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AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF SOME ASPECTS OF NEUTRALISM

by

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INTRODUCTION

In the years after World War II, a number of Afro-Asian states championed neutralism as the best formula whereby certain countries can promote their national interests while assisting with relative effectiveness in the growth of international peace and security.

In describing their formula, advocates have defined neutralism as a two-fold policy of: (a) dissociation from the East-West power struggle which became prominent shortly after World War II and (b) a contention to remove, or at least mitigate, some of the harshness of the Cold War between the two opposing camps. Neutralism was and is stressed as a peace contribution which concerned countries could not offer in the same degree should they decide to join one camp against the other.

On the other hand, this concept has been condemned by a number of world leaders, particularly in the West and in West-oriented countries, as a hollow notion which cannot, in view of the existing power configuration, render any service to the development of world peace. In dismissing the remote possibility of such a service, opponents maintain that any neutralist country or group of such countries is bound to be much too weak in relation to the two super-powers to exert any effective influence on the trend of world affairs. Neutralism, they maintain, is a more political maneuver designed to strengthen the position of some underdeveloped nations vis-a-vis the
two contending blocs or to justify the stand of some morally weak countries which have failed to determine on whose side they would fight in the event of war.

Pro and con attitudes toward neutralism are by no means limited to the rationale of this policy. Rather, they are seen to be diametrically opposed when it comes to the application of this policy to specific international issues and developments. One area of agreement seems to be that neutralism is a result of the Cold War and that its duration is subject to and even fashioned by the continuation of the present power struggle.

The division of the world into camps headed by the Soviet Union and the United States became openly acknowledged shortly after World War II. Around each of these protagonists are grouped several other states in accordance with their sympathies or the circumstances in which they find themselves. A third category gradually came into being. Many states, without any association or alliance, chose to follow a policy of non-alignment with either of the power blocs.

The Cold War has gone on, creating many frictions and resulting in a wide rift between the two groups in conflict. The dismemberment of Germany, Korea and Indo-China are usually cited as illustrating the intense distrust and hostility that exist between the two blocs. Cold War propaganda, which is bound to prevail in this state of affairs, is considered to have confused many an
international issue, and thus cast shadows of doubt as to the factual truth of matters at issue.

In order to "talk from positions of strength," both sides have taken various measures to consolidate and strengthen themselves. These measures it is often said, have aggravated, rather than abated, the war of nerves. Each side has steadily built up its armaments and military strength on a scale far in excess of normal peacetime requirements and all appreciable attempts to halt this armaments race have failed. The reason for this failure is the mistrust and suspicion between the principal Great Powers. In addition, both sides have concluded a series of alliances with other states with the objective of providing for collective defense against aggression. But organizations like NATO, SEATO, Warsaw Alliance, and the numerous other defensive pacts, concluded by both the United States and the Soviet Union with states within their respective areas of influence, have only accentuated the rift. These measures have, in effect, "frozen the Cold War" but have not provided any guarantee against an armed clash which is the principal threat to all nations.

The rapid progress in the development of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons has introduced a new urgency into a situation which is already fraught with danger to the peace of the world. For the first time in history the entire world is now faced with the threat of total annihilation. It is true that the knowledge that both sides
possess of such weapons and the fear of retaliation against which there is no adequate defense, are some deterrent. But this is not an acceptable guarantee of an enduring peace; nor is it any consolation to the peoples of the world to feel that a few select nations have in their hands the power to destroy all that it has taken centuries to build.

In this unusual situation, world opinion has gradually realized that in a trial of strength there can be no easy or decisive victory; that in a nuclear war no country, however remote, will be safe from the dreaded consequences of a nuclear explosion. There is also the realization that there exists a limited prospect of a rapprochement between the two power groups and that the present state of equilibrium cannot continue indefinitely. As a result, new ideas were sought and the gimmick of peaceful coexistence was put forward as a way out of this dilemma.

On the face of it, coexistence postulates the possibility of Communist states and non-Communist states living together in pursuance of a policy of "live and let live." It presupposes an abandonment of the belief that one cannot survive except by crushing the other. It implies a policy of non-interference and non-intervention by the one in the affairs of the other. It is basically a democratic concept in that it recognizes the right of others to their own political views and doctrines and assumes that they will not attempt to impose these views by force or by any other means.
The fear that this assumption may not be justified makes many nations hesitate to accept readily the formula of coexistence. The anti-Communists see in coexistence a concept fundamentally opposed to the declared Communist objective of working for the overthrow of Capitalism. They argue that unless there has been a radical change in Communist doctrines -- and there is no evidence that there has been -- coexistence cannot mean to Communists the same as it means to democratic countries. The pattern of Communist behavior since the last war, both internationally and within national boundaries, has been such that Communist protestation of sincerity are received with suspicion and even doubt. It is unfortunate, but true, that non-Communist countries have some difficulty in believing that to the Communists coexistence means anything more than a slogan behind which consolidation of existing Communist regimes can proceed in preparation for the ultimate reckoning between Communism and Capitalism.

Be that as it may, it is my contention that an objective and complete analysis of neutralism must be sought in the light of all the above mentioned forces, a task which I do not intend to exhaust in this dissertation. Rather, I have chosen to limit my study, as shown by its title, to an examination of selected aspects of this broad subject, hoping that a penetration into these topics will shed light on reasons for international antagonisms.

My prime concern will be focused on instances concerning Afro-Asian countries, even though the non-aligned states are by no means
identical with this group. Examples outside this restricted area include Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Israel, Sweden and Yugoslavia. But, with the exception of passing references to some of these countries, no attempt will be made to cover their cases. The period under review is narrowed to that extending from 1945 to early 1962.

The study is divided into five chapters and a conclusion.

Chapter I outlines the main features and phases of the Cold War and thus describes the setting in which neutralism occurs and is shaped. The different stages of the Cold War struggle, the growth of the rival military alliances, the emergence of new states, and the growing strength of neutralist currents are traced. As neutralism can be understood only in relation to the Cold War struggle, particular attention is paid in this chapter to the official attitudes and policies of the two super-powers toward neutralism in general and to neutralist leaders in particular.

Chapter II deals with the conceptual framework of neutralism. It attempts to trace its birth, explain its components, and explicate on the reasons for its adoption in Africa and in Asia. Also in this chapter is a discussion of two instances in which the mobilization for neutralism was manifested. These include: the Asian-African Conference of 1955 and the Belgrade Conference of non-aligned countries organized in late 1961.
Chapters III, IV and V are concerned with neutralism as approached by India, the United Arab Republic and Indonesia respectively. Chapter III gives an overview of India's neutralism during the time of administration of the late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. It examines the features of this policy as defined by Nehru and as applied to India's immediate and far-distant problems. Included in the examination are such issues as peaceful coexistence, opposition to military alliance, anti-colonialism and the "area of peace."

Chapter IV is devoted to an appraisal of Egypt's neutralism: how various forces led Egypt to a policy of non-alignment. The examination of these forces is extended to both pre-revolutionary Egypt and to the period since 1952. But as Egypt's neutralism is so interlocked with the Israeli question, a later section will give an analysis of Nasser's policy toward Israel, thus showing the significant motives for Egypt's neutralism.

Chapter V affords a preview of Indonesia's neutralism. It examines the formation of its independent policy which is inseparable from Indonesia's nationalism and its desire to assert its own identity vis-a-vis the opposing power blocs. It further analyzes the pressure that had been brought to bear on this policy both internally and externally in an effort to influence its course.
CHAPTER I

THE SETTING OF NEUTRALISM

The concept of neutralism which emerged on the world scene as a result of the Cold War, should be studied in the light of postwar developments in East-West relationships, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union. But the history of the Cold War is complicated by many forces and it is in no way the aim here to attempt a full narrative account of all events. Rather we shall attempt to sketch what appear to be the major developments in the continuing Cold War struggle in relation to neutralism in order to evaluate this particular aspect of it.

The main vicissitudes of the Cold War until 1962 can be conveniently outlined in terms of four fairly distinct phases: (1) the breakup of the wartime coalition and the evolution of bipolarity, 1945 - 1950; (2) the Korean War and "Creeping Neutralism" 1950 - 1953; (3) rising forces and the decline of bipolarity, 1953 - 1957; and (4) the forming of new systems, 1959 - 1962.

THE EVOLUTION OF BIPOLARITY

Despite some early hesitation, the years immediately following World War II witnessed a revolution in the conduct of American foreign policy. Not only by her willingness to assume a permanent role of leadership in world politics, but also domestically, in the forging of
a bipartisan, or nonpartisan, foreign policy. This basic change in American attitudes was a result of the growing recognition of Soviet expansionist policies and the gradual but quite determined assumption of leadership to stem Communist advances. Now that the war was over, it was inevitable that the wartime coalition which bound together the Soviet Union and the Western democracies against their common enemy would break up as other grand alliances had throughout history. And that there should re-emerge the difference which had kept them apart during the twenty-five prewar years.

Soviet influence, now operating from a secure base inside Russia, and despite enormous wartime losses in resources and manpower, was from 1945 onward pressing outward in all directions. It had three main theaters of operation. These were, in ascending order of importance: the Far East, the Middle East, and Europe.

In the Far East the Soviet Union secured, during the latter half of 1945, the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin, and its troops occupied Manchuria. In accordance with the Potsdam agreements, it also occupied Korea north of the 38th parallel; with U.S. forces to the south. Toward China it pursued right up to 1949 an equivocal policy of giving slight support to the Chinese Communists, while recognizing and dealing more fully with the Kuomintang.¹ In the Middle East, traditional

Russian pressure on Turkey and on Persia was renewed and attempts to embarrass Western interests in this area led to the Soviet Union's casting the first veto in the UN Security Council. However, Europe was the prime area of Soviet concern, and where it made its greatest postwar territorial advances. It regained the territories initially obtained during the period of Nazi-Soviet alliance: Eastern Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, Bessarabia, plus certain parts of Finland. In addition, it acquired the province of Petsamo, with its valuable nickel mines, from Finland; part of Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia; and a piece of East Prussia, including the port of Kalingrad, (formerly Konigsberg) from Germany. Moreover, most of the countries of Eastern Europe fell under Soviet sway -- whether they were the "liberated" territories of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania and Poland, or the ex-enemy states of Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania and Finland. With the two exceptions of Yugoslavia, which was to successfully assert its freedom from Cominform control in June, 1948, and Finland, which enjoyed a severely circumscribed freedom under the terms of the Finno-Soviet treaty of April, 1948, all these states became Soviet satellites. An interlocking network of treaties developed to bind them to each other and to the Soviet Union in particular. Russia's direct sphere of control also included the Soviet zones of occupation in Germany and Austria. In areas outside the sway of Soviet armies, especially in Western-Europe and Southeast Asia, Communist efforts were concentrated on building up the strength of local
parties and fomenting internal unrest against "bourgeois-capitalist" governments -- policies which found expression in Zhdanov's speech at the founding conference of the Cominform in September, 1947.

Zhdanov reaffirmed the doctrine of "two camps," stressed that a world revolutionary situation now existed, and proclaimed that all Communist parties had to go over to the offensive. At the same time, a world-wide peace campaign was launched to provide cover for this aggressive policy. As the UN became part of the diplomatic equipment of the Cold War, Stalin's World Peace Movement seemed intended to create alternative international organizations to a UN dominated by American power.

As the American reaction to Soviet threats began to crystallize, after the uncertainties of 1945-6, a pattern of bipolarity developed. Official American strategy came to be based on taking up positions all along the perimeter of the Soviet world to resist any further Soviet advance. Translated into operational policy terms, such as the

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"containment" thesis, eventually led the United States to assume commitments over a wide arc stretching from North Cape in Norway, through Central and Southern Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, then northward through the Philippines, Korea and Japan. Such long Cold War frontiers became fortified, though gradually, in response to each Soviet challenge and by such actions as seemed dictated by the circumstances.

Prior to 1949, the Soviet breakthroughs seemed to be most likely in Western and Southeastern Europe, and American Cold War policies began in these areas with emergency programs of extensive economic and military aid designed to combat the twin dangers of Communist subversion and Russian military pressure. First, to Greece and Turkey, under the "Truman Doctrine" of March, 1947, then, more comprehensively, under the Marshall Plan from June, 1947 onward.

Initially, the Marshall Plan, which was limited to economic aid, had no overt anti-Communist overtones and was ostensibly aimed at increasing inter-European cooperation, peace, order and stability. But, subjected to the pressure of political controversy, it later took on

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The author of the containment thesis is George F. Kennan. His thesis was first made public in Foreign Affairs July, 1947, under the title "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Up to 1953 Kennan was a steady advocate of the primacy of the problem of limited war, as his analysis of Soviet policy led him to view that Stalin would be exceedingly cautious about risking major war.
a markedly anti-Communist aspect. For in July, 1947, the Soviet Union rejected the application of the Marshall Plan within her sphere of control. In January, 1949, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania and the Soviet Union formed a Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as a counterweight to the Marshall Plan; and during 1949 the armies of the satellites were rebuilt and re-equipped under Soviet direction.

The Berlin Blockage, from early 1948 until May, 1949, was the first open test the Soviet Union made of American determination and strength. NATO, which grew out of the confrontation, became the second postwar multilateral security pact in which the U.S. was to play a leading role. Its founding members were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Rio Pact of 1947 was the first, but this was designed for an area still outside the main areas of Cold War conflict, though it was not without relevance to Cold War activities, as over a third of the original members of the UN were Latin-American countries and at this time they

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tended to vote with the U.S. on all Cold War matters.

Direct confrontation between the two main Cold War protagonists, apart from encounters at various UN meetings, was rare. Even more rarely, when they found themselves on the same side (as at the birth of Israel in 1948) their mutual embarrassment was obvious. At the inaugural meetings of the UN there had been a general feeling that the legal status of neutrality would be superfluous with institution of the UN collective security system.7 Though two wartime neutrals, Argentina and Turkey, were among the fifty-one original members of the UN,8 there was general agreement in ostracizing Franco's Spain. As the Cold War struggle developed and UN collective security measures were clearly inoperative, not only was the earlier assumed superfluity of


8Before December, 1955, only 9 states had gained admission to the UN following the original 51. These were Afghanistan, Iceland and Sweden (Nov., 1946); Thailand (Dec., 1946); Pakistan and Yemen (Sept., 1947); Burma (April, 1948); Israel (May, 1949); and Indonesia (Sept., 1950). The first 3 were wartime neutrals, 2 of them became neutralists, while Iceland joined NATO. Thailand, an ex-enemy state of World War II, became an ally of the Western powers. Pakistan was neutralist, until 1954 and then an American ally. The Yemen, independent but isolationist since 1918, became neutralist, though Israel's neutralism took on a marked Western orientation. All other applications were refused. For details, see Yearbook of the United Nations (New York: UN Secretariat), annual volumes 1946-1955.
legal neutrality seem to be premature but Cold War necessities, as seen by the two main protagonists, made the question of behavior during World War II less important than present intentions, as each side sought to enlist support and gain strength against its chief adversary. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union appeared ready to accept the idea of genuine non-attachment to either cause; the only essential difference was that the United States could distinguish in practice between active and passive allies, that is, between those with whom it concluded treaties and those others which were, nevertheless, part of the non-Communist world.

In Europe, neutralism, however vociferous, was the concern of impotent cliques, not of governments, and probably had no effect at all on policies. States either fell under Communist sway, became formal allies of America, or stayed isolated. In this latter class were Ireland, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, joined by Yugoslavia after its break with the Cominform in 1948.

In Asia, ten new states emerged; Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines. All of them at this time were mainly absorbed in internal tasks. The

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governments of Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines each faced internal Communist insurrection. India, in her efforts to speed Indonesia independence, and in official comments on the situations in Indo-China and Malaya, made clear that Indian concern was rather with the colonial struggle than with Cold War rivalries. Great Britain was still the dominant power in the Middle East and appeared as the chief "protector," however unwelcome, in this area. The Soviets openly regarded all the new states — with the possible exception at this time of Israel — as "puppets" of their former colonial masters;\(^\text{10}\) while American policy makers erred in assuming too readily that if an Asian state was non-Communist it was naturally ready to take part in American led anti-Communist measures.\(^\text{11}\) On the whole, though, these states were not involved in Cold War matters, and the fact of their neutralism was not yet a matter of such international significance.

In the main areas of Cold War concern, divisions hardened; both Moscow and Washington enlisted partisans and helped to seal off frontiers or to resolve civil strife. In Germany, East and West became completely cut off from each other (with West Berlin a small island in a Communist sea); in China, the Communists won a conclusive victory

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over the Kuomintang, and Chiang Kai-Shek's forces had to evacuate, mostly to Formosa; in Korea, the Russian-dominated north faced the American-occupied south. In Greece, Turkey and Iran, Communist pressures were successfully resisted. The only overt loss of an ally suffered by either side during this period was Yugoslavia's defection from the Communist camp; Kuomintang China was not formally an ally of the West, though the victory of the Communists was widely represented as a great American defeat.\(^{12}\)

This first phase of the Cold War was a time of American atomic monopoly and the Soviet Union's overwhelming superiority in conventional armaments. It is difficult to see what particular diplomatic advantages atomic monopoly gave to the United States. Probably it was a restraining influence on the Soviets, though Stalin constantly denied that there was any special value in the possession of atomic bombs.\(^{13}\) America's exclusive atomic monopoly ended in September, 1949, with the first explosion of a Soviet bomb, though the world had to learn of it through an American announcement;\(^{14}\) and this event, coming shortly after the signature of the NATO treaty and the conclusive

\(^{12}\)Ibid., Chapter 8: "The Great American Defeat."


\(^{14}\)Ibid., p. 369.
victory of the Communists in China, gave dramatic point to the idea of bipolarity which by now had come to be the dominant pattern of world affairs.

THE KOREAN WAR AND "CREEPING NEUTRALISM"

If the first phase was dominated by events in Europe, the second was equally dominated by developments in Eastern Asia, particularly by the Korean War. China had been exempted from the developing bipartisanship of American policy, and though the Korean War began in June, 1950, as a UN operation designed to repel a North Korean invasion south of the 38th parallel (a little earlier, Soviet troops had withdrawn from North Korea, and American troops from South Korea to Japan), by January, 1951, it had become converted, essentially, into a Sino-American conflict, fought solely on Korean soil. In these years American involvement in world affairs deepened, while at the same time domestic criticisms, obvious misgivings of allies, and distrust of neutralist nations added to the difficulties of American Policy makers. Anglo-American relations were openly strained at times, especially over Far Eastern issues, and President Truman later revealed that in 1950 the British Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, thought there was a good chance of China's, becoming the Yugoslavia of Asia, thus breaking with the Soviet bloc.

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In fact, throughout this phase, the Soviet Union pursued a far less obviously active international role than did its main Cold War opponent, perhaps because of Stalin's preoccupation with purging "Titoism" within the Soviet empire and Sino-Soviet cooperation seemed to increase rather than suggest strains. Throughout the Korean War, the Soviet Union not only claimed all the privileges and immunities of an officially neutral state, but championed similar claims from Communist China, even though the latter was implicated in the war through the presence of contingents of so-called "Chinese volunteers" on the side of the North Koreans. Indeed, one consequence of Korea was the growing identification of Communist China and the Soviet Union, so that for a number of succeeding years, most Western observers regarded Peking as Moscow's most faithful ally. The sense of Communist menace, which had been a prime factor in European affairs right up to 1950, and lingered thereafter as a constant background threat, did not have the same intensity or effect in non-Communist

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Asia. Europeans feared the USSR more than Asians feared China. Though in 1950, China began to absorb Tibet, this apparently caused less concern to most Asian neutralists than did the continuance of the "colonial" struggle in Indo-China (and growing identification of French and American interests in this question), while it has increasingly felt that American policies were bringing and spreading the Cold War into Asia.

Though ostensibly a UN collective security endeavor, only fifteen UN members\(^{19}\) joined with the U.S. in the Korean fighting, and these formed a roughly accurate list of the states that were by now America's closes allies. A number of neutralist states tried, at first, to reconcile their faith in the UN and their Cold War non-alignment by siding UN forces with measures short of becoming active combatants.\(^{20}\) When, early in October, 1950, General MacArthur's troops pushed northward across the 38th parallel, neutralist misgivings about the war increased. When, in February, 1951, the United States sponsored a United Nations

\(^{19}\) These were: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey.

\(^{20}\) For instance, medical aid was sent by Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden. Here the differences between the neutralists and some aligned states were not sharp. A full list of aid offered to UN forces in Korea is given in Y.B.U.N., op. cit., 1950, pp. 226-8.
resolution\textsuperscript{21} condemning Communist China as an aggressor, most neutralist states considered that the war had taken an aggressively anti-Chinese turn and many expressed their loud disapproval. By 1953, American dominance in UN General Assembly matters was past its peak, and an Arab-Asian bloc,\textsuperscript{22} neutralist in Cold War matters, had begun to coalesce.

Neutralist misgivings about U.S. policies heightened as growing American concentration on the Cold War as a quasi-military aid,\textsuperscript{23} in the consolidation of its existing alliances and in the extension of her commitments in the Middle East and Far East.

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 made it a prerequisite of American assistance that the recipient country should unequivocally place itself in support of the U.S. in the Cold War. In fact, American aid to Yugoslavia, and the Indian grain bill of 1952 showed that

\textsuperscript{21}The U.S. resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on February 1, 1951, by 44 votes to 7 (Soviet bloc, India and Burma) with 9 abstentions (Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Yemen and Yugoslavia).


these were not unqualified conditions even if American preferences for formal allies, rather than "ambivalent" neutralists, were now patently clear.

These years saw the heyday of the neutralism of European public opinion. Ironically, it was probably American enthusiasm for consolidating NATO as a means of raising European morale, and countering "Creeping neutralism" -- the growth of neutralist feeling, sentiment, and ideas in a state whose foreign policy was not ostensibly or avowedly neutralist -- that gave European neutralism most succor. In retrospect, still seems to have been an insignificant force in Europe and fears of "creeping neutralism" exaggerated. In early 1952, Greece and Turkey

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25 Thus, General Eisenhower in his First Annual Report to the Group NATO (Paris: NATO, April 2, 1952): "There was serious question as to the state of public morale among the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization .... It was extremely difficult for the average European to see any further in an attempt to build defensive forces which might offset this real and formidable threat. There seemed to be too much of a load to be overtaken. The doubts of the European people gave birth to the false but glittering doctrine of neutralism, through which they hoped to preserve the things they had always held dear ...... the cumulative effects of repeated failure to make any headway in conferences with the Soviets produced an intellectual defeatism, in some quarters bordering upon despair."
joined NATO thus further extending the treaty area of the "North Atlantic" alliance; and in Sept., 1953, Spain was linked to the U. S. in three bilateral agreements known collectively as the Madrid Pact.  

Indeed, it seemed to be more and more the aim of U.S. policy to spread the NATO pattern of alliances and bases around the whole periphery of the Communist bloc. If this were so, only at the extremities of Eastern Asia did American policies meet with any real success, and even here it concluded only bilateral pacts. The United States pushed through a treaty of peace and reconciliation with Japan, despite strong opposition from behind the Iron Curtain, and from some Asian neutralists.  

The Japanese Peace Treaty, signed at San Francisco in September, 1951 -- but more particularly, the simultaneous signing of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty -- aroused the fears of several states who were most likely to be threatened in the event of renewed Japanese expansion and aggression, and the opposition of Asian, including Japanese, neutralists. It was in order to quiet such fears that the U.S. entered into the Philippine-American Defense Pact in

28 Ibid.
August, 1951, and into a treaty with Australia and New Zealand in September, 1951. As the French position in Indo-China worsened, American anxiety increased, and American relations with Indonesia as well as with India and Burma, became increasingly distant. The idea pursued in 1951-2 of a comprehensive regional pact for the Middle East (M.E.D.O.) was stillborn. Although proposals for this pact were sponsored jointly by the United States and Great Britain, Britain here played the leading role. For a number of reasons -- historical, economic and strategic -- British sensitivity to nationalist and neutralist fears and hopes in south and southeast Asia were not paralleled by a similar appreciation of Middle Eastern nationalism and neutralism. Britain's conflicts with Iran and Egypt were sufficient at this time to prevent the realization of M.E.D.O. However, arrangements were made for U.S. air bases in Morocco, Libya and Saudi Arabia.

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32 Ibid.

33 Survey of International Affairs 1951, op. cit., pp. 25 et. seq.
The May, 1950 Tripartite Declaration -- France, Britain and the United States -- aimed at guaranteeing existing Arab-Israeli frontiers and maintaining a balance of forces in the area, had not endeared the Western powers to the Arab states. As it was, this policy depended on the condition that these powers could monopolize the supply of arms to the Middle East -- a condition shattered by Egypt's arms deal with the Soviet bloc in 1955.

The first six or eight months of 1953 saw the closing of this Cold War phase and the beginning of a series of shifts and changes which eventually affected the whole pattern of international relationships. These changes were symbolized in a change of personalities. First, with General Eisenhower's accession to the American Presidency in January, 1953, pledged to end the fighting in Korea, to promote "liberation" in Eastern Europe, and to reduce expenditure overseas. Secondly, and more significant, was the death of Stalin in March, 1953. August, 1953, saw the explosion of the first Soviet H-bomb. The first U.S. experimental H-bomb had only been exploded in November, 1952, and it seemed that the gap in nuclear weaponry between the two superpowers was rapidly narrowing, at least qualitatively.

In the summer of 1953 an armistice was signed to end the war in Korea, more than two years after truce talks had opened. The representatives of Sweden and Switzerland, as two members of the five-member commission of neutral nations, found themselves in the disagreeable position of being cast in the role of "neutrals" on
the side of the West, while Poland Czechoslovakia were openly "neutral" on the Communist side. Only India, as chairman of the commission, seemed able to avoid charges of blatant partisanship. As it was, the end of the Korean War brought no settlement, only a military stalemate, and did not lead to any political resolution of the essential issues at stake.

RISING FORCES AND THE DECLINE OF BIPOLARITY

For the greater part of this third phase of the Cold War there was a marked contrast in apparent Soviet and American priorities, and in most neutralist eyes the post-Stalin policies of the Soviet leaders probably were preferable to the Eisenhower-Dulles policies, at first declaredly based on "massive retaliation" and "brinkmanship." America, aided at times by her chief allies, Britain and France, seemed determined to extend the range and membership of her military alliances and to give foreign aid only to allies, and then mostly for military purposes. At the same time the Soviets, pursuing a "new look" policy, began to try openly to encourage the spread of neutralism outside the Soviet bloc and to woo several leading

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neutralist nations with offers of aid, and, in certain respects, with diplomatic support. It seemed that just as the Americans were offering "swords," and then only on condition that a state was, or became, a formal ally, the Soviets were offering "plough-shares" to neutralist nations and were asking for no formal undertakings in return. These contrasts, dramatized by Soviet bloc arms to Egypt in 1953 were hardly "plough-shares," even if Egypt was not required to join in a military alliance with the Soviet bloc. These Soviet-American contrasts were softened or obscured with the Suez and Hungary crises in the later part of 1956. As it was, the neutralist nations were growing in numbers and self-confidence and were becoming increasingly independent factors in international politics, with consequent effects on the nature of Cold War rivalries.

The fluctuations and contrasts of this phase can be conveniently conveyed in terms of the major developments in Europe, the Middle East, and the rest of Asia, in questions of foreign aid, and in UN matters. An over-all treatment would give a better impression of the conjunction of certain events but would make it more difficult to show their significance in relation to neutralism.

