London study suggested that the basic difference was that while Muslim Americans placed emphasis on procedural justice both in the policy formation and policy implementation, British Muslims emphasized procedural fairness in policy
implementation as a factor that determines their willingness to cooperate with the police in counterterrorism.

A replication of the original New York study was conducted in Australia in 2013. Cherney and Murphy (2013) studied the effect of perceptions of law legitimacy on willingness to cooperate with police. The researchers employed a quota sample of 302 participants from 1800 Arabic-speaking Australians identified from the telephone directory, based on common Arabic surnames. Cherney and Murphy (2013) found, in their sample of Arabic-speaking Australians, that perceptions of legitimacy mediated the effects of procedural justice on the willingness to cooperate in both general crime control and counterterrorism. In addition, legitimacy mediated the effects of law legitimacy in general crime control but not counterterrorism. Differently from a general crime control setting, law legitimacy and acceptance of Australian identity were statistically significant positive predictors of willingness to cooperate in counterterrorism.

Overall, these studies provide strong evidence for the normative model. The perceived fairness of the formation of counterterrorism policies and fairness of implementation greatly matter with regard to minority group’s perceptions of police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police in counterterrorism. On the other hand, instrumental judgments (i.e., police effectiveness) do not appear to have any significant effect on building police legitimacy and garnering cooperation in counterterrorism from minority communities.

**Community Policing as Procedural Justice**

Community policing and procedural justice are inherently related. In fact, community policing can be considered a manifestation of procedural justice. In the words of Hawdon (2008, p. 185),

> [t]he basic model is that community-policing tactics increase resident perceptions of procedural justice. This increase in procedural justice enhances perceptions of
police legitimacy. In turn, residents who perceive police as being legitimate are more likely to cooperate with the police and comply with the law.

While some studies acknowledge this relation between community policing and procedural justice (Hawdon et al., 2003; Hohl, Bradford, and Stanko; 2010; Murphy et al., 2008;), there has been little exploration of this relation in theory and research (Sargeant et al., 2010; Willis, 2011). This section aims to provide a detailed argument for this relation.

Procedural justice has two elements; quality of decision-making and quality of treatment. The quality of decision-making dimension of procedural justice at the micro level entails that the police give citizens an opportunity to explain their opinions and views before they make a decision. This is true not only for micro-level interactions where police make decisions such as issuing a traffic citation, but also for macro level policy formation such as identifying policing priorities in neighborhoods. By the same token, police departments implementing community policing mobilize and empower communities they serve to identify and prioritize community problems the communities feel requires immediate attention. They also involve citizens, ideally, in all stages of problem solving including the selection of interventions and their assessment, giving them some form of democratic control on policing, which is a source of legitimacy.

Greene (2011) states that one reason for widespread acceptance of community policing is that the problem-solving focus makes it possible for the police and the public to reach a consensus on both the policing objectives and responses to achieve the objectives. He continues to state that “using a problem-solving approach police typically have a clear crime target, community awareness of the target and of the selected police response. This is not to be construed that the community is immediately supportive of the police; rather, it suggests that the police generally work under a legitimacy umbrella provided by the community” (Greene, 2011; p. 220). Of course, this argument assumes that police make a genuine effort to activate the public as decision
makers in matters of security rather than dictate their own views and use partnerships as mechanism to generate support for one-sided policies (Greene, 2011; Thacher, 2005). In short, community policing, with its focus on the co-production of security with communities through partnerships and problem solving, is tantamount to the quality of the decision-making dimension of procedural justice because making policing decisions in consultation with communities is more procedurally fair (Willis, 2011) than making one-sided policing decisions.

The other dimension of procedural fairness is about the quality of the interaction. This dimension of procedural justice relates to the manner in which the police engage with citizens, such as whether they were respectful, polite, and honest in their treatment of citizens during interactions that may occur in any context such as enforcement of laws, criminal proceedings, beat meetings, or simply casual. Cordner (2000) states that personalized service is one of the key elements of the philosophical dimension of community policing. Personalized service is not only about tailoring the role, functions, and style of policing in accordance with the local norms and values, but also how the police treat community members. Public demands “officers who generally deal with citizens in a friendly, open, and personal manner” rather than “who operate in a narrow, aloof, and/or bureaucratic manner (p.48)”. Cordner (2000) argues that the former type of officers will be more likely to generate trust and confidence. By these observations, Cordner (2000) alludes to the suggestion that procedural justice is inherently linked to community policing. In addition, Willis (2011) states that quality of interaction is salient in beat meetings, a typical community policing implementation. He states, “managers of the beat meetings would need to be courteous and good natured, and express genuine concern for resolving the issues brought to their attention” (p. 665) highlighting the salience of the quality of the interaction dimension of procedural justice to community policing initiatives.
Perhaps, it will be useful to explore the link between community policing and procedural justice through the lenses of community members who are the clients of services provided by police. Community policing is a highly complex and multi-dimensional strategy. It requires substantial transformation at the individual and organizational levels. Yet, when it is considered in terms of community members’ experience with the police, this complexity boils down to the frequency and nature of police-community member interactions, formal or informal. Community members do not care if their police department is applying community policing to its fullest, adhering to the idealized version by police reformers, including significant changes at the organizational level. From a community member perspective, the basic difference between a traditional and a community policing operation would be the frequency of informal contact with the officers, familiarity with the officers serving their communities, the demeanors of the officers, the opportunity to have a say in setting the police priorities, and the resolution of recurrent and never-seem-to-be-ceasing nuisances in the neighborhood. It is true that not all people have a direct, face-to-face experience with police officers, and the proportion of communities that do so are minimal. Yet, research shows that vicarious experience with police officers is important to shaping perceptions of police. For instance, Rosenbaum, Schuck, Costello, Hawkins, and Ring (2005) found that indirect experience through learning that others have had a positive or negative experience with the police in Chicago predicted attitudes toward the police. Accordingly, community members who have heard others having had positive experiences with the police may also be more inclined to develop positive attitudes toward police (i.e., legitimacy and trust).

A competing explanation why people perceive the police as a legitimate authority and cooperate with them is police effectiveness -- that is, because they believe that police are
effective at fighting with crime and disorder. Community policing is also compatible with this paradigm with its problem-solving dimension that emphasizes the resolution of recurrent problems in a given community, which should increase the perceptions of police effectiveness, and thereby, legitimacy and willingness of members of the communities to assist the police. Problem-solving orientation as a process, which might involve a meaningful input of communities, should increase police legitimacy because the process by which problems and solutions are identified is just, while the successful resolution of problems demonstrates that the police are effective. This point also suggests that different types of community policing initiatives, in terms of processes by which they are implemented and outcomes they bring about, manifest their effect on legitimacy and cooperation through different mechanisms.

Sargeant et al. (2012), in their review of studies on legitimacy and policing, state that one way police can improve their legitimacy is through community policing. An empirical test of the link between community policing and procedural justice, legitimacy, and willingness to cooperate was provided by Murphy et al. (2008) in Australia. The authors used two waves of a longitudinal survey data collected in 2005 and 2006 in a suburban community before and after the implementation of a community policing initiative, which involved police officers increasing their informal contact with suburban residents to discuss “issues of safety, security, and crime prevention” (p. 146) as well as organizing community and school-based activities. Their findings revealed that legitimacy in Time 2 significantly predicted cooperation in Time 2, controlling for cooperation in Time 1 as well as competing explanatory variables (e.g., distributive justice and police performance) and socio-demographics. Similarly, procedural justice in Time 2 had a statistically significant positive relationship with perceptions of legitimacy in Time 2 controlling for legitimacy in Time 1. The authors conclude “policing strategies that aim to specifically
encourage informal contact between the police and public are effective in changing community perceptions and behaviour in a positive manner” (p. 151). Two particular shortcomings of this research should be noted. First, the research design employed uses Time 1 (pretest) scores in the variables of interest as a proxy for comparison group. However, this does not rule out alternative explanations without a comparison group that has not been subjected to the intervention in Time 1 and Time 2. Although the researchers controlled for a number of variables in their model, there might have been other changes in the course of the implementation of community policing that could account for the observed relationships. Second, the authors do not provide a formal test of the mediation hypothesis, that is, community policing improves perceptions of police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate through its effect on the perceptions of procedural justice.

I should concede here that procedural fairness may not be the only intervening factor to mediate the effects of community policing on legitimacy and cooperation. Community policing means different things to different people. In addition, community policing does not provide a one-size-fits-all package, but it is tailored to fit the local needs. Accordingly, police organizations tend to emphasize some dimensions and activities over others in their implementation of community policing. For example, some organizations may emphasize beat patrols over community engagement. In such cases, the mediating factor can be police visibility rather than procedural justice. Hawdon et al. (2003) found that police visibility mediated the positive effects of community policing implementation awareness in their sample on the perceptions that police are trustworthy.

The type of community policing implementation in this study is mostly in the form of informal contact between police officers and Kurdish local youth on social projects, school visits, sports tournaments, or philanthropic contributions. The nature of these contacts does not
involve decision making or policy formation. Rather, they involve police treating youth in a respectful, friendly, and sincere manner. Accordingly, based on the nature of the interactions, a more plausible case can be made for procedural justice in interpersonal treatment as the mediating factor, rather than procedural justice in decision making or other likely factors. While this theoretical statement makes the assumption that procedural fairness in decision making and interpersonal treatment are distinct, they may not be empirically separable. In other words, the two dimensions can converge on a single construct.

**Conclusion**

This chapter focused on the two key attitudinal outcomes of this study, legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with police, by which the effectiveness of community policing initiatives in counterterrorism can be assessed. These are the very outcomes the literature on community policing as it applies to counterterrorism places an emphasis on. On the other hand, despite the growing literature in this line of research, there appears to be a lack of empirical evidence on whether community policing is making a positive impact on these outcomes. In addition, a separate body of research indicates that legitimacy and cooperation are predominantly influenced by whether the police are perceived to be employing fair procedures in making law enforcement decisions and in their interactions with citizens. What remains to be answered is whether community policing and procedural fairness exert their influences separately (subject to the condition that they both predict legitimacy and cooperation) or whether procedural justice mediates the effect of community policing on outcomes. Accordingly, this study proposes to test the following hypotheses using survey data from a sample of Kurdish youth living in a province in southeast Turkey where the TNP has been implementing initiatives inspired by community policing to improve perceptions of police legitimacy as part of its counterterrorism efforts.
Research Hypotheses

H1: There is a positive relationship between participation in community policing initiatives and perceptions of procedural justice, holding constant other independent variables in the model. Those who participated in community policing initiatives will report higher perceptions of procedural justice than non-participants.

H2: There is a positive relationship between participation in community policing initiatives and perceptions of police legitimacy, holding constant other independent variables in the model. Those who participated in community policing initiatives will report higher perceptions of police legitimacy than non-participants.

H3: There is a positive relationship between participation in community policing initiatives and willingness to cooperate with the police, holding constant other independent variables in the model. Those who participated in community policing initiatives will report a higher willingness to cooperate with the police than non-participants.

H4: There is a positive relationship between perceptions of procedural justice and police legitimacy, holding constant other variables in the model. As perceptions of procedural justice increase, so do the perceptions of police legitimacy.

H5: There is a positive relationship between perceptions of procedural justice and willingness to cooperate with the police, holding constant other variables in the model. As perceptions of procedural justice increase, willingness to cooperate with the police increases.

H6: There is a positive relationship between perceptions of police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police, holding constant other variables in the model. As
perceptions of police legitimacy increases, willingness to cooperate with the police increases.