The first significant sign of changing Soviet policies occurred when, at the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers in January-February, 1954, Mr. Molotov suggested, inter alia, bringing into being a reunified Germany by prohibiting its participation in any alliances and coalitions, by strictly limiting its armaments, by barring all
foreign military bases from its territory and by withdrawing all foreign troops. These measures would, according to Mr. Molotov, provide a satisfactory basis for a reunified, neutralized Germany. A similar status for Austria was advanced by Mr. Molotov at the same time. However, the Soviet proposals were unacceptable to West Germany and her allies, and after more than a year of diplomatic preparations, Western Germany became the fifteenth member of NATO in May, 1955. The Soviets' reply to this further consolidation of NATO was to announce the knitting together of pre-existing bilateral arrangements in Eastern Europe in a newly comprehensive Warsaw pact. Even so, Soviet abandonment of previous claims that the German and Austrian problems must be considered together was able to facilitate Austria's independence by neutralization during 1955. Soviet endeavors to stimulate support in West European political opinion in favor of military disengagement were shown not only in the parading of "the Austrian example," but also in the dramatic reconciliation with Yugoslavia, and in the reversion of the military base at Forkkala to Finland. This was the only Soviet military base outside the Soviet bloc, and its

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38 Ibid., pp. 48-50 and 54.
relinquishment was probably intended to strengthen demands for the withdrawal of American bases from Europe. Certainly, Soviet leaders and publicists39 began to give unprecedented and seemingly unconditional approval to neutralism at this stage of world affairs. The most important Soviet pronouncement was Mr. Krushchev's first speech at the 20th Party Congress when he adroitly adopted the uncommitted countries of Asia as his friends, describing them as part of "a peace camp" allied to the "socialist" one, with "fraternal Yugoslavia" hovering ambiguously between the two, and with Finland, Austria and other neutral countries distinguished from America's allies.40

In fact, the vital, though naturally unpublished, reservation to Soviet approval of neutralism was that it was only to be encouraged outside the Soviet bloc. This had, perhaps, been implicit in the abortive rising in East Berlin in June, 1953 and in the carefully qualified "liberalization" in Poland in the middle months of 1956,41


but it was brutally demonstrated in October, 1956, when Soviet troops crushed the attempts of the Hungarians to defect from the year-old Warsaw Pact and to work out their own variant of neutralism.\(^{42}\) Parallel with events in Hungary, and quite apart from the palpable inability of the Western powers to intervene on behalf of the Hungarians, came the swift cooling of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and the imponderable but undoubted intrusion of China into east European affairs during 1956. After the Hungarian revolution had been quieted, Soviet efforts were concentrated on repairing rifts in the Communist camp. This repair work seemed to be complete by the time of the Moscow meeting of the ruling Communist parties in October, 1957, which time seemed also to mark the undoubted emergence of Mr. Krushchev as the pre-eminent leader in the Soviet Union.\(^{43}\)

In the Middle East during these years there were four dominant trends. Firstly, there was a rapid deterioration in British-Egyptian relations, culminating in the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in October, 1956.\(^{44}\) Secondly, there was the formation of the


Bagdad Pact in 1955, bringing together Britain, Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran, though leaving the United States in the ambiguous position of silent partner and not a formal member.\textsuperscript{45} In fact, this development re-emphasized pre-existing divisions in the Middle East and provoked strenuous responses, especially from Egypt, but also from Syria and Saudi Arabia, as well as from Israel. Third, there was the dramatic renewal of active Soviet interest in the region and signs of a growing association between the Soviets and Egypt and Syria.\textsuperscript{46} Fourth, throughout the years 1954-56, inclusive, American policy tried to reconcile the irreconcilable, by seeking to build up Western defenses in the area while at the same time trying to cultivate good relations with Arab neutralist states. Such a vacillating policy found its way when in January, 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine -- offering military and economic assistance to any Middle Eastern state that asked for help against "armed aggression from any country controlled by international Communism" -- met with strong opposition from most states, and only tepid enthusiasm from a few, throughout the whole region.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{45}Campbell, op. cit., chapter 5.


\textsuperscript{47}Campbell, op. cit., chapter 4-9 and 17.
By contrast, such Soviet acts as the retrocession of Port Arthur to the Chinese in May, 1955, and the official "visits of friendship" by Bulganin and Krushchev, in late 1955, to India, Burma and Afghanistan (the latter marked by the ceremonious prolongation of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of neutrality and non-aggression, which originated in 1926) were all part of Moscow's new line of encouraging and cooperating with most of the neutralist nations of the world. Support for Afghanistan's irredentist claims against Pakistan, and the Indian position with regard to Kashmir and Goa, and offers of aid and trade were further instances of this new trend.

In the rest of Asia, American attempts to build up defense arrangements against possible Communist attack further alienated neutralist opinion, and official American spokesmen openly regarded neutralism with suspicion and dislike. The conclusion of the South

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48 Survey of International Affairs 1955-6, op. cit., pp. 53 and 126.

49 For full texts of the Bulganin and Krushchev speeches in India, Burma and Afghanistan, see supplement in New Times (Moscow) December 22, 1955.

East Asian Defense Treaty in September, 1954,\textsuperscript{51} linked the security interests of the Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand (all already linked with the United States) with Britain, France and Pakistan in a comprehensive agreement — SEATO. Three of the four successor states of former French Indo-China, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (the fourth was Communist North Vietnam) were declared to be under the "protection" of the SEATO treaty members, though they did not become full members themselves. The United States' adhesion to the treaty was qualified in a protocol which made clear the American preoccupation with Communist aggression, while appearing to regard other forms of aggression as less reprehensible. Formosa was excluded from SEATO, but under pressure from Chiang Kai-Shek, the United States felt it necessary to conclude a bilateral defense agreement. This was signed on December 1, 1954,\textsuperscript{52} and completed the list of formal U.S. defense commitments in the Far East.

In the aftermath of the Korean and Indo-China wars, American concentration on military arrangements seemed to be rather backward-looking as the Soviets' rapid development of trade and aid programs

\textsuperscript{51}For a full account, see Royal Institute of International Affairs, \textit{Collective Defense in South East Asia}, (London: Oxford University Press, 1956).

\textsuperscript{52}Survey of \textit{International Affairs} 1955-6, \textit{pp. cit.}, pp. 7 and 10-14.
to neutralist states added a new dimension to Cold War rivalries. Previously, the Western powers had been the sole, and rather selective suppliers, to neutralist nations. The first Soviet loan to a non-Communist country was made to Afghanistan in January, 1954, for the sum of $3.5 million. In that first year, the total aid from the Soviet Union and other Communist countries to non-Communist countries was $10.6 million. For 1955 it was $305 million, for 1956 nearly $1,100 million, and for 1957 over $1,900 million.\(^53\) In total volume U.S. aid greatly exceeded Soviet aid, but U.S. aid priorities seemed to be with Israel, Libya, South Korea, South Vietnam, Laos and Formosa, whereas the main Soviet efforts were concentrated on Syria, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, India, Egypt, Cambodia, Ceylon, Indonesia, and Nepal.\(^54\)

It is notoriously difficult to compare aid programs even in economic terms, let alone assess their political effects, but, certainly, foreign aid first became a serious matter of Cold War rivalry in these years. The Soviets began with a number of advantages over their Western rivals. -- the novelty of their aid programs, the prevailing Afro-Asian anti-imperialist image of the USSR, the apparent absence of political or military "strings," the procedural advantages


\(^{54}\)Ibid.
of totalitarian governments in operating foreign aid programs, and
the fact that Soviet bloc aid was growing at a more rapid annual rate
than Western aid. The experience of being actively courted by Com-
munist states proffering "unconditional" aid was not only attractive
in itself, to neutralist nations, but it afforded opportunities for
provoking the United States to increase, or initiate, its own aid
programs, whatever the misgivings of many Americans about such moves.
During June and July, 1956, U.S. spokesmen made a spate of contradic-
tory pronouncements,\(^55\) approving or disapproving of neutralism in
general terms -- including Mr. Dulles' notorious phrase that
"except under very exceptional circumstances" neutrality is an "immoral
and shortsighted conception."\(^56\)

All these pronouncements should be seen in the context of the
Eisenhower administration's difficulties in attempting simultaneously
to: increase American foreign aid programs in the face of strong
opposition from neo-isolationists at home,\(^57\) to placate the anxieties

\(^55\) There is a collection of the major speeches, with commen-
taries in _Foreign Policy Bulletin_, Aug. 15, 1956 and February 15,
1957.

\(^56\) _D.S.B._, June 18, 1956, pp. 999-1004.

\(^57\) Norman A. Graebner, "Foreign Aid and American Policy",
of those allies who feared a reduction of their aid from the United States, and to take increasing account of the needs of neutralist nations.\textsuperscript{58} By the middle of 1957, there was evidence of a far more balanced estimate than hitherto in influential American thought about neutralism.\textsuperscript{59}

The Asian-Afro Conference held at Bandung, Indonesia, in April, 1955, was a dramatic illustration of trends which were increasingly cutting across strict Cold War rivalries. It was primarily a gathering of Afro-Asian leaders who were anxious, above all, to keep out of Cold War quarrels and yet aware, as President Sukarno said, that "The affairs of the world are our affairs, and our future depends on the solution found to all international problems, however far or distant they may seem."\textsuperscript{60}

It would be wrong to convey the impression that the Bandung Conference was wholly a neutralist meeting, for the views of aligned states were fully ventilated. Anti-colonialism in its various

\textsuperscript{58} For a balanced assessment of the American Leader's predicament, see \textit{The Economist}, June 16, 1956, p. 1076.


manifestations was becoming a vital trend in the Afro-Asian movement, though by no means fully synonymous with it, as neutralists began to shed some of their former defensiveness and to move more surely internationally, encouraged by accords with fellow neutralists.\(^{61}\) It was probably in such matters as increasing contacts and seeing the advantages of an international platform that Bandung was most beneficial to neutralists.

The Conference met at a time when Cold War deadlocks had for more than five years prevented any expansion in the membership of the United Nations -- a fact much regretted by all neutralists. However, with the so-called U.S.-USSR "horse-trading deal"\(^{62}\) of December, 1955, by which the United Nations immediately gained sixteen new members,\(^{63}\) and became open to further increases in membership.

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\(^{61}\)Mary Keynes, "The Bandung Conference," *International Relations*, October, 1957, pp. 362-376. According to this author, there were 9 confirmed neutralists at Bandung -- Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Syria & Yemen. The positions of Egypt, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia were not fully clear but were at times neutralist. There were 2 Communist states -- China and North Vietnam, and 15 anti-Communists -- Ceylon, Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Pakistan, Philippines, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey and South Vietnam. See p. 375.


\(^{63}\)These were Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Romania and Spain. Cambodia, Ceylon, Laos and Libya were all new states created since 1945.
membership. That organization seemed to gain a new relevance and vitality in world affairs, whilst greatly augmenting the number of neutralist votes and voices.

Though the rivalries between the U.S. and the USSR quickened, became more varied in scope and, on the whole, slightly less venomous, direct contacts between the two superpowers were virtually as rare and unproductive as in the Stalin-Truman era. Mr. Dulles quickly withdrew the American delegation from participation in the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China, leaving Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov to attempt a compromise settlement.

Both the Geneva Summit Conference of July, 1955 and the follow-up Conference of Foreign Secretaries in October - November, 1955 were unproductive, though there was such superficial talk then and for some time afterwards about a vague but new, welcome and all pervasive "Geneva spirit." As both superpowers developed their nuclear capacities, the need to avoid thermo-nuclear war and to agree on some form of "peaceful coexistence" was recognized on all sides. The outstanding problem was to establish a basis on which the two Cold War camps could agree to coexist. This problem was no nearer solution than it had ever been when the successful launching of the Soviet Sputnik in October,

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64 Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia -- all new states -- became members in November, 1956; Japan in December, 1956; Ghana, a new state, in March, 1957; and Malaya, another new state in September, 1957.
1957 encouraged Mr. Krushchev to claim that this event had altered the power balance in the world. In a sense, this was no doubt true; but other more gradual changes were increasingly affecting the nature of Cold War rivalries. The Soviet Union and the United States were still predominant, but both had to give greater attention to independent forces, both within and outside their own alliances.

THE FORMING OF NEW SYSTEMS

The chief characteristics of this fourth phase of the Cold War seem to be the developing global character of Cold War struggles (as Africa and Latin-America now become areas of active Cold War rivalry, too); the greater number of direct contacts between the U.S. and the USSR; the apparently growing attractions of neutralism, and the increasing attention paid by each of the superpowers toward neutralist states.

Following the Soviet success in launching the first earth satellite (Sputnik), it seemed that the Soviet leadership had gained fresh confidence and that the Soviet state, now militarily stronger and industrially more powerful than ever before, began to extend the scale of its international operations. However, much of this expansion was due to the undoubted emergence of Mr. Krushchev as the first man in Russia, a more important reason probably was that a new state of

65 For explanation of changes leading to the ascension of Mr. Krushchev to power, see The Times, July 5, 1957.
"mutual deterrence" between the two superpowers had been ushered in, now that Russian capacity to launch intercontinental missiles had marked the end of the territorial invulnerability of the American homeland.

In such a situation, the advantages accruing from Communist-inspired local aggression were likely to increase, not only because the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation was less credible as a deterrent to local attack on her minor allies, but also because further developments in America's own weaponry were likely to reduce her dependence on large numbers of fixed overseas bases, and might even reduce the military value of small, exposed allies in her eyes. This did not, of course, reduce the chances of local wars, and between October, 1957, and early 1962 there was a succession of skirmishes and war scares over Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Laos, Formosa, Cuba, the Congo and Berlin. 66

Another feature of this post-Sputnik phase is the growing number of direct contacts between the citizens and leaders of the two superpowers. 67 This process began formally with the two-year agreement


67 Ibid. Mr. Krushchev's visit to the U.S. in September, 1959 was the most dramatic of these new contacts.
on cultural, technical and educational exchanges, signed in January, 1958. But it is doubtful if the superficial cordiality which was becoming customary in these new encounters appreciably lessened the distrust and mutual irritation which marked the fundamental relations between the two governments. In terms of U.S.-USSR relations, the failure of the Paris summit conference of May, 1960, was a revealing example of deep-rooted incompatibilities.

The rivalry between the two superpowers now seemed to be increasingly complicated by incipient stresses and strains within their respective alliance systems, as well as by the growing number of new states which were emerging and pursuing neutralist courses. The days when American leaders openly denigrated neutralists had gone. Many neutralists were proselytizers themselves, now, and the very new neutralist state did not find itself in a world where one was expected to apologize for one's neutralist stand, but where one could point to many notable exemplars and precedents. A new and looser international system, more flexible and multilateral, was in being, and formalities now seemed far less significant than before.

Stresses and strains were certainly evident throughout America's alliances. The defection of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, following the Kassim revolution in July, 1958, called forth a reconstruction of that alliance with the U.S. assuming a much more active role in what now became called the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), with its
new headquarters in Turkey. Five months earlier, the union of the two states of Egypt and Syria in a single "United Arab Republic" was proclaimed in Cairo as a first step toward the unification of the Arab peoples. It seemed as if the tide of Nasserite nationalism and neutralism was rising. Within SEATO, deteriorating situations in the two "protected" states of Laos and South Vietnam revealed a lack of any concerted alliance policy: there were a number of reports that the Philippines and Siam were actively seeking other, unspecified means of ensuring their security, and in November, 1960, it was announced that Thailand had for the first time accepted Soviet offers of economic assistance. In January, 1960, the U.S. signed a new ten-year defense treaty with Japan, though by the following October some fear was expressed of the popular trend toward neutralism in Japan, and of the likelihood that this would increase.


69 Ibid., pp. 189-192.


cumulative effect of the overthrow of pro-American military dictatorships in a number of countries—Peru (1956), Colombia (1957), Venezuela (1958) and Cuba (1959)—and growing Russian and Chinese interest in this region prompted the United States to pay greater attention to Latin American affairs, and to increase economic assistance to Latin American countries. Only Cuba, following the accession of Fidel Castro to power in January, 1959, had by early 1961 clearly embarked on a neutralist policy; but it was a sign of the growing attractiveness of neutralism in Latin America that Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador each decided to send official observers to the neutralist summit meeting in Belgrade in September, 1961. In early 1962 NATO of all America's alliances, seemed least threatened by the corrosive effects of "creeping neutralism" from within the alliance, or the enticements of already neutralist leaders from without. But trade rivalries between member states, the growing self-confidence of France under President de Gaulle and Soviet pressure (from November, 1958 onward) on the Western powers to reach a "permanent solution" of the Berlin question, all added to America's task of reconciliation and leadership.75

73 For details, see annual volumes of U.S.W.A. 1957-60.


75 Ibid., 1957-60.
In some respects the Soviet Union as the leader of the Communist bloc seemed to be experiencing similar difficulties to those of its main Cold War antagonist. The meeting of the ruling Communist parties in Moscow in November, 1957, marked the definite failure of Krushchev's attempts to woo Yugoslavia back into the Communist camp. Subsequent to that Moscow meeting and right up to the ending of a similar meeting, also in Moscow, in November, 1960, there was considerable evidence of Sino-Soviet disagreements. Whatever the full reasons for Sino-Soviet tensions in these years, Chinese dissatisfaction with the way that Mr. Krushchev was promoting good relations with India and Indonesia, even to the extent of neglecting to support China's interests in her quarrels with these two countries, was undoubtedly one of the immediate causes. Certainly, in these years China showed a greater militancy and aggressiveness internationally than did the Soviet Union, and the official Chinese attitude to neutralism was, in general,

76 H. Seton-Watson, Neither War Nor Peace, op. cit., pp 357-8.


78 Ibid., esp. pp. 5 and 7.

less friendly than that of her senior partner, though both powers preferred to distinguish between neutralists they approved of and those who met with their disapproval.

One of the most striking developments since 1957 has been the considerable increase in the number of new neutralist states, and with their emergence -- they are almost all African states -- sub-tropical Africa has at last become drawn into the mainstreams of international politics. Indeed, twenty newly independent states were born, eighteen in Africa, between January, 1958, and September, 1961 -- all of them professed neutralists and all of them, with the exception of Kuwait, became members of the UN. This large addition to the ranks of the neutralist nations not only gave new impetus and strength to neutralist currents, but there are increasingly signs of a willingness on the part of a large number of neutralist leaders to try to concert together on issues of common concern. This latter trend was particularly evident in the autumn 1960 session of the UN General Assembly, and in the

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80 The other two were Kuwait and Cyprus.

81 Guinea joined the UN in December, 1958; Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Somali, Togo and Upper Volta all joined the UN in September, 1960; and Nigeria joined in October, 1960. Sierra Leone joined in September, 1961.

82 Tom Little, "Mr. Krushchev and the Neutrals at the UN," World Today, December, 1960.
summoning of a neutralist "summit" conference in Belgrade in September, 1961. The meetings of African leaders in Casablanca, in January, 1961, and in Lagos, in January, 1962, can be cited as another example. This is not to say that a neutralist "bloc" has now emerged on the world scene. But the sheer number of neutralist states and the importance of some of the larger ones -- India, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Ghana and the United Arab Republic, for example, has forced both superpowers to pay increasing attention to them. Mr. Krushchev's attendance and behavior at the UN General Assembly in September, 1960, made clear his interest in "the neutralist world." His proposal that most of the important international organizations should be re-organized on a "Troika" basis with equally weighted Western, Communist and Neutralist representation served the dual purpose of furthering Soviet aims to secure a permanent veto in a wider range of international organizations than the Security Council, whilst also appearing to advocate a new importance for neutralist nations. The Kennedy administration installed in office since January, 1961, had been at pains to show that it, too, is aware of the needs of "friendly" neutralist nations.


The difficulties of trying to please both allies and "friendly" neutralists, while also pursuing their own interests, are now familiar predicaments, common to both superpowers. The results of their endeavors will vary with the issues at stake, the attitudes and policies of individual neutralists, and their own expectations and aims.
CHAPTER II

NEUTRALISM: RATIONALE AND FORMULATION

Despite its ambiguity, neutralism continues to receive great attention. While there have been a number of other developments relating to the Cold War, the steadfast increase in the number of neutralist countries has led to a suspicion that neutralism may evolve as the major force affecting the world balance of power.

THE BIRTH OF NEUTRALISM:

The concept of neutralism in today's power struggle was first advanced in the psychological climate which prevailed during the second half of 1946. In that year two major developments occurred:

The first was the rift between the members of the Grand Coalition of World War II and the gradual realization of the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of successful postwar cooperation between the principal partners of this Coalition, United States and Soviet Russia.¹ With this rift, a growing concern was experienced by a number of smaller nations which feared the consequences of the rapidly deteriorating relationships between the shaping blocs.

The second development was the rise of nationalism in many underdeveloped nations, particularly in Asia and in the Arab countries.

¹See discussion in preceding chapter.
This was manifested in these countries' demands for political independence as well as in their desire for economic and social betterment.

Though uncorresponding, these two developments were responsible for the creation of apropitious atmosphere through which neutralism was first advanced. In India, where the concept originated, the impact of East-West relationships together with nationalism at home, was more intense than in any other country. Thus, we find Jawaharial Nehru on September 7, 1946 -- that is at a time when India was still under British rule -- stating the tasks of Indian foreign policy in the name of the provisional government as follows:²

1. India would not participate in any conflict between groups of power.
2. India would support all peoples struggling for the liberation of their countries and independence.
3. India demanded equality for all races and also demanded the elimination of racial discrimination.
4. India promoted international cooperation and the establishment of a world wide community of nations.
5. Friendship with Britain and the preservation of the Commonwealth.

It is this basic declaration of India's foreign policy which gave birth to what later became known as neutralism. But the word neutralism, despite its common usage today, is still a newcomer to the vocabulary of international relations. As a matter of fact, its naming as such is disputed. Instead, it has variously been described

²For text of Nehru's statement, see Government of India, Jawaharial Nehru's Speeches (Delhi, 1958) Vol. I, pp. 1-5.
as isolation, non-alignment, neutrality, positive neutrality, non-involvement and uncommitted policy.

Although each of these terms may connote a different meaning to the concept, its essence was described by the neutralist nations themselves at the Cairo Preparatory Conference of Non-aligned Nations held in June, 1961. This conference, attended by foreign ministers or senior diplomats of nineteen countries, agreed on five broad criteria as basis for the issuance of invitations to the Belgrade Conference. According to these criteria, a neutralist country:

1. should follow an independent policy based on the coexistence of States with different political and social systems and on non-alignment;
2. should support the movements for national independence;
3. should not be a member of a multilateral military pact concluded in the context of East-West struggle;
4. should not be a member of a bilateral military agreement with a Big Power in the East-West struggle;
5. should not have granted military bases to foreign powers in the context of great power conflicts.

These criteria are no doubt very broad-based and are, consequently, inadequate precisely to explain the nature of the policy of neutralism. The difficulty of the conference in agreeing to more exact

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4 Ibid.
criteria for defining neutralist nations was, however, genuine because neutralism is more an approach than a policy and as such is difficult to define precisely. It will be safe, however, to say that neutralism presupposes the existence of "Cold War" conditions between two or more states, regarding which a neutralist country will follow an independent course supported by its non-alignment to either side, militarily or otherwise. In that sense, neutralism would differ from the legal concept of neutrality which presupposes the prevalence of war between two or more states. Logically then, it would follow that neutralism is subject to the continuance of the Cold War, and that it may fade away or turn to neutrality depending on the elimination of tension or the development of this tension into war.

THE REASONS FOR NEUTRALISM:

It is a much remarked and very important fact that most of the neutralist nations of post-World War II international politics are new and weak nations. The mutually reinforcing experiences of colonial rule and the nationalists' struggle for independence continue to shape their outlooks and actions. In the post-independence period, these experiences have been given expression by a search for dignity and identity. The new nations are not quite sure of the nature of their purposes. In the pursuit of national consciousness and character, they are particularly sensitive to attitudes and policies which affect their independent status. As a result, the new nations tend to place the
burden of proof concerning motives, and objectives on their former colonial masters, who are associated with their lack of freedom in the recent past.

The neutralist position in international politics, however, is more than a response to certain psychological dispositions based on past experience. It also has the very practical effect of maximizing the power of neutralist nations in world diplomacy and is thus a response to their weakness. Possessing neither military nor economic strength, the neutralists have developed the tactics of negotiation into an effective instrument of policy. The growth of world public opinion has had the effect of democratizing diplomacy. Neutralist nations have both contributed to and exploited this development. By playing such roles as arbiter, conciliator, and negotiator in a context of world public opinion, they have succeeded in maximizing the source of influence available to them in world politics. It is no mere coincidence that the neutralist nations place great stress on the United Nations as the arena for the conduct of world politics, for it is in the United Nations that world public opinion is given formal

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recognition and some authority. The discrepancy between equality of voting strength within the United Nations General Assembly and the actual power position of various nations no doubt creates serious problems by throwing the relationship between authority, power, and responsibility out of balance. On the other hand, there is also no doubt that such a situation maximizes the influence of the ex-colonial nations.

Neutralism, however, is not only an expression of the new nations' efforts to form an ideologically viable and effective foreign policy in the present complex of world politics to maximize their interests. Nor is it only a reflection of the desire to promote the maintenance of peace. It is also an expression of internal economic and political forces and circumstance. For instance, an underdeveloped country, desirous of overcoming its problem of economic backwardness will find it necessary to pursue a policy which would allow it to utilize its limited resources for the primary task of economic advancement. For in the Cold War, it would require that the underdeveloped countries allocate a large portion of its scarce resources to military preparedness -- a policy which seriously conflicts with the requirements of economic development. Neutralism, therefore, is a means

7 Ibid., especially p. 80.
by which an underdeveloped country can participate effectively in international affairs, without diverting scarce resources from what it views as the primary task of economic development.

The neutralist policy is also intimately related to the problem of maximizing internal political support and the more general problem of political stability. For in an emergent society, a neutralist leader who is constantly showing discontent with the world power configuration may find it more advantageous to generate greater internal support than a committed leader who chose to support one side against the other. In other words, a neutralist leader may be able to enhance his internal prestige by drawing on neutralism for local consumption to his people.

In summary, the post-colonial nationalistic states see in neutralism the following aspects:

1. the reflection of their desire to concentrate on domestic economic development, free of the military burdens associated with the Cold War;
2. insurance of political freedom and independence and contribution to self-respect and moral integrity;
3. an opportunity to maximize their international role and compensate for their actual economic and military weakness, thereby gaining the prestige they so lack and so much desire;
4. a reflection of their rejection of "imperialism" and of their unwillingness to embrace communism;
5. an opportunity to promote peace.

The leaders of the neutralist nations, however, are eager to claim for their foreign policies great benefits for the peace and welfare of mankind. They view neutralism as an opportunity to play
a special role separately or jointly in efforts to dampen down or resolve big power conflicts. This claim to serve world peace is meant to imbue their policies with high moral principles; thus dismissing the counterclaim that their policies are pursued to blackmail both East and West and to gain certain benefits from the existence of the Cold War.

Their advocated peacemaking efforts in the East-West conflict can be described as falling in three main areas: (1) creation of a climate to induce world peace; (2) mediation in big power disputes; and (3) opposition to nuclear weapons and urge for disarmament agreement.  

But while there is very little quarrel with the first two areas, the last one seems to be in conflict with some of the underlying principles of Neutralism. For example, the following of an independent policy by a neutralist country which would entail its right to judge world issues on their merits could mean the support of or opposition to nuclear testing, the spread of nuclear weapons or the reduction and control of arms generally. Both the support and opposition of such could be still argued as the best guarantee of peaceful coexistence.

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THE MOBILIZATION FOR NEUTRALISM: THE ART OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

In its effort to enlarge the area of non-alignment, the leadership of the neutralist countries has utilized the media of international conferences to promote the thesis that the more of the world remaining uncommitted in the Cold War, free from military pacts with either the Communist or Western blocs, the better the chances for maintaining peace. Perhaps among the best sample propaganda voiced, was in Mr. Nehru's address before the Political Committee of the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung during April, 1955: "If I join any of these big groups I lose my identity; I have no identity left, I have no views left. How, then, can I contribute to world peace? ... If all the world were to be divided up between these two big blocs what would be the result? The inevitable result would be war. Therefore every step that takes place in reducing that area in the world which may be called the unaligned area is a dangerous step and leads to war. It reduces that objective, that balance, that outlook which other countries without military might can perhaps exercise."^9

Although attended by a mixture of aligned and non-aligned nations, the Bandung Conference had provided, nevertheless, an opportune

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^10 According to one delegate's calculation, at least fourteen of the twenty-nine participating countries had entered into military pacts with great powers. See A. Appadorai, The Bandung Conference (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1955), p. 25. Also see Mary K. Keynes, "The Bandung Conference," International Relations, October, 1957, especially p. 375.
platform for the neutralist leaders to present their views on world affairs. Another main conference, called specifically for the promotion of neutralism was the meeting of the non-aligned nations held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia during September, 1961.

Following is a commentary on the two gatherings and their intervals:

1. THE ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE:

The Asian-African Conference, commonly known as the Bandung Conference, was the first historic gathering of Asian and African countries. Conceived by the Colombo Powers (India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon), the conference was an effort to consolidate the multiple revolutions in Asia against colonialism, racism, poverty, and disease and to spread these revolutions to Africa. It was also an endeavor to formulate concerted policies upon these common aspirations. Present were representatives of twenty-nine countries including Chou En-Lai of Communist China. The meeting took place in the Indonesian mountain city of Bandung with the Government of Indonesia acting as host country.