H7: Perceptions of procedural justice will mediate the effects of participation in community policing initiatives on perceptions of police legitimacy.

H8: Perceptions of procedural justice will mediate the effects of participation in community policing initiatives on willingness to cooperate with the police.
CHAPTER 5
DATA AND METHODS

This chapter introduces the methodology of the study. Details with regard to the data used for the analysis, and the sampling and data collection process are followed by a description of the variables of central interest, and concerns in relation to internal validity, external validity, measurement validity and reliability, and statistical validity.

This study uses secondary data to answer the research questions central to this study. The data for this study come from Şırnak, a province in the southeast region of Turkey bordering Iraq and Syria. In the first two weeks of June 2013, the Şırnak Police Department conducted a survey of students attending grades 6 through 12 in an attempt to evaluate the impact of the initiatives undertaken based on a community policing approach directed towards local youth with the aim of improving perceptions of police among local youth. The survey instrument, designed based on the literature on Tyler’s work on procedural justice and legitimacy, was administered to a sample of 1,009 students sampled in nine public schools in the city center of Şırnak.

Sampling Strategy

The sample was drawn through a non-random sampling procedure. My contact with the original data collectors revealed that it was not readily feasible to obtain a representative sample from schools. The feasible method was to take nonrandom samples at the classroom level rather than individual level in view of several constraints such as time and financial constraints as well as potential social stigma randomly selected students would experience when they were collected from classrooms in the presence of peers. In the light of this information, the primary aim of the sampling strategy was to obtain a sample of sufficient size that would have sufficient variation in
the variables of interest such as participation in community policing initiatives. Students were selected from nine schools located in the neighborhoods that are locally known to have lower levels of confidence in police. Those schools were also the primary targets of community policing efforts. In each of the schools identified, surveys were administered to the classrooms the school administrators were willing to include in the study, while an effort was made to sample about 10 percent of the students attending each school. Since the unit of analysis is individuals but sampling was completed at the classroom level, which is a higher level, we could not claim that the sample was representative of the schools from which the data were collected even if the classrooms had been randomly selected. The response rate is unknown to us since the original data collector failed to collect response rates from each of the classes sampled.

Participation in the survey was completely voluntary. The participants were informed that they could withdraw from the study at any point. No identifying information was collected from the survey participants, and participants were given assurances of anonymity and confidentiality both orally and in written form. Surveys were administered in Turkish at the schools in the class environment by proctors under the observation of class teachers. Proctors, who were university students attending the local university, were fluent in the Kurdish language and provided Kurdish translation when individual students had problems understanding the statements in the survey. The survey instrument was designed in optical scanner format, and completed forms were shredded using a document shredder after the answers were transferred to computer with an optical sheet reader and the data were manually checked against data entry errors.

The survey instrument was prepared based on the literature on legitimacy, procedural justice, and public perceptions of law enforcement. The survey items that relate to the legitimacy and procedural justice were localized and designed to make sense once translated into Turkish.
In addition, an effort was made to use dissimilar semantic content on multiple items that are theorized to load onto different latent constructs because failure to do so raises measurement problems such as correlated errors between manifest variables of different constructs.

**Variables in the Study**

**Dependent Variables**

Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on the study variables that are of interest as the dependent variables. There are three dependent variables this study is concerned with: procedural justice, police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police.

Procedural justice is theorized to have two components: quality of decision-making and quality of treatment. *Quality of decision making* is measured by responses to on a five-point scale measuring respondents’ level of agreement with each of the following four statements: “Police exercise their powers in accordance with the law”; “Police elicit the support of the people in my neighborhood to fight crime and terrorism”; “Police listen to/take into account the views of the people in my neighborhood in fighting crime and terrorism”; and “Police make decisions for the well-being of the people in my neighborhood”. These statements tap into the perceptions of co-production of safety with due diligence to the views of local people in fighting crime and terrorism as well as the belief that police make decisions and exercise their powers in accordance with the law and for the well being of local people. The *quality of treatment* construct captures respondents’ perceptions of fairness in interpersonal treatment of people by the police and is measured by responses to following statements on the same five-point scale as above: “Police treat citizens with dignity and respect”; “Police take time to listen to people”; “Police treat people fairly”; and “Police respect citizens’ rights”.

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Table 3

Frequencies and Descriptive Statistics for 23 Items Measuring the Dependent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Categories</th>
<th>Coding Scheme</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Q25. Procedural Justice**

- **Quality of Decision-making**
  a. Police exercise their powers in accordance with the law
     0.317 0.182 0.223 0.156 0.123 1 2.585 1.387 906 10.21
  b. Police elicit the support of the people in my neighborhood to fight crime and terrorism
     0.236 0.175 0.265 0.163 0.161 1 2.836 1.379 897 11.10
  c. Police listen to/take into account the views of the people in my neighborhood in fighting crime and terrorism
     0.273 0.211 0.275 0.156 0.086 1 2.571 1.272 899 10.90
  d. Police make decisions for the well-being of the people in my neighborhood
     0.257 0.216 0.241 0.181 0.106 1 2.663 1.317 908 10.01

- **Quality of Interpersonal Interaction**
  e. Police treat citizens with dignity and respect
     0.290 0.183 0.256 0.179 0.093 1 2.603 1.317 853 15.46
  f. Police take time to listen to people
     0.285 0.146 0.274 0.187 0.108 1 2.686 1.345 862 14.57
  g. Police treat people fairly
     0.288 0.204 0.258 0.169 0.082 1 2.552 1.285 858 14.97
  h. Police respect citizens’ rights
     0.264 0.164 0.268 0.204 0.100 1 2.713 1.321 867 14.07

**Q23. Legitimacy**

- **Obligation to Obey**
  a. I accept the police as an authority
     0.333 0.129 0.271 0.156 0.111 1 2.583 1.375 918 9.02
  b. People should obey the decisions made by the police
     0.239 0.187 0.231 0.217 0.127 1 2.806 1.353 900 10.80
  c. You should do what the police tell you to do even when you disagree with their decisions.
     0.238 0.182 0.258 0.200 0.122 1 2.786 1.333 903 10.51
  d. Police should always be respected
     0.182 0.143 0.211 0.300 0.164 1 3.121 1.348 883 12.49

*(table continues)*

111
Table 3 (continued).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Response Categories</th>
<th>Coding Scheme</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% Missing</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>-Trust</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. I trust the police</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. I like the police</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. The police can be trusted to make decisions that are right for the people in my neighborhood</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. The police are there for our safety</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. The police are generally honest</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. I would go to police if I needed help</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q24. Willingness to Cooperate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. To help the police solve a crime</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. To help the police capture a suspected criminal</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. To report a suspicious or dangerous activity in your neighborhood</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. To report a crime in your neighborhood</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. If you knew some people were planning an attack on the police/army</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.335</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
Response category frequencies presented in proportions.
Coding Scheme
1. 1= Disagree strongly; 2=Disagree; 3=Neither agree nor disagree; 4=Agree; 5= Agree strongly
2. 1=Definitely would not; 2=Would not; 3=No opinion; 4=Would; 5=Definitely would
A literature review suggests that there are two components of legitimacy: trust in the police and obligation to obey to the directives of the police. *Obligation to obey* is measured as a scale composed of four questions as shown in Table 3 on a five category scale ranging from 1-disagree strongly to 5-agree strongly with “Neither agree nor disagree” marking the middle category. The statements theorized to load on to obligation to obey construct are as follows: “I accept the police as an authority”\(^{19}\); “People should obey the decisions made by the police”; “you should do what the police tell you to do even when you disagree with their decisions”; “police should always be respected”. Trust in police, the second subconstruct under legitimacy, is also measured as a scale of six statements: “I trust the police”; “I like the police”; “The police can be trusted to make decisions that are right for the people in my neighborhood”; “The police are there for our safety”; “The police are generally honest”; and “I would go to police if I needed help”. Measurement is based on the same five category response scale as in obligation to obey.

The next dependent variable is *willingness to cooperate* with the police. The respondents were presented with five situations that are of concern to law enforcement and asked to indicate their likelihood of reporting to the police on a five category Likert-type scale ranging from 1-definitely would not to 5-definitely would, no opinion marking the middle category. These situations include 1- to help the police solve a crime; 2- to help the police capture a suspected criminal; 3- to report a suspicious or dangerous activity in your neighborhood; 4- to report a crime in your neighborhood; and 5- if you knew some people were planning an attack on the police/army. These variables were reverse-coded so that a higher value indicates higher likelihood of reporting to the police.

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\(^{19}\) The first statement, “I accept the police as an authority” is a rephrased version of the typical statement in previous research which reads “The police are legitimate authorities”. The replacement of statements was based on a suspicion about the language skills of the juveniles to understand the translated Turkish version of the statement.
Although procedural justice and legitimacy are presented here as having two-dimensions each based on the theory, it may not be the case empirically, as evidenced by high factor correlations. Typically, factor correlations that exceed 0.85 are considered to be measuring the same concept. I will elaborate more on this in the analytical strategy section. Therefore, rather than calculating the three dependent variables of concern to this study based on theory and reporting descriptive statistics for the procedural justice, legitimacy, and willingness to cooperate variables, I report statistics for each of the indicators that I will use in exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in a structural equation modeling (SEM) framework to measure the dependent variables. Such a strategy is predicated on the concerns over dimensionality of the key constructs, and performance of the individual observed indicators to predict their respective latent constructs.

A brief interpretation of the statistics presented in Table 3 is as follows: The mean scores for all willingness to cooperate indicators were greater than the theoretical average of 3 on a five-point scale, indicating that the respondents in this sample were willing to cooperate with the police on average. On the other hand, the means scores of procedural justice and legitimacy indicators were generally lower than the theoretical average. Proportions reported for each response category reveal that negative views were highly prevalent among respondents. For example, more than a quarter of the respondents provided “disagree strongly” as a response particularly for the majority of procedural justice indicators. The rate of missing values varies from 7.83 to 16.63, with the majority of indicators having missing values more than 10 percent.
Table 4  
*Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to Community Policing</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-city tour</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within-city tour</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visits to police units</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentations on police</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports tournaments</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance for private tutoring</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing assistance</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.145</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conferences</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.142</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family visit</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>14.583</td>
<td>1.871</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1009</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in a dormitory</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>5.745</td>
<td>1.840</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of siblings</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>2.769</td>
<td>1.558</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>3.488</td>
<td>1.082</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived economic status</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>0.548</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Level (1=Secondary, 0=Primary)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade Attended</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>3.155</td>
<td>1.241</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11th</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0.054</td>
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<tr>
<td>School Attended</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anadolu Ogretmen Lisesi</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahcelievler Ortaokulu</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumhuriyet Lisesi</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumhuriyet Anadolu</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gazi Ilkogretim Okulu</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ismet Pasa Lisesi</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kiz Meslek Lisesi</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rekabet Ilkogretim Okulu</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Şırnak Lisesi</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Math Grade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Language Grade</td>
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<td>3.611</td>
<td>1.144</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous contact with police as a suspect</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious negative experience</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>2.351</td>
<td>1.183</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious positive experience</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>2.129</td>
<td>1.056</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Independent Variables

The primary independent variable in this study is self-reported participation in community policing activities. Nine types of interventions informed with community policing philosophy were captured as dichotomized variables coded as 1 if the respondent participated in the activity and 0 otherwise: out-of-city tours, within-city-tours, visits to police units, presentations on police services, sports tournaments, financial assistance for private tutoring, clothing assistance, conferences, and family visits. According to Table 4, the proportion of participants in community policing interventions ranges between about nine percent (financial assistance for private tutoring) and twenty-one percent (visits to police units). I estimate separate models for each of the interventions in multivariate analyses in a SEM framework.