When the conference opened on the 18th of April, 1955, there was considerable risk of its foundering through disunity and divided aims, as had been freely predicted by the West. This was the first

time such a move had been taken; and it found an eloquent expression in the opening speech by President Sukarno:

It is a new departure in the history of the world that leaders of Asian and African Peoples can meet together in their own countries to discuss and deliberate upon matters of common concern. Only a few decades ago it was frequently necessary to travel to other countries and even other continents before the spokesmen of our peoples could confer. I recall in this connection the Conference of the "League Against Imperialism and Colonialism" which was held in Brussels (1927) ... But that was a meeting place thousands of miles away, amidst foreign people, in a foreign country, in a foreign continent. It was not assembled there by choice but by necessity.\(^{12}\)

It is worth noting that up until that time the countries of Asia and Africa had known very little of one another.\(^{13}\) Throughout the long colonial period, the Master powers had followed a policy which allowed no intercourse among these territories. They were kept isolated to insulate them from outside confusion.' Consequently, there was very little contact, even among their intellectuals. They were worlds apart, and if they met, it was as Sukarno said, in foreign countries.

The purpose of the conference was two fold: to bring the leaders of these countries to intimate relationships and to formulate

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\(^{12}\)From the text, Let a New Asia and a New Africa Be Born, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1955.

\(^{13}\)"Yes, we have so much in common; and yet we know as little of each other!" so declared President Sukarno in his opening speech, Ibid.
some general policy arising from their common aspirations. This was the peak of postwar Asian-African political awareness, their increasing sense of solidarity and of common interests; a feeling that reflected in the Bogor Communique\textsuperscript{14} which propounded the conference objectives as follows:

\begin{itemize}
\item[a)] to promote goodwill and cooperation among the nations of Asia and Africa, to explore and advance their mutual as well as common interests and to establish and further friendliness and neighborly relations;
\item[b)] to consider social, economic, and cultural problems and relations of the countries represented;
\item[c)] to consider problems of special interest to Asian and African peoples -- for example, problems affecting national sovereignty and of racism and colonialism;
\item[d)] to view the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in the world today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{itemize}

But despite the clearness of these objectives, there is no denying that other objectives were of great importance to the Conference's sponsors. Related to our concern here, one must note that the conference was principally organized by leaders who espoused neither

\textsuperscript{14}The Communique was issued after the final decision to convene the Asian-African Conference was adopted by the Colombo Powers at their meeting during December 20-29, 1954, in Bogor, Indonesia. See Kahin, \textit{The Asian-African Conference}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 3.
the Communist nor the anti-Communist cause, and whose aspiration it was to stand aside from the ideological divisions which had haunted the world since 1947. Accordingly, it must have been natural for these leaders to think of the occasion as a form to advocate that concentrating a policy in favor of any one division would be an unfortunate demeanor in international affairs.

It is noteworthy to observe that between the time the conference was first proposed to the time of its convening, many new factors came into play. Among these, were the signing on September 8, 1954, of the Manila Treaty establishing the South East Asia Treaty Organization; to which the three Asian countries of Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand became partners. Later in February, 1955, with the Bandung Conference already decided two months earlier in Bogor, the SEATO powers met at Bangkok which became the permanent headquarters of the Organization's Council.

Of the five sponsoring leaders, four were classified as neutralists: President Sukarno of Indonesia; Prime Minister Nehru of India; Sir John Kotelawala of Ceylon; and U Nu of Burma. Only Pakistan's Mohammed Ali was committed to SEATO and to other mutual defense pacts.

The conference was proposed by Indonesia's Premier, Ali Sastroamidjojo to the other premiers of the Colombo Powers at their meeting in Ceylon at the end of April, 1954.

Other members in the Organization are Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.
For a time, it was misunderstood that the Bandung Conference was planned to battle the SEATO. There were two factors that caused this speculation:

1. SEATO was composed largely of non-Asian countries and it was upon the contribution of these powers that its efficiency and meaning was contingent. The Bandung Conference, on the other hand, was called by Asiatic Countries;

2. SEATO was regarded by many Asian countries to be running directly counter to Communism, while the Bandung Powers were neither pro nor anti-Communist. 19

This was a time of great confusion when a dreadful war between the United States and China over Formosa was imminent. The emotion of the Asian Countries was immeasurably aroused over the threats of war and the entire continent was stirred. However, the Western countries were quite indifferent; they anticipated the final outcome of the Conference to be nothing but a reduction of the spirit of resistance to Communism in Asia. The United States for instance, thought that the meeting was going to evoke anti-American or anti-Western sentiment among the participating countries.

This expectation by the West seemed to be materializing when

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19 This included even aligned Pakistan; whose Prime Minister Mohammed Ali gave assurance to China's Chou En Lai that although Pakistan was party to the Manila Treaty, it was not against China ... that should the United States take aggressive action under the Treaty or if the United States launched global war, Pakistan would not be involved in it, just as she had not been involved in the Korean War. See speech by Premier Chou En-Lai to the Political Committee of the Bandung Conference, New York Times, April 25, 1955.
the Indian National Congress meeting on January 22, 1955, denounced SEATO as extending the area of the Cold War; this same Congress also condemned nuclear weapons in absolute terms. And Indonesia described the proposed gathering in Bandung as a "severe blow to the American war-mongering policy." But further than this, the expectation did not go; in fact, it began to dwindle.

The change in Western attitudes toward the Bandung Conference may partially be explained by the fact that while Communist China was invited, so were Japan, Thailand, the Philippines and Turkey. But more positive was the tactful statesmanship of Nehru who almost trespassed into the arena of the Western reaction by explaining, that the conference was not intended to be anti-Western or anti-Australian in spirit, and there was no intention of creating a "so-called third bloc." Because of this and other leaders' pronouncements, Western suspicions had been largely overcome by the end of March. Ultimately, it was the Western powers who took the initiative to encourage reluctant Turkey to attend as a spokesman for their views.

The conference opened with a lot of exhilaration. Among the many and complex problems discussed were the Palestine issue introduced


21 The Hindu, March 25, 1955.
by Egypt, the Aden question which was tabled by Yemen, and the Indo-
Pakistani dispute over Kashmir. But the most crucial issue which
threatened to disrupt the conference was the proposed attempt to
use it as an anti-Communist propaganda — a view put forward by Fili-
pino delegate General Romulo and strongly supported by Turkey, Pakistan,
Iraq, and other countries in alliance with the Western nations. At
this juncture, there was an intention of counteracting any condem-
nation of "colonialism" by equating it with Russian domination over
Eastern European countries; a concern expressed by Sir John Kotel-
awala of Ceylon. The other desire was brought up by the delegates
from Thailand and Cambodia, warning that China must respect the
principles of the Pancha Shila Pact. The successful conclusions
over these two points — a thing which rescued the conference from
falling to pieces — were attributed to the diplomatic handling by
Nehru and Chou En-Lai.

22These are: mutual respect for each other's territorial
integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in each
other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefits; and peaceful
coexistence. These principles were first announced in the preamble
to the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet concluded on April 29, 1954,
in Peking. They were reiterated in talks between Chou En-Lai and
Nehru in June, 1954 in New Delhi. See discussion of these prin-
ciples in Chapter III next.

23For an excellent presentation of the roles played at the
Conference by Nehru and Chou En-Lai, see Kahin, The Asian-African
Conference, op. cit., pp. 11-38.
In considering the results of the Bandung Conference, Mario Rossi gives two important points: First, that this meeting enabled the leaders of Africa and Asia to get acquainted and discuss their common problems. Second, that it exposed to these nations how diverse they were; there was no common link of language, religion, ethnic group and historical traditions, there was only such negative factors as a past colonial domination, an economic condition of underdevelopment suspicion toward the West, deep racial feelings and an eagerness to end the condition of inferiority in relation to the rest of the world.

But an equally important result was that Communist China was generally accepted as a peace-loving nation. This was enhanced by the soothing manner with which Chou En-Lai expressed himself, and by his genial, compromising personality. It was China who bridged the gap between India and the Western-aligned nations over the phrase "peaceful coexistence" which to the latter was a Communist term. China substituted for it "The Five Principles of Co-existence" which contained some generally agreeable points; and Chou En-Lai went ahead to stress that "we will observe them." And, what is not least important, Chou En-Lai offered to negotiate with the United States and Formosa. His


25 See text of his speech before the Political Committee as appeared in the appendixes of Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, op. cit.
conciliatory attitude toward the Western-oriented countries of Thailand, the Philippines, Laos and Cambodia immensely reduced the tension in the Western Pacific. As for Pakistan, he won its assurance that it would not join in any war or act of aggression promoted by America.

The regroupment of political forces was another achievement of the Bandung Conference. The Conference had not intended to create a power bloc; and it did not. But the new relationships, even between China and the Arab states which had hitherto regarded the Chiang Kai-shek regime as the legitimate one of China, was an important indication of togetherness. Also, the invitation of Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus to Bandung multiplied the opposition of the Cypriots and Greeks to British rule in Cyprus. And now it was Pakistan which introduced a powerful resolution on behalf of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria against France. Thus, toward the end of their conference, only Lebanon stood as an obdurate supporter of the West; a situation which proved the rightness of early Western concern.

Finally, we might add that the importance of the Conference did not lie only in its communique or its detailed discussion, but also in the point that it met at all. Indeed, the Bandung Conference had paved the road for more inter-Asian and African consultations, and for the conclusion of later conferences among the leaders of the two continents.
2. FROM BANDUNG TO BELGRADE

During a six-year interval between the Asian-African Conference in Bandung and the Belgrade meeting of non-aligned nations in 1961, many significant developments took place. In 1956 there was the Suez Crisis which momentarily became an infectious exhalation in the international atmosphere. The same year witnessed the Hungarian Revolt, and the year before this, the Communist countries had formed the Warsaw Pact. The Lebanese problem occurred in 1958 and in 1959 there was the Cuban crisis. 1960 saw a better sample of the international intrigue: the Congo Crisis. And in the Union of South Africa the national policy of apartheid was raising great concern in many quarters of the world.

But despite the graveness of these matters, and the allowance in the Bandung Conference Communique for a second Afro-Asian meeting, none was called. Indonesia has continued to encourage the convening of a second Bandung, but so far without success. Several of the original Colombo powers were hesitant to form a bloc; neither did they want to face the difficult decision of whether or not the USSR should be invited to any second Asian-African Conference. One continuing outcome of the original Bandung Conference has been, however, the close and sometime fruitful cooperation of the Asian-African states as a discussing group at the UN.

Seeing that the conditions for international peace were
worsening, the non-aligned nations\textsuperscript{26} joined together during the 15th Session of the United Nations General Assembly to press for the review of the international situation with a view to bettering it.\textsuperscript{27} Their doctrine of peaceful coexistence, joyously carried from the Bandung Conference, had relaxed by that time. Yet it was the same lot of people who believed that peaceful coexistence could not be an armed truce; that it is actually a creative and fruitful cooperation among all peoples and all social systems so that all may prove their efficiency in serving the free man and make room for a common reaction capable of promoting the political, economic and social development of all nations.

The conditions attending the atmosphere were graver than mere relaxation of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. For as President Nasser observed, the living signs around the world confirmed the fact that the deterioration of the international situation was going at terrific speed and that the danger was becoming more and more imminent:\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{26} By that time, the Afro-Asian neutralists were in working relationships with President Tito of Yugoslavia who claimed neutralism shortly after his split with the Communist camp in 1948.

\textsuperscript{27} Francis O. Wilcox, UN and the Non-Aligned Nations, Headline Series, September-October, 1962.

\textsuperscript{28} President Nasser's Speech before UN General Assembly issued by U.A.R. Embassy, Washington, D.C., September, 1960.
At the opening of that UN Session, the non-aligned nations brought up the question of the Congo Crisis so as to move world conscience in respect of what was happening there. To most Africans, Lumumba was a typical symbol of the people who were fighting for freedom against imperialism; and his arranged murder created a repercussion indicating the significance and consequence of this critical tragedy. Also during the same Session, these nations protested against the treatment given Premier Castro when he visited the United Nations. Yet a few months later the world situation in Cuba grew much worse. Similarly, they exerted all kinds of moral pressures against racial discrimination and renounced it as an inhuman policy. But that simply made the Union of South Africa sever her official relations with the entire world in order to continue on its path without honor, and without shame.

Of perhaps greater significance was the collective effort by the Prime Ministers of Ghana, India, Indonesia, the U.A.R. and Yugoslavia to induce Premier Khrushchev and President Eisenhower to enter into talks to lessen world tensions, an effort which did not bear any fruits but frustration for the non-aligned nations.

All these were a witness manifestation to the fact that chances for peace were narrowing categorically and the deterioration in the

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29 During his attendance of UN meetings in New York, Premier Castro of Cuba was restricted by U.S. authorities to the Manhattan area. Also restricted was Premier Khrushchev of the USSR.
international situation was incessantly continuing. For example, this same time witnessed the unnegotiable problems between the French Government and the Revolutionary Government of Algeria; the armed conflict of which was extended to the City of Bizerte in Tunisia. Also, the problem regarding the division of Germany was about to kindle the fires of the Third World War.

It was on the occasion of the 15th United Nations General Assembly that the seeds were planted for further contact amongst the leaders of the non-aligned nations. This desire for closer consultation was enhanced by the travels of President Sukarno and President Tito, especially the visits of the latter to Accra in March, 1961, and to Cairo in April, 1961.

These visits by the Yugoslav leader to Africa were of greater significance; as Africa by that time has become into the world spotlight. At the Bandung gathering, Africa was quite a Junior partner, with only six nations in attendance: Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, Liberia, Libya, and the Sudan. With the birth of many new nations, the African states since 1958 had held their own continental conferences. In April, 1959, Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana convened

30 Earlier, the French Air Force had bombed Bizerte City claiming that it had provided a raiding base against French forces in Algeria. This French action, which resulted in the killing of many innocent Bizertans, brought a strong protest from the Tunisian Government.
the first Conference of Independent African States. Eight nations were present: Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, and Tunisia. This stimulated the formation of the African group at the United Nations. The second meeting of this group was held in Addis Ababa in June, 1960, with a wider representation. In December, 1958, Prime Minister Nkrumah sponsored, also in Accra, the first All-African People's Conference. This has been called "the African Bandung," for most of the nationalist leaders of Africa were present. A permanent secretariat was established and subsequent conferences were held in Tunis in January, 1960, and in Cairo in March, 1961. These various conferences however, were primarily concerned with continental problems in Africa, even though some of the world problems were placed on their agenda.

The first official measure for a conference of non-aligned nations was taken on April 26, 1961, when Presidents Nasser and Tito addressed a communication to the heads of states of twenty-one neutralist countries suggesting that, in view of world developments and increasing tension, a conference be held before the convening of the 16th United Nations General Assembly. President Sukarno of Indonesia associated himself with the need for such a meeting. And on May 18,

31 Among those in attendance were Tom Mboya, H. Kamuzu Banda, Patrice Lumumba, Kenneth Kaunda, Holden Roberto, Joshua Nkomo, and Prime Minister Nkrumah.
1961, the three presidents, joined by the Prime Minister of India, invited a number of neutralist countries to send representatives to a preparatory meeting in Cairo set for June, 1961.

The Cairo meeting was attended by representatives from nineteen countries, seventeen of which came from Africa and Asia.32 It convened from June 5th to June 12th under the chairmanship of Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Egypt's Foreign Minister. The discussions of the conference were held in a friendly and frank atmosphere and unanimous agreement was reached on the necessity of calling a conference to deal with matters of common concern for the uncommitted nations. The meeting further agreed on some criteria as basis for the issuance of invitations to the proposed conference.

In their official communique, the Cairo participants expressed the opinion that the area of non-commitment could be extended, gradually transforming it into a basic factor for the preservation of peace and international security. It was their conviction that desirable consequences regarding world peace, respect and international cooperation could be achieved if the conference could be held.33

Among the proposed agenda for the Belgrade Conference to be held in September, 1961, were three major items: exchange of view on

32 The other two were Yugoslavia and Cuba. Brazil sent an observer.

33 Homer A. Jack, op. cit.
the international situation; establishment and strengthening of
international peace and security; and problems of unequal econ-
omic development -- promotion of international economic and technical
cooperation.  

Finally, the participants at the Preparatory meeting in Cairo
expressed "their loyalty to the policy of non-commitment as a method
of approaching positively the problems which contront the world at
this hour."  

3. THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE

The Belgrade Conference of non-aligned states was attended
by delegates from Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon,
Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia,
Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan,
Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen and Yugoslavia. Bolivia,
Brazil and Ecuador, however, were represented by observers. The
meeting was held for six days during the first week of September,
1961.

The atmosphere in which the conference held its discussions,
and the manner in which these were delivered showed that the purpose

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34 For Text of proposed agenda, see Ibid, p. 6.

35 From the Communique of Cairo meeting.
of the Bandung Conference had succeeded: the deliberations were made in great intimacy, with sincerity and frankness and understanding. However, we should observe that from the speeches given by President Nasser, Prime Minister Nehru and Congo's Vice-Premier Antoine Gizenga, this conference exhibited a change from the Bandung Conference.

At the Bandung Conference, and during the period following it, the Afro-Asian states expressed their opinion not to form a third world force. This was particularly true of Prime Minister Nehru who was opposed to Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's proposal that these proletarian nations unite so as to affect the imbalance of power among the colossal nations. The "Christian Science Monitor" of April 27, 1955, also reported from press comments on the Bandung meeting that what the conference was showing most clearly was that there was no "Afro-Asian Bloc," no Asian-African agreement on any one body of policy.

Contrary to Bandung, the Belgrade Conference agreed that the non-aligned countries can and must de facto be a third force albeit their force would be operative through their independent stand by which they would be capable of neutralizing the two opposing blocs which have reasons for opposing each other. Also of significance was the major concern exhibited by the neutralist group on questions encompassing survival and development.

Beginning from a negative and pessimistic view of the world situation, the Conference's statement On the Danger of War and Appeal
for Peace opens: "This Conference of the Heads of State or Govern-
ment of Non-aligned Countries is deeply concerned that, even apart
from already existing tensions, the grave and critical situation
which, as never before, threatens the world with the imminent and
ominous prospect of conflict, would almost certainly later develop
into a World War! In this age of nuclear weapons, so the statement
goes on, and the accumulation of the power of mass destruction, such
conflict and war would inevitably lead to devastation on a scale
hitherto unknown, if not to world annihilation."36

The uncommitted nations expressed their concern to see that
this calamity was avoided.37 They urged the parties concerned,
especially the United States and the USSR, to halt immediately their
recent war preparations and approaches, to take no steps that would
aggravate the world situation, and to resume negotiations on all vital
issues in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations and in
consonance with the rules of international law so as eventually to
achieve enduring peace for the entire world.

36 For full text of this document, see Homer A. Jack, op. cit.,
p. 40.

37 On this and succeeding points, see the text of the Declara-
tion of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries
in Appendix B.
The conference observed that even though the decisions leading to war and peace rest with the colossal nations, the consequences affect the entire world. With the premise that all people of the world want peace and not extinction, the neutralists sent their appeal to the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union to compromise between themselves in order to avert the imminent conflict and to establish world peace. Finally, the conference invited the rest of the world to file their appeals with Washington and Moscow, thereby proclaiming and promoting the desire and determination of all mankind to see the achievement of last peace and the security of all nations.

For purposes of emphasis and importance, the Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-aligned Countries included their observation of the world situation then: that they met at a moment when international events had taken a turn for the worse and when world peace was seriously threatened. Also included in the preamble of the declaration was their opinion that the old order based on domination has to be necessarily replaced by a new order based on cooperation among the nations of the world if lasting peace and good relations have to thrive at all.

As a rule, the non-aligned countries voiced their desire to banish war. "War has never threatened mankind with graver consequences than today," they wrote. "On the other hand, never before has mankind had at its disposal stronger forces for eliminating war as an instrument
of policy in international relations," they added. With the realization that imperialism was waning and the aspirations for freedom and liberty were handsomely materializing, the neutralist countries declared that the great majority of world population was constantly growing conscious of the fact that war constituted an anchronism and a crime against humanity: which realization created an impeccable moral force capable of exercising a vital influence on the development of international relations. They judged that war was, therefore, not inevitable, for to admit so would be a reflection of a sense of helplessness and hopelessness which ran counter to today's progress of the world. War belonged to a past epoch of human history and its utilization in policy matters today would be inappropriate.

The neutralists further observed that the existence of different social systems in the present world order was no barrier to the stabilization of peace, provided of course that states would refrain from participation in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of other countries with a purpose of domination. To affect the deteriorating world situation, the principles of peaceful coexistence provided the most appropriate devices. These principles include the rights of peoples to self-determination, to independence, and to the free determination of the forms and methods of economic, social, and cultural development. And this must be the only basis of all international relations if mankind were to avoid the Cold War and the general nuclear catastrophe. The conference suggested that the most
rapid way to create and maintain these conditions was through active participation in international cooperative schemes in the fields of material and cultural exchanges among peoples of the world.

Emphasis was laid on the point that the policy of coexistence is a vital complement in the effort toward the elimination of historical injustices and the liquidation of national oppression, guaranteeing, at the same time, to all peoples, weak and strong alike, their independent development.

In added discussion, the uncommitted nations expressed the belief that ideological differences were necessarily a part of the growth of human society. Insofar as the peoples and governments refrained from using their ideologies for waging the Cold War, exercising pressure, or for the imposing their will over others, ideologies per se would remain inert and harmless.

It was not the intention, however, of the Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries participating at the Belgrade Conference to make any specific proposals for the solution of the heaving international situation, especially as relating to the two blocs. Rather, it was their aim to bring to the attention of all peoples of the world those improper problems which they considered threats to the security and well-being of mankind. Generally, they recommended that a great sense of responsibility and realism be exercised in solving these acute problems. It was also suggested that the Great Powers would take a leading role in easing the world situation by negotiations,
making necessary concessions to insure the maintenance of peace and security.

Following these deliberations, the non-aligned nations at the conference turned to clarifying their position in world affairs. First, they expressed their wish not to form a bloc and said that they could not be a bloc!

As neutralists, they stated their willingness to cooperate with any government which was working to strengthen confidence and peace in the world. Their declared adherence to this policy was an exemplification of their awareness that without mutual good relations among the Great Powers, peace and stability in the world would remain a myth, an elusive desire. The perpetuation of non-alignment, however, and the activities of the non-aligned countries under the prevailing conditions would immensely contribute to the safeguarding of world peace. It was, therefore, their responsibility, the conference agreed, to participate in solving vital international issues regarding the peace and security of the world since none of them would remain unaffected by these issues. And in their opinion, the expansion of the non-committed area in the world, would establish the only possible and indispensable alternative to the total division of the world into blocs, and intensification of the psychological warfare. As a prelude, they encourage and give moral and political support to all peoples consciously fighting for their independence and equality.

Finally, the conference expressed the hope that the emergence
of the newly liberated countries would further help to narrow the area of bloc antagonisms and thus encourage all tendencies aimed at strengthening peace and promoting peaceful cooperation among independent and equal nations.

The conference of the non-aligned countries made twenty-seven significant points regarding the international situation. These points ranged from colonialism and support for the "United Nations Declaration in the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" (passed at the 15th Session of the General Assembly) to their deep concern over the acute situation in Berlin. And following adoption by the conferees, the Declaration of the Conference was sent to the United Nations for the attention of its members and all other nations of the world.
CHAPTER III

INDIA'S NEUTRALISM: A CASE OF PRAGMATIC "IDEALISM"

A careful examination of India's neutralism indicates that it is a result of idealism and self interest in proportions that are almost impossible to determine. It also points out the paramount role of India's Nehru in the development of this foreign policy approach.

India's pursuit of a policy of non-alignment in the Cold War is considered by Indians as both an internal economic necessity and a moral obligation, derived from its religio-cultural tradition vis-a-vis world issues. These two reasons were voiced by Prime Minister Nehru as follows:

The first thing we kept in view was to build our own country on solid foundations and not to get entangled in matters which did not directly affect us -- not that we are not interested in these matters, but the burden of these entanglements would be too great and the problems we had to face in our own country were big enough for any country to face."

He also declared in the same speech:

I have . . . ventured to point out that whatever policy we were pursuing was not just merely neutral or passive or negative, but that it was a policy which flowered from our past history, from our recent past and from our

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national movement and from the various ideals that
we have proclaimed from any point of view, whether
long-term or short-term that you may apply to the
circumstances existing today.2

The roots of this idea are to be found back in the genesis
of the Cold War. Long before most observers were aware of, or
concerned about, the possibility of a future rift among the members
of the Grand Coalition assailing its Axis enemies, Nehru had taken
note of the difficulty, if not impossibility of successful postwar
cooperation between the partners of the Coalition – the United
States, Soviet Russia, and Great Britain.3 He had then asked
rhetorically;

Where do the hundreds of millions of Asia and Africa come
in this picture? For them, inevitably, the test of each
move or happening is this; does it help toward our liber-
ation? Does it end the domination of one country over
another? Will it enable us to live freely the life of
our choice in cooperation with others? Does it bring
equality and equal opportunity for nations as well as
groups within each nation? Does it hold forth the
promise of early liquidation of poverty and illiteracy
and bring better living conditions?4

In the years following the termination of World War II, Nehru
continued to claim that Asia's outlook, of necessity, had to differ

2 Ibid.

3 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New York: J.

4 Ibid., p. 559.
from that of Europe and America. Asia's problems were the immediate human ones of providing food, clothing, and education -- the primary necessities of life -- to her millions. These were problems which had, normally speaking, long been solved in Europe and America, Nehru maintained. The approach of Asia to the problems of international politics would, therefore, necessarily have to be unique. Absorbed with these pressing and Herculean problems Asia had neither the time nor the inclination to become involved in the machinations of power politics in which Europe and America's comparative freedom from comparable human problems enabled them to participate.

To Nehru, Asia's approach to international politics would also be somewhat novel; for, newly arisen from her colonial bondage, she lacked the legacy of conflict which shrouded and darkened the relations of European nations. Engrossed with their exacting internal problems and unbound by a legacy of distrust and hatred toward other nations, Asia should, and India would, Nehru vouched -- "Keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to an even vaster scale of destruction." His declaration in resigning the Congress Presidency to enter the interim

6 Ibid., p. 233.
7 Ibid., p. 340
Government in September of 1946 that India under his guidance would "take an independent stand and not act as a satellite" followed logically from this background.

But the pursuit of this policy by India has been conditioned by factors other than the strong personality of Prime Minister Nehru. Among these are India's experience of British rule, conflict with Pakistan and the geographical location of the country. Moreover, the importance accorded India by the United States and Russia in their competition over independent Asia has added a tremendous source of strength which enabled India to sustain its neutralist policy and to do so without feeling strongly pressured to join either camp. This attention given to India by the two competing powers is explained by India's influence on the Asian mind and perhaps, of even greater importance, its present socio-economic race with Communist China.

India's historic tradition had expanded during the first seven centuries A.D. to establish an area of Indian influence covering all of South and Southeast Asia.

This was done chiefly through the expansion of Hinduism and Buddhism during these early centuries and by India's constant trade with Asian countries. Also, during the past century the countries of Southeast Asia have been recipients of sizeable groups of Indian

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immigrants who added more Indian imprint on the Asian mind. The Indo-Chinese race in effecting a substantial elevation in the living standards of their peoples is one that will result not only in conferring the Asian leadership on one country or the other but, undoubtedly, will influence the outcome of the Cold War itself. India's experiment with parliamentary democracy and China's communist practices are now competing in regard to their abilities to meet the rising expectations of their overwhelmingly poor and illiterate populations. The success of one system or the other in this competition will decide the fate of many Asian countries whose way of life is yet to be determined.

1. NEHRU'S EXPLANATION OF NEUTRALISM

According to Nehru, India's neutralism includes several concepts. First, it urges that India should join no power group. Alignment would mean that India would have to surrender its own opinions and follow a policy determined by the desires, if not the dictates, of the other, and more powerful, members of the group.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} In addition, 

\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} \footnote{Nehru, \textit{Speeches 1949-53} (Delhi: Information Service of India, 1954), pp. 192-93.}
entanglement with one of the rival blocs entailed the undesirable possibility that India might be dragged unwillingly into any possible future conflicts.\textsuperscript{12} Neutralism, as Nehru developed the policy, is, however, more than merely non-alignment with other nations and groups of nations. He in fact disliked the use of the term "neutralism" as a description of his policy. "Neutrality is a word which applies to war and belligerency,"\textsuperscript{13} he explained. "In terms of no war or peaceful condition, the use of the word 'neutral' is completely out of place."\textsuperscript{14} Additionally, Nehru objected to the use of the word "neutralism" because it had about it an air of passivity, of timidity.\textsuperscript{15} And India's policy was not, he insisted, a passive one. Rather it was a positive approach to world problems which sought above to further the cause of peace in the world.\textsuperscript{16}

The essence of the policy was the refusal to commit India to follow a certain line in advance. "Suppose there are two power blocs,"

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{12}Nehru, Independence and After, op. cit., p. 239.