Control Variables

In order to reduce threats to internal validity (which I discuss in the following section in detail) from omitted variable bias, several confounding variables that may be correlated with both the independent and dependent variables will be controlled for in the analyses. These variables include socio-demographics and prior experience with the police.

The socio-demographics cluster includes such variables as gender, age, school attended, grade attended, school success, whether the respondent lives in a dormitory (attends a boarding school), family income, perceived family economic status, and the number of siblings. Gender is a dummy variable coded as 1 for females and 0 for males. Slightly more than half of the sample (about 52 percent) was female. Age is measured in years as a continuous variable. The average age of the sample was about 15. The respondents were from nine different schools and attended grades 6 through 12. Slightly more than half the respondents (about 54.8 percent) attended secondary school. School success is measured with two variables: math grade and Turkish
language grade in the past semester, on a five category scale ranging from 1 – less than 1 to 5-about 5 reflecting the grading system in school. About 10 percent of the respondents reported living in a dormitory. Family income (monthly) is measured at the ordinal level with a range of 1- less than 500 Turkish Lira to 7- more than 3,000 Turkish Lira. About half of the respondents (48.7 percent) indicated having a monthly family income below 1,000 Turkish Lira (roughly $480). Perceived family economic status is measured with the question how well off financially the respondents perceived their family to be in comparison to other families in their city on a scale of 1-much better off to 5- much worse off. This variable was reverse-coded so that higher scores indicate better economic status. The mean of this variable, 3.488, indicates that the respondents on average perceived the economic status of their family somewhere between “similar to others” and “a little better off than others”. Number of siblings is a discrete integer variable, yet the last category is an open-end measure that lumps together those who have 8 or more siblings. On average, the respondents had about six siblings including themselves.

Prior experience with the police is measured both as direct and vicarious experience. Direct experience with police is measured by a dichotomized variable that captures whether the respondent had a prior direct contact with the police because of a suspicion of involvement in a crime. Those who responded in the affirmative were coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. About 7.5 percent of the respondents reported having a prior contact with the police as a suspect. Previous research indicates that vicarious experience is also an important factor that shapes perceptions of the police, given the fact that only a small minority directly gets into a direct contact with the police (Rosenbaum et al., 2005). Respondents answered two questions that measure how often they heard positive or negative experiences with the police from the people around them, such as family members, relatives, or friends on a four-item scale that ranges from 1- never to 4- often.
Respondents reported hearing more negative experiences than positive experiences. The mean score for indirect negative experiences was 2.35 and 2.13 for positive.

**Internal Validity**

This study adopts a cross section non-experimental design to answer the question whether participation in community policing programs increases perceptions of legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police among juveniles in a setting where police and juvenile relations are characterized by counterterrorism. Like any study, this study suffers from internal validity problems. “Internal validity refers to the accuracy of causal claims” (Langbein and Felbinger, 2006, p. 34). Since the primary interest of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of community policing programs, which entails a causal claim, threats to internal validity and steps taken to remedy identified threats need to be addressed.

Primary sources of threats to internal validity in this study are omitted variables bias arising from self-selection to participate in community policing programs, social desirability of responses, contamination in the measurement of the treatment variable (namely, participation in community policing activities), sampling (decision to participate in the survey), and statistical interaction. Omitted variable bias occurs when confounding variables that are related to both independent (X) and dependent (Y) variables are not statistically controlled for in the regression analyses, creating the false impression of a direct relationship between X and Y. Omitted variables bias both regression coefficients and their standard errors leading to invalid significance test. Unless the researcher employs a carefully planned and implemented randomized field experiment or quasi-experiment in which the assignment of treatment to groups is based on a purely random process (hence no other variable is related to the receipt of treatment – the independent variable), omitted variable bias always exists and may not be totally
eliminated but minimized. Bearing in mind that the primary independent variable in this study is participation in community policing programs, what known and unknown factors could be related to the receipt of the treatment as well as perceptions of police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police? The answer to that question requires information about the selection process for each type of intervention.

In relation to omitted variable bias, selection emerges as a threat. The nature of the community policing programs directed towards juveniles and measured in the survey is associated with three types of selection processes: self-selection to participate, selection by the police, or selection by the school. The coefficients, their standard errors, and consequently statistical tests will be biased to the extent that the variables tapping into the criteria for selection to participate are not statistically controlled. Table 5 shows the type of the program, selection process, likely sources of omitted variable threat, and remedies. Selection by the police for activities that cannot be provided to everybody such as cultural travels, financial assistance for private tutoring in preparation for university entrance exams, and clothing assistance due to the nature of the activity and involved costs are provided to a selected group of students usually based on school success or economic status such as low family income. These variables are going to be controlled for in the analyses. With regard to family visits, there is no known criterion on which families to be visited are selected on religious festivals.

Selection by the school tends to be random or expected to be independent of any known factors. However, there may be factors unknown to us and not measured in the survey instrument that selection by school might be correlated with by chance. Nevertheless, I will control for a host of variables that tap into previous direct and vicarious experience with the police,
demographics, and family socioeconomic status that might be correlated, by random chance, with selection by school for participation in programs.

Table 5

Program Types, Selection Process, and Remedies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Program or Activity</th>
<th>Selection Process</th>
<th>Omitted Variable Threat and Remedy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-town cultural travel</td>
<td>Selection by the police</td>
<td>School success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within-town cultural travel</td>
<td>Selection by the police</td>
<td>School success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visits to police facilities</td>
<td>Selection by the school</td>
<td>Unknown – general controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentations on police services</td>
<td>Selection by the school</td>
<td>Unknown – general controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport tournaments (soccer etc.)</td>
<td>Self-selection</td>
<td>Personal experiences with the police; gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial assistance for private lessons</td>
<td>Selection by the police</td>
<td>School success; Socioeconomic status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing assistance</td>
<td>Selection by the police</td>
<td>Socioeconomic status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conferences (anti-drug etc.)</td>
<td>Selection by the school</td>
<td>Unknown – general controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family visit</td>
<td>Selection by the police</td>
<td>Unknown – general controls</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The only type of program based on self-selection by each respondent is sports tournaments. Typically, the police organize a tournament such as a soccer tournament and call for applications by youth teams to participate. It could be expected that the decision to participate on the part of the students might be highly correlated with their perceptions of police, such as trust and legitimacy, leading to reverse causality or in statistical terms, an endogenous relationship, between the participation in sports tournaments and legitimacy of the police, biasing both regression coefficients and their standard errors, thus hypothesis tests. On the omitted variable part of threats to internal validity, I will control for previous direct and vicarious experience with the police as they are potentially related to both the decision to attend sports tournaments and legitimacy of the police. Gender arises as another important control variable for this particular intervention which typically appeals more to male students than female.
Another threat to internal validity is contamination. Contamination occurs when treatment diffuses to those in the control group who are not intended to receive the treatment. In our case, it is possible that some cases who report that they did not participate in any of the community policing interventions might have been exposed to the treatment through their friends who did through sharing of positive experiences. This might improve the perceptions of police among those who did not participate in any of the programs, minimizing any likely differences between the groups in their attitudes towards police that participation might have induced, thereby reducing our ability to find a statistically significant effect of participation in the community policing initiative.

Another threat to internal validity may arise from social desirability. Simply, some students might have provided responses that are socially desirable rather than their true opinions. In order to minimize this threat, students were assured about the anonymity and confidentiality of their responses in oral and written form. On the other hand, if those providing responses in socially desirable ways to the dependent variable, namely legitimacy and confidence in police, do not systematically vary across the treatment and control groups (no Z variable is correlated with Xs), it introduces a random measurement error only for the dependent variable, which is captured by the error term in the regression equation, hence, not a threat to internal validity.

Another threat to the internal validity of this study stems from self-selection to participate in the survey. Although I do not have any information on response rates, it is known that some refused to participate in the survey. If respondents differ systematically from nonrespondents, it will pose a threat to validity of the results. Yet, nonresponse may not necessarily result in bias. Groves and Peytcheva (2008), in their meta-analysis of 59 studies with an estimate of nonresponse bias found that nonresponse differences were similar “across the range of
nonresponse rates found” (p.175). How might respondents differ systematically from nonrespondents? Apparently, a likely reason not to participate is negative attitudes toward police (e.g., lack of legitimacy). Accordingly, if those who opted for participation in the survey also are those who have favorable perceptions of the police, it will bias our findings downwards reducing any significant difference that might have been achieved through community policing initiatives in the population from which the sample was drawn. In other words, those who have participated in community policing initiatives and those who have not will be more alike in terms of their perceptions of police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate. Another possibility is that those who volunteered to participate might be those who feel more strongly or are more concerned about police legitimacy. Unfortunately, since I do not have any viable means to estimate nonresponse bias, I do not know to what extent self-selection to participate represents a limitation.

Statistical interaction may render findings from additive models internally invalid. For example, there may be gender differences in the effects of community policing programs on police legitimacy, or the program effects may depend on other factors such as having a family member in the terror organization or previous participation in violent protests against the police. Unfortunately, it is not possible to control for likely interaction effects as they relate to juveniles’ associations with terrorist organizations, since variables such as exposure to terrorist propaganda, participation in protests conducted in the name of the terrorist organizations, or having family members in the terrorist organization were not measured.

**External Validity**

“External validity refers to the generalizability of research results” (Langbein and Felbinger, 2006, p. 34) to a larger population or other times and place. A primary factor that
determines the generalizability of research results relates to the sampling procedure. Only samples that are drawn by a random selection process where each unit of analysis has a known probability of selection to the sample from a population large enough are representative and results obtained are generalizable. The data used in this study come from a sample of secondary and high school students in Şırnak province of Turkey that is not representative of any known population because a non-probability sampling procedure was utilized. The sampling procedure is explained in previous sections of this chapter. Therefore, this study does not make any generalizability claims with regard to the results. A non-probability sample eliminates one’s ability to test hypotheses at given levels of significance. I report these levels nonetheless.

**Measurement Validity and Reliability**

“Measurement validity and reliability pertain to the appropriate measurement of all the concepts and variables in the research. Measurement validity concerns the accuracy with which concepts are measured, while reliability pertains to the precision of measurement” (Langbein and Felbinger, 2006, p. 35). One would question the content validity of the participation in community policing programs due to the operationalization of community policing. Community policing is typically conceived to be an organizational strategy and philosophy rather than a set of programs or interventions. However, this study does not aim to evaluate the overall community policing implementation in Şırnak Police Department, but rather community policing as it relates to informal contact between the police department and juveniles outside the law enforcement context. Therefore, the use of dummy variables to capture participation in specific interventions inspired by community policing is justified. Another threat to measurement reliability is from socially desirable responses. As explained under internal validity section above, if some participants altered their responses in socially desirable ways rather than stating
their true opinions, measurement reliability of these variables might be questionable. On the other hand, precaution against this was taken by giving assurances of anonymity and confidentiality.

Two constructs that are central to this study are procedural justice and legitimacy. Based on Tyler’s argument of the normative model for cooperation with the police and compliance with the law, procedural justice and legitimacy are construed as having two sub-components. Procedural justice is presumed to consist of quality of decision making and quality of treatment, whereas legitimacy is presumed to be captured by trust in police and an obligation to obey the law. Such an argument assumes four latent constructs which are internally consistent (convergent validity) and empirically distinguishable from each other (discriminant validity). On the other hand, there have been recent criticisms in relation to the measurement of these constructs in previous research such as inconsistent measurement across the studies, the use of semantically indistinguishable manifest variables to measure different latent constructs, and failure to address convergent and discriminant validity issues such as overreliance on Cronbach’s alpha to show internal consistency (convergent validity) and disregarding high correlations between the theoretical constructs that exceed .85, signaling discriminant invalidity (Gau, 2010; Henderson, Wells, Maguire, and Gray, 2010; Kochel, 2009; Maguire and Johnson, 2010; unpublished manuscript; Reisig, Bratton, and Gertz, 2007).