\textsuperscript{13}Nehru, India Foreign Policy (Delhi: Information Service of India, 1961), p. 6.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15}Nehru, Speeches 1949-53, op. cit., p. 264.

\textsuperscript{16}Nehru, United Asia, II (1949-50), p. 82.
\end{footnotesize}
he reasoned during a debate on the Korean War in the Indian House of the People. "If I am neutral that itself is a commitment, that I will not do this or that. I refuse to bind myself. The whole essence of our policy is independence of action, that is to say at any moment we decide for ourselves what is best in our interests and in the interests of world peace . . . ."\textsuperscript{17}

The development of friendly relations with all countries is another concept of Nehru's neutralism. Normally, Nehru said, a nation has friendly and close relations with some nations and a consequent hostility to others. Friendliness with other nations is good, but not if it is merely reflected hostility to some other countries, for ultimately that hostility provokes a corresponding hostility to one's own nation and that is the first step on the path to conflict.\textsuperscript{18} India, the late Prime Minister urged, should seek friendly relations with all countries, and though for reasons of mutual advantage these relations may be closer with some, they should not be such as to bring her inevitably into conflict with other countries.\textsuperscript{19}

Of immediate concern to neutralism is its service to world


\textsuperscript{18}Nehru, \textit{Independence and After}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 254.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid.
peace. Thus, Nehru said, "The policy of non-alignment and the other ramifications of neutralism is not only designed to promote specific national interest of the Indian people, it also is an instrument for the furtherance of world peace."20

Neutralism, Nehru described, as both the negative virtue of not adding to the tensions and fears of the world which now threaten to cascade mankind into a new war and the positive merit of assisting in the reduction of these tensions. It assists in the maintenance of world peace in several ways. To begin with, the spread of neutralism and the growth of an area of peace halts the division of the world into two armed camps: "If, in the world, there was no country left, which was not lined up with this big group of powers or that big group i.e. there was a perfect and absolute division into these two groups, all over the world, whether that will be a factor conducive to peace or war. I say definitely that if that were so, war would be terribly near, and war would take place. The mere fact that a number of countries, even though they might not be militarily powerful or financially strong -- do not accept the inevitability of war, do not want to do anything which helps war, do not, with all respect, talk about security and peace, in terms of heavier and heavier armaments, 

20 Nehru, India Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
will act as a brake; if there are such countries, they are, in some measure, a brake on war," said Nehru.

In its application to India, the Prime Minister suggested that neutralism had permitted her to extend friendly advice and persevere in its efforts to avoid hostilities between other nations. He said, "If we tie ourselves up with any group or bloc, we lose our individuality. We lose the power we have today of influencing others, because of our individuality, because of our closer understanding of their minds and their psychological conditions, and we just become a reflex of somebody else's mind and somebody else's activity." And later he boasted that "India's independent position permits her to moderate disputes between Great Power Coalitions and thus ease the approach to world peace and to augment its stability and durability."

The concept of an area of peace is an extension of Nehru's neutralism beyond the borders of India making it the approach of not one country but of an area of the world. Such an area is not a "third force," for that would be neither desirable nor feasible:


23 Ibid.
"The biggest countries today are small compared with the two giants. It would be absurd for a number of countries in Asia to come together and call themselves a third force or a third power in a military sense." Nehru suggested instead that it be called a third area, "an area which does not want war, works for peace in a positive way and believes in cooperation." He urged that all those nations that did not want to align themselves with either of the two powerful blocs of nations and who were willing to work for the cause of peace to come together in such an area.

To Nehru, the purpose of an area of peace was twofold. First, the associated nations would make it clear to the hostile factions which divided the world that the nations within the area of peace proposed not to enter the arena of welfare under any circumstances, thus restricting the area of a war and insuring that region of the world be saved from devastation. Secondly, the members of the area, by refusing to denounce and slander other nations, would help to lessen fear and tension in the world. Positively, they would be able to moderate the momentary passions which might actually start an international

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25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.
It would be desirable, contended Nehru, "to have an area where peace might, perhaps, subsist, even if war was declared. That would be good, of course, to the countries there, but it would be good for the world too, because that area would exercise some influence, when a crisis came, on avoidance of war. Also, if by some mischance war came with all its terror, if a large area is outside the scope, it may play a useful role, even afterwards in bringing about peace." 28

The connection between Nehru's neutralism with its area of peace, and his concern about the barriers to peace was an obvious consideration. The division of the world by the proliferation of military pacts naturally diminishes the scope of a possible area of peace. In addition, the growth of fear and the intensification of passions and hatreds by public denunciation of other nations are evils against which neutralism and an area of peace are aimed. The dispassionate, moderating influence of this group of nations acting upon the merits of all disputes to further the cause of peace should lessen international fear and encourage cooperation and unimpassioned discourse among nations.


In declaring the role of neutralist countries in the establishment of peace, Nehru asserted that it was simply to help in toning down differences and easing a tense situation: "The real agreement will naturally have to come between the others. The neutral is not going to bring about an agreement; he will only help in providing a certain atmosphere which might lead the others to agree."29 "The neutral" he added, "is a kind of commissionless broker who facilitates settlement of Cold War differences by bringing disputants together, creating a friendly atmosphere, and providing suggestive ideas which the parties to the dispute can pursue in their endeavors to reach a satisfactory conclusion to their difficulties. The mediator, the neutral, does not provide solutions or arbitrate the differences, he merely facilitates the antagonists in their efforts to achieve a settlement. This, then, is one of the positive measures in all likelihood, the most important - by which the policy of neutralism aids the world in securing and strengthening world peace."30

Related to the maintenance of India's neutralist position and independence is the matter of receiving foreign aid from the great


30 Ibid.
powers. On this, Nehru wrote, "We want aid but, oddly enough, we do not want too much aid. There is a risk in accepting external aid. The recognition of the absolute necessity of this aid must not entice India to compromise its independence and freedom. No Asian country will welcome any assistance if there are conditions attached to it which lead to any kind of economic domination. We would rather delay our development." He further said, "India welcomes aid on honorable terms for it literally has to have it if the nation is to progress at the rate it desires but -- at every stage and at every step we have made it clear to every country we have dealt with that we are not going to change our domestic or our foreign policy. If at any time it is not accepted, well, there the matter ends; we part company from the aid and from that country if necessary." Even when help is accepted without strings there might still be a risk. "Our sense of obligation might affect our policy without our knowing it. All I can say is that we should remain wide awake and try honestly."

The essence of India's neutralism, as seen by Nehru, was its

31 Nehru, Independence and After, op. cit., p. 308.


independence and freedom of action. His consideration of economic aid as having possible effect on this independence and freedom was unequivocally extended to the receiving of military assistance from the great powers. In considering the latter type of aid, he said, "We want no protection from others . . . because we know by long and bitter experience that such protection becomes something else later." Instead of reliance on other countries, Nehru recommended that India should drive for self-sufficiency in order to guard its independence. He said: "Any defense forces that cannot, more or less provide their own equipment, are not independent. There is no harm in this, except in a crisis when the things for which the armed forces depend on others are not available."35

He also argued, "that whatever machines you use for your defense should be as far as possible produced in the country" because, "just as alignment with other nations by acceptance of foreign military aid or economic assistance under specified stipulations compromises a nation's independence, so also dependence upon external industrial sources, for the mechanisms of modern warfare gravely

limits its capacity for independent action! Neutralism allied with the self-reliance which its non-alignment implies should therefore forestall these dangers to India's independence. "36

2. INDIA'S PRACTICE OF NEUTRALISM

Between 1947 and 1950, India was preoccupied with immediate tasks stemming from its newly achieved independence following the partition of British India. Domestic and foreign policy tasks were closely linked, for not only were the promotion and consolidation of national unity essential, but Nehru clearly saw that popular support for foreign policy could become an important cement of national unity. Great stress, too, was laid on India's attempt to industrialize.37

It was perhaps inevitable that Indo-Pakistani relations should be strained from the start considering the circumstances of their mutual origin, but the unresolved fate of Kashmir undoubtedly intensified mutual animosities. India's continuing close relationship with Great Britain, should be seen, therefore, not only in terms of a large legacy of goodwill, expressed especially in good relations with

36 Ibid.

the Attlee government and in close economic ties, but also as a means of preventing Pakistan from developing exclusive relations with Britain to the detriment of India. Apart from the Kashmir issue, India's championship of Indonesian independence was her most active international concern in these years.

At this time Indian neutralism seemed to have a pro-Western orientation. This was partly shown in India's success in being the first Asian state to reconcile independent status with Commonwealth membership, though her relations with the United States were merely correct and tepid, as Mr. Nehru's visit to that country in 1949 seemed to underline. More significantly, this apparent pro-Western inclination was the unavoidable consequence of Soviet propaganda, and of the Asian Communist parties' persistence in portraying India as not, in fact, independent at all, but as still tied to the "Imperialists."

From 1951 to 1956, India pursued a fairly active mediatory role and moved from a Western-oriented neutralism toward a more strictly middle-of-the-road position. The strengths and limitations of Indian neutralist diplomacy were shown by her behavior toward

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such issues as the Korean, Indo-Chinese and Suez wars and the Hun-
garian Revolution.\textsuperscript{40} It was a period during which Indian relations with Russia generally improved, while those with the United States deteriorated, and those with Britain showed some considerable fluctu-
tuations.

Two working assumptions of Indian diplomacy, always there, but particularly evident in this phase, were that Asian affairs should be decided by Asians and that all remaining vestiges of "Colonialism" must be removed.\textsuperscript{41} In effect, the policies following from these assumptions tended to improve Indian relations with the Communist powers, and in particular with Communist China,\textsuperscript{42} and to embarrass or strain her relations with the Western powers. During these years Indian leaders tended to stress China's Asian, rather than her Communist character; and to hint that she was a potential neutralist, perhaps an Asian Titoist. Certainly, during both the Korean and the Indo-Chinese wars, India cast herself in the role of intermediary between the Communist powers and the West, showed great solicitude for Chinese feelings and great suspicion of American aggressiveness, and worked hard to secure satisfactory compromises and peaceful settlement.

\textsuperscript{40}For details, see \textit{Ibid.}, Chapter 19.

\textsuperscript{41}Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, \textit{op. cit.}, chapter 26.

\textsuperscript{42}Brecher, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 588-592.
An undramatic yet significant, aspect of India's diplomacy on these occasions was her close continuing contacts and, at times, working cooperation with Great Britain. Commonwealth ties here probably aided cooperation where no conflicting interests were involved. By contrast, British and, more importantly, Pakistani adhesion to the Baghdad Pact and to SEATO called forth much criticism of Britain, both from India's official leadership and from Indian opinion at large.43 Bulganin and Khruschev, when they paid a state visit to India in 1955, received such an apparently enthusiastic welcome that widespread alarm was expressed in many Western countries. These probably exaggerated the diplomatic implications of India's reception of these two Communist leaders, for it is far more likely that such a reception was compounded of public curiosity, genuine hospitality, and relief on the part of the official leadership now that Soviet policies towards India had changed for the better.44

From 1951 onwards India had assiduously striven to build up close relations with a number of fellow neutralist states, and was


widely regarded as the leader of the so-called Arab-Asian bloc, in the United Nations. With the rapid expansion of Asian and African membership of the United Nations, this bloc grew correspondingly, became known as the Afro-Asian bloc. became more unwieldy, and India's undisputed leadership began to diminish, though between 1954 and the first half of 1956 India seemed to be developing especially close diplomatic ties with Egypt and Yugoslavia. With the eruption of the Suez and Hungarian crises in 1956, India's neutralist policies were less effective than during the Korean and Indo-Chinese wars.

Though in the Suez question India approved of the active mediatory role of her fellow Commonwealth member, Canada, she herself came to support her neutralist friend, Egypt, with whose plight she had a great deal of sympathy. Mr. Nehru's initial public reaction to the Hungarian Revolution was vacillating and then rather evasive. This caused great annoyance in the Western world and in a sizeable


\[47\] India's concern over Suez was also augmented out of the important role which passage through the Canal played for the success of India's second five years plan; namely in the shipping of machinery from Europe.
segment of Indian opinion, and he was accused of applying double stand-
ards, either as between the Suez and Hungary questions, or as between
Asian and European questions. His own explanation about his early
reaction to Hungarian events was that it was difficult to find out
exactly what was happening. 48

Another factor influencing the course of Indian neutralism
was the development of Soviet aid programs from 1954 onward. From a
neutralist point of view, this had the political advantage of removing
a wholesale dependence on the Western Powers. By the end of 1956,
India had evolved a neutralist foreign policy recognized by both Cold
War camps as independent, and, if only by contrast with the years 1947-
51, it seemed slightly inclined in favor of the Soviet bloc. 49

Since 1957, India has tended to be content with a rather
quieter role internationally than hitherto; in contrast to say,
either Egypt or Yugoslavia, to be more moderate, less radical and
revisionist. These contrasts have been particularly evident in the
policies of these three states towards the problems arising from the Civil
War in the Congo. 50 This generally quieter, more moderate role is to be
explained not only in terms of the free inclinations of India's leaders
their distaste for belligerent methods and their preference for trying

48Encouter, October, 1958, p. 61.

49Brecher, op. cit., pp. 582-588.

50Observer, March 5, 1961.
to reconcile "anti-colonial" with "repentant colonial" states - but, also, because India has felt the need to devote more energy than hitherto to pressing foreign policy tasks nearer home. Furthermore, the broadly based national unity of India's neutralist foreign policy has shown some signs of weakening.\textsuperscript{51}

The dispute with China over Tibet and the Indian border\textsuperscript{52} is the most dramatic of these concerns, but the growing demands of linguistic nationalism - or even separatism, as in the case of the Nagas - and the continuance of bad relations with a new militarily stronger Pakistan, are further reasons for Indian disquiet.

3. **INDIA'S PRACTICE OF NEUTRALISM: A VIEW TO "PRACTICALITIES"**

The outline of India's foreign policy began emerging many years before independence. The objectives formulated by the Congress Party during the early period were designed to attract world support for the nationalist movement and build Asian solidarity rather than to deal with less appealing national interests. One of the clearest statements of these general foreign policy objectives was given by the Congress Party in Resolution V at the Jaipur session in 1948.


\textsuperscript{52} See Cyril Dunn, "The Double Policy of Mr. Nehru," *The Observer*, September 13, 1959.
"The principles are the promotion of world peace, the freedom of all nations, racial equality and the ending of imperialism and colonialism . . . It should be the constant aim of the foreign policy of India to maintain friendly and cooperative relations with all nations, and to avoid entanglements to military of similar alliances which tend to divide up the world in rival groups and thus endanger world peace."

But to assume, as is commonly done, that India's policies are based entirely on these stated principles often would be a major error -- for India, like all other countries, the application of its foreign relations is also guarded by practical requirements and by satisfaction of essential interests. This error in the understanding of India's policy is due to two main considerations: (1) That when official foreign policy objective are applied to most international problems there is little conflict between moral attitudes and pragmatic interests. Indeed, the two elements seem to complement each other on many problems of worldwide scope. (2) That in most of these cases, Indian leadership leans to explain its stand, both to the world at large and to its people as well, by emphasizing the ethical motivation behind its foreign policy without direct mentioning of protecting. India's national interests; thus, creating the image that moral attitudes are a determining factor in

53 All India Congress Committee, The Background of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: 1952), p. 96.
Concerning neutralism and its various ramifications, one can detect that Indian practices are not always consistent; specifically, when the forces of idealism and practical advantages proved to be at odds. This discovery, however, should not prompt us to conclude that India has applied a double-standard policy, rather it should merely illustrate that India's policy is not all devoid of "practicality."

Of the various features of India's neutralism, two in particular would present us with instances of practical considerations. These are India's anti-colonialism and advocacy of peaceful settlement of disputes.

A. INDIA'S ANTI-COLONIALISM:

One feature of India's non-alignment is its outspoken attacks against colonialism. The roots of this concern, however, go back to many years before the gaining of independence. Beginning in 1921, the Indian Congress gave its support to anticolonialism and freedom movements everywhere, recognizing that Indian independence was linked to the problem of independence for other nations under foreign domination. During the period between the two World Wars, India's support of anti-colonialism was of necessity confined to a moral aspect.

The Indonesian struggle for independence, however, was the first anti-colonial cause supported by India with action, even before its own independence had been achieved. In 1945 the National Congress
Working Committee condemned in open terms Dutch repression of Indonesian demands for freedom, and the Indian Government granted Indonesia de facto recognition as an independent state. When the Dutch began their military campaign against the new Indonesian Government, India, joined by Australia, brought the issue before the UN Security Council. Following a second Dutch attack in 1948, India called for a meeting of nineteen Asian countries to consider ways of assisting the Indonesian Republic.54

India's support for independence has also been exhibited to other Asian countries in their postwar demand for self rule. Moreover, India's anti-colonialism was not limited to the Asian continent but has extended to support independence elsewhere -- East Africa, Cyprus, Algeria, and North Africa were given India's support in their struggles for liberation. This anti-colonialism in India's orientation was a development of the British rule and is directly linked with Indian nationalism and its deep concern for the resurgence of Asia.55 For India, at least until the ending of colonial frontiers, the struggle between nationalism and colonialism was the central issue in contemporary world politics. Notwithstanding its growing attention to the struggle between Communism and Democracy, it still remained of secondary concern. This was clearly illustrated by Prime Minister Nehru

54Moraes, op. cit., chapter 26.

55Ibid.
when he declared in 1954 before the Indian Council of States (The Rajya Sabha): "We talk about the crisis of our time, and many people do it in different ways. Probably in the United States of America the crisis of the time is supposed to be communism versus anticommunism. Maybe so, to some extent. Well, the crisis of the time in Asia is colonialism versus anticolonialism."56

India has stressed its opposition to colonialism in all conferences which dealt with dependent people. The declaration of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung and the Belgrade meeting of non-aligned nations, as well as the 1960 resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on colonialism find clear expression of India's views on the subject.

While anticolonialism may appear to be India's most unqualified stand, Indian self-interest, however, has been underlying this policy, causing it to be, at times, inconsistent. Contrary to its policy toward Indonesia, India's attitude toward Vietnam was decidedly negative. The Vietnamese insurgents who fought for independence between 1948 and 1955 received no Indian support for their cause. True, India appealed to the "power concerned" to strive for a cease-fire, it nevertheless refrained from advancing any "way out" of the going war. This can be partially explained by India's unwillingness to antagonize France at a time the issue of French possessions in

56 *The Times*, New Delhi, August 27, 1954.
India had not yet been settled, a matter indicating India's readiness to modify its anticolonial position for own interest. After France had agreed to transfer its four Indian settlements to the Indian Government, however, India assumed its anticolonial policy toward France and supported Algerian struggle for independence.

Another sign of inconsistency in India's anticolonialism was exhibited during United Nations consideration of Russia's action against the Hungarian "freedom fighters," it had failed to support the UN resolution condemning Soviet suppression of the revolt and was opposed to a Western proposal to send UN observers and the call for a UN controlled election in Hungary. This Indian stand was motivated by India's desire not to antagonize the Soviet Union, in order to retain her support in the Security Council for the Kashmir issue, and by fear that the adoption of the Western proposal may have created a precedent which could be subsequently applied to the Indian-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir.

Finally it could be stated that while India has declared its opposition to colonialism in all its manifestations, Western imperialism, as in cases of Russian policies toward subject nationalities within the Soviet Union and toward the countries of Eastern Europe, or the policies of Communist China in Tibet, Korea or Indo-China, has hardly been condemned by the Indian Government; the reasons for which were practical considerations.
B. INDIA'S ADVOCACY OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS:

The consolidation of India's advocacy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful methods for the settlement of international disputes took place in several stages of development. The climax in these developments, however, was the formulation of the principles, known as the Pancha Shila or the five principles set forth in the Sino-Indian Agreement on trade with Tibet signed in 1954. The principles were the following:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. Mutual non-agression;
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
4. Equality and mutual benefit; and
5. Peaceful coexistence.

The importance of these principles lies in the fact that they have added to the coloring of India's foreign policy "Quest for Peace."

Accordingly, the Indian Prime Minister wrote: ". . . The Indian people seemed to have developed a tradition to do things peacefully. . . If there was any message which India offered to other countries, it was this message of doing things by peaceful methods to solve any problems."\(^57\)

But even prior to the Pancha Shila, the Indian Constitution was clearly written to reveal the efforts to make a peaceful foreign

\(^{57}\) Information Service of India, Indigram, No. 851 (Washington: Embassy of India), December 11, 1959.
policy. Article 51 of the Constitution provides for:

a) the promotion of peace and security;
b) the maintenance of just and mutual relations between countries;
c) the respect for international law and the written agreements normal in the relations between civilized people;
d) it, also provides that all unsettled questions can be solved by peaceful means.  

But despite the Government's emphasis on peaceful methods there were occasions where India's armed forces were employed for the settlement of international issues which it regarded as of significant national interest. The questions of Kashmir and Goa are two obvious cases in point. India's refusal to submit its claims to Kashmir to be settled by a United-Nations-supervised plebiscite and its repeated threats to take forceful action, (in addition to the actual use of military force in late 1947 to force incorporation of Kashmir), are undoubtedly in violation of its stated principle of peaceful settlement of disputes as well as that of the United Nations Charter.

Indeed, in 1957 and after several years of protracted negotiations with Pakistan, India announced that the accession of Kashmir to India was "irrevocable." This came two days after the Security Council had adopted by a vote of 10 - 0 a resolution calling on India and Pakistan to take no further action on Kashmir pending a

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United-Nations-supervised blebiscite. Also, the invasion of the Portuguese enclaves of Goa, Damao and Diu by India's troops in 1960 gives an instance of India's readiness to resort to force in support of vital policies. While India has offered many justifications for its actions in Goa, the fact still remains that force was used in violation of India's emphasis on peaceful methods.
CHAPTER IV

EGYPT'S NEUTRALISM: AN OPPORTUNISTIC APPROACH

No study of Egypt's foreign policy in general, or its advocacy of neutralism in particular, would be complete without an appreciation for Nasser's attitudes toward Israel. From the outset, the Israeli question seems to have haunted the thinking of Egyptian leadership to the extent that it became the basis for Egypt's approach to the majority of international issues. Indeed, Egypt's foreign policy, especially under Nasser's regime, has been centered on the solicitation of foreign support for a future "second round" against the state of Israel. Convinced that such a support was not obtainable from the West, Egypt, while still under the rule of King Farouk, turned to Arab Unity and to support from the Afro-Asian countries.¹

The policy of neutralism and non-alignment, heretofore advocated by India alone, began to appeal to policy-makers in Cairo. Their first consideration was that a policy of neutralism could provide Egypt with much-needed diplomatic support not only for its case against the West, seen at that time largely in terms of Great Britain, but also against Israel. By its advocacy of freedom for dependent countries and by defiance of the West, Egypt had hoped to emerge as a leader worthy of the support of other countries. And

¹It was not before 1955 that Egypt sought military assistance and subsequent diplomatic support from Communist countries.
although other considerations came to bear during succeeding years, Egypt still regards neutralism at least in large part as a bridge for a successful crossing toward Israel.

Having this as my opinion, I have chosen to divide my study of Egypt's neutralism into two separate sections: (1) Egypt's claim to a neutralist policy toward the East-West struggle based as we have seen on the advocacy of world peace and (2) a projection into Nasser's policy toward Israel; a thesis which not only runs counter to his advocacy of peace, but also discloses the prime benefit of neutralism as considered by the Egyptian leader.

(1) **EGYPT'S CLAIM TO NEUTRALISM**

The beginning of Egypt's neutralist policy is somewhat obscure. It could be dated from the onset of the Israeli question, from the July Revolution of 1952, from the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of October, 1954 regarding British evacuation of the Suez base, or from the actual departure of the last of the British troops from Suez in 1956.\(^2\)

But regardless of the exact time of its emergence, Egyptian nationalism and the tensions between specifically Egyptian and pan-Arab interests. It also has mirrored some widespread and deep-

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\(^2\)Egyptian writings including various Government publications have differed as to the beginning time of Egyptian neutralism. The general consensus, however, is that its roots began shortly after the Arab-Israeli war of 1948–49.
rooted attitudes such as: chronic suspicion of great power policies, the desire for an untrammeled national independence, the hunger for recognition and respect in the eyes of the outside world, an urge to promote Arab unity and its continued opposition to Israel.3

A. BEFORE THE JULY REVOLUTION:

Situated at the junction of Africa and Asia, midway between Morocco and Iraq, with her cultural tradition, relatively large population, and historic sense of identity, Egypt seems to be marked out for leadership in the Arab world. Yet before the July Revolution, this seems to have been a role in which Egyptian leaders were unwilling or unable to perform. For instance, it is reported that when Saad Zaghlul, the great Egyptian nationalist, was approached in the early twenties to join efforts for the promotion of pan-Arabism, he abruptly retorted: "If you add one zero to another zero, then you add another zero, what will be the sum."4 The zeroes referred to the Arab countries. During the period between the two World Wars, Egypt seemed to continue its policy of non-identification with either pan-Islam or pan Arabism - the two movements most popular among other

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Arabs at the time - and preferred a policy of "isolationism" from Arab countries.

This position also prevailed to a lesser degree during the Second World War, and even after. At the time of the establishment of the Arab League in 1945, in which Egypt formally assumed a leadership role, it was still considered by many a nominal partner in the Arab movement. This Egyptian separation was a result of a number of factors. Among them was the fact that Egypt has long been a separate political unit. In the early part of the nineteenth century, the Turkish Viceroy Mohammed Ali succeeded in founding a dynasty of his own. After that time, Egypt pursued an independent course of action. When, in 1882, British commercial penetration into the country had led to military and political domination, Egypt used up all its National fervor in opposition to this foreign rule. In contrast, most of the rest of the Arab-speaking peoples had different masters prior to the First World War.

The Ottomans ruled the Fertile Crescent and most of the Arabian peninsula, and the French were in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. Also, from its early development in the middle of the nineteenth century up to the first quarter of the twentieth century, pan-Arabism was not clearly defined, and was plagued with a dual purpose. On the one hand, it aimed at a merger of the Arab-speaking peoples into a single Arab nation, and, on the other, at a politico-religious
unity of the Islamic countries.\textsuperscript{5} The Arab revolt of 1916, undertaken in consideration for what was considered to be an unequivocal promise by the British of a United Arab state, proved to be a failure. After the Revolt, in fact, that portion of the Arab world under Ottoman rule became divided into several states. This was a blow to Arab aspirations, since the area in question constituted a single unit under the Ottomans, and the division which existed before World War I was for administrative purposes and had not constituted political units. Thus, during Ottoman rule, the people of the Fertile Crescent had unrestricted freedom of movement and ample opportunity for social intercourse, a situation which had changed with the rise of political units after the World War I.\textsuperscript{6}

Formally neutral in both world wars, Egypt had, in fact, served as an important operation base for Britain. Throughout the First World War, Egypt was governed by Prime Minister Rushdi Pasha, who in all important matters followed British advice. As the war progressed, Egypt became a great British military base, from which attacks were launched toward Gallipoli and Palestine, and Cairo became a center of Britain's Arab diplomacy against the Ottomans.

\textsuperscript{5} For details, see "Some Aspects of Islamic Nationalism" by Anwar G. Chejne, The Islamic Literature, August, 1956, pp. 11-21.

\textsuperscript{6} Furthermore, the Arabs enjoyed full advantages of citizenship under the Ottomans.
Perhaps with some opposition, Egypt for the second time became the principal British, and later Allied, base in the Middle East during World War II. Overhalf a million Allied troops, including British, Indian, Australian, New Zealand, South African, Polish, Czechoslovak, Greek, Yugoslav, and American soldiers, found themselves in the course of war on Egyptian territory. Cairo was a real hub of Allied diplomatic and economic activity.  