With regard to the measurement validity of the concepts central to the theory, it is highly salient to address convergent and discriminant validity because in the presence of discriminant and convergent invalidity, internal validity of the results obtained is questionable due to nonrandom (systematic) error in measurement. Imprecisely measured dependent and independent variables will be correlated with the error term violating the “no endogenous relationship”
assumption. In this study, I will address convergent and discriminant validity issues with regard to the measurement of obligation to obey, trust, quality of decision making, and quality of treatment based on a structural equation framework that incorporates exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) as the initial steps. I outline the procedure for this under the analytical strategy section below.

**Statistical Validity**

“Statistical validity refers to the accuracy with which random effects are separated from systematic effects.” (Langbein and Felbinger, 2006, p.35). Statistical validity concerns the validity of significance tests with regard to the effect of independent variables on the dependent variables. Failure to address statistical validity threats in research causes two types of errors: Type I or Type II. Type I error (false positive) occurs when the researcher rejects the null hypothesis (no effect) in favor of the alternative hypothesis in fact when the null hypothesis is true. In this case, researcher erroneously finds a relationship between the independent and dependent variables when in fact there is no relationship. On the other hand, Type II error (false negative) occurs when researcher fails to reject the null hypothesis when in fact the alternative hypothesis is true. In this case, researcher finds no relationship when in fact there is.

One source of statistical invalidity is random measurement error in the study variables. This is particularly likely with abstract concepts such as attitudes. One way to reduce this threat is to use multiple indicators that tap into different aspects of the concept being measured. Variables central to this study such as legitimacy, procedural justice, and willingness to cooperate are abstract attitudinal concepts which I measure with multiple manifest indicators. Therefore, I do not expect serious statistical invalidity due to random measurement error in the study variables that might stem from the abstract nature of the concepts measured. Another threat
to statistical validity is socially desirable responses which may introduce non-random measurement error in the measurement of legitimacy and procedural justice variables. In order to increase statistical validity, I will estimate a structural equation model based on an acceptable measurement model (confirmatory factor analysis) to minimize measurement error in the study variables.

Statistical validity is also closely related to the regression assumptions for unbiased and efficient estimations. Assumptions relevant to this study are no multicollinearity, homoskedasticity, and no autocorrelation.

Multicollinearity arises when explanatory variables are highly correlated with other explanatory variables in the regression equation so that regression fails to isolate the individual effects of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable, because it usually artificially inflates the standard errors of the collinear variables (although not biasing the regression coefficients themselves), decreasing the chances of finding a significant relationship and thereby increasing chances of making a Type II error (false negative). I run regression diagnostics to check for the presence of multicollinearity. There is no agreed-upon threshold for the variance inflation factor (VIF) that would indicate multicollinearity. Studenmund (2005) recommends the threshold of 5 (p. 259). The largest VIF score was 2.12 for conferences, which indicates that there is low multicollinearity among the independent variables.

Heteroskedasticity exists when the error term (residuals) does not have a constant variance (Studenmund, 2005, p.93). Simply, the regression equation estimates the value of the dependent variable more accurately for some cases whereas less accurately for others because of different variances in the residuals (i.e., variance in the squared difference between the observed and estimated values). This represents a violation of the assumption of homoskedasticity.
(constant variance of residuals) and biases the standard errors and invalidates significance tests. Survey research is particularly susceptible to this problem due to different degrees of randomness in human behavior (Langbein and Felbinger, 2006). The estimator I will use, mean-and-variance-adjusted weighted least squares (WLSMV) estimator available in Mplus, uses robust standard errors (Brown, 2006), and potential heteroskedasticity in standard error estimates is reduced. I explain the rationale for using the WLSMV estimator below in the analytical strategy section.

Regression assumes that observations of the error term are uncorrelated with each other. This assumption of independent observations is usually violated in survey research because observations within the same cluster tend not to be independent and respondents in the same cluster can influence each other. This violation biases the standard errors downwards, increasing our chances of finding a statistically significant relationship (Type I error – false positive). I would expect autocorrelation to be a problem in this research because juveniles from the same classrooms and schools tend to be more alike in their perceptions of the police through peer influence. In order to control for that, I use clustered standard errors at the school level in the models.

**Analytical Strategy**

As outlined above, serious concerns have been raised with regard to the convergent and discriminant validity of constructs such as legitimacy and procedural justice. Given the recent trend in the literature to address the measurement problems with regard to the latent constructs such as legitimacy and procedural justice, my analyses will be based on a structural equation framework that is best suited to address measurement concerns.
As a first step, I conduct exploratory factor analysis on the 23 items that capture the measures of procedural justice, legitimacy, and willingness to cooperate with the police using a random subsample consisting of approximately 50 percent of the cases. Exploratory factor analysis does not impose any structure on the data, unlike confirmatory factor analysis. EFA is a useful analytical tool that allows a researcher to identify the underlying dimensionality within a given set of indicators that have been developed to measure specific latent constructs and detect items that are poor predictors of the underlying dimensions (i.e., factors) because they do not load strongly on any factor or cross-load on multiple factors. I use the geomin rotation method to extract the factors. Geomin is an oblique rotation method which assumes that extracted factors are correlated unlike orthogonal rotation methods (Brown, 2006). There is reason to believe that extracted factors will be correlated as evidenced by consistently high correlations among procedural justice, legitimacy, and willingness to cooperate constructs in previous research.

The second step involves the estimation of a measurement model using confirmatory factor analysis based on the results from the initial EFA on the remaining 50 percent of the sample not chosen in the first subsample. This step provides an opportunity to validate the EFA results. The final step is to estimate structural equation models for each of the independent variables that capture various community policing interventions controlling for potentially confounding variables. The structural models are based on the best fitting CFA model and are conducted on the full sample rather than a randomly selected subsample because the independent variables of interest to this study are specific interventions that are observed only for a small portion of the full sample.

Because the manifest indicators constituting the measures of interest are ordinal categorical, I use the mean-and-variance-adjusted weighted least squares (WLSMV) estimator
available in structural equation modeling software Mplus version 7.11 (Muthén and Muthén, 1998-2012). “The WLSMV estimator provides weighted least square parameter estimates using a diagonal weight matrix ($W$) and robust standard errors and a mean- and variance-adjusted $\chi^2$ test statistic (Muthén and Muthén, 1998-2004)” (Brown, 2006, p. 388). This estimator is shown to perform well (i.e., produce accurate estimates) in estimating CFA models with varying sample sizes, non-normal data, and model complexity (Flora and Curran, 2004; Muthén, du Toit, and Spisic, 1997).

Table 6

Missing Values on the Study Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Missing Values</th>
<th>Dependent Variables Only</th>
<th>Independent Variables Only</th>
<th>All Study Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Cum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
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<td>48.56</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>79.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>82.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6+</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>17.44</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1009</td>
<td>99.99</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentages do not add up to 100.00 due to rounding.

Missing Data

A key decision with regard to analytical strategy is how to handle missing data. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, the frequency of missing values in individual study variables is generally low, usually below 10 percent. Table 6 shows the frequency of missing values on dependent variables, independent variables, and all study variables in separate columns. The frequencies reported in Table 6 indicate that listwise deletion, using cases that have valid values on all study variables only, would result in a loss of about two thirds of the full sample (30.8% of the cases have valid values for all study variables) for analysis although about three fourths of the sample had five or
fewer missing values on all study variables. This suggests that listwise deletion would introduce bias to estimates and/or reduce efficiency in estimation due to the loss of many cases that have few missing values. An alternative method to handle missing data is to use pairwise deletion, which uses all available data for each pair of variables instead of dropping cases with missing values entirely. Since pairwise deletion appears to be more efficient than listwise deletion in this case because it uses more of the information available, I will use this method, which is the default with the WLSMV estimator in Mplus.
CHAPTER 6
ANALYSES AND FINDINGS

Exploratory Factor Analysis

As an initial step, I performed exploratory factor analysis on the twenty-three manifest variables serving as indicators for the dependent variables. I utilized the WLSMV estimator and geomin rotation method to extract the factors, which were explained in detail in the preceding chapter. These analyses were conducted on a randomly selected 50 percent of the full sample using pairwise deletion. Six cases had no usable data and were dropped from the analysis leaving 500 usable cases.

A first step in EFA is to determine the number of factors to be retained using multiple criteria such as descriptive values (i.e., eigenvalues and scree plot), goodness of fit statistics, and substantive and theoretical justifications. The goodness-of-fit statistics included $\chi^2$ test, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis index, and weighted root mean square residual (WRMR). Following the guidelines by Hu and Bentler (1999) and Yu (2002), the following criteria for acceptable model fit were adopted: a nonsignificant $\chi^2$, RMSEA (<.06), CFI (> .95), TLI (> .95), WRMR (<1.00).

The strength and statistical significance of factor loadings, cross-loading problems, and interpretability of extracted factors based on theory are other considerations that help reach a solution. Based on these criteria, the results indicated that the data were represented best by three underlying factors. Eigenvalue criterion suggests that only factors above the threshold of 1 be retained. Only three factors appeared to have eigenvalues above 1 (12.843, 3.064, and 2.743
respectively). The screeplot shown below in Figure 3 also indicates that retaining four or more factors (on the shallow slope) contributes little to the solution.

Table 7 presents the goodness-of-fit statistics for multiple solutions ranging from 2-factor to 5-factor solutions. As the number of factors increased, the goodness of fit statistics improved. All chi square tests were statistically significant. Although a model that has a good fit should ideally have a nonsignificant $\chi^2$, this test is highly sensitive to large sample sizes. If other goodness-of-fit statistics indicate good fit, a statistically significant $\chi^2$ can be ignored (Bowen and Guo, 2012). All RMSEA values were greater than the suggested threshold of 0.06 and smaller than 1.00 except in the 2-factor and 3-factor solutions. All CFI and TLI values were greater than 0.95 indicating good fit except 2-factor solution. No factor solutions had negative residual variances.

Figure 3. Scree plot.
The results presented clearly indicate that a 2-factor solution is not acceptable, a decision that is also supported by the Kaiser-Guttman criterion (i.e., eigenvalue over 1) and scree plot tests. The goodness-of-fit statistics for the 3-factor model is acceptable. However, the RMSEA value (above 1) signals problems with the fit. To reach a solution, I examined the geomin-rotated factor loadings, their significance, cross-loading issues, and interpretability starting with the 4-factor solution. No indicators clearly loaded on the third factor extracted in the 4-factor solution. The two items that had factor loadings above 0.30 (q23a and q23c) loaded more strongly on the first factor (r=0.719 and r=0.857 respectively) which was clearly identified as representing the latent construct of legitimacy. These two items were originally construed to be indicators of “obligation to obey” dimension of legitimacy. It appeared that these two indicators formed a minor factor due to underlying “obligation to obey” dimension in addition to an overall “legitimacy” dimension. A similar problem existed with the 5-factor solution. An examination of 3-factor solution, which had a poor RMSEA value, revealed that all items loaded strongly on their respective factors. As shown in Table 8, all factor loadings are above 0.60 and statistically significant. Interpretability-wise, the three factors represent legitimacy, procedural justice, and willingness to cooperate with the police respectively. Ten indicators (q23a – q23j) load on legitimacy, eight (q25a – q25h) on procedural justice, and five (q24a – q24e) on willingness to
cooperate. In addition, no items cross-load on other factors. The three factors are positively and significantly correlated as shown in Table 9. Factor correlations provide evidence for discriminant validity (r<0.85). Therefore, a decision was made to retain three factors despite the poor RMSEA value. The three factors extracted indicated that procedural justice and legitimacy constructs were unidimensional in this sample.