Declared formally independent by the British in 1922, Egypt had to wait until the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 before achieving any measure of control of her foreign relations, and even this was circumscribed by the requirement that Britain should be able to maintain a permanent military base on the Suez Canal zone — though with provision for negotiation on the terms of Britain's occupancy after twenty years. The treaty contained the following main provisions:

(1) Egypt and Britain entered into an alliance, with Britain pledging to defend Egypt against aggression and Egypt placing her communications facilities at Britain's disposal in case of war;

(2) Recognizing Britain's vital interest in the Suez Canal, Egypt consented to a British garrison of 10,000 men and 400 pilots in the Canal Zone, where barracks were to be constructed at Egypt's expense. British troops were to evacuate the rest of Egyptian territory

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but Britain was allowed to retain her naval base at Alexandria for eight more years;

(3) British personnel in the Egyptian army and police were to be withdrawn. Instead, a British military mission was to advise the Egyptian army to the exclusion of other foreigners, and Egyptian officers could not be trained abroad in other countries than Britain. Egypt regained full freedom to increase her armed forces;\(^8\)

(4) Unrestricted immigration of Egyptians into the Sudan was to be permitted and Egyptian troops were to return to the Sudan;

(5) Britain was to support Egypt in her plea for the abolition of capitulations;

(6) Britain promised to support Egypt's candidacy for membership in the League of Nations;

(7) The British high commissioner was to be replaced by an ambassador, the latter receiving permanent diplomatic seniority rights;

(8) The treaty was to be of indefinite duration, but at the end of twenty years negotiations toward its revision were allowed. It was, however, agreed that "any revision of this treaty (would) provide for the continuation of the alliance between the High Contracting Parties."\(^9\)

\(^8\) Previously objected to by the British.

\(^9\) For the full text, see Helen M. Davis, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1953) pp. 68-78.
Egypt emerged from the Second World War determined to revise the 1936 treaty; in particular, to secure the removal of British troops from her soil, and to end British control over the Sudan in the expectation of joining Egypt and the Sudan in the "Unity of the Nile Valley."^10 Ironically, it was Great Britain which brought Egypt actively into Arab politics and persuaded her leaders to take a leading role in the Arab League,^11 founded in 1945.

The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 gave the Arab League a common enemy, and added an immediate and lasting gall to Egyptian, and, indeed, to Arab hatred and distrust of great power policies. The humiliation suffered by the Arabs, and especially the Egyptian, army in the Palestine war against Israel was a potent factor making for the creation of the Arab Collective Security Pact of 1950,^12 and in paving the way for the eventual overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy in 1952. The Arab Security Pact was unanimously approved by the Political Committee of the Arab League and had been announced to contain the following provisions:

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^10 For details, see Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 406-414. Eventual Sudanese independence in 1956 was a rebuff to Egyptian hopes of an Egyptian-Sudanese union.

^11 J. S. Raleigh, "Ten Years of the Arab League" in Middle East Affairs, March, 1955, pp. 65-77.

(1) The parties asserted their determination to seek political solutions for international disputes;

(2) Aggression against any of the signatories would be regarded as aggression against all. The signatories would then take all measures to repulse aggression by armed force, first notifying the UN Security Council and the Arab League Council.

(3) A permanent Joint Defense Council would be established to coordinate inter-Arab defense. This Council would consist of the Defense and Foreign Ministers of the member states. Its decisions reached by simple majority vote, would be binding on all members;

(4) A permanent committee would be formed, composed of the chiefs of staff of the member countries. This committee would be responsible to an economic committee formed of the member nations' Ministers of National Economy.13

While it is true that prior to the overthrow of the monarchy in July, 1952 Egyptian leaders had failed to secure the eviction of British troops from Suez and the new settlement of Sudan's status,14


14 Though the Sidki-Bevin agreement of 1945 proposed terms concerning the Suez Canal Zone quite acceptable to the Egyptians they eventually refused to ratify the agreement on account of the Sudanese question. See Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 410-412.
they nevertheless had endeavored to demonstrate Egypt's neutralism in the Cold War and dissatisfaction with the continuance of formal ties with Britain. In addition to the conclusion of trade agreements with the Soviet Union in February, 1948 and July, 1951, Egypt refused to contribute forces to the United Nations contingent in Korea as a protest against British "occupation." On July 21, 1950, Egyptian foreign Minister Saleh ed-Din Bey told a press conference that Egypt was maintaining neutrality in the conflict. His statement was corroborated on April 14, 1951, by Abdul Salam Fahmi Comas Pasha, president of the Chamber of Deputies and one of the leading Wafdists, who declared that in event of a general war Egypt would be neutral and at the proper time would simply abrogate her 1936 treaty with Britain.

The Egyptian government decided on the Month of October, 1951, as the proper time referred to by Gomaa Pasha. On October 8, it presented to the Parliament a series of decrees unilaterally abrogating both the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Anglo-Egyptian agreement

15 Lenczowski, Ibid., p. 416.

16 Ibid., p. 418. India, Yugoslavia, Egypt were all sitting as nonpermanent members of the Security Council when the Korean War began. See Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade and After, 1945-1960, op. cit., pp. 150-161.

17 New York Times, April 15, 1951. Paradoxically enough, the Egyptian navy was at the same time carrying out joint maneuvers with the British Mediterranean fleet, "to gain experience," as was explained in official Egyptian quarters.
on the Sudan of 1899, and proclaiming Farouk "King of Egypt and the Sudan." The decrees were unanimously approved by the Parliament on October 15, just two days after the receipt of a British proposal that Egypt should join with other Middle Eastern states and with Western powers in a middle East Defense Organization.18

B. REVOLUTIONARY EGYPT

In its first two years of power, the new revolutionary regime, and Nasser in particular, not only consolidated its power, and inaugurated internal reforms,19 but also secured an agreement with Britain concerning the future of the Sudan and another one laying down conditions for the evacuation of the Suez Canal base.

On the Sudan, the agreement provided for the immediate introduction of self-determination by the Sudanese people. Elections for a self-governing legislature were to be held immediately. It also provided that within a period of three years the Sudan would be free to choose between complete independence and association with Egypt.20

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20 In 1956 the Sudan chose independence.
The negotiation on the Suez, however, was by all means a protracted one. There was hard bargaining, domestic opposition, and some give and take on both sides. Though at one stage an Egyptian government spokesman "hinted strongly . . . that Egypt would align herself with the neutralist bloc of Asian nations" in an effort to end Britain's 'imperialist' occupation of the Suez Canal Zone," on the whole, Egypt seemed to be assuming a markedly pro-Western orientation, if only in expectation of substantial economic and military aid from the West, and Egyptian-Israeli relations were probably less tense than at any previous time since 1948. On October 19, 1954, a final settlement of the Suez Canal negotiations was reached with Great Britain.

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21 Official representatives of 12 Afro-Asian countries convening in Cairo on December 23, 1952 at the invitation of the Egyptian government, held the first meeting of its kind outside the UN. See Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, January 2, 1953.

22 Quoted in Wheelock, op. cit., p. 215.

23 Such expectations did not preclude the expression of such sentiments as: "The so-called 'Free World', particularly the United States, proclaim they are helping to attain self-determination and are helping underdeveloped countries to advance. We consider such talk as opium administered by the 'free world' to enslaved peoples so that they may remain under its domination and not seek liberation," said Nasser, November 27, 1953. Quoted in Wheelock, Ibid., p. 215.

Principal points provided for the withdrawal of all British troops by June 18, 1956; termination of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty; a seven-year period during which British or other allied troops might re-enter the Canal Zone in case of attack upon the Arab states or Turkey;25 the 1888 Constantinople Convention guaranteeing freedom of navigation to be upheld. The agreement was to be in force seven years from the date of its signature.

The time between the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on Suez in 1954, and the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in July, 1956, was seminal in the shaping of Nasser's neutralist policy and it was during this period that its general character began to unfold.

Until 1954, Nasser had been content to speak for Egypt, henceforth he assumed the role of chief spokesman and champion of the "Arab People."26 The Israeli commando attack on Egyptian-administered...
territory in Gaza at the end of February, 1955 brought about a swift
deterioration in Egyptian-Israeli relations and heightened Egypt's
quest for arms and diplomatic support. In the following September,
Nasser announced the purchase of a substantial amount of arms from
Czechoslovakia, forced on Egypt, he said because "the West refused
us the means of defending our existence." According to later re­
ports, the arms deal reached a total of about $80 million, with the
individual weapons priced at a fraction of their real value. The
purchase, only a small part of which was paid for in cash, included 200
MIG jet fighters, 100 tanks, 6 submarines, and heavy artillery. Simultaneous bargaining with both Cold War camps was becoming one
of Nasser's favorite tactics, and perhaps his most novel and influ­
ential contribution to neutralist diplomacy.

Certainly, Nasser was the first significant neutralist to
pursue a policy of active alliance with both camps, taking the ini­
tiative himself, in attempts to elicit aid. "We have invented positive
neutralism," claimed Mohammed Husanain Haykal, one of Nasser's chief

27 Ibid., p. 211.

28 In October, 1954, an Egyptian government spokesman had ad­
mitted that Nasser had renounced American military aid because "the
conditions imposed" were "incompatible with respect for our national
sovereignty." Ibid., p. 215.

29 For details, see E. V. Lawrance, Egypt and the West, (New

30 J. and S. Lacouture, op. cit., p. 224.
spokesmen, the day after the Soviets offered to build Egypt an atomic power station and following the West's first offer to finance the Aswan High Dam.\textsuperscript{31}

The Western offer announced in December, 1955, by the United States and Great Britain, included an initial grant to the Egyptian government of 70 million dollars, with about 56 million coming from America and 14 million from England.\textsuperscript{32}

Another significant aspect of Egypt's neutralist policy took shape during 1955. This was Egypt's undoubted emergence not only among the ranks of the neutralist states, but among the leaders. The year began with Nasser calling on Tito in Yugoslavia and ended with Tito repaying the visit in Cairo. In between times, Nasser attended the Bandung Conference,\textsuperscript{33} where he was accorded a leading role, secured Chinese support for the Arabs' case against Israel, and had

\textsuperscript{31}For the significance of the Aswan High Dam in Nasser's schemes, see \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 388-395; also Keith Wheelock, \textit{Nasser's New Egypt, op. cit.}, Chapter 8.


\textsuperscript{33}On his return from Bandung, Nasser said, during a speech to a Cairo crowd: "I went to Bandung to announce that Egypt had been liberated, and that it speaks for the cause of self-determination and freedom of the nations, the suppression of imperialism, and the independence of all states." Reported in the \textit{New York Times}, May 3, 1955. Many commentators date Nasser's popularity in Egypt and throughout the Arab World from the time of his return from Bandung. For the significance of Bandung for Nasser, see Georgina Stevens, "Arab Neutralism and Bandung" in \textit{The Middle East Journal}, Vol. 12, Spring, 1957, pp. 139-152 and Keith Wheelock, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 225.
several long consultations with Nehru. Apart from their both being Afro-Asian Neutralists, Nehru and Nasser were at this time facing a common problem: both were opposed to the newly created Baghdad Pact.

Whatever the intensity of their opposition to "Cold War moves" near their frontiers, this was undoubtedly heightened for Nehru by the fact that Pakistan was associated with the scheme, and for Nasser by Iraq's membership in the Pact. Egyptian opposition was a contributory factor in limiting the membership and future operations of the Pact - just as, similarly, Indian opposition helped to limit the membership and restrict the operations of SEATO; but whereas Nehru attempted no military-diplomatic countermove, Nasser's opposition led to the conclusion of two military agreements, with Syria and with Saudi Arabia, both during October, 1955, each of which placed the signatories' armed forces under a Joint command headed by Egyptian generals.35

As well as these military measures, Nasser continued to try to strengthen his diplomatic friendships with fellow neutralists, especially with India and Yugoslavia. Indeed, Nasser, accompanied by Nehru, had just left Yugoslavia where he had been in conclave with Tito and Nehru, when the late Secretary of State Dulles abruptly


announced the withdrawal of the American offer to provide aid in the building of the Aswan High Dam. Already the same week had brought Nasser two diplomatic setbacks; for the Soviet Union had concluded a sizeable oil deal with Israel which dealt a severe blow to the Arab economic boycott, and Tito and Nehru did not subscribe fully to Nasser's views on Algeria, Israel and East Africa. It seemed that Nasser's prestige and projects were irretrievably deflated.

The nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, the Suez War, and their aftermath, restored Nasser's prestige and showed the wide sympathy and diplomatic support that a neutralist state could secure in repelling what are widely believed, or said, to be "imperialist" pressures. The Soviet Union quickly showed that any neutralist state at odds with Western powers can count on Soviet support, and there began a period of close Egyptian-Soviet accord. By contrast, equivocal American attempts, under the shadow of impending Presidential elections, to reconcile the antagonists only estranged her from both sides. Subsequently, Egypt abstained on all ten UN General Assembly resolutions criticizing Soviet aggression against Hungary.

Widespread sympathy throughout Asia and Africa for the Egyptian cause during the Suez crisis seemed to encourage Egypt to revive

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37 Later Nasser explained that these abstentions were "because the Soviet Union was the only country in the Security Council that supported us in our dispute over Suez. We abstained out of gratitude," See interview reported in New York Times, June 11, 1957.
and revitalize ideas of Afro-Asian solidarity, which had languished somewhat since the Bandung Conference. By the end of 1957, Cairo had become the headquarters of the permanent non-governmental Afro-Asian movements, and Egypt and the Sino-Soviet bloc seemed to be working in close harness.38

The inauguration of the United Arab Republic in February, 1958, seemed to have disturbed, however, the Egyptian-Soviet accord in previous years. Indeed Egypt, as well as Syria, seemed to be becoming increasingly dependent economically on the Soviet bloc during these years, as the Western powers generally boycotted Egypt and Syria. There are indications that Nasser was disturbed by this growing dependence on the Soviets,39 but such gestures as his October, 1957 decree ordering all branches of the government and the press to present Egypt as strictly neutralist country, and his reported willingness to substitute the term "Positive Neutrality," with its unfavorable connotations in the West, for the more euphenistic term "non-alignment," were not sufficient to bring about an appreciable detente with the West.40 Egyptian propaganda against Western interests and


40 Wheelock, op. cit., p. 256.
pro-Western elements throughout the Middle East and Africa continued unabated throughout 1957.

In fact, Nasser restored a great deal of his freedom of maneuver between East and West, following the Union of Egypt and Syria in February, 1958. Though the initiative came from Syria, within a year the overwhelming dominance of Egyptian leadership in this new United Arab Republic was patent, though the Union was showing signs of strain.\(^1\) Furthermore, relations with the Soviet Union now became considerably cooler, no doubt because Soviet influence in Syria had been nullified, and Nasser was achieving a détente with the United States. Certainly, from mid-1958 onward Nasser made clear his preference for political connections with neutralist rather than Communist states and began to pursue an active line in the Pan-African movement to the exclusion of the Soviet Union.\(^2\)

Throughout 1959-60, it was clear that the Soviet Union was as unwilling to see Nasser as the uncontested leader of the Arab world as were Great Britain, France and the United States between 1954 and 1956. Following the revolution of July, 1958, in Iraq, Soviet interest in the United Arab Republic appeared to lessen, probably because the


former seemed to be a more profitable area. Even so, Soviet moves had to be circumspect and her preferences not too favorable to one, in view of continuing Egyptian-Iraqi rivalry. Since 1958 Soviet-Egyptian ties have loosened, their different interests have become more obvious, but Soviet aid has continued.

"Positive neutrality" as practiced by Nasser since 1955 seems to be a policy which, despite its name, has been sustained by two powerful negative themes -- anti-Westernism and anti-imperialism -- and by radical Arab nationalism. But to say that it had no positive effect would not be true: for at least it had inspired the Egyptians to think of the world beyond and to feel that they are on equal footing with other countries. It also placed Egypt in the rank of leaders in the Afro-Asian camp. But even in the words of its champion, Egypt's neutralism has lacked a distinctive creed of its own. While it embodies Arab nationalism sweeping across state boundaries it appears to lack any precise plans for what has to succeed what is to be overthrown.

By great tactical skill and flexibility it has raised Egypt's diplomatic standing; but still has not produced any substantial measure

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44 Nasser: "... as far as ideologies go we still have no final position. We are still at the formative stage. We haven't really made our choice between liberalism and controls of matters of economics and politics. Our decisions will be taken according to specific problems and needs." Quoted in J. and S. Lacouture, op. cit., p. 465. For similar statements, see Wheelock, op. cit., pp. 216, 227, 236 and 263.
of pan-Arab unity. Though it has initiated a number of long overdue domestic reforms, it has not so far brought about any appreciable increase in the Egyptians' standard of living. And the potentials of its long-range practices are not certain.

(2) NASSER'S POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL: A STUDY IN MOTIVATION OF EGYPT'S NEUTRALISM

By the Spring of 1954, Nasser had become the strongest man in Egypt; on April 17 of that year, he assumed the title of Premier, thus giving de jure confirmation to his de facto position since the July Revolution in 1952.

Regarding his general views concerning Israel, I must differentiate between his desires, inspired by Arab consciousness and ambitions, on the one hand, and his actual and potential capabilities, on the other.

Such a distinction between Nasser's desires and the power that is available to him is of great importance here and should be applied to every statesman in dealing with his foreign, as well as his domestic, policy.

To Nasser, as to many ambitious Arab leaders, the very existence of Israel within the Arab circle is an unpalatable and frustrating fact. He considers the vast territory from Morocco to the Persian Gulf, including Palestine itself, as the homeland of one Arab
Nation which is yet to be established;⁴⁵ and within this framework of beliefs and aspirations there is no room for a Jewish state.⁴⁶

He looks at the State of Israel as one of the major challenges to complete Arab unity, and also as a great handicap in the path of the Arabs' hopes of playing a positive role in world affairs.

His desire is simply to drive Israel into the sea, eliminating from the Arab world a state which he regards as a product of imperialism.⁴⁷ He sees the Balfour Declaration of 1917,⁴⁸ and every subsequent action⁴⁹ that contributed in any degree to the establishment of Israel, as typical imperialistic strategems being employed against a weak and disunited Arab people. With such an inflexible approach

⁴⁵"We must become strong so that all Arabism's lands from Morocco to Baghdad will be for the Arabs and not for the occupiers or the exploiters, so that we can retrieve for the people of Palestine their right to freedom." From a public speech by President Nasser, delivered in Cairo's Republic Square on June 18, 1956. Time, July 2, 1956, p. 18.

⁴⁶"There is no place in the Arab homeland except for the sons of the Arab Nation." From a speech by President Nasser, delivered at the Presidency in Cairo on May 16, 1958.


⁴⁸The Declaration was issued by the British Government on November 2, 1917, favoring the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.

⁴⁹This would include the "Partition Resolution" adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 29, 1947. The resolution called for the establishment of a "Jewish" State, an Arab State, and an international area around Jerusalem.
as Nasser's toward the existence of Israel, his preferred solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict would be the total destruction of Israel.

This, from his point of view, would lead to a highly satisfactory solution to the problems which have plagued Arab-Israeli relations since 1948. The two major problems, i.e., the frontier problem and the Arab refugee problem would automatically disappear since there would no longer be any Israeli boundaries or territory. Also, this desired solution would clear the way for Nasser to achieve his other goals. He would be able to continue his crusade for complete Arab unity and concentrate all his efforts on that particular end without having to fear a neighboring state which poses a major threat to his plans. He could move more actively on the international scene and be safe from any pressure that might be brought to bear on him either by Israel directly or by other powers acting indirectly through Israel.50

This, then is Nasser's desire: the total destruction of Israel. The question that must have troubled him since the time he rose to power is whether or not it is within his power to achieve this objective.

If Nasser's answer to the above question is in the affirmative, then his policy would aim at the total destruction of Israel. This

50"Israel has shown that it is a ready tool against us for any power. Britain and France have used it for their ends, and this can happen again with any other country." From President Nasser's statement to the members of the American Society of Editors and Commentators (Cairo: Government Information Service, 1957), p. 13.
policy would lean on continued non-recognition of Israel, leading to the denial of her right to exist. Nasser would not under these circumstances be willing to compromise or to accept any final settlement that would imply the possibility of recognition of Israel. In this case his designs would be to gather all his power and when the opportunity presented itself to launch a campaign of annihilation against tiny Israel.

On the other hand, Nasser may have arrived at a negative answer to his question. He may have realized that his desired objective is beyond his power and, in consequence, may have adjusted his policy to the political realities. This would mean acknowledging that Israel does in fact exist, then her existence is likely to continue and that his policies must be carried out within these limitations.

A third assumption could be that Nasser has not come to a definite answer to his question. In such case, Nasser would have no clear-cut policy with regard to Israel. His policy then would have no definite shape and would develop according to circumstances as yet unforeseen. Depending on the nature of these circumstances, it might be shaped in accord with the first assumption or be forced to conform to the dictates of the second.

This last assumption is less likely than the two others. Nasser by this time, having been in power for more than a decade, should have come to a specific answer to a question which is so basic
in determining his policy. He is surrounded by numerous capable advisors who have considerable experience in international politics and diplomacy. These advisors must have evaluated the situation in the light of the realities of power politics, and arrived at conclusions which can serve as a basis for Nasser’s policy.

There are two fundamentals with regard to the existence of Israel, of which Nasser may be well aware:

The first fundamental is the fact that the establishment of Israel has been officially laid down by the United Nations and that Israel has been, since May 11, 1949, a member of this organization. As a member of the United Nations, Israel is presumably protected against destruction by the principle of collective security, incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations.52

Of perhaps even greater importance is the awareness of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 on the part of the United States, United Kingdom and France. This declaration stands as a gigantic wall

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51 Such as Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, who until recently was Egypt’s foreign minister and who was highly regarded in diplomatic service and in the United Nations.

52 Chapter VII of the Charter.

53 This Anglo-French-American Declaration was made on May 25, 1950, announcing that they would take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent a violation of frontiers or armistice lines. The Declaration was reaffirmed by the British Premier in the House of Commons on April 4, 1955. However, they failed to respect their guarantee when it was put to the test in the Suez War.
guaranteeing the security of Israel by opposing any military attack against her frontiers.

The second fundamental which Nasser may also be considering is the fact that the existence of Israel is heartily sustained by two great forces, which are not going to allow, under any circumstances or at any price, any harm to come to the existence of Israel.

In the first place, there is the political power of Zionism which is influential over a great part of the world, mainly through the numerous Zionist organizations set up in various countries. The great power of this movement was clearly demonstrated by its successful campaign to persuade the British Government to issue the Balfour Declaration in 1917, and by the further achievement of turning this promise of a national home into a Jewish State in 1948.

This power provides Israel today with financial aid, diplomatic support and military assistance and obviously is not going to allow any attack against the state which, in its eyes, is regarded as the fulfillment of the prophecy of Ezekiel.\(^\text{51}\)

The second power, in Nasser's view, which heartily backs the existence of Israel is the United States Government. Nasser has seen certain aspects of American policy as clues which have convinced him that the United States has been and will continue to be the major power

\(^{51}\) 37:21. "Behold, I will take the children of Israel from among the heathen, whither they be gone, and will gather them on every side and bring them into their own lands."
backing Israel's continued existence.

The first of these clues is the major role America played with regard to the creation of Israel. Nasser believes that the Partition Resolution of the United Nations was mainly adopted by virtue of the great political and economic pressure exerted on several members of the General Assembly by the United States Government. He knows that the two-third majority which was achieved in the final voting was a result of a great American effort.

This pressure which was not exerted directly in New York, but indirectly through the American embassies abroad, has made Nasser believe that the United States has a vital interest in the existence of the State of Israel.

The second clue is the immediate recognition of the State of Israel by the United States Government. This occurred within eleven

55"You used your fullest political strength, including that of your President, to thrust a foreign state among us Arabs. Oh, you meant well. 'Israel is here to stay. The American people are going to see to it that she stay.'". From an interview with Nasser, Life, April 16, 1956, p. 34. See also President Nasser's statement to the members of the American Society of Editors and Commentators. (Cairo: Government Information Service, 1956), p. 6.

56Namely, the pressure exercise on the governments of New Zealand and the Phillipines.

57It is rather the interest of the American Administration reflecting the particular interest of a segment of the population which yields political power within the general electorate of the country through its concentration in certain areas.
minutes of the Israeli Proclamation of Independence.

These two clues, added to America's continued policy of military and economic support to Israel, have made it clear in Nasser's view that the United States would stand firmly behind the security of Israel.

It seems to me to be most likely, in view of all the evidence, that Nasser has probably arrived at a negative answer to his fundamental question. In calculating his potentialities and comparing them with those of Israel, Nasser must have realized that the total destruction of Israel is beyond his power. This is most likely because Nasser is aware of the fact that it is not a question of strength, either quantitative or qualitative, of the two armies; but rather it is a question of "who is backing whom."

**Nasser's Plan: The Deposition of Israeli Retreat:**

At this moment, I must distinguish between Nasser's immediate and long-range policies. It is necessary to make this distinction

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58 For example, the United States Government gave Israel economic aid amounting to $82,000,000 in the year 1952 whereas Egypt was given in the same year less than $500,000. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1958, published by the Department of Commerce (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 871-72.

59 The conventional usage of "immediate" and "long range" has been adopted to distinguish in a general way between the two aspects of his policy. It is not intended to indicate any specific timetable of future events.
because, in my view, Nasser's over-all plan calls for very different types of policies to be pursued at different stages of his timetable of operations.

During the first stage - which continues to be in progress - Nasser seems to be seeking two specific ends. The first end is the maintenance of the status quo between Israel and the Arab States. The second, and dominant concern, is to gain so much overwhelming strength as to be infinitely superior to that of Israel.

With regard to his first objective, Nasser is mainly concerned with keeping the existing Arab-Israeli situation intact; he is not interested, for reasons which will be explained later, in having any settlement with Israel regarding any current problem. His main interest is to keep the State of Israel in permanent check and prevent her from carrying out any territorial expansion. This tactic is to be achieved through a policy of containment on Nasser's part and on his build-up of strength which will mark the pursuit of his second objective.

Nasser has shaped his policy in this first stage on the conviction that the element of time is in his favor, provided Israel is

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60 "We seek no war, however, should Israel pursue some aggressive course of action, such as diverting the river Jordan, then I believe there would be war. Syria and Jordan would probably fight. Our defense pact stands beside them. We will honor it." From an interview with Nasser, Life, April 16, 1956, p. 34.
not able to gain any additional territory. While he builds an enormous strength, both militarily and diplomatically, tiny Israel will continue to be struggling within the limited capacity of her territory\textsuperscript{61} to cope with the growing economic crisis which springs from her unrestricted immigration policy.\textsuperscript{62}

In efforts to build the major military force required for the achievement of his second goal (\textit{i.e.} defeating the Israeli army) the Egyptian leader turned to mobilize the Arab countries through the advocacy of Arab unity under his leadership. It is the control of oil deposits in other Arab States with which Nasser is mainly concerned.

He has, therefore, concentrated since the time he came to power on the achievement of this specific aim, and his attainment of this goal proceeds hand in hand with his "crusade" for Arab unity.

Through "Radio Cairo" and through "The Voice of the Araba" he has beamed a steady propaganda campaign for Arab unity. This campaign has used all types of propaganda devices and has rested on many differing ideologies.

Israel herself has been employed as one of his major tools in his struggle for this objective. The common enmity and fears which the

\textsuperscript{61} Israel has been receiving great economic aid from various outside sources, but her economy has always been based primarily on her own domestic resources.

\textsuperscript{62} The Israeli Government enacted on July 5, 1950, "The Law of the Return" stating that every Jew has the right to immigrate to Israel.
Arab states have felt toward Israel since her creation have provided Nasser with a fertile field for his operations.

Meanwhile, Nasser has launched with great energy his plan for developing the military strength of the United Arab Republic. He is currently devoting more than one-half of the public budget to military purposes. He has invited foreign experts to help rebuild his army along modern lines. Thus, for the first time, Egypt's armed forces now include some guided missiles, paratroops and frogmen as well as more conventional types of troops. As part of this modernization program he has made agreements with the Soviet Union as well as with other countries to get heavy equipment and such modern weapons as jet planes and submarines.63 He has launched a program of universal military service in which every male citizen is required, upon reaching the age of 18, to do service in the armed forces. To sum it up, he has used every feasible device to build the strongest possible army.

Nasser, however, is aware of the fact that, in carrying out a successful military plan which would have any influence on the international scene, it is necessary to gain a great deal of political support.

63 On September 27, 1955, Nasser announced the conclusion of an arms deal with Czechoslovakia. The deal was originally assumed to be an $80 million deal, but later estimates placed the figure in the neighborhood of $250 million. The agreement was reported to provide for 200 MIG 15 jet fighters, 60 II-28 heavy bombers, 100 heavy Stalin III tanks complete with guns, 6 submarine and heavy artillery. For further details about this arms deal see E. V. Lawrence, op. cit.
from other nations, Nasser seems to feel that this support can be gained by means of his building great personal popularity in the African and Asian countries; and here is where the policy of neutralism has gained for him many advances. Thus, his main efforts have been devoted to achieving this popularity; in this attempt he has utilized a variety of approaches, depending on his evaluation of the different targets he wishes to reach. He is aware that most of these countries suffer from external exploitation and they look forward to freedom and higher standards of living. If, at the moment, he can do little to help them achieve these goals, he can at least offer them great dreams. For example, he played a major role in the establishment of the Islamic Congress\textsuperscript{64} at Cairo which aims at the cultural, economic and social improvement of the peoples of Moslem faith in the whole world community. In practice, the Islamic Congress has confined its operations to a few chosen countries such as Indonesia, Tunisia, and Somaliland.

The Bandung Conference of 1955, which Nasser attended and where, in carefully chosen words, he held out to the Afro-Asian Peoples glowing dreams for the future,\textsuperscript{65} provides a second instance of this policy.

\textsuperscript{64}The Islamic Congress was established in 1954 by an agreement signed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{65}"The cooperation between the Asiatic and African nations can lead these countries representing the biggest two continents of the world and more than half of mankind toward progress and better standards of living." From Nasser's address at the Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 17, 1955. For the full context of the address see \textit{Vital Speeches of the Day}, June 1, 1955, pp. 1256-58.
A third instance is the establishment of the radio station, "The Voice of Free Africa," which started broadcasting in 1957. This station beams broadcasts from Cairo in fourteen different African dialects calling upon the people of Africa to rise up against "imperialists" and colonialists." The establishment of the "Supreme Council for African Affairs" in Cairo in December, 1955, promoting Nasser's role as the protector of Africa is another example of this program at work, as was the establishment of the "Afro-Asian Council" in Cairo in 1958, which was the fruit of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference sponsored by Nasser on December 28, 1957. At the UN Nasser's government has continued to support measures in favor of the Afro-Asian countries, and to champion such issues as anti-colonialism and freedom for all peoples. Added of course were Nasser's efforts at the Belgrade Conference of non-aligned nations which convened in 1961 partially on his own initiative.

To complete his plan, Nasser would enforce the United Nations Partition Resolution of November, 1947.66

Nasser may be expected to embark on this objective after he becomes sure that he has achieved his goal of building overwhelming power. With this enormous force he would impose enforcement of the

66 This would include the "Partition Resolution" adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 29, 1947. The resolution called for the establishment of a "Jewish" State, an Arab State, and an international area around Jerusalem.
resolution. After denouncing the Armistice Agreement he would launch a blitzkrieg-type attack designed to seize all Israeli-held territory beyond the boundaries laid down by the Partition Resolution of 1947. He would follow this up with military action by quickly settling Arab refugees in the re-occupied territory. These refugees under his guidance would then proclaim the existence of an independent Arab State of Palestine, thereby fulfilling the resolution of the United Nations. New Jerusalem, after being wrested from Israeli control, would be turned over to the United Nations to be administered by an international agency.

This action would take place in the expectation that the new Arab State of Palestine would, after her establishment, immediately join the United Arab Republic and would, therefore, come under UAR control.

Nasser, at this stage, would be thinking and acting mainly in terms of power; however, he would attempt to clothe his action with certain legal devices. He would be prepared to offer some legal justifications for his use of force. But his main concern would not be so much to prove the legality of his action, but rather to create a plausible argument.

He would be confronted mainly with the Charter of the United Nations, the Armistice Agreement and the effect of the Tripartite

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67 New Jerusalem was occupied by the Israeli Army after the signing of the Armistice Agreement and was proclaimed on January 24, 1950, to be the new capital of Israel.
Declaration.

To cope with the first, he would try to show his military action to be in accord with the Articles of the United Nations Charter and not in violation of them. This would be attempted through two successive steps on his part: The first, which would precede his military advance, would be to request the United Nations to enforce the Partition Resolution as adopted by the General Assembly. The second step, which would follow the expected failure of the United Nations to achieve such enforcement, would be to proclaim that his military advance constituted a "police action."

Nasser would state that his action constituted an enforcement of the United Nations resolution, approved by the General Assembly, as the best settlement for the Palestine question. He would also attempt to show himself as serving the Charter of the United Nations by forcing the State of Israel to respect the General Assembly's decisions which she had been ignoring.

Confronted with the argument of the illegality of his denunciation of the Armistice Agreement he might be expected to argue on more than one ground. He could proclaim that Israel -- as the second party of this bilateral agreement -- was the first to denounce it, and that the agreement was purely military in character and never prejudiced Egypt's position with regard to the future of Palestine.

He could also stress that this Armistice Agreement was signed for one major purpose; i.e., to create circumstances that might lead
to a permanent peace in Palestine. This purpose, however, was nullified by Israeli non-compliance with the United Nations resolutions, since, as long as Israel refused to comply, such circumstances would never exist. The Armistice demarcation lines were not permanent political boundaries, but were temporary, provisional, purely military in purpose and non-political in character. The Armistice never put an end to the Arab-Israeli war; it was just a cease-fire between the two combatants.

Nasser, at this stage, could be sure that the United Nations would fail -- as it usually does -- to take any effective measures against his plan. He could expect to receive the support of a considerable number of members of the United Nations, probably of enough of them to prevent any effective action.

Faced with the threat of the Tripartite Declaration, which guarantees both the frontiers and the Armistice lines, Nasser would claim that this Declaration had no meaning with regard to the Armistice lines since, with the abrogation of the Armistice agreement, these lines no longer existed.

He would challenge the three big powers of the West -- in case they might think of intervention -- to balance their interest in backing Israel in her claims to such a small territory against their larger interest in the Arab world as a whole. He would expect to be supported by his fellow neutralists.
INDONESIA'S NEUTRALISM: A STUDY IN CONTINUING NATIONALISM

Unlike India's claim to peace and "idealism" and indifferent to UAR pragmatic tactics for Arab leadership and determined opposition to Israel, Indonesia's neutralism is argued as an outgrowth of a rooted opposition to colonial rule; a need for maintaining national unity; a desire for a place in the international arena; and a natural quest for material improvement. Of these varied considerations, the continued development of Indonesia's nationalism and perpetuation of its own unity, especially in view of the geographical peculiarity of the country and the diversity of its peoples, is perhaps of the greatest impact on the choice for a neutralist foreign policy. In the years following its independence, the leadership in Indonesia became busily engaged in asserting their country's new status and convincing their nationals that their continued unity is the only assurance for the nation's strength and prosperity.

I. BACKGROUND TO NATIONALISM: THE DUTCH IN THE TROPICAL EAST INDIES

What the postwar world knows as Indonesia the prewar world knew as the Netherlands East Indies. The territory involved consists of a chain of islands extending from Malaya in the west to New Guinea in the east, covering a distance of more than 3200 miles and with a land area of between seven and eight hundred thousand square miles.
Thus in prewar days Dutch territory reached from British Colonies in Southeast Asia to Australia, with the United States to the north in the Philippines.

In their rule over the East Indies, the Dutch sought to maintain native social and cultural traditions. The effect of this policy was to stabilize the colonial regime and shield the colony from the dislocating impact of western ideological and economic forces. By forbidding the alienation of property, the government avoided the evils of landlessness and tenancy which characterized other Asian states. Yet the tremendous rise in population on Java and nearby Madura meant exceedingly small landholdings, and the impoverished peasantry suffered heavily under the burden of taxes and debt. The Dutch record was hardly impressive enough to neutralize the powerful attraction which nationalism was bound to exert on the peasantry.

Another important aspect of Dutch rule was the indirect system of administration through a native aristocracy. In actuality, however, the supremacy of the Dutch authority was kept unchallenged through a centralized and bureaucratic structure. The Governors of the provinces were subordinated to the governor-general who was, in turn, subordinated to the government.

1 For survey of Dutch rule in the East Indies, see Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944).
of the Netherlands. This excessive centralization, however, began to be modified after the first World War. More autonomy was given to the colonial government, and the Volksraad (People's Council) created in 1918 gradually assumed more power. "Until 1927 it (the Volksraad) had only advisory powers, but in that year it was given co-legislative powers, which in practice meant that legislative measures normally required the approval of both the Volksraad and the Governor General."— an early taste of native authority which contributed, however modestly, to the future advance of Indonesia's nationalism.

II. INDONESIA'S NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

A. PREWAR DEVELOPMENTS:

Concurrently with the loosening of Dutch centralization in the governmental system and with its counterpart in the form of what was called the "ethical" policy of paying more attention to the social, and economic interests and needs of the people, there came the prewar

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3Of the sixty members of the Volksraad, 30 were Indonesians, of whom 20 were elected; 25 were Europeans; and the remainder were selected from among the nonindigenous Asians, of whom the largest group were the Chinese.

development of Indonesian nationalism. The first nationalist society held its first congress in 1908. Its purpose initially was the economic and educational improvement of the position of the people. To realize its purposes, however, the new Indonesian cultural organization necessarily turned more and more to political matters. It was followed and eclipsed, by the Sarekat Islam, founded in 1911, and first motivated by a desire to secure economic independence of the increasingly dominant Chinese.  

The new society grew considerably in the years between its first congress, held in 1913, and its emergence as a "full-fledged political party" in 1916 when the Sarekat Islam held its first National Congress in Bandung. Its program was one of social and economic reform, to be achieved in co-operation with and through the colonial government. Politically it began to seek association of Indonesians with the Dutch in the working out of a policy for the colony looking toward self-government. In this phase it could properly be called a "nonrevolutionary, essentially middle-class organization" from the point of view of both its program and its methods of action. On the

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economic and social side its activities were somewhat coordinated with those of the trade unions which came into being during and after the period of the First World War.

Sarekat Islam had just begun to be a national political movement of significance sufficient to claim some credit for the Dutch action in establishing the advisory People's Council when it began to be caught up in the revolutionary currents flowing from Russia. The anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism of Leninism, together with the revolutionary techniques of violence, were brought into Indonesia through a newly organized Indonesian Communist Party. As economic conditions deteriorated in the years after 1918, the economic weapon of the strike was utilized to bring about changes to Dutch policy. 6

The measures taken by the authorities to maintain the established order stimulated demands for a less moderate kind of program than the one advanced in 1918. In order to maintain itself, the Sarekat Islam became a nationalist movement seeking independence, while at the same time in 1923, expelling the more radical members from the organization. These went into the Indonesian Communist Party.

By 1927, what had once been an essentially moderate reform

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6 Ibid., pp. 56-58.
agitation had become the Indonesian fight for independence. A new Indonesian National Party led by Sukarno, was formed in evidence to this new aspiration. Attempted Communist insurrection in West Java during November, 1926 and in West Sumatra in January, 1927, were rigorously suppressed. Thereafter the repressive policy of the government was directed more vigorously against all nationalists, many of whom had the label of Communist attached to them to justify their suppression or internment.

But despite a few disturbances, Indonesian nationalism was not then a mass movement of a mass sentiment. Indeed political awareness was largely confined to a small but growing class of intellectuals, many of whom were removed in experience, feeling and understanding from the masses. But while this was true, there had been sufficient growth of nationalism to disturb the Dutch and cause them to proceed with some vigor against those who showed political inclinations or who did not formally agree to accept the Dutch policy of gradual introduction of self-government, with the pace of development set by Holland. Numerous Indonesians, where qualified by training, did, however, show their willingness to cooperate by entering the bureaucracy in its lower ranges.

One of the retarding factors in the growth of a competent and experienced Indonesian political leadership was to be found in the comparative lack of emphasis by the Dutch on education. Only a small
proportion of the adult Indonesians were literate and only about 4,000,000 could read Dutch. Those who achieved an education in the islands were not actively encouraged to go abroad, even to Holland, for advanced studies. Despite this, however, considerable numbers of Indonesians had studied in Holland. From this relatively small group of foreign educated Indonesians came the ideas and much of the initiative which was found in the prewar nationalist movement. Its ideas were drawn largely from foreign sources, which also provided a basis for ideological division among the educated leaders. To the extent to which the views seriously held by the leaders were foreign they could not readily be rapidly translated into terms widely understood and accepted. This consequently constituted a barrier between the leaders and the masses. And frequently, before the leader could carry forward the work of translation of concept into mass thinking, he found himself imprisoned or interned in one of the settlements utilized for political prisoners.

B. EFFECTS OF THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION: A NEW TIDE

It was, consequently, not domestic nationalism but foreign invasion which initially destroyed Dutch power in Indonesia. It


8 Ibid. Among these prisoners, was Sukarno who was seized in 1928 and again in 1933, after which time he remained interned in Sumatra until released by the Japanese.
was Japanese power rather than Dutch weakness which forced changes in the Indonesian policy of the Netherlands government itself.

The Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1943 was not a simple substitution of one colonial regime for another. It provided a totally new environment within which the forces of Indonesia's resistance grew more rapidly to maturity. Having destroyed the apparatus of Dutch power and interned Dutch residents, the Japanese were confronted with the immediate task of keeping the wheels of routine administration turning and, in the long run, with the need to find some sort of basis in consent for their own regime. Their solutions to the two problems, coupled with their release of nationalist leaders who had been political prisoners under the Dutch, led to important developments in the future.

For the first task, the Japanese turned to use Indonesian civil servants, assigning them to posts higher than they had occupied under the Dutch. For the second, the Japanese in due course recognized the necessity of coming to terms with the nationalist leaders in the hope of mobilizing their support for the occupation.\(^9\) Certainly though, the Japanese were compelled in this way to do business with the leaders of the nationalist movement. They did so for their own advantage. Nationalism was, for the time being, to be the servant of

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occupation policy. Not until the tide of the Pacific war had turned decisively against them did the Japanese take practical steps to prepare for the establishment of an independent Indonesia, and only then to embarass the returning Allies. But even in the earlier stages the Japanese were unable to control the forces that they had set in motion. The use for propaganda purpose of prominent figures, including Sukarno himself, was intended to reduce opposition to Japanese authority.\textsuperscript{10} In resulting terms, however, it gave such leaders a vantage point from which radical nationalist consciousness developed among the masses of the population. In other instances, and while closing some fissures, Japanese policy at the same time opened new ones within the nationalist movement. Divisions between Moslem organizations and the secular nationalist leaders were widened. Divisions established themselves also between those who collaborated and those whose wartime role was to lay the framework of an under­ground movement. In this situation, the elements for growing nationalism were sown in different sections of the country. As the war progressed, the increasing harshness and arrogance of Japanese rule gave Indonesians a glimpse of a more thoroughgoing imperialism than that of the Dutch. However, under pressure of coming defeat, \\

\textsuperscript{10} The Dutch were later to level a collaborationist charge against Sukarno as did many Indonesian nationals.
the Japanese, finding it to their own advantage, set up a Preparatory Committee to prepare a draft constitution for Indonesia's independence. But with the Japanese surrender to the Allies in August, 1945, the nationalist leaders, under pressure from elements anxious to avoid acquiring independence as a gift from the Japanese, themselves declared Indonesia to be an independent republic. A government was set up under Sukarno's presidency, and when British troops landed in Java, they found a functioning administration in existence. Shortly afterwards, Dutch troops began to arrive to reclaim, as they thought, their country's rightful possession and the Indonesia stage was set for revolutionary struggle.

C. THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE: CONFLICTS AND NEGOTIATIONS

Between 1945 and 1950, the Indonesian Republic was three times engaged in prolonged conflicts with the Dutch, and three times in prolonged negotiations.11 The first conflicts with the Dutch—also the British and Japanese—occurred in late 1945 and early 1946. The Republican forces retreated under virtual blockade into the Jogjakarta area of Central Java and into other big and little enclaves. Under the circumstances, they accepted the Linggadjati Agreement, initialed on November 15, 1946, which provided for temporary partitioning of Indonesia into Dutch and Republican areas and permanent cooperation

11 For detailed account of this period, see Dorothy Woodman, The Republic of Indonesia, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), Chapter XI.
in a Netherlands-Indonesian federal union. The agreement was promptly sabotaged by both Dutch reactionaries and Indonesian extremists.

The failure of the agreement led the Dutch to launch their "First Police Action" on July 21, 1947, attempting to subdue the Republic by force of arms. International protest led to negotiations sponsored by the United Nations, a cease-fire and the ambiguous Renville Agreement of January 17, 1948, which reverted, in fact, to the Linggadjati agreement. Eight months later the Republic suffered an internal conflict manifested in the Maniun insurrection of September 18, 1948, which was led by Communists and pro-Communist troops and was suppressed by the Sukarno government. The Dutch, who had consolidated their hold on the rest of Indonesia and had worked busily to create semi-autonomous federated states to rival the Republic's political hegemony, seized this occasion to launch their Second Police Action. On December 19, 1948, Dutch forces captured the Republic capital and the Republican leaders.

The Republic refused to admit defeat, and won the support of Indonesian leaders who had favored federation with the Netherlands. The impasse led to international protests, UN negotiations and the Round Table Conference at the Hague, reviving and modifying--very much to Dutch disadvantage--the Linggadjati provisions.

In line with the new agreement the Dutch transferred sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia on December 27, 1949. The new nation, in accordance with the terms of the agreement,
was a federal union of the 15 Dutch created states plus the Republic. The Republic dominated the federation, and on August 17, 1950, covert it, by unilateral action, into the present centralized Republic of Indonesia. The new nation remained a partner in an inoperative Dutch-Indonesian union until that arrangement, too, was unilaterally revoked in 1954.

III. NATIONALISM CONTINUED: THE DICTATES OF A POLICY

Throughout the history of the Indonesian nationalist movement the question of the exact nature of the future Indonesian state has been frequently raised by different participant individuals and groups in that movement. In the years when colonial domination still appeared secure the question seemed largely an academic one, but after Indonesia's successful revolution against the Dutch and the attainment of independence, its urgency could no longer be denied. The question is commonly considered in relation to two specific matters: (1) the ultimate socio-economic structure of the free Indonesian state and the political means of realizing it and (2) the kind of a foreign policy most advantageous to the new Republic. On the latter consideration, the Government of Indonesia adopted the course of neutralism.

A. THE IDEOLOGY OF "UNFINISHED REVOLUTION"

On the issue of the socio-economic system, one thought appears at the moment to have reached a certain preponderance. It is represented by the ideologies of President Sukarno by the doctrine of marhaenism
(populism) which is the official program of the influential National Indonesian Party (PNI) and not the least by the theories of the country's Communists as pronounced by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). In an important sense these three converge in a notion that the national revolution against the Dutch is "not yet completed," that political independence is not yet fully attained, and that certain objectives must be reached before Indonesia can be said to be on the road toward stability and prosperity.

1. SUKARNO'S POLITICAL THOUGHTS:

The published political thought of Sukarno is not noted for its lucidity, but few prominent figures in Indonesia have been so consistent as the President in declaring that national independence was and is but a prelude to the establishment of an essentially Socialistic society, in which the economic disparities of the colonial era will no longer exist. Well before the outbreak of World War II and the demise of Dutch colonial dominion Sukarno had developed this theme, and during the Indonesian revolution he was able to discourse upon it.

For the time being perhaps the fullest elaboration of this idea has been reached in two main documents: the President's address "Res Publica. Once more Res Publica!" delivered to the now defunct Constituent Assembly on April 22, 1959,\(^2\) and the President's "Political

\[^2\]See text of address published by the Indonesian Ministry of Information, special issue No. 40, President's Speeches Series: 1959.
Manifesto of the Indonesian Republic," delivered on August 17, 1959, 13 and generally regarded as the rationale of the present condition of "guided democracy" that prevails in the country.

"The Indonesian people", declared Sukarno in his Res Publica speech, "are still in the midst of a revolution, which has as its objective the transformation of an absolute-colonial system into a modern and happy national structure." A "thoroughgoing and revolutionary overhaul of our State," the President further declared, is yet to be accomplished, for although "the physical revolution was ended at the end of 1949" new and old impediments remained. In the socio-economic field, for example, there were "tendencies towards national capitalism," in politics there were serious partisan divisions, and on top of these armed rebellion repeatedly broke out. In overcoming these obstacles the Indonesian nation needs to realize that its "national revolution has not yet been completed," because a just and prosperous society has not yet been attained, because a unitary government is still being threatened by regional separatism and by "federalism," and because there are still groups which are out for their own interest. By abandoning "liberal democracy" with its parliamentary system, and by imposing instead a democracy "which is led by wise guidance, not one which is led by debates and maneuvers,"

13 Text published by the Indonesian Department of Information, special issue No. 53.
and by accepting not "liberal capitalism" but instead "Socialistic reconstruction," the nation can be returned to the right path. Too long, the President declared, has Indonesia suffered from dissension over the question of whether or not the revolution is completed. The liberal parliamentary system "has inclined us to believe that basically the revolution has been completed." This was an error, for it is not the leadership of a nation that determines whether or not a revolution has been completed, but rather the people. And today the people "loudly and clearly" demand further "revolutionary progress." As Sukarno expressed it "Our people are permanently on the run. They demand swift and immediate results..."

The immediate objectives of the ongoing revolution, as outlined by Sukarno, center on the realization of economic prosperity and, concurrently, on a vision of national greatness in which the various dissident and rebellious movements throughout the country have vanished, and Western New Guinea, now held by the Dutch, will have come under Indonesian control as part of its rightful national territory. The first of these objectives is perhaps the most important, given the dangerous stagnation of the Indonesian economy in the past few years. To realize it Sukarno has urged a radical course: "Conventional regulations or conventional thinking are not always applicable to us...today I firmly reject text book thinking." To establish a "national economy...with sufficient clothing and food" Indonesians should "all be conscious that we are still in the midst of
a revolution, a violent revolution." This revolution, as Sukarno indicated in his Political Manifesto,\textsuperscript{14} may be described as having two types of objectives, short-term and long-term objectives. The former includes enactment of measures that will satisfy the basic needs of the people, such as food, clothing and security, but the long-term objective is not only the establishment of a just and prosperous society but also "the elimination of imperialism everywhere" and the foundation of world peace. Again, the "tools of the past" cannot be used: "we have to throw out the system of liberalism as far as possible and we should replace it with guided democracy and guided economy."

Sukarno's concept of "guided economy" is still none too clear in his writings and speeches, but basically it appears to involve what the President on other occasions has called "Socialism a la Indonesia," i.e. a system of collectivism, in which the major branches of production and distribution are state-owned or controlled, but with limited openings for certain fields of private enterprise by nationals.\textsuperscript{15} This collectivism is to be free from Marxistic class conflict theories, however, and is to reflect primarily the ancient traditions of mutual

\textsuperscript{14}Text of the Political Manifesto address sometimes have the added title "The Rediscovery of our Revolution."

assistance and common deliberation that are found in the Indonesian village cultures. In recent policy decisions the President appears to exhibit virtually unlimited confidence in the possibility that this system can be imposed on the country by executive decree.

2. THE DOCTRINE OF MARHAENISM

The theory of "Socialism a la Indonesia" is, in effect, Sukarno's own term for the philosophy of marhaenism which he and other nationalists associates developed in the 1930's and which has received its most extensive formulation in Manifesto Marhaenisme, published by the National Indonesian Party (PNI) in 1952.16

Marhaenism can perhaps best be characterized as Socialism without Marx. In its more mystical aspects marhaenism attributes a kind of a sacred wisdom to the common man, especially to the small farmers and the workers, which in the colonial era, was thwarted by the feudalistic suppression exercised by the Dutch, rendering the marhaen into a passive creature ridden by an inferiority complex.17 In a more down-to-earth sense the marhaenist program advocates "socio-


"Socio-democracy" and "socio-nationalism," and the establishment of a co-operative collectivist state based on traditional Indonesian concepts of mutual help. "Social-nationalism" is a nationalism based on the humanitarian impulse, it rejects aggressive imperialistic nationalism that sets country against country or class against class. "Socio-democracy" is an essentially collectivist system of economic production, but in which private national (as opposed to foreign-owned) enterprise operates in a "socially responsible manner."  

In essence, the program of Marhaenism differs from the dialectic materialism of Marxism. To be sure, marhaenist theoreticians follow Marxists in condemnation of laissez-faire capitalism as a system which encourage exploitative monopoly, widens the distance between rich and poor and concentrates political power solely in the hands of the "rich industrialists." But the Socialist method of seeking reform through evolutionary, parliamentary means the marhaenist also rejects. Marhaenist tactics are those of the revolutionary mass movement, composed of the "little" peasants and workers, who in a united front with other groups, having kindred objectives, can swiftly bring about a basic overturn of established society so that the marhaen will at last achieve the political prominence that is his due. Communism too is not favored.

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by the marhaenist, because the technique of a class struggle is held to be alien to the Indonesian character and repulsive to nationalism and social unity. Not dialectical or historical materialism but instead "historical parallelism" is the driving force of history.\textsuperscript{19} The latter term embodies a rejection both of the Hegelian metaphysics with its impersonal and resistless dynamic of change and of Marxist materialism and instead advances a kind of voluntaristic mystique, in which mind and body acting in "parallel" fashion, bring about desired social changes.\textsuperscript{20}

In marhaenism several strands of thought have been interwoven. There is nationalism and the search for a unique Indonesian national identity (the notion that there is a socialism a la Indonesia and that it bears the name marhaenism is itself an indication of the nature of this search), there is village communalism and tradition and there are vague conceptions of a general condition of well-being expressed in the ideal of national and international humanitarianism. But this melange contains other ideological exhortations of equal vagueness: "The remnants of feudalism" in Indonesia must be eliminated vital enterprise must be nationally owned but private capital of national

\textsuperscript{19} Kroef, "Indonesia's Unfinished Revolution," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 484.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.}
origin must also be respected and encouraged. How all these principles and ideological currents are to be reconciled and implemented in practice is a difficult matter which remains to be answered. The distinctly capitalistic inclinations of many PNI activists has contributed greatly to the instability and corruption of the Indonesian government in recent years. It is perhaps not surprising that the marhaenist philosophy has had comparatively little following in the poverty stricken Javanese countryside compared to the program of the Indonesian-Communist Party. And the loftier implications of marhaenism have today perhaps found an even more esoteric expression in the doctrines of the Pantjasila, or "Five Principles of the Indonesian State," also formulated by Sukarno, and comprising belief in God, nationalism, humanitarianism, democracy and social justice.

It would be a mistake to underrate the significance of the marhaenist ideology because of its vagueness and heterogeneity. It is not so much its program, that is important, but rather its ability to express a widely prevalent temper in the country, a mood of distrust of capitalistic private enterprise, of adhesion to traditional and


22 An outline of these five principles was first made by Sukarno on June 1, 1945 at the meeting of the Body for Investigating Efforts in Preparation for Independence. See Towards Freedom and the Dignity of Man: A Collection of Speeches by President Sukarno (Djakarta: Government of Indonesia, 1961), pp. 3-21.
deeply embedded folkways of mutual support and common endeavor, and above all a discontent with the aftermath of the political revolution against the Dutch which did not bring automatic prosperity, as had been popularly believed, and which therefore posits the necessity of still further domestic changes utile the revolution would be "complete."

But this temper has also been shrewdly analyzed by other movements in Indonesia and probably none of them has made it so useful to the means of realizing its objectives as has the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). A comparison of marhaenism and Communist theory in Indonesia at the present time does not reveal many important differences, but in implementing their theory and in organizing their followers the Communists have been far more effective than the PNI and in many parts of the country, especially in Central and East Java provinces, the PKI has steadily been gaining followers at the expense of the Nationalist Party.