Table 8

*Geomin Rotated Factor Loadings from 3-factor EFA Solution (n=500)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
<th>Willingness to Cooperate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q23a. I accept the police as an authority</td>
<td>0.794</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q23b. People should obey the decisions made by the police</td>
<td>0.929</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q23c. You should do what the police tell you to do even when you disagree with their decisions.</td>
<td>0.921</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q23d. Police should always be respected</td>
<td>0.894</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q23e. I trust the police</td>
<td>0.860</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q23f. I like the police</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q23g. The police can be trusted to make decisions that are right for the people in my neighborhood</td>
<td>0.820</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q23h. The police are there for our safety</td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q23i. The police are generally honest</td>
<td>0.796</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q23j. I would go to police if I needed help</td>
<td>0.809</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q24a. To help the police solve a crime</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q24b. To help the police capture a suspected criminal</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q24c. To report a suspicious or dangerous activity in your neighborhood</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q24d. To report a crime in your neighborhood</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q24e. If you knew some people were planning an attack on the police/army</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>0.843</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(table continues)*
Table 8 (continued).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
<th>Willingness to Cooperate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q25a.</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td><strong>0.699</strong></td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q25b.</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td><strong>0.787</strong></td>
<td>-0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q25c.</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td><strong>0.878</strong></td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q25d.</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td><strong>0.816</strong></td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q25e.</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td><strong>0.944</strong></td>
<td>-0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q25f.</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td><strong>0.919</strong></td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q25g.</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td><strong>0.921</strong></td>
<td>-0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q25h.</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td><strong>0.925</strong></td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Loadings in bold indicate the factor on which the item was placed.

Table 9

Geomin Rotated Factor Correlations (n=500)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
<th>Willingness to Cooperate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Justice</td>
<td>0.569***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to Cooperate</td>
<td>0.351***</td>
<td>0.336***</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *** p<0.001
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)

Following the EFA, a second step in structural equation modeling is to estimate a measurement model with confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the exogenous and endogenous latent variables. This step involves testing and refining the latent measures based on theory and/or EFA results before estimating a structural model. I estimated a CFA model on the three dependent variables, procedural justice, legitimacy, and willingness to cooperate with the police that were extracted in the EFA using the remaining 50 percent of the sample that was not selected for the EFA. Missing values were handled using pairwise deletion. Six cases had missing values on all variables and were dropped from the analysis, leaving 497 usable cases. Standard errors were clustered by school to take into account the nested nature of the data. I do not report the input data because raw data, instead of covariance matrix and standard deviations, were used as required by the WLSMV estimator.

A three-factor model as represented in Figure 4 was estimated using CFA. The initial CFA model assumed uncorrelated errors. The model specification was based on the results of the EFA presented above. Items q25a – q25h were hypothesized to load on procedural justice, q23a – q23j on legitimacy, and q24a – q24e on willingness to cooperate with the police. No errors were hypothesized to be correlated in the initial specification. The three latent factors, procedural justice, legitimacy, and willingness to cooperate, were permitted to be correlated based on the theory and prior evidence pertaining to the relationships among these constructs. The model was over-identified with 227 degrees of freedom.

Multiple criteria were used to evaluate the model fit. The initial model with three factors with no correlated errors specified fit the data well ($\chi^2=359.371$, df=227, p<0.001, RMSEA=0.034, CFI=0.994, TLI=0.993, WRMR=1.126). Chi-square was statistically significant
indicating a model misfit. However, as was previously noted, chi-square is sensitive to sample size. RMSEA, CFI, and TLI values indicated good model fit. Only WRMR was slightly inflated. All manifest indicators loaded well on their respective factors (range of $R^2$s=.56 -.87) and were statistically significant indicating good convergent validity. Factor correlations indicated that the factors had discriminant validity, that is, they represented empirically distinguishable theoretical constructs. The three latent variables were significantly and positively correlated. The factor correlations were moderate to strong as typically seen in the literature on procedural justice theory, providing evidence that the factors are concurrently valid.

Standardized residuals and modification indices were examined against localized strains in model fit. Standardized residuals did not indicate any localized areas of ill fit. The largest residual correlation was 0.132. On the other hand, modification indices suggested freeing two pairs of error correlation paths; q23b with q23c (MI=15.563, EPC=0.158)$^{20}$ and q24a with q24b (MI=21.899 and EPC=0.135). Brown (2006) suggests that model respecifications should be based on substantive and theoretical grounds rather than a concern to improve the model fit. Correlating the errors is justified in the presence of method effects. Method effects arise from sources that account for the correlations among a set of manifest indicators other than the latent construct (i.e., factor) itself (Brown, 2006).

Since the expected parameter change score is larger for the q23b and q23c pair, I first examined this pair for the presence of method effects. The indicator q23b reads “People should obey the decisions made by the police” and q23c “You should do what the police tell you to do even when you disagree with their decisions”. These two items along with q23a and q23d were initially construed to be measuring the “obligation to obey” dimension of legitimacy. While q23b measures a generalized obligation to obey the police, q23c is more personalized and specific in

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$^{20}$ MI stands for “modification index” and EPC for “expected parameter change”.
measurement referencing directly the respondent rather than others unlike the former. These two items (q23b and q23c) also differ from the other two indicators (q23a and q23d) of obligation to obey the police because the former pair represents an active form of obedience. Based on these considerations, I concluded that correlating the errors of these two items was substantively justified. I re-specified the model by freeing the path between the errors of q23b and q23c. The error correlation was .510, statistically significant at p<0.001 level. The model fit slightly improved (Chi-square=343.178, df=226, p<0.001, RMSEA=0.032, CFI=0.994, TLI=0.994, WRMR=1.072). Modification indices suggested correlating the errors of the manifest indicators q24a and q24b, which load on the willingness to cooperate with the police. An examination of these two items revealed that they were similarly worded. Both statements start with the statement “help the police to...” I interpret this as a method effect. I re-specified the model by correlating error terms of these two items. The error correlation was 0.543 and statistically significant at p<0.001 level. The model fit, again, slightly improved (Chi-square=322.595, df=225, p<0.001, RMSEA=0.030, CFI=0.995, TLI=0.995, WRMR=0.990). This re-specified model with two pairs of correlated manifest variable errors was accepted as the best-fitting CFA model. Table 10 presents the factor loadings of this model along with the goodness of fit statistics. All factor loadings are strong and statistically significant. Table 11 shows the factor correlations. The factor correlations are statistically significant and positive, consistent with the prior evidence on procedural justice theory. Figure 4 presents a graphical representation of the model.
Figure 4. CFA Path Diagram and Results.

Table 10

*CFA Results* (*n=497*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>λ</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th><em>p</em>-value</th>
<th><em>R</em>²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Procedural Justice</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q25a. Police exercise their powers in accordance with the law</td>
<td>0.845</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q25b. Police elicit the support of the people in my neighborhood to fight crime and terrorism</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q25c. Police listen to/take into account the views of the people in my neighborhood in fighting crime and terrorism</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q25d. Police make decisions for the well-being of the people in my neighborhood</td>
<td>0.879</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.772</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Model fit: \( \chi^2 = 322.95, \text{df} = 225, p < 0.001 \)
RMSEA = 0.039, CFI = 0.995,
TLI = 0.995
WRMR = 0.990

*(table continues)*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Q25e</th>
<th>Q25f</th>
<th>Q25g</th>
<th>Q25h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police treat citizens with dignity and respect</td>
<td>0.906</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police take time to listen to people</td>
<td>0.883</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police treat people fairly</td>
<td>0.825</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.681</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police respect citizens’ rights</td>
<td>0.911</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.830</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legitimacy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Q23a</th>
<th>Q23b</th>
<th>Q23c</th>
<th>Q23d</th>
<th>Q23e</th>
<th>Q23f</th>
<th>Q23g</th>
<th>Q23h</th>
<th>Q23i</th>
<th>Q23j</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I accept the police as an authority</td>
<td>0.751</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.564</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People should obey the decisions made by the police</td>
<td>0.831</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You should do what the police tell you to do even when you disagree with their decisions.</td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police should always be respected</td>
<td>0.908</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.824</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I trust the police</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.871</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I like the police</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.871</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police can be trusted to make decisions that are right for the people in my neighborhood</td>
<td>0.919</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.845</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police are there for our safety</td>
<td>0.926</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police are generally honest</td>
<td>0.924</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.854</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would go to police if I needed help</td>
<td>0.805</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.648</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Willingness to cooperate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Q24a</th>
<th>Q24b</th>
<th>Q24c</th>
<th>Q24d</th>
<th>Q24e</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To help the police solve a crime</td>
<td>0.797</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.635</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To help the police capture a suspected criminal</td>
<td>0.913</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To report a suspicious or dangerous activity in your neighborhood</td>
<td>0.938</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To report a crime in your neighborhood</td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.886</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If you knew some people were planning an attack on the police/army</td>
<td>0.907</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.823</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $\lambda=$Standardized factor loadings. Model includes two pairs of manifest variable correlations.
Model fit information: $\chi^2=322.595$, df=225, p <0.001, RMSEA= 0.030, CFI=0.995, TLI=0.995, WRMR= 0.990.
Table 11

*CFA-estimated Factor Correlations (n=497)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th>Willingness to Cooperate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Justice</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>0.639***</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to Cooperate</td>
<td>0.363***</td>
<td>0.385***</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *** p<0.001

**The Structural Equation Models**

The third step involved estimating structural equation models for each of the community policing interventions. The SEM models were specified after the best-fitting CFA model above. The model tested is shown in Figure 5. In the diagram, circles represent latent variables (i.e., factors) and rectangles the manifest variables. For simplicity, rather than representing each of the control variables separately, they are represented by a single vector. The arrows from the control variables vector are not solid lines to indicate that no hypotheses were made in relation to their effects on the endogenous variables. The validated measures in the CFA, procedural justice, legitimacy, willingness to cooperate served as the endogenous variables in this step. Based on past research, a recursive model was estimated by regressing willingness to cooperate with the police on legitimacy and procedural justice, and legitimacy on procedural justice. The two pairs of manifest variable errors were also allowed to correlate (not shown in the diagram). All estimated models included several control variables that capture basic demographics and previous experience with police. Demographic variables were gender, age, number of siblings, whether the respondent lives in a dormitory, and perceived family economic status. School success was also controlled for by two variables that captured math and Turkish language grades.
in the past semester. Experience with police variables were previous contact with police as a suspect, vicarious negative experience, and vicarious positive experience.

![SEM Path Diagram (Structural Model)](image)

**Figure 5.** SEM Path Diagram (Structural Model).

Tables 12 – 20 present the SEM results for each of the community policing interventions. Model fit information is provided at the bottom of each table. Goodness-of-fit statistics slightly
varied from model to model. Overall, all models fit the data well. Chi-square tests were statistically significant in each model, and WRMR values slightly exceeded the threshold value of 0.8. RMSEA values ranged from 0.017 and 0.021; CFI values from 0.988 to 0.991, and TLI values from 0.986 to 0.990. These values indicated very good fit. All manifest variables loaded well on their respective latent constructs (not reported). Pairwise deletion of cases with missing values resulted in a reduction of sample size available for each of the model estimated. Pairwise handling of missing values dropped all cases that had missing values on exogenous variables, regardless of whether they had valid values on the manifest variables that loaded on the latent endogenous variables. Accordingly, sample sizes varied from 565 to 588 depending on the number of cases with missing information on the community policing interventions. Again, the variation in endogenous variables explained by the models varied from model to model. The models explained from 27.9 percent to 30.0 percent of variation in willingness to cooperate; 44.3 percent to 46.8 percent in legitimacy; and 15.3 percent to 16.0 percent in procedural justice.