3. THE COMMUNIST THEORY

Indonesian Communist theory also stresses that the Indonesian Revolution is, in fact, incomplete. The successful political revolution against the Dutch was but a stage in a complex development. For everywhere in Indonesia, the Communists argue, the old order still persists: the presence of foreign capital and foreign estate and mining enterprises, the "survivals of feudalism" in agrarian relationships
such as concentration of landownership and extensive peasant indebtedness, the threats coming from local "compradore" capitalist groups, in league with foreign interests, threats that further undermine internal security. What is needed, therefore, is not a government that will carry out Socialist reform but rather, "a government of the dictatorship of the people," which will carry out "democratic reforms." Such a government would be capable of "uniting all the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces," eliminate landlordism and provide land free of charge to the peasants, it would strengthen the national entrepreneur and capitalists in their fight against foreign imperialistic capital (the latter would, in fact, be eliminated), it would help in "raising the material living conditions of the workers," and it would carry out "a cultural revolution among the people."23

Like the marhaenist program the PKI program is solicitous of the welfare not only of the peasant, but also of the native Indonesian businessman, who is seen in both programs as a prey to the machinations of big foreign interests. At this point marhaenism and Indonesian Communist theory both advocate private enterprise. For example, the PKI program stipulates that the agrarian economy should be based on private ownership of peasants of the land and that "economically, the national capitalists should, moreover, be developed... protection and

and facilities must be granted to the national capitalists." To be sure, the extent of the power of the national capitalists must be carefully watched, nor are their political convictions necessarily the most desirable from the PKI point of view, but there is no denying that at the moment Indonesian Communist theory has made a place for private national enterprise.

All this puts Indonesian Communist theory in a somewhat unusual light and PKI leaders themselves have been quick to draw the implications of their party's present position. In so doing they have stressed the harmony between PKI aims and the principles set forth in President Sukarno's Political Manifesto and Res Publica Speech and the general theory of marhaenism. Sukarno had spoken of "short-term" objectives of the ongoing revolution in Indonesia, the latter including establishment of a just and prosperous society in which "imperialism" would be eliminated everywhere. Indonesian Communists interpret this Sukarno analysis to mean that there are two phases to the Indonesian revolution. In the first, the old feudal imperialistic order must be abolished, in the second a socialist society can be created. An as D. N. Aidit, Chairman of the PKI's

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Central Committee, put it in his address before the Conference of the 1945 Generation, in March, 1960: We cannot possibly complete the second stage of our revolution before we have completed the first stage. We cannot possibly build a Socialist society before we have completely liquidated imperialism and the survivals of feudalism... A person cannot possibly talk seriously now about "building a Socialistic society in Indonesia" so long as imperialism and feudalism are still tolerated." The postponement of the Socialist phase means that at this stage Communists must join hands with other Indonesian groups to complete the democratic phase of the national Indonesian revolution, i.e. collaborate with peasants, workers, and even with the national capitalists, in order to effect not a government of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" and a Socialist reconstruction program, but instead a government of "the dictatorship of the people" and a "democratic" program looking toward the abolition of landlordism, feudal agrarian relationships, and foreign term objective" as the PKI sees it—in which the technique of the united or national front is particularly appropriate. Although theoreticians of marhaenism have cautioned against the Communist national front idea, it needs hardly to be pointed out that marhaenist tactics themselves

25 Ibid.

stress the importance of the revolutionary mass movement (the front marhaenist as it is called) of peasants, workers and small entrepreneurs, and thereby in effect subscribe to the nations' front idea.

Whether the curious role of the PKI at present, with its support of private landownership and of national capitalism is wholly in accord with Sukarno's ideologies and with marhaenism may be doubted. This support of the PKI is, of course, but a tactic appropriate to this first stage of ongoing revolutionary effort: land for the landless and aid to private national entrepreneurs are means of breaking the alleged hold of feudalism and imperialism on Indonesia. Yet even as a tactic the PKI finds itself striving for essentially the same ends as are envisaged in Sukarno's speeches and in marhaenist thinking and it is hardly surprising that President Sukarno has long been in the high favor with the PKI. The President, in turn, has made it repeatedly plain that he regards the PKI as part of that national mass effort that is needed to help Indonesia overcome its present difficulties. As Sukarno put it in his address to the Sixth National Congress of the PKI early in August, 1959: "I have been very pleased with the Communist Party of Indonesia... because the Communist Party of Indonesia clearly states that it is indispensable to have national unity... we must not during a national revolution sharpen the class conflicts and the class struggle within our nation. On the contrary, we must build all revolutionary unity... into one powerful wave to sweep away our main enemy, political imperialism and economic imperialism,"

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B. FOREIGN POLICY: AN INDEPENDENT COURSE

Like India and the U.A.R., Indonesia's foreign policy is called "independent and active." It is claimed that this foreign policy is based on Sukarno's pantjasila or the five postulates, in which he suggested that nationalism is not only to establish the "state of free Indonesia, but we should also aim at making one family of all nations." For Sukarno, peace in the world is impossible to attain unless nationalism is recognized as the basis of internationalism; Sukarno specifically rejected cosmopolitanism. The existence of a national state is essential in Indonesia's international cooperation. Sukarno in the same speech said: "Nationalism cannot flower if it does not grow within the garden of internationalism. Thus, these two ...are dovetailed together."29

Bitter colonial experience, the experience of the independence struggle, and geographical distance from the center of the power struggle may all be part of the reason why Indonesia chose this neutral position in the cold war struggle. We can only summarize the main currents in Indonesia's relations with other countries.

1. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC

The U.S.S.R.'s unenthusiastic support in the UN for Indonesia's


29 Ibid., p. 24.
independence struggle was a disappointment for the Indonesian leaders. The Communist revolt at Madiun in September, 1948, was also viewed as a Russian-directed conspiracy. Following its independence, however, Indonesia does not feel much concerned about a communist threat from outside. 30 Diplomatic relations were not established with the U.S.S.R. until the first cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo in 1954. The diplomatic exchange with the U.S.S.R. was not made with enthusiasm, but for an "equilibrium" in Indonesia's diplomatic relations in the cold war. 31 Technical assistance and trade relations with Russia were negotiated in the later part of 1954. Russia participated in the International Trade Fair in Djakarta in 1954 and many Indonesian trade, medical and industrial delegations visited Russia during the same year. A trade agreement between the two countries was signed in 1956. President Sukarno visited Moscow in August, 1956, and received a spectacular welcome. He stressed in Moscow that Indonesia would accept any aid from any source if no political conditions were attached. Shortly after his return, Russia offered Indonesia a low interest loan of $100 million. 32 In 1957, the Russian Chief of State K. Y. Voroshilov visited Indonesia and voiced support against


32 Ibid.
colonialism and a ban on nuclear weapons.

The relations between the two countries have been friendly. The Indonesians appreciated the Russian support for her claim to West Iran through the United Nations. Mr. Khrushchev visited Indonesia in early 1960 in an effort to counter-balance the increase of U.S. influence in Asia through President Eisenhower's visit to India and the Middle East countries.

Indonesia has little cultural kinship with China. But, like India, she often has a fellow feeling for China's victory, which was led by Mao Tse-Tung in defeating western imperialism. Through a suggestion made by Hatta, Communist China recognized Indonesia; and on August 13, 1959, the envoy of Peking arrived at Djakarta. The Chinese Embassy had a huge staff which seemed to have aroused some suspicion in Djakarta. The Indonesian nationalists do not seem at all to equate communism with imperialism, as does the western bloc. On the contrary, the Indonesians identify themselves with Peking as anti-imperialist friends. The world peace conference in Peking in October, 1952, was attended by many Indonesian news reporters and politicians.

China's economic growth was admired and closely watched. Indonesia does not desire more trade relations with China. She did not

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33 News From Indonesia, November 18, 1949.
vote on the UN resolution calling China an aggressor (in Korea) on February 1, 1951. Indonesia also consistently supported a seat for Peking in the UN.

The 2.5 million Chinese residing in Indonesia are cause for careful dealing with China. Indonesia in early 1951 announced her restriction on Chinese immigration to an annual quota of 4000. All Chinese governments in the past have considered overseas Chinese as China's citizens; and so does the Communist Government in Peking. Most of the Chinese in Southeast Asia do not want to take local citizenship.

On April 22, 1955, a treaty was signed between the two countries, which provided the Chinese with a period of two years during which they had to choose to become Indonesians or remain Chinese. But only about 30% of the Chinese did choose before the end of the period; and 30% of the Chinese are pro-nationalist Chinese on Formosa. Relations between Peking and Djakarta over Chinese residents in Indonesia have been strained, because the Peking government demands protection for Chinese as the treaty so stipulated; at the same time Peking pledged not to interfere in Indonesian internal affairs. Thus the Peking-Djakarta development is closely watched by other Southeast Asian countries for their own future reference. Relations between the two

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countries have recently deteriorated over the treaty arrangements. Peking has chosen to protect its nationals against the Indonesian economic policy.

Indonesian trade with China is regulated by agreements. She did declare adherence to the UN embargo resolution of May 18, 1951, although she had abstained from voting on it. She, however, decided in 1956 to begin rubber export to China and North Korea. On the political front, Pancha Shila\textsuperscript{35} was recognized through a joint statement on April 28, 1955, between Chou En-Lai and Ali Sastroamidjojo. The latter visited Peking in the following June, 1955. In 1956, President Sukarno visited China and was more enthusiastically received. He seemed to be immensely impressed by the progress and unity in China.

Indonesian relations with Eastern European countries are only consequences of her relations with Russia and China. Political complications do not enter her diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet bloc countries. In fact Indonesia had concluded commercial treaties and economic aid pacts with several Eastern European countries before she entered such relations with the U.S.S.R.\textsuperscript{36} In 1955 she

\textsuperscript{35}See above p. 106.

\textsuperscript{36}Russell H. Fifield, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 145.
received from East Germany $7 million for the construction of a sugar
mill.37 She has diplomatic relations with most of the Communist countries.
But other than these trade and diplomatic contracts there is little
else which is not nominal.

Since 1953 the peaceful co-existence policy of the U.S.S.R.
has attracted the neutralist countries quite considerably. The Russian
economic drive in these countries only began in 1955. However, the
Soviet-bloc propaganda and its position on colonialism and racialism
have earned it great good will and friendship. It is a common and also
a natural practice of Russian delegates in the UN to vote the same
way with India, U.A.R. and Indonesia, for example, for the indepen­
dence of Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and the demand for abolition of
racial discrimination in the Union of South Africa.

The U.S.S.R. has been quick to adapt its foreign policy to
the neutralist-idealistic approach. The experience with western
imperialism gives the Indonesian leaders a sensitive appreciation of
the U.S.S.R.'s position on colonialism and racialism. The Soviet
diplomacy is fashioned to isolate the West from the uncommitted countries
and as a result Indonesia is currently under the high peak of international

37 Charles Wolf Jr., "Soviet Economic Aid in Southeast Asia,
Threat or Windfall?" World Politics, October, 1957, p. 93.
2. RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN BLOC

Indonesian leaders believed literally in the high ideals of the Atlantic charter and the role of the United Nations sponsored by the West. They took it for granted that the United States would whole-heartedly support the independence of Indonesia from the Dutch, because the U.S. commanded a great prestige and leadership among Southeast Asian leaders, and she was also committed to national self-determination.

But the U.S. did not utilize this unchallenged leadership. She was dominated by fear of Communism in Western Europe and continued a hands-off policy in Southeast Asia. She did not support the Indonesian independence unreservedly until after the second Dutch "police action." George McT. Kahin said "with the spring of 1949 came the nadir in America's position in Indonesia. Disillusionment with the United States grew to deep embitterment..." Only after mid-1949 were the Dutch subjected to the great U.S. pressure to give Indonesia

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its independence.

The change of U.S. policy in 1949, as seen by the Indonesians, was not based on an altruistic support for the Indonesian people, but rather based principally upon America's concern for its own strategic interests within the general context of the cold war, a concern which they believed was heightened by Communist victory in China.\(^\text{40}\)

The Indonesian struggle for independence ended in 1949 by an Indonesian-Dutch union under the queen. This union was at the beginning doomed to failure because of suspicion and distrust on both sides. Over one billion dollars in Dutch private capital was invested in Indonesia. To Indonesians, the over 50,000 Dutch businessmen, the 100,000 Eurasians and heavy Dutch investments threatened the economic and political security and development of the nation. The Dutch unwillingness to negotiate on the West Irian dispute further enhanced the political resentment against the Dutch.\(^\text{41}\)

The failure to solve the West Irian dispute provoked the Jakarta government to abrogate the agreement of Netherlands-Indonesian Union of 1949; on August 10, 1954, a protocol was signed

\(^{40}\)Ibid., p. 40.

\(^{41}\)Russel H. Fifield, op. cit., pp. 121-126, for fuller discussion.
which abrogated most of the previous agreements. Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo happily noted that "the old colonial link limiting our independence has been broken."\textsuperscript{42} But the Indonesian government unilaterally abrogated the entire Netherlands-Indonesian Union of February 13, 1956. Such abrogation was, on the Indonesian part, legalized by a bill passed through parliament and the constitutional convention.

The Dutch hoped to get diplomatic help through the N.A.T.O. council to force Indonesia to adopt a policy of moderation. The Indonesian government appealed for support from the Asian-African group. In connection with West Irian, Indonesia's relations with Australia, New Zealand, Britain and the U.S. often became strained and efforts by the Asian-African group through the United Nations failed to get a resolution that would require the two nations to enter again in direct negotiation on West Irian.

The dispute was first brought to the UN in 1954. President Sukarno stated that "the return of West Irian is for the remaining part of our national political aspiration. It is the final installment on the colonial debt."\textsuperscript{43} Indonesians accuse the Dutch of violating Article II of the Draft Charter of the transfer of sovereignty which

\textsuperscript{42} Times of Indonesia, August 18, 1954.

\textsuperscript{43} The Department of State Bulletin, June 4, 1956, p. 930.
provided that the future status of West Irian would be determined by negotiation within one year after the transfer of sovereignty. The issue seems to continue to shake the Indonesian cabinets and plague both sides with an apparent impasse. The tense implication is a very dangerous factor in Indonesia's internal politics and its political temper.44

The real contacts of Indonesia with the United States and Britain have been more economic than political since Indonesia does not agree with the Western powers on many of the cold war issues. French which had supported the Netherlands in the UN during Indonesia's struggle for independence, has been a target of Indonesian attack in the cases of Morocco, Tunisia, the Indo-China War, and the Algerian War of independence. British policy in North Borneo and Malaya has not been challenged in Djakarta. Before the second Dutch "police action" in 1948 Britain had been supporting the Netherlands in Indonesia, however, it granted a de facto recognition to the island republic after the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement in 1947. The interest in and support for Indonesia by both India and Australia had a bearing on British policy toward Indonesia. The Colombo Plan began cooperation with Indonesia in 1951; and Indonesia became a full member in 1953. As a result, Indonesia

44 Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "Irian in the Indonesian Politics," Far Eastern Survey, April, 1951, p. 75.
was economically brought into a close relation with the commonwealth nations of Australia, Canada, and also with the United States, which contributes economic aid through the plan. The plan further brings India, Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, and Indonesia into a relationship of political, economic, cultural cooperation for national development.

Indonesia's political relations with the U.S. have not been cordial, because of the latter's collective-military defense against the communist world, her lack of enthusiasm toward Indonesia's independence, abstention on the West Irian dispute, non-recognition of Communist China, and support given to Formosa. However, American good offices for Indonesian independence were appreciated. But the U.S. is also considered to oppose neutralism; and it was not considered to be peace-loving by the Indonesian press around 1952 and 1953. American aid was suspected to be imperialistic, an opinion based on the American abstention from the West Irian dispute in the UN, the U.S. support of the Indo-China War, and sponsorship of S.E.A.T.O.

The U.S. economic aid agreement caused the fall of Sukiman government in February, 1952, because the agreement provided that a state receiving aid should contribute to the defensive strength of the independent and sovereign nations as required by the Mutual
Security Act of 1951 passed by the U.S. Congress. The agreement was opposed as a challenge against Indonesia's independent foreign policy.

Indonesians complain that the U.S. aid is too little. The sizeable amounts of aid have been the $100 million grant by the Export-Import Bank in 1950, $7 million in 1955, $11 million in 1956, and other agreements on delivery of rice and other grains.

In general the U.S.-Indonesian relation has not been quite as stable as American relations with India. However, the visit by Mr. Dulles to Indonesia and President Sukarno in the U.S. in 1956 improved mutual relations and understanding considerably. American policy has been much less rigid since 1956 during which year both Nehru and Sukarno expressed their views to the American public during their visits to the U.S.

Indonesia has diplomatic relations with most of the Western countries. Trade relations with the West are more extensive than with the Soviet bloc and most foreign experts are recruited from Western Europe and the U.S.

C. RELATIONS WITHIN THE ASIAN-AFRICAN GROUP

Indonesia is primarily concerned with her close neighbors and

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the Arab world. Her participation in the Colombo Plan and special intimate relations with India are important factors in her foreign policy.

Even before real independence was achieved, Indonesia sent diplomatic agents to the Middle Eastern countries for support. Ninety percent of her population follow the Islamic religion, and Indonesia is "interested in cooperation among the Moslem countries of the world." Her support for Tunisia and Morocco were clear examples. She succeeded, in opposition against India, in preventing an invitation to Israel to the Bandung Conference. Her violent position against France and Britain on the Suez canal crisis of 1956 at both the London conference and in the United Nations was a further indication of her close relations with the Arab countries, which, in return, consistently supported Indonesian independence in the UN and endorsed her claim on West Irian.

However, Indonesia does not seem to endorse Arab solidarity in opposition to a general African-Asian common approach to world affairs. She has, nevertheless, many treaties of friendship with Arab states. Sukarno visited the Middle East in 1955. One of Indonesia's cardinal principles on foreign policy has been the demand of independence for all North Africa. For example, she

46 Fifield, op. cit., p. 119.
recognized as early as December, 1951, "the king of Egypt as King of both Egypt and the Sudan," and in 1952 she permitted a "Tunisian office" to be created in Djakarta as a symbol of future recognition. Indonesia was active in placing the Algerian question on the UN General Assembly agenda in 1955. The close relations between Indonesia and the Afro-Asian nations began since 1947. Examples of their early support of each other include, Indonesia's dispatch of a delegation to the Middle East in April, 1947, wherein she acquired de facto recognition and friendship treaties from many Arab states in a few months. Such diplomatic activities were charged by the Dutch as violations of the Linggadjati Agreement.

Among all Asian countries, Indonesia's relations with India are the most cordial and close. Such good relations may be traced to the religious and cultural kinship in their early histories. The leaders of both countries knew each other as early as the 1920's. Indonesia's national movement also adopted a non-cooperation policy against the Dutch as India did against the British. India supported the Indonesian independence struggle from the beginning to end. She refused the Dutch permission to use Indian airfields and seaports; she sent a medical unit to the Republic during the war with the Dutch; and the Dutch military actions were severely condemned.

In addition to visits by Indonesia's Premier, President

\textsuperscript{47}Ibid., p. 155.
Sukarno visited India in January, 1950 to strengthen their bonds of good relations. Friendship and trade treaties exist between the two countries. It should be remembered that it was India who brought the Indonesian case before the United Nations in 1947, and that a New Delhi Conference on Indonesia was called by Nehru on January 20, 1949, to give United Asian support to Indonesia.

During Nehru's visit to Djakarta in June, 1950, he actually laid down the basic foreign policy for his host country when he said that "we become more and more intimately connected, not by formal treaties and alliances and pacts but by bonds which are much more secure, much more binding -- the bonds of mutual understanding and interest and, if I may say so, even of mutual affection."

To remain an informal but loyal ally with India is an important consideration in Indonesian policy-making.

Indonesia faces a dilemma on the Kashmir dispute in her relations with India and Pakistan. The Indonesians were afraid of a war over Kashmir; but they failed to mediate on the dispute between India and Pakistan, because India refused the UN supported plebiscite.

49 Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1949-53, op. cit., p. 117.
and seemed to want the whole of Kashmir. Although fearing a Kashmir war that might upset the relations in the sub-continent, Indonesia cannot do anything that will hurt India or compromise Pakistan's position on Kashmir.\(^{51}\)

Indonesia's relations with Pakistan are not as close as that with India, despite the commonly shared Islamic religion. President Sukarno visited Pakistan in early 1950 and thanked his Islamic brothers who had refused to fight against the Indonesians when Britain landed in Indonesia in 1945. Indonesia signed friendship treaties with both India and Pakistan on the same day, March 3, 1951. Indonesia was much alarmed at the U.S.-Pakistan Alliance, because she feared the extension of the cold war to southeast Asia and possible involvement in another world war.\(^{52}\)

Indonesia's relation with Burma is also very close. Mutual visits have become very frequent, including those of Ali Sastroamidjojo, Hatta and Sukarno. The two countries generally agree on major issues at the Colombo conference. They signed a friendship treaty in 1951 and mutually supported each other on anti-colonial issues. Burma in 1954 sent a hundred tons of gift rice to Indonesia for relief of

\(^{51}\) Dunning Idle, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

\(^{52}\) Ibid., p. 114.
victims of flood disasters. In appreciation of the rice the Indonesian foreign minister commented on it as "close bonds of sympathy and mutual understanding."53

Even though her effort for Asian solidarity has been a disappointment to her, Indonesia has adopted a good neighbor policy toward all. With regard to the Philippines, Pakistan and Thailand, she only hopes for cooperation whenever possible. Thailand is generally not considered a member of the Asian-Arab bloc. She did not attend the 1949 New Delhi Conference on Indonesia nor did she sponsor the thirteen Asian-nation resolution on the cease-fire in Korea in 1950. But geographic proximity qualifies her to enjoy Indonesia's good neighbor policy. There have been mutual visits; and a friendship treaty was signed in 1954.

The Philippine Republic was active for Indonesia's independence; she also actively supported the latter's membership in the UN.54 The two countries recognized their ancient cultural and racial kinship. Sukarno and Quirino seemed to have tried hard to influence each other on foreign policy but without success during

53 Fifield, op. cit., p. 154.

their mutual visits. Djakarta expressed embarrassment when the Philippines signed a military pact with the United States.\footnote{Ibid., July 16, 17, 28, 30, 1952.}

Indonesia accepted Ho Chi Minh's regime as legitimate national independence movement; and she was opposed to the French Indo-China War. She was also very slow to admit that Vietminh was communist-dominated, because of her sentiment against colonialism. However, Indonesia did not challenge the British policy in Malaya and British North Borneo, even though Britain did not support the Indonesian cause at the UN Security Council until after the second Dutch "police action.\footnote{Fifield, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 155.} Since independence, Malaya and Indonesia have had very good relations. The two agreed to cooperate on cultural linguistic and educational questions.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 156-157.} As a member of the Colombo powers, Indonesia did its best in a joint effort to promote the Geneva Conference of 1954 on the Indo-China war. She announced on April 6, 1955, the de facto recognition of Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam and North Vietnam. In January of 1957, the Indonesian government signed a treaty of trade with Ho Chi Minh's government.\footnote{Ibid., p. 149.}

The Afro-Asian conference in Bandung greatly boosted Indonesia's
role in the Asian-African group. Being host to the delegates from 28 countries was a great prestige factor for Indonesia, regardless of some disagreements among the countries. The conference demonstrated the awareness of geographical cultural, religious ties and common colonial experience. Indonesia in particular seemed to hope for an emphasis on the anti-west attitude and on a united Asia. The conference was described in part as a protest by the sponsoring states against the supposed failure of the Western powers to pay sufficient attention to the Asian countries and their views in making decisions affecting Asia.

The conference gave the Indonesian leaders a chance to meet all the leaders of the participating countries and to obtain their support of "the position of Indonesia in the case of West Irian based on the relevant agreements between Indonesia and the Netherlands." The active and independent foreign policy of Indonesia had one of its best manifestations at the Bandung Conference.

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59 See above, pp. 57-65 for fuller discussion.


CONCLUSION

A. THE EXPANSION OF NEUTRALISM:

Between 1947 and 1950 India was practically the only country to pursue a policy of neutralism - then in its formative stage. Both the power blocs regarded the policy as heretical.

With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, neutralism became more attractive. In the context of the new balance of power created by the accession of China to the Communist camp and the possession of the atom bomb by the Soviet Union, and the general consternation all over the world at the outbreak of actual hostilities, the neutralist countries in the Security Council - India, Yugoslavia (which had broken away from the Soviet camp in 1948) and Egypt (though it was still under the Farouki regime) - were able to contribute to the peace efforts at the time. India assumed certain direct responsibilities in trying to ease the Korean situation. These years opened a new negotiating and mediating role for the neutralist nations. This role was played with considerable effect in the Indo-China crises in 1954.

The neutralist countries took an active part in the discussions in the United Nations on the questions of liberation of colonies like Tunisia and Morocco; disarmament; racism in South Africa; and in international efforts for the economic development of underdeveloped nations. Fuller implications of the policy also emerged, as for example
in the opposition to regional military pacts.

The strength of the neutralist nations grew in the world body with the liberation of new countries or in consequence of major political changes in others as in the case of Indonesia, Burma, and Egypt. The two blocs also came to look upon the policy of neutralism more seriously though with continuing scepticism and suspicion.

By 1956, there was a further turning point. The political changes in the Soviet Union following the death of Stalin and the accession of Khrushchev to leadership in the party (and later in the government) meant a modification of Soviet policies towards the neutralist countries. This modification soon found eloquent expression in the report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The failure of U.S. policies in China and later in Indo-China led to some rethinking in American circles also. Though the Vice-President Nixon and Secretary of State Dulles repeatedly denounced neutralist policy as "immoral" till 1956, there were indications of a change in some of the statements of President Eisenhower. Fuller indications of these changes in the Western attitude came only a few years later and very slowly. By now neutralist policy has assumed a greater respectability and importance in world affairs. The Suez crisis of 1956 gave indication of the utility of the policy in preserving the independence of weak nations.

A little later, the operation of the policy with regard to developments in Hungary did not meet with appreciation in neutralist
circles. In general, neutralist nations were critical of the Soviet action in Hungary as violating the freedom of a small nation, but the tone of criticism was not as severe as in the case of Suez.

Apart from the differences in the nature of the two crises, there was also the fact that the Soviet Union had, after the revision of its policy toward the neutralist countries, gone much farther than any Western country to cultivate their friendship and had committed herself in support of these countries in major questions of national interest to them like the West Irian issue for Indonesia and the Kashmir and Goa issues for India. The changing attitude of the two blocs, particularly of the Communist, the increasing strength of the neutralist group of nations in the world, especially due to the advent of independence to a number of African nations and a greater clarification of the principles of the policy in practice also contributed to increasing the effectiveness of the policy in world affairs.

On practically all major issues in world affairs the neutralist nations are seen to participate with greater or lesser success. The Five Power resolution moved at the 15th Session of the UN General Assembly on September 30, 1960, and the Belgrade appeal of 1961 to the two major powers are indications of this increasing participation of the neutralist nations in world affairs.

The original 12-nation Arab-Asian group in the United Nations
had enlarged itself into the Afro-Asian group by 1950 when Ethiopia and Liberia, the only two independent Sub-Saharan African states at that time, joined the group. Today with a strength of 34, it has grown into the largest political or regional grouping in the United Nations.

It is a forum where Afro-Asian states meet together to discuss and work on solutions to common problems. What is important is not that these nations disagree and have disagreed on major questions, but that they feel some sort of common cause and urge and have therefore developed an affinity.

The similarity in approach to international politics by the Afro-Asian group arises from the existence of a certain similarity in three factors that generate their foreign policies:

1. Subjection to foreign rule or control and racial discrimination in the recent past. The consequence of this has been a powerful and emotional resentment against imperialism and the imperialist powers, distrust of their policies, an extreme self-consciousness and sensitivity about their newly won independence and the equality of status with other nations.

2. The emergence of a strong and triumphant nationalism with an anti-colonial tradition, but also with social objectives of a very general character, often bordering on socialism.
3. Underdeveloped economy and a strong urge for modernization and social and economic development. In foreign relations the country therefore seeks to create such attachments and conditions as would help it in the pursuit of the objective of development.

These common factors have led to the existence of certain common objectives in the foreign policies of these nations such as the search for security and the preservation of their independence; a quality of status with other nations; establishment of the independence of all colonies and the principle of the equality of races; and social and economic development through bilateral or multilateral programs. The preservation of peace is seen as a necessary condition for the achievement of this, and is therefore often made out as the primary objective.

From this have emerged certain common programs in foreign policy. Primarily, they tended to avoid entanglements in Cold War politics by keeping aloof from alignment with particular blocs and bilateral or collective military alliances formed in this context. For the preservation of peace they have urged disarmament, total prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons and the adoption of peaceful methods of settlement of disputes between nations. They have supported the United Nations in which they find the means of collective security, particularly for small nations, and the peaceful settlement of disputes; and expression of the principle of
equality of nations; a forum through which their own importance and
independence in foreign relations can be maximized; and the means of
promoting international cooperation, particularly for their own de­
velopment efforts. They have opposed colonialism and threats to the
independence of nations and the principle of racism adopted in the
policies and practices of other nations.