**Community Policing Interventions**

The results presented in Tables 12 – 20 suggest that the majority of community policing interventions had a statistically significant impact on willingness to cooperate with the police. Out-of-town tours (b=0.191, B=0.211), visits to police units (b=0.205, B=0.228), presentations on police (b=0.294, B=0.325), assistance for private tutoring (b=0.404; B=0.452), clothing assistance (b=0.154, B=0.175), and conferences (b=0.437, B=0.476) were positively and significantly related to willingness to cooperate with the police at p <0.05 level, holding constant all other variables in the model. The effects of these interventions on willingness to cooperate were also substantively significant, consistent with the theoretical predictions. Attending conferences had the largest effect, followed by assistance for private tutoring. For example,
holding constant the other variables in the model, those who attended conferences scored 0.437 points (with a 0.476 standard deviation) higher on average in their willingness to cooperate with the police than those who had not. Clothing assistance had the least effect among these variables. Clothing assistance was associated with an increase of 0.154 points (0.175 standard deviation) in willingness to cooperate with the police, controlling for the other variables in the model.

Regarding the effects of community policing interventions on legitimacy, only one intervention, assistance for private tutoring (b=0.091, B=0.110) was marginally significant at p <0.10 level. Similarly, only sports tournaments (b=0.209, B=0.227) was significantly and positively related to the perceptions of procedural justice at the p <0.05 level. The only statistically significant relationship that was in the opposite direction (i.e., negative) was between conferences and procedural justice (b=-0.169, B=-0.185). Those who attended conferences scored 0.169 points (0.185 standard deviation) lower on average in their perceptions of procedural justice compared to those who had not, controlling for the other variables in the model. This finding is an interesting one given the statistically significant and substantively the largest effect conferences, among other interventions, has on willingness to cooperate with the police. I provide a discussion on this finding in the next chapter.

With regard to the relationships between the endogenous variables, procedural justice had a positive and statistically significant effect on legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police at p<0.001 level. In addition, legitimacy was positively and significantly related to willingness to cooperate with the police at p<0.001 level. As is the case with the other results, the regression coefficients varied across the models estimated for different interventions. The unstandardized regression coefficient for the effect of procedural justice on legitimacy ranged from 0.518 (visits to police units) to 0.548 (assistance for private tutoring), and on willingness to
cooperate with the police from 0.138 (sports tournaments) to 0.170 (clothing assistance). The effect of legitimacy was somewhat stronger than that of procedural justice on willingness to cooperate with the police. The unstandardized regression coefficient for the effect of legitimacy on willingness to cooperate ranged from 0.281 (presentations on police) to 0.320 (conferences).

**Control variables**

An examination of the results for the control variables across the models estimated revealed findings generally consistent with theoretical predictions. Starting with the demographics, gender and age had a consistent positive and statistically significant relation with willingness to cooperate with the police and perceptions of procedural justice at p < 0.05 level, controlling for other variables in the models. Females reported greater willingness to cooperate with the police and perceived the police acting more procedurally fair than males did. As age increased, willingness to cooperate and perceptions of police as procedurally fair increased. Those who lived in a dormitory tended to have lower perceptions of procedural justice compared to those who did not live in a dormitory. Although not highly robust, family income was negatively related to perceptions of procedural justice. As family income increased, perceptions of procedural justice decreased. This result was statistically significant at p < 0.05 level in three of the models estimated and marginally significant at p < 0.10 level in five of the models. On the other hand, another variable that captures socioeconomic status, perceived economic status, had a robust statistically significant and positive relationship with perceptions of legitimacy across all the models.

With regard to the effects of variables that capture experience with the police, some robust findings were also apparent. Previous contact with the police as a suspect was inversely related to perceptions of legitimacy and perceptions of procedural justice. This relationship was
significant at $p < 0.05$ level across all models. On the other hand, it was not significantly related to willingness to cooperate with the police. The effect of previous contact as a suspect was substantive as well, consistent with theoretical predictions. For example, those who had a contact with police for suspicion of involvement in a crime scored about 0.479 points (0.591 SD) lower in their perceptions of police legitimacy than those who did not in the model estimated for the visits to police units intervention, controlling for other variables.

The effects of vicarious negative and positive experiences with the police were also very robust across the models. While vicarious negative experience was inversely related to perceptions of procedural fairness, vicarious positive experience had a positive relationship with willingness to cooperate and perceptions of procedural fairness in all models. Vicarious negative experience had no statistically significant effect on willingness to cooperate and perceptions of legitimacy. Vicarious positive experience had a statistically significant effect on perceptions of legitimacy in only two of the models estimated. These results suggest that as the respondents heard negative experiences of others in their immediate environment (parents, relatives, peers, etc.) more often, they perceived police demonstrating less procedural fairness. In addition, as the respondents heard positive experiences from others, their willingness to cooperate with the police increased and they also viewed police as more procedurally fair.
Table 12

Unstandardized and Standardized SEM Results for Out-of-town Tours (n=588)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Willingness to Cooperate</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>p value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endogenous Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td><strong>0.000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Justice</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td><strong>0.000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exogenous Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-town tours</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td><strong>0.023</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td><strong>0.002</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td><strong>0.004</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in dormitory</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of siblings</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>0.452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived economic status</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Math grade</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td><strong>0.095</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkish grade</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous contact as a suspect</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td><strong>0.052</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious negative experience</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>0.573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious positive experience</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td><strong>0.041</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: b=unstandardized coefficients, B=standardized coefficients.
P values < 0.05 (two-tailed) shown in bold. P values <0.10 underlined.
Model fit: Chi-square=562.907, df=465, p=0.001, RMSEA=0.019, CFI=0.990, TLI=0.989, WRMR=0.829
Table 13

*Unstandardized and Standardized SEM Results for Within-city Tours (n=582)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Willingness to Cooperate</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>p value</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>p value</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>p value</td>
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<td><strong>Endogenous Variables</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Justice</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.525</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exogenous Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within-city-tours</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>0.433</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.160</td>
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<td>0.007</td>
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<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in dormitory</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>-0.094</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>0.525</td>
<td>-0.303</td>
<td>-0.330</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of siblings</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.808</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>0.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.876</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.849</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived economic status</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>0.746</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Math grade</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish grade</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous contact as a suspect</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>-0.423</td>
<td>-0.519</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.532</td>
<td>-0.579</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious negative experience</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>-0.084</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious positive experience</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R²</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.449</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: b= Unstandardized coefficients, B= Standardized coefficients.
P values < 0.05 (two-tailed) shown in bold. P values <0.10 underlined.
Model fit: Chi-square=554.406, df=465, p=0.003, RMSEA=0.018, CFI=0.990, TLI=0.989, WRMR=0.808
Table 14

Unstandardized and Standardized SEM Results for Visits to Police Units (n=580)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Willingness to Cooperate</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>p value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endogenous Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td><strong>0.000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Justice</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td><strong>0.000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exogenous Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visits to police units</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td><strong>0.000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td><strong>0.005</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td><strong>0.006</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in dormitory</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of siblings</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
<td>0.358</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family income</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived economic status</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Math grade</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish grade</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous contact as a suspect</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious negative experience</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious positive experience</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td><strong>0.004</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>0.165</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Notes: b= Unstandardized coefficients, B= Standardized coefficients.
P values < 0.05 (two-tailed) shown in bold. P values <0.10 underlined.
Model fit: Chi-square=570.326, df=465, p=0.001, RMSEA=0.020, CFI= 0.989, TLI=0.987, WRMR=0.857
Table 15

Unstandardized and Standardized SEM Results for Presentations on Police (n=575)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Endogenous Variables</th>
<th>Exogenous Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Willingness to Cooperate</td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td>0.254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Justice</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentations on police</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in dormitory</td>
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<td>0.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of siblings</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived economic status</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.007</td>
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<td>Math grade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkish grade</td>
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<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous contact as a suspect</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious negative experience</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious positive experience</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>0.443</td>
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Notes: b= Unstandardized coefficients, B= Standardized coefficients.
P values < 0.05 (two-tailed) shown in bold. P values <0.10 underlined.
Model fit: Chi-square=555.889, df=465, p=0.002, RMSEA=0.018, CFI=0.990, TLI=0.988, WRMR=0.811
Table 16

Unstandardized and Standardized SEM Results for Sports Tournaments (n=576)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Willingness to Cooperate</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>p value</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>p value</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>p value</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Justice</td>
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<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.534</td>
<td>0.609</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td><strong>Exogenous Variables</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sports tournaments</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.958</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.924</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in dormitory</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>-0.168</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>-0.254</td>
<td>-0.275</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of siblings</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.757</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.661</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.860</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived economic status</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Math grade</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish grade</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.651</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous contact as a suspect</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.711</td>
<td>-0.433</td>
<td>-0.535</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.447</td>
<td>-0.484</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious negative experience</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>0.669</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>0.440</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious positive experience</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: b= Unstandardized coefficients, B= Standardized coefficients.
P values < 0.05 (two-tailed) shown in bold. P values <0.10 underlined.
Model fit: Chi-Square=572.904, df=465, p=0.001, RMSEA=0.020, CFI=0.989, TLI=0.987, WRMR=0.851
Table 17

Unstandardized and Standardized SEM Results for Assistance for Private Tutoring (n=577)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Willingness to Cooperate</th>
<th></th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th></th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>p value</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>p value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endogenous Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Justice</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.548</td>
<td>0.608</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exogenous Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance for private tutoring</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in dormitory</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>0.417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of siblings</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.722</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived economic status</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>0.659</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Math grade</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>0.628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish grade</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.838</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous contact as a suspect</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.852</td>
<td>-0.488</td>
<td>-0.587</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious negative experience</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>0.363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious positive experience</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: b= Unstandardized coefficients, B= Standardized coefficients.
P values < 0.05 (two-tailed) shown in bold. P values <0.10 underlined.
Model fit: Chi-Square=585.862, df=465, p<0.001, RMSEA=0.021, CFI=0.988, TLI=0.986, WRMR=0.873
Table 18

*Unstandardized and Standardized SEM Results for Clothing Assistance (n=571)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Willingness to Cooperate</th>
<th></th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th></th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>p value</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>p value</td>
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<td><strong>Endogenous Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Justice</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exogenous Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing assistance</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in dormitory</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
<td>0.461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of siblings</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>0.403</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.771</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived economic status</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Math grade</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish grade</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.679</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous contact as a suspect</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>-0.438</td>
<td>-0.530</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious negative experience</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>0.651</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>0.377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious positive experience</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R²</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.283</td>
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<td>0.442</td>
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</table>

Notes: b= Unstandardized coefficients, B= Standardized coefficients.
P values < 0.05 (two-tailed) shown in bold. P values <0.10 underlined.
Model fit: Chi-square=544.714, df=465, p=0.006, RMSEA=0.017, CFI=0.991, TLI=0.990, WRMR=0.780
Table 19

*Unstandardized and Standardized SEM Results for Conferences (n=567)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Willingness to Cooperate</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>p value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endogenous Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td><strong>0.000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Justice</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td><strong>0.000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exogenous Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conferences</td>
<td>0.437</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td><strong>0.002</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td><strong>0.004</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td><strong>0.003</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in dormitory</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td><strong>0.029</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of siblings</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>0.381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived economic status</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Math grade</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td><strong>0.003</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish grade</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous contact as a suspect</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious negative experience</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>0.569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious positive experience</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td><strong>0.010</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R^2</strong></td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0.159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: b= Unstandardized coefficients, B= Standardized coefficients.
P values < 0.05 (two-tailed) shown in bold. P values <0.10 underlined.
Model fit: Chi-Square=563.334, df=465, p=0.001, RMSEA=0.019, CFI=0.989, TLI=0.988, WRMR=0.827
Table 20

Unstandardized and Standardized SEM Results for Family Visit (n=565)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Willingness to Cooperate</th>
<th></th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th></th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>p value</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>p value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endogenous Variables</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>0.274</td>
<td><strong>0.000</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Justice</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td><strong>0.000</strong></td>
<td>0.531</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td><strong>0.000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exogenous Variables</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family visit</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td><strong>0.000</strong></td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td><strong>0.005</strong></td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in dormitory</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
<td>0.553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of siblings</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.653</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived economic status</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td><strong>0.038</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Math grade</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td><strong>0.052</strong></td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>0.347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish grade</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.026</td>
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<tr>
<td>Previous contact as a suspect</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>-0.440</td>
<td>-0.544</td>
<td><strong>0.000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious negative experience</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>0.561</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>0.338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious positive experience</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td><strong>0.008</strong></td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td><strong>0.085</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: b= Unstandardized coefficients, B= Standardized coefficients.
P values < 0.05 (two-tailed) shown in bold. P values <0.10 underlined.
Model fit: Chi-square=557.890, df=465, p=0.002, RMSEA=0.019, CFI=0.991, TLI=0.989, WRMR=0.837
Mediation Analyses

This study hypothesized that the effects of community policing interventions on legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police would be mediated by procedural justice. Mediation occurs when the effect of an X variable on Y is partially or fully accounted for by a Z variable. Full mediation occurs when a statistically significant relationship between X and Y turns nonsignificant with the inclusion of Z variables in the model. Partial mediation maintains that the effect of X on Y attenuates once Z is added to the model. In that case, Z partially accounts for the relationship between X and Y. Then, full or partial mediation first requires that the intervening Z variable be statistically significant. An examination of Tables 12 – 20 suggests that only two interventions had statistically significant impacts on procedural justice, the hypothesized intervening variable: sports tournaments and conferences. These variables were further analyzed for their indirect effects on perceptions of legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police through perceptions of procedural justice. Table 21 reports the direct, indirect, and total effects of the two community policing interventions, sports tournaments and conferences which significantly predicted perceptions of procedural justice. Sports tournaments had statistically significant indirect effects both on legitimacy and willingness to cooperate via

Table 21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th>Willingness to Cooperate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>IE</td>
<td>TE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Tournaments</td>
<td>0.227*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.227* -0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conferences</td>
<td>-0.185*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.185* 0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  ** p<0.01 * p<0.05
Standardized coefficients reported
DE= Direct Effect
IE= Indirect Effect
TE= Total Effect
procedural justice. The direct effects of sports tournaments on legitimacy and willingness to cooperate were non-significant, while the indirect effects were significant. These results indicate the perceptions of procedural justice fully mediate the effects of sports tournaments on legitimacy and willingness to cooperate. A full mediation was evident for the effects of conferences on legitimacy as well. However, the mediated effect was contrary to the expected direction. Conferences had a statistically significant but negative effect on procedural justice. The indirect effects of conferences on legitimacy via procedural justice was also statistically significant but in negative direction. These results suggest that the negative effect of conferences on legitimacy was fully mediated by procedural justice, which I elaborate on in the next chapter. Eyeballing Tables 12 – 20 reveals potential mediation effects, particularly of procedural justice on the relationships between a number of control variables and legitimacy. Yet, I do not provide any formal tests of these potential effects since the control variables are of central concern to this study.

**Hypotheses Revisited**

Table 22 provides a summary of the findings.

**Table 22**

*Research Hypotheses and Results*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Hypotheses</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1: There is a positive relationship between participation in community policing initiatives and perceptions of procedural justice, holding constant other independent variables in the model. Those who participated in community policing initiatives will report higher perceptions of procedural justice than non-participants.</td>
<td>Partially supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2: There is a positive relationship between participation in community policing initiatives and perceptions of police legitimacy, holding constant other independent variables in the model. Those who participated in community policing initiatives will report higher perceptions of police legitimacy than non-participants.</td>
<td>Partially supported at p&lt;0.10 level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(table continues)*
| H3: | There is a positive relationship between participation in community policing initiatives and willingness to cooperate with the police, holding constant other independent variables in the model. Those who participated in community policing initiatives will report a higher willingness to cooperate with the police than non-participants. | Partially supported |
| H4: | There is a positive relationship between perceptions of procedural justice and police legitimacy, holding constant other variables in the model. As perceptions of procedural justice increase, so do the perceptions of police legitimacy. | Supported |
| H5: | There is a positive relationship between perceptions of procedural justice and willingness to cooperate with the police, holding constant other variables in the model. As perceptions of procedural justice increase, willingness to cooperate with the police increases. | Supported |
| H6: | There is a positive relationship between perceptions of police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police, holding constant other variables in the model. As perceptions of police legitimacy increase, willingness to cooperate with the police increases. | Supported |
| H7: | Perceptions of procedural justice will mediate the effects of participation in community policing initiatives on perceptions of police legitimacy. | Partially supported |
| H8: | Perceptions of procedural justice will mediate the effects of participation in community policing initiatives on willingness to cooperate with the police. | Partially supported |
CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation sought to undertake an impact assessment of the community policing initiatives of the Turkish National Police directed towards Kurdish juveniles in Şırnak, a province in southeast Turkey where the nature of police and citizen interactions is largely shaped by the threat of terrorism and the police response to this threat. As was discussed in Chapter 1, the study site, Şırnak, features a policing environment with structural problems that hinder positive relationships between the police and the locals, one that is predicated on mutual distrust. Among these structural problems are the compulsory rotation of officers from west to the underdeveloped east, underrepresentation of Kurds in the police force, the PKK’s sphere of influence on the local residents, omnipresent threat of deadly attacks on police officers by the PKK members, and past experiences with heavy-handed responses to terrorism by the government, among others. These factors combine to create a policing context where the police and locals have few reasons to trust each other and work together in the co-production of security. In such a context, local Kurdish children are easy targets for recruitment into the terrorist organization. In fact, the PKK is known to push children into violent protests against the police to radicalize them through punitive criminal justice responses\(^{21}\) and simply force them to take a side between two competing forces. Having seen that punitive responses only serve the interests of the PKK, the TNP started experimenting with initiatives inspired by community policing to reach out to local children in an effort to develop trust and prevent radicalization. Although early results were encouraging (Dikici, 2008; Sevinç, 2013; Yıldız and Göktepe, 2011;}

\(^{21}\) Just like we call incidents where individuals commit suicide by inducing police to shoot oneself as police assisted suicide, we can call this radicalization strategy of the PKK as police assisted radicalization.
Yıldız and Şahin (2010), there was a lack of robust empirical research to evaluate the initiatives and assess their impact on participants, which provided the motivation for the current study.

The Effects of Community Policing Initiatives on Outcomes

The results from this study were encouraging. SEM results indicated that most of the interventions had a positive impact on respondents’ willingness to cooperate with the police. Those who indicated that they participated in community policing initiatives expressed greater willingness to cooperate with the police than non-participants. These interventions included out-of-town tours, visits to police units, presentations on police, assistance for private tutoring, clothing assistance, and conferences. Only three of the interventions, within-city tours, sports tournaments, and family visits, were found not to have a significant direct effect on willingness to cooperate.

Despite these positive findings, the interventions generally were found to have no direct effect on perceived legitimacy. Except assistance for private tutoring, which was only marginally significant, none of the interventions were significantly related to the perceptions of legitimacy, which indicates that the initiatives tended not to improve trust in police and obligation to obey the police. The finding that assistance for private tutoring (prep schools) improves perceptions of police legitimacy, although weak in statistical significance, is an important one. The Şırnak Police Department provided financial assistance to 100 students from needy families for their private prep schools expenses which prepare students for university entrance exams or secondary and high schools that accept students based on exams held nationwide. This intervention might have led to increased perceptions of legitimacy as manifested by trust and felt obliged to obey the police because it is an expensive commitment on the part of the police and a major investment in the future of the children.
The results with regard to the effects of the interventions on perceptions of procedural justice were more or less similar to those for legitimacy. Only sports tournaments were associated with increased perceptions of procedural justice. In other words, those who participated in sports tournaments expressed that they perceived the police to be more procedurally fair than non-participants. The procedural fairness measure was composed of procedural fairness in decision-making and procedural justice in quality of interpersonal interaction. Although theory makes a distinction between these two subconstructs, EFA and CFA results suggested that these two dimensions formed a single construct of procedural justice in this sample. Since sports tournaments do not involve a decision making process, a more plausible explanation is that those who participated in sports tournaments were highly satisfied with the interpersonal interaction with the officers. This also makes sense given the informal and friendly nature of these interactions that take place around a shared activity.

Some controversial findings also need to be noted here particularly with regard to the conferences. This intervention had a statistically significant positive effect on willingness to cooperate. In fact, this intervention was found to have the largest substantive effect. On the other hand, this intervention had a statistically significant negative effect on perceptions of procedural justice. Moreover, mediation analyses indicated that this negative effect fully mediated the inverse relationship conferences had on perceptions of legitimacy. The conclusion is that while conferences were associated with increased willingness to cooperate on the one hand, they were also associated with decreased perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy on the other. This finding appears to be counter-intuitive. Conferences are usually conducted by the counter-terrorism departments at schools as a preventive strategy to inform students and increase their awareness on how terrorist organizations manipulate individuals and what recruitment strategies
they employ. Other conferences include drug demand reduction activities that aim to increase students’ awareness with regard to the harmful effects of substance use as well as the PKK’s involvement in drug trafficking and control over the market to finance their activities. Such conferences are typically conducted at the schools premises with the participation of classes selected by school principals. Therefore, participation is not voluntary but made compulsory on the students by the school, which rules out the speculation that dissidents are attracted to conferences more than non-dissidents. Previous research indicates that Kurdish youth are highly sensitive to labels associated with terrorism when the PKK and its activities are referred to (Sevinç, 2013). There are reports that students protested such conferences by leaving the conference hall upon hearing labels of terrorism and terrorists. Therefore, the negative effect of these conferences on perceptions of procedural fairness and legitimacy might be attributed to the content presented and the kind of language used. It would be advisable to appeal to this sensitivity and stop using judgmental language in seminars and conferences. This brings to mind the saying that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (Forst, 2009, p. 6). It could be that Kurdish youth may be experiencing divided loyalties towards those who represent their ethnic interests (i.e., the PKK) and those who legitimately provide their security needs (i.e., the police), which may help explain the positive effect of conferences and seminars on willingness to cooperate with the police. This speculation assumes that local Kurdish youth are influenced by instrumental judgments, such as police effectiveness to curb crime and terrorism, security concerns, and fear of terrorism, in their willingness to cooperate with the police. Unfortunately, the data do not permit testing this hypothesis. Given the consistent positive effect of community policing initiatives on willingness to cooperate combined with mostly null effect on procedural justice and legitimacy, it could also be argued that the instrumental model that suggests that
people cooperate with the police because they are perceived to be effective in curbing crime and terrorism is highly plausible. Future research can investigate this hypothesis by testing the mediating effects of police effectiveness in combating terrorism on the relationship between community policing and willingness to cooperate.

**Procedural Justice as a Predictor of Legitimacy and Willingness to Cooperate**

Consistent with previous research on procedural justice theory, perceptions of procedural justice were positively associated with perceptions of legitimacy and willingness to cooperate. Moreover, perceptions of legitimacy were positively related to willingness to cooperate (Hinds, 2009; Huq et al., 2011a, 2011b; Murphy and Gaylor, 2010; Murphy et al., 2008; Reisig and Lloyd, 2009; Schulhofer et al., 2011; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2004; Tyler and Fagan, 2008, Tyler et al., 2010). These findings suggest that Kurdish local youth, just like citizens in western countries such as the US, the UK, and Australia, place an emphasis on their perceptions of police legitimacy when deciding to cooperate with the police. In addition, their opinion on how procedurally fair the police behave shapes their perceptions of police legitimacy and their willingness to cooperate with the police. In this sample, the statistically significant effect of procedural justice on willingness to cooperate indicates that perceptions of procedural justice have a direct effect on willingness to cooperate independent of perceptions of police legitimacy. These findings are important because the policing context of Şırnak differ significantly from the study sites in previous studies in terms of the nature of police – citizen interactions and primary security threats as was explained in Chapter 1.

**Procedural Justice as a Mediator**

This study is one of the first to propose and test the hypothesis that procedural justice mediates the effects of community policing on legitimacy and willingness to cooperate. The
results provided support for this hypothesis in the case of sports tournaments intervention. SEM results indicated that procedural justice fully mediated the effects of sports tournaments on legitimacy and willingness to cooperate. This finding suggests that sports tournaments also improve perceptions of legitimacy and willingness to cooperate because it improves perceptions of procedural justice. A plausible explanation for this finding is the friendly atmosphere of sports tournaments where youth engage in a structured activity with police officers. A controversial finding, as was discussed above, is that procedural justice mediated the negative effect of conferences on perceptions of legitimacy. A plausible reason for this finding is the use of labels associated with terrorism when referring to the activities of the PKK in presentations.

**Experience with the Police**

Although not a primary focus of this dissertation, three control variables that tap into experience with the police were included in the models: previous contact as a suspect, vicarious negative experience, and vicarious positive experience. It was found that those who had a previous contact with the police as a suspect had lower perceptions of procedural fairness and legitimacy of the police than those who did not. Similarly, exposure to others’ negative experiences with the police had a negative effect on perceptions of procedural justice. However, exposure to others’ positive experiences was associated with an increase in perceptions of procedural justice and willingness to cooperate. Among all the variables included, direct negative experience with the police as a suspect had the largest but negative effect on perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy.

**Policy Implications**

The community policing interventions evaluated in this study are found to be engendering the intended effect when willingness to cooperate with the police is considered.
However, their effects on procedural justice and legitimacy are less robust. Given the strong effect of perceptions of procedural justice on perceptions of legitimacy and willingness to cooperate, it would be advisable for the police to focus on improving the perceptions of procedural justice during their interactions with the local Kurdish children on community policing initiatives by treating them with respect, dignity, and sincerity, and approaching with friendliness. Going beyond simply the community policing initiatives, procedural justice needs to be incorporated into any contact in any setting the officers make with juveniles as well as all citizens regardless of their ethnic or religious background. The importance of community policing initiatives with local youth is that they provide an opportunity for such interaction to take place when one takes into account the minimal opportunities officers have for interactions with local Kurdish communities due to their isolation from the communities. The police should also consider the cumulative effect of community policing initiatives on attitudes toward police. It may not be realistic to expect local youth to change their attitudes toward police over a single positive interaction. Therefore, it is incumbent on the police to break stereotypes that have taken years to build through repeated initiatives that provide the opportunity for positive interactions with the locals incorporating procedural fairness.

While the quality of the interpersonal interaction dimension of procedural justice is more relevant for a discussion of policy implications than the quality of decision making due to the nature of community policing initiatives evaluated in this study, the quality of the decision making dimension of procedural justice as manifested by a community policing philosophy predicated on partnerships is also salient to developing trusting relationships with locals, increasing police legitimacy, and locals’ cooperation with police on security matters as well as neighborhood problems. Partnerships with local NGOs, neighborhood representatives, and
individuals to empower them in the co-production of security might go a long way in achieving this. This is not an easy task. There will be numerous hindrances and resistance to partnerships that involve locals as decision makers in security matters and on how they are being policed from within the police organization that identifies itself with hardline counterterrorism, the locals who are distrustful of the police and not familiar with this type of policing style, and the power politics of the PKK which make an effort to keep the upper-hand and monopolize local communities’ voice. It is foreseeable that this may not be an easy transition and that the application in the field might be far from ideal. Yet, incremental changes can help achieve the fulfillment of the objective of a working and trusting relationship between the police and the local communities in the long run.

A controversial finding was that conferences tend to have an adverse effect on perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy. I speculated that this finding could be attributed to the use of stigmatizing language when the activities of the PKK and other terrorist organizations are in question. One recommendation to the police would be to carefully re-consider the content of conferences and the sensitivities of the local youth so that they avoid using stigmatizing language on such events.

The final set of noteworthy findings was in relation to experience with the police. Prior direct experience as a suspect was negatively related to perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy. Moreover, this study found that knowledge of others’ negative experiences with the police reduced perceptions of procedural justice while knowledge of others’ positive experiences led to an increase in perceptions of procedural justice. Although the causal direction is disputable with regard to direct negative experience because reverse causation is possible, such as negative experiences with the police leads to negative attitudes toward police vice versa, these findings
altogether underscore the importance of making procedural fairness such as treatment with respect and dignity a central feature of policing across all situations that involve police-citizen interaction. This is all the more true in policing contexts such as that of Şırnak, where police are perceived as outsiders and have fewer opportunities for positive interaction.

**Limitations and Future Research**

This study employed a non-experimental design to answer the research questions. Non-experimental design is particularly susceptible to internal validity threats mainly from omitted variable bias. That is, the causal claims made in research employing this design are more questionable than those in experimental and quasi-experimental designs because the treatment and control groups might differ in other aspects that are also correlated by the outcome variables that have not been observed in the data. Non-experimental design, therefore, approximates the other two designs by controlling for a number of factors that can confound the effect of treatment on the outcomes. Yet, this requires the researcher to predict these confounding factors and measure them. This is a daunting task given the multitude of factors that can influence the receipt of the treatment and the outcomes studied. It is not always possible to predict and measure all these measures. Accordingly, some unobserved factors are liable to confound the results, and methods that statistically create comparable groups are bound by the observed factors.

While predicting and measuring potentially confounding factors can prove to be a challenge, measuring sensitive confounding factors might be another. Some particularly important omitted variables in this research and highly sensitive ones are exposure to terrorist propaganda, whether the respondent has family members within the ranks of the PKK or other terrorist organizations in the region, the degree of radicalization, and participation in violent protests. Why would these variables matter in the first place? An essential requirement for a
variable to be statistically controlled for is that it needs to be correlated with both the independent and dependent variables, and this is common under conditions of self-selection. For example, if a respondent previously had been involved in violent protests, it is conceivable that he or she has negative perceptions about the police because violent protests typically involve protestors’ throwing harmful or explosive objects at the police. In addition, one would expect that such a respondent will be less likely to attend the activities organized by the police. While there is an absolute necessity to measure these variables, they are also highly sensitive. They require respondents to reveal sensitive information on their past behaviors that are of criminal in nature and attitudes which they cannot comfortably share even in an anonymous and confidential survey. Beyond personal discomfort, obtaining such information from respondents is politically sensitive. The PKK actively manipulates every opportunity in the region to distance the gap between the Kurdish communities and the police. Police are known to have engaged in keeping intelligence profiles on Kurdish locals. Given this experience, survey items to capture the above-stated variables are open to political manipulation by the PKK as allegations of intelligence gathering.

While the above-stated variables were not available in the data, a number of variables that might tap into radicalization were indirectly included in the statistical models. These variables were previous contact with the police as a suspect, and vicarious positive and negative experience with the police. Previous contact with the police as a suspect should capture those who have been taken into custody for participation in violent protests. It could also be expected that those who are exposed to negative experiences with the police from others also have heard such experiences as part of a larger propaganda disseminated by the terrorist organizations active in the city. These two variables should ideally capture at least a portion of radicalization, thus
reducing the omitted variable bias. Future research employing non-experimental design can also find innovative ways to capture radicalization if not directly measure it. Yet, it is advisable to employ experimental or quasi-experimental designs rather than non-experimental, to the extent that they are feasible, to maximize internal validity.

In Chapter 5, I discussed the selection process for the initiatives and argued that participation in sports tournaments was based on self-selection, therefore, susceptible to reverse causation which might bias the hypothesis tests. Future research can test a non-recursive model by using an instrumental variable that is theoretically associated with participation in sports tournaments but not structurally correlated with the outcomes studied. One such variable might be how the respondents spend their leisure time. Those who spend their leisure time in formal or informal sports might be more likely to participate in sports tournaments organized by the police than those who prefer to spend their leisure time on different activities. In addition, whether the respondents spend their time playing sports or the frequency with which they do so is not likely to be structurally correlated with their perceptions of the police. Therefore, this variable can serve as a valid instrument if measured. Another method is to use propensity score matching to find comparable groups from within the sample based on multiple variables that might predict participation in sports tournaments. However, no statistical software provides an opportunity to estimate propensity score matching in a structural equation modeling framework.

The data used to answer the research questions in this study were from a sample that was not randomly selected. Therefore, the results of this study are not generalizable to any other known population. The original data collectors obtained the current sample of students by sampling classrooms. It is known that some students opted out of participation. We have no information on who was left out of the study, but one could speculate that the current sample
might have been composed of respondents who had more or less favorable views of the police, reducing our ability to find statistically significant differences, which also has bearings on the internal validity of the results. Future research can address this weakness by designing survey research based on a probability sampling procedure to obtain generalizable results. Those who do not want to participate in the survey can be asked to fill out a single page survey that asks basic demographics as well as their reason for opting out, which might be a posed as a question with multiple answer choices including an open-ended choice. This should allow a comparison between participants and non-participants to understand the pattern of bias that is likely to occur from unit non-response (non-participation).

This dissertation evaluated the community policing initiatives toward local Kurdish youth. Beyond this group, adults are also exposed to community policing initiatives. Future research can sample adults to assess generalized community policing initiatives on the same outcomes. Future research can also consider evaluating the community policing initiatives with regard to other outcomes such as delinquency, truancy, and radicalization, in addition to procedural justice, legitimacy, and willingness to cooperate.

One limitation to this study was missing values. One reason for this could be the fact the survey instrument was in Turkish. Although surveys were administered by Kurdish-speaking proctors who were available to clarify any statements in the survey, conceivably some respondents might have opted for omitting the questions and statements they did not fully understand rather than asking for clarification. Future studies can consider presenting the respondents a survey instrument in Kurdish to increase the response rate as well as reduce missing values which may emanate from a failure to understand the statements in the instrument.
This study was one of the very first to conduct an impact assessment of community policing initiatives towards youth in a counterterrorism setting. There is a need for replication of this study in other locations where terrorism is a prime threat and police engage in similar practices. This would help ascertain whether community policing initiatives are making a difference in perceptions of procedural justice, legitimacy, and willingness to cooperate in other locations as well.
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