There have been other expressions of a similar affinity among
Afro-Asian nations. The Bandung Conference of twenty-nine Afro-Asians
in April, 1955, was an important demonstration of this fact. The two
previous occasions for similar international conferences had been con­
fined to Asian countries - the Asian Relations Conference of 1947
and the Asian Conference on Indonesia in 1949. The sponsors of the
Bandung Conference were five Asian powers (Burma, Ceylon, India,
Indonesia, and Pakistan) but they had decided to convene, not an
Asian, but an Afro-Asian Conference. This was at a time when Africa
was just beginning to make its entry onto the world scene. Five
African states, not all of them fully independent, attended the con­
ference. The final communique of the conference showed the broad
nature of spheres of agreement among these nations on colonialism,
world peace and cooperation, racism and human rights, and economic,
cultural and other forms of cooperation among the Afro-Asian nations.
Full understanding on the methods of achieving these common objec­
tives has not, however, developed among them, except when they were
very broadly stated as in the Declaration on Colonialism by the UN
General Assembly in December, 1960.
The Belgrade Conference of September, 1961, was another instance whereby the neutralist countries (now slightly extended outside the Afro-Asian region) had voiced their judgment on practically all world issues; with compromises being reached and with emphasis being placed on select topics.

But the existence of common factors of the foreign policy of Afro-Asian countries are, however, often counterpoised by the differences in degrees to which they are present, the existence of other factors, and the differences in the specific national interests of each country. The great diversity in the history, traditions, politics, economics, social organization, and geography of the countries that met at Belgrade is an indication of these diversities.

Countries coming from the background of different continents vary with regard to their historical and recent experiences and traditions. Even as regards countries from the same continent considerable differences can be seen in their recent historical experiences regarding colonialism or foreign rule, nature of nationalist movements, methods of struggle for independence, forms of political organization, internal political conditions, nature and qualities of leadership, level of development, or rather underdevelopment and problems of security by virtue of geography, size, etc. Besides, the specific national interests of each country give particular orientations to their policies. From the midst of this diversity it is only natural if a uniform policy for all countries has not always emerged. The impact of various
international events on each of the countries varies and its outcome in foreign policy is not uniform.

B. GENERAL ESTIMATE:

The Cairo Preparatory Conference of June, 1961, affirmed the belief in its final communique that the area of neutralism in the world had widened and could further widen in scope and influence to become "a fundamental factor in the preservation of international peace and security."

In relation to major questions of peace in the world, the policy of neutralism has come to be a medium for setting off negotiations between the major power blocs in the world. At times of important international crisis when the East-West tensions had reached a high breaking point as in Korea, Indo-China and Laos, the policies of the non-aligned nations were seen to pay good dividends. They were able to initiate negotiations and occasionally smooth out minor points of differences between the two blocs. They have also come in very handy to hold position of high, but delicate responsibility as in Korea and Laos. But this role has not always been successful as was seen in their efforts in the United Nations to resolve the deadlock after the failure of the Paris Summit or at the Belgrade Conference to resolve the deadlock over Germany and Berlin. On questions like colonialism, racism, disarmament, testing of nuclear weapons, etc., the policy has helped, though not always with spectacular success,
to promote what they have regarded as the conditions of freedom and peace.

Within the United Nations, the policies of these nations have resulted, within limits, in protecting and promoting the interests of the non-self governing territories and developing a greater consciousness about the problems of the under-developed areas and organizing international assistance programs in the social and economic fields. The unanimous support given to the world body by these nations has also gone a long way to strengthen the organization. The functioning of the neutralist nations in the UN has demonstrated definitely that neutralism is not a passive policy and that the nations pursuing the policy have taken up international responsibilities vis-à-vis world problems.

In relation to African problems in particular, the neutralist nations have sought to encourage the growth of the forces of nationalism and the cause of the freedom of subject peoples. This is what they have sought to do in Algeria, the Congo, Angola, South Africa and other areas of the continent. It is also evident that the neutralist nations have, in general, shown greater energy and dynamism in promoting schemes for the economic development of the area through the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

But the policy of neutralism still suffers from certain obvious limitations of scope and action. It came into being as a result of the
interplay of a variety of circumstances relating to the international situation as well as the national conditions within the countries themselves. It continued to grow as an important force in modern international relations as a result of the persistence of these same circumstances.

The most important of the international situations relating to the emergence of the policy of neutralism was the division of the world into two blocs threatening to engulf the world in a mighty conflagration. The new and weak nations of Asia, Africa and other part of the world that turned to neutralism were seeking refuge from the dangers to their own freedom and existence from this bloc antagonism. The practical successes of the policy were registered only when the balance of power between the two blocs had reached an even keel, as from 1950 onwards. The policy has operated in international affairs within the scope of this balance of power.

In this, the neutralist nations were aided by certain new trends in international relations. The possession of an adequate power by both the blocs to destroy each other completely has made it necessary for them to place an increasing emphasis on factors other than that of superior military power in their diplomatic practices. The growth of the democratic practice of counting votes in world politics through the functioning of international organizations has given the smaller nations an importance beyond their limited military power. As uncommitted nations, the position of the neutralist countries
has become particularly important in this respect. The growth of an independent public opinion, as different from the opinions of various governments, has also helped this process of international relations. In consequence of these developments, the neutralist nations are today in a position to negotiate and mediate between the bigger nations and to assume an independent position for themselves. This means that a major shift in the present balance of power position would make the operation of the policy difficult if not impossible. The ending of bloc divisions and antagonisms would also remove the scope and need for the continued operation of the policy.

It has often been pointed out that the basic elements of the policy are negative, that is keeping aloof from power blocs, opposition to racism and colonialism, etc., and that the unifying forces of the policy are derived from this common opposition to them. It is, therefore, pointed out that with the natural death of colonialism, racism, and the like, these elements of unity are liable to vanish. The increasing expressions of disagreement among major neutralist countries are pointed out in justification of this view.

There is apparently a large element of truth in these views. At the same time, a further factor of major importance has also to be considered in this context. It is not by simple accident that the governments of those countries that pursue an active neutralist policy—countries like Ghana, India, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, which form the real centers of the neutralist policy in the underdeveloped
world - are seen to be more stable and more popular (though not always realized through parliamentary democratic institutions, but this is largely due to the special circumstances in these countries) and to be more conscious of an responsive to the needs of their people and country than the governments of countries aligned to the Western bloc. In other words, the policy of neutralism in world affairs is linked up with the general policy of these governments of progressive social and economic action within their own countries. This interrelationship between foreign and domestic policies may not be equally evident in certain neutralist countries like Saudi Arabia or Nepal, but so far as the neutralist policy is concerned are only peripheral. Further, the very fact that these countries have claimed to pursue a neutralist policy indicates the pressure exercised by the operation of progressive social forces on these governments, even though this has not expressed itself in more visible form in their political and social organization.

Neutralism as a policy in international relations might tend to become irrelevant under a different set of international relations. But the real political content of the policy, viz., the emergence of a long-delayed social revolution in these underdeveloped countries, might continue to be expressed in their external policies in other forms.
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A. FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE.

The Asian-African Conference, convened upon the invitation of the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan met in Bandung from the 18th to the 24th April, 1955. In addition to the sponsoring countries the following 24 countries participated in the conference:

1. Afghanistan 13. Liberia
2. Cambodia 14. Libya
4. Egypt 16. Philippines
5. Ethiopia 17. Saudi Arabia
6. Gold Coast 18. Sudan
7. Iran 19. Syria
8. Iraq 20. Thailand
12. Lebanon 24. Yemen

The Asian-African Conference considered problems of common interest and concern to countries of Asia and Africa and discussed ways and means by which their people could achieve fuller economic, cultural and political cooperation.

A. ECONOMIC COOPERATION

1. The Asian-African Conference recognized the urgency of promoting economic development in the Asian-African region. There was general desire for economic cooperation among the participating countries on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty. The proposals with regard to economic cooperation within the participating countries do not preclude either the desirability or the need for cooperation with countries outside the region, including the investment of foreign capital. It was further recognized that the assistance being received by certain participating countries from outside the region, through international or under bilateral arrangements, had made a valuable contribution to the implementation of their development programmes.

2. The participating countries agreed to provide technical assistance to one another, to the maximum extent practicable, in the
form of: experts, trainees, pilot projects and equipment for demonstration purposes; exchange of know-how and establishment of national, and where possible, regional training and research institutes for imparting technical knowledge and skills in cooperation with the existing international agencies.

3. The Asian-African Conference recommended: the early establishment of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development; the allocation by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development of a greater part of its resources to Asian-African countries; the early establishment of the International Finance Corporation which should include in its activities the undertaking of equity investment, and encouragement to the promotion of joint ventures among Asian-African countries in so far as this will promote their common interest.

4. The Asian-African Conference recognized the vital need for stabilizing commodity trade in the region. The principle of enlarging the scope of multilateral trade and payments was accepted. However, it was recognized that some countries would have to take recourse to bilateral trade arrangements in view of their prevailing economic conditions.

5. The Asian-African Conference recommended that collective action be taken by participating countries for stabilizing the international prices of and demand for primary commodities through bilateral and multilateral arrangements, and that as far as practicable and desirable, they should adopt a unified approach on the subject in the United Nations Permanent Advisory Commission on International Commodity Trade and other international forums.

6. The Asian-African Conference further recommended that: Asian-African countries should diversify their export trade by processing their raw material, wherever economically feasible, before export; intraregional trade fairs should be promoted and encouragement given to the exchange of trade delegations and groups of businessmen; exchange of information and of samples should be encouraged with a view to promoting intra-regional trade and normal facilities should be provided for transit trade of land-locked countries.

7. The Asian-African Conference attached considerable importance to Shipping and expressed concern that shipping lines reviewed from time to time their freight rates, often to the detriment of participating countries. It recommended a study of this problem, and collective action thereafter, to induce the shipping lines to adopt a more reasonable attitude. It was suggested that a study of railway
freight of transit trade may be made.

8. The Asian-African Conference agreed that encouragement should be given to the establishment of national and regional banks and insurance companies.

9. The Asian-African Conference felt that exchange of information on matters relating to oil, such as remittance of profits and taxation, might eventually lead to the formulation of common policies.

10. The Asian-African Conference emphasized the particular significance of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, for the Asian-African countries. The Conference welcomed the initiative of the Powers principally concerned in offering to make available information regarding the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; urged the speedy establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency which should provide for adequate representation of the Asian-African countries on the executive authority of the Agency; and recommended to the Asian and African Governments to take full advantage of the training and other facilities in the peaceful uses of atomic energy offered by the countries sponsoring such programmes.

11. The Asian-African Conference agreed to the appointment of Liaison Officers in participating countries, to be nominated by their respective national Governments, for the exchange of information and ideas on matters of mutual interest. It recommended that fuller use should be made of the existing international organizations, and participating countries who were not members of such international organizations, but were eligible, should secure membership.

12. The Asian-African Conference recommended that there should be prior consultation of participating countries in international forums with a view, as far as possible, to furthering their mutual economic interest. It is, however, not intended to form a regional bloc.

B. CULTURAL COOPERATION

1. The Asian-African Conference was convinced that among the most powerful means of promoting understanding among nations is the development of cultural cooperation. Asia and Africa have been the cradle of great religions and civilizations which have enriched other cultures and civilizations while themselves being enriched in the process. Thus the cultures of Asia and Africa are based on spiritual and universal foundations. Unfortunately contacts among Asian and African countries were interrupted during the past centuries. The
peoples of Asia and Africa are now animated by a keen and sincere desire to renew their old cultural contacts and develop new ones in the context of the modern world. All participating Governments at the Conference reiterated their determination to work for closer cultural cooperation.

2. The Asian-African Conference took note of the fact that the existence of colonialism in many parts of Asia and Africa in whatever form it may be not only prevents cultural cooperation but also suppresses the national cultures of the people. Some colonial powers have denied to their dependent peoples basic rights in the sphere of education and culture which hampers the development of their personality and also prevents cultural intercourse with other Asian and African peoples. This is particularly true in the case of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, where the basic right of the people to study their own language and culture has been suppressed. Similar discrimination has been practised against African and coloured people in some parts of the Continent of Africa. The Conference felt that these policies amount to a denial of the fundamental rights of man, impede cultural advancement in this region and also hamper cultural cooperation on the wider international plane. The Conference condemned such a denial of fundamental rights in the sphere of education and culture in some parts of Asia and Africa by this and other forms of cultural suppression.

In particular, the Conference condemned racialism as a means of cultural suppression.

3. It was not from any sense of exclusiveness or rivalry with other groups of nations and other civilizations and cultures that the Conference viewed the development of cultural cooperation among Asian and African countries. True to the age-old tradition of tolerance and universality, the Conference believed that Asian and African cultural cooperation should be developed in the larger context of world cooperation.

Side by side with the development of Asian-African cultural cooperation the countries of Asia and Africa desire to develop cultural contacts with others. This would enrich their own culture and would also help in the promotion of world peace and understanding.

4. There are many countries in Asia and Africa which have not been able to develop their educational, scientific and technical institutions. The Conference recommended that countries in Asia and Africa which are more fortunately placed in this respect should give facilities for the admission of students and trainees from such countries to their institutions. Such facilities should also be made available to the
Asian and African people in Africa to whom opportunities for acquiring higher education are at present denied.

5. The Asian-African Conference felt that the promotion of cultural cooperation among countries of Asia and Africa should be directed towards:

(I) the acquisition of knowledge of each other's country;
(II) mutual cultural exchange, and
(III) exchange of information.

6. The Asian-African Conference was of opinion that at this stage the best results in cultural cooperation would be achieved by pursuing bilateral arrangements to implement its recommendations and by each country taking action on its own, wherever possible and feasible.

C. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION

1. The Asian-African Conference declared its full support of the fundamental principles of Human Rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and took note of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.

The Conference declared its full support of the principles of self-determination of peoples and nations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations resolutions on the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination, which is a pre-requisite of the full enjoyment of all fundamental Human Rights.

2. The Asian-African Conference deplored the policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination which form the basis of government and human relations in large regions of Africa and in other parts of the world. Such conduct is not only a gross violation of human rights, but also a denial of the fundamental values of civilization and the dignity of man.

The Conference extended its warm sympathy and support for the courageous stand taken by the victims of racial discrimination, especially by the peoples of African and Indian and Pakistani origin in South Africa; applauded all those who sustain their cause, re-affirmed the determination of Asian-African peoples to eradicate every trace of racialism that might exist in their own countries; and pledged to use its full moral influence to guard against the danger of falling victims
to the same evil in their struggle to eradicate it.

D. PROBLEMS OF DEPENDENT PEOPLES

1. The Asian-African Conference discussed the problems of dependent peoples and colonialism and the evils arising from the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation.

The Conference is agreed:

(a) in declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end;

(b) in affirming that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation;

(c) in declaring its support of the cause of freedom and independence for all such people, and

(d) in calling upon the powers concerned to grant freedom and independence to such peoples.

2. In view of the unsettled situation in North Africa and of the persisting denial to the peoples of North Africa of their right to self-determination, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of the rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence and urged the French Government to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue without delay.

E. OTHER PROBLEMS

1. In view of the existing tension in the Middle East, caused by the situation in Palestine and of the danger of that tension to world peace, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and called for the implementation of the United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.

2. The Asian-African Conference, in the context of its expressed attitude on the abolition of colonialism, supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West Irian based on the relevant agreements between Indonesia and the Netherlands.
The Asian-African Conference urged the Netherlands Government to reopen negotiations as soon as possible, to implement their obligations under the above-mentioned agreements and expressed the earnest hope that the United Nations would assist the parties concerned in finding a peaceful solution to the dispute.

3. The Asian-African Conference supported the position of Yemen in the case of Aden and the Southern parts of Yemen known as the Protectorates and urged the parties concerned to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

F. PROMOTION OF WORLD PEACE AND COOPERATION

1. The Asian-African Conference, taking note of the fact that several States have still not been admitted to the United Nations, considered that for effective cooperation for world peace, membership in the United Nations should be universal, called on the Security Council to support the admission of all those States which are qualified for membership in terms of the Charter. In the opinion of the Asian-African Conference, the following among participating countries, viz: Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Nepal, a unified Vietnam were so qualified.

The Conference considered that the representation of the countries of the Asian-African region on the Security Council, in relation to the principle of equitable geographical distribution, was inadequate. It expressed the view that as regards the distribution of the non-permanent seats, the Asian-African countries which, under the arrangement arrived at in London in 1946, are precluded from being elected, should be enabled to serve on the Security Council, so that they might make a more effective contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

2. The Asian-African Conference having considered the dangerous situation of international tension existing and the risks confronting the whole human race from the outbreak of global war in which the destructive power of all types of armaments, including nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, would be employed, invited the attention of all nations to the terrible consequences that would follow if such a war were to break out.

The Conference considered that disarmament and the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons of war are imperative to save mankind and civilization from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction. It considered that the nations of Asia and Africa assembled here have a duty towards humanity and civilization to proclaim their support for disarmament and for the prohibition of these weapons and to appeal to nations principally concerned and to world opinion, to bring about such disarmament and prohibition.
The Conference considered that effective international control should be established and maintained to implement much disarmament and prohibition and that speedy and determined efforts should be made to this end.

Pending the total prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, this Conference appealed to all the powers concerned to reach agreement to suspend experiments with such weapons.

The Conference declared that universal disarmament is an absolute necessity for the preservation of peace and requested the United Nations to continue its efforts and appealed to all concerned speedily to bring about the regulation, limitation, control and reduction of all armed forces and armaments, including the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of all weapons of mass destruction, and to establish effective international control to this end.

G. DECLARATION ON THE PROMOTION OF WORLD PEACE AND COOPERATION

The Asian-African Conference gave anxious thought to the question of world peace and cooperation. It viewed with deep concern the present state of international tension with its danger of an atomic world war. The Problem of peace is correlative with the problem of international security. In this connection, all States should cooperate, especially through the United Nations, in bringing about the reduction of armaments and the elimination of nuclear weapons under effective international control. In this way, international peace can be promoted and nuclear energy may be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. This would help answer the needs particularly of Asia and Africa, for what they urgently require are social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.

Freedom and peace are interdependent. The right of self-determination must be enjoyed by all peoples, and freedom and independence must be granted, with the least possible delay, to those who are still dependent peoples. Indeed, all nations should have the right freely to choose their own political and economic systems and their own way of life, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Free from mistrust and fear, and with confidence and goodwill towards each other, nations should practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors and develop friendly cooperation on the basis of the following principles.

1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.

3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small.

4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.

5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

6. (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.

(b) Abstention by any country from exorting pressures on other countries.

7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.

8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

9. Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation.

10. Respect for justice and international obligations.

The Asian-African Conference declared its conviction that friendly cooperation in accordance with these principles would effectively contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security, while cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields would help bring about the common prosperity and well-being of all.

The Asian-African Conference recommended that the five sponsoring countries consider the convening of the next meeting of the Conference, in consultation with the participating countries.

Bandung, 24th April, 1955
B. DECLARATION OF THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT
OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

The Conference of Heads of State or Government of the following non-aligned countries:

1. Afghanistan
2. Algeria
3. Burma
4. Cambodia
5. Ceylon
6. Congo
7. Cuba
8. Cyprus
9. Ethiopia
10. Ghana
11. Guinea
12. India
13. Indonesia
14. Iraq
15. Lebanon
16. Mali
17. Morocco
18. Nepal
19. Saudi Arabia
20. Somalia
21. Sudan
22. Tunisia
23. United Arab Republic
24. Yemen
25. Yugoslavia

and of the following countries represented by observers:

1. Bolivia
2. Brazil
3. Ecuador

was held in Belgrade from September 1 to 6, 1961, for the purpose of exchanging views on international problems with a view to contributing more effectively to world peace and security and peaceful cooperation among peoples.

The Heads of State or Government of the aforementioned countries have met at a moment when international events have taken a turn for the worse and when world peace is seriously threatened. Deeply concerned for the future of peace, voicing the aspirations of the vast majority of people of the world, aware that, in our time, no people and no government can or should abandon its responsibilities in regard to the safeguarding of world peace, the participating countries - having examined in detail, in an atmosphere of equality, sincerity and mutual confidence, the current state of international relations and trends prevailing in the present-day world - make the following declaration:

THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

noting that there are crises that lead towards a world conflict in the transition from an old order based on domination to a new order based on cooperation between nations, founded on freedom, equality and social justice for the promotion of prosperity; considering that the dynamic
processes and forms of social change often result in or represent a conflict between the old established order and the new emerging nationalist forces; considering that a lasting peace can be achieved only if this confrontation leads to a world where the domination of colonialism-imperialism and neo-colonialism in all their manifestations is radically eliminated;

AND RECOGNIZING THE FACT

that acute emergencies threatening world peace now exist in this period of conflict in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin American and big power rivalry likely to result in world conflagration cannot be excluded;

that to eradicate basically the source of conflict is to eradicate colonialism in all its manifestations and to accept and practice a policy of peaceful coexistence in the world;

that guided by these principles the period of transition and conflict can lay a firm foundation of cooperation and brotherhood between nations, state the following:

I

War has never threatened mankind with graver consequences than today. On the other hand, never before has mankind had at its disposal stronger forces for eliminating war as an instrument of policy in international relations.

Imperialism is weakening. Colonial empires and other forms of foreign oppression of peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America are gradually disappearing from the stage of history. Great successes have been achieved in the struggle of many peoples for national independence and equality. In the same way, the peoples of Latin America are continuing to make an increasingly effective contribution to the improvement of international relations. Great social changes in the world are further promoting such a development. All this not only accelerates the end of the epoch of foreign oppression of peoples, but also makes peaceful cooperation among peoples, based on the principles of independence and equal rights, an essential condition for their freedom and progress.

Tremendous progress has been achieved in the development of science, techniques and in the means of economic development.

Prompted by such developments in the world, the vast majority of people are becoming increasingly conscious of the fact that war
between peoples constitutes not only an anachronism but also a crime against humanity. This awareness of peoples is becoming a great moral force, capable of exercising a vital influence on the development of international relations.

Relying on this and on the will of their peoples, the Governments of countries participating in the Conference resolutely reject the view that war, including the "cold war," is inevitable, as this view reflects a sense both of helplessness and hopelessness and is contrary to the progress of the world. They affirm their unwavering faith that the international community is able to organize its life without resorting to means which actually belong to the past epoch of human history.

However, the existing military blocs, which are growing into more and more powerful military, economic and political groupings which, by the logic and nature of their mutual relations, necessarily provoke periodical aggravations of international relations.

The cold war and the constant and acute danger of its being transformed into actual war have become a part of the situation prevailing in international relations.

For all these reasons, the Heads of State and Representatives of Government of non-aligned countries wish, in this way, to draw the attention of the world community to the existing situation and to the necessity that all peoples should exert efforts to find a sure road towards the stabilization of peace.

II

The present-day world is characterized by the existence of different social systems. The participating countries do not consider that these differences constitute an insurmountable obstacle for the stabilization of peace, provided attempts at domination and interference in the internal development of other peoples and nations are ruled out.

All peoples and nations have to solve the problems of their own political, economic, social and cultural systems in accordance with their own conditions, needs and potentialities.

Furthermore, any attempt at imposing upon peoples one social or political system or another by force and from outside is a direct threat to world peace.

The participating countries consider that under such conditions the principles of peaceful coexistence are the only alternative
in the "cold war" and to a possible general nuclear catastrophe. Therefore, these principles - which include the right of peoples to self-determination, to independence and to the free determination of the forms and methods of economic, social and cultural development - must be the only basis of all international relations.

Active international cooperation in the fields of material and cultural exchanges among peoples is an essential means for the strengthening of confidence in the possibility of peaceful coexistence among States with different social systems.

The participants in the Conference emphasize, in this connection, that the policy of coexistence amounts to an active effort towards the elimination of historical injustices and the liquidation of national oppression, guaranteeing, at the same time, to every people their independent development.

Aware that ideological differences are necessarily a part of the growth of the human society, the participating countries consider that peoples and Governments shall refrain from any use of ideologies for the purpose of waging cold war, exercising pressure, or imposing their will.

III

The Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries participating in the Conference are not making concrete proposals for the solution of all international disputes, and particularly disputed between the two blocs. They wish, above all, to draw attention to those acute problems of our time which must be solved rapidly, so that they should not lead to irreparable consequences.

In this respect, they particularly emphasize the need for a great sense of responsibility and realism when undertaking the solution of various problems resulting from differences in social systems.

The non-aligned countries represented at this conference do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a bloc. They sincerely desire to cooperate with any Government which seeks to contribute to the strengthening of confidence and peace in the world.

The non-aligned countries wish to proceed in this manner all the more so as they are aware that peace and stability in the world depend, to a considerable extent, on the mutual relations of the Great Powers;
Aware of this, the participants in the Conference consider it a matter of principle that the Great Powers take more determined action for the solving of various problems by means of negotiations, displaying at the same time the necessary constructive approach and readiness for reaching solutions which will be mutually acceptable and useful for world peace.

The participants in the Conference consider that, under present conditions, the existence and the activities of non-aligned countries in the interests of peace are one of the more important factors for safeguarding world peace.

The participants in the Conference consider it essential that the non-aligned countries should participate in solving outstanding international issues concerning peace and security in the world as none of them can remain unaffected by or indifferent to these issues.

They consider that the further extension of the non-committed area of the world constitutes the only possible and indispensable alternative to the policy of total division of the world into blocs, and intensification of cold war policies. The non-aligned countries provide encouragement and support to all peoples fighting for their independence and equality.

The participants in the Conference are convinced that the emergence of newly-liberated countries will further assist in narrowing of the area of bloc antagonisms and thus encourage all tendencies aimed at strengthening peace and promoting peaceful cooperation among independent and equal nations.

1. The participants in the Conference solemnly reaffirm their support to the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," adopted at the 15th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and recommend the immediate unconditional, total and final abolition of colonialism and resolved to make a concerted effort to put an end to all types of new colonialism and imperial domination in all its forms and manifestations.

2. The participants in the Conference demand that an immediate stop be put to armed action and repressive measures of any kind directed against dependent peoples to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence and that the integrity of their national territory should be respected. Any aid given by any country to a colonial power in such suppression is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.
The participating countries respecting scrupulously the territorial integrity of all states oppose by all means any aims of annexation by other nations.

3. The participating countries consider the struggle of the people of Algeria for freedom, self-determination and independence, and for the integrity of its national territory including the Sahara, to be just and necessary and are, therefore, determined to extend to the people of Algeria all the possible support and aid. The Heads of State or Government are particularly gratified that Algeria is represented at this Conference by its rightful representative, the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of Algeria.

4. The participating countries drew attention with great concern to the developments in Angola and to the intolerable measures of repression taken by the Portuguese colonial authorities against the people of Angola and demand that an immediate end should be put to any further shedding of blood of the Angolan people, and the people of Angola should be assisted by all peace-loving countries, particularly member states of the United Nations, to establish their free and independent state without delay.

5. The participants in the Conference demand the immediate termination of all colonial occupation and the restoration of the territorial integrity to the rightful people in countries in which it has been violated in Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as the withdrawal of foreign forces from their national soil.

6. The participating countries demand the immediate evacuation of French armed forces from the whole of the Tunisian territory in accordance with the legitimate right of Tunisia to the exercise of its full national sovereignty.

7. The participating countries demand that the tragic events in the Congo must not be repeated and they feel that it is the duty of the world community to continue to do everything in its power in order to erase the consequences and to prevent any further foreign intervention in this young African state, and to enable the Congo to embark freely upon the road of its independent development based on respect for its sovereignty, unity and its territorial integrity.

8. The participants in the Conference resolutely condemn the policy of apartheid practiced by the Union of South Africa and demand the immediate abandonment of this policy. They further state that the policy of racial discrimination anywhere in the world constitutes a grave violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
9. The participating countries declare solemnly the absolute respect of the rights of ethnic or religious minorities to be protected in particular against crimes of genocide or any other violation of their fundamental human rights.

10. The participants in the Conference condemn the imperialist policies pursued in the Middle East, and declare their support for the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in conformity with the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations.

11. The participating countries consider the establishment and maintenance of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries, particularly against their express will, a gross violation of the sovereignty of such States. They declare their full support of countries who are endeavoring to secure the vacation of these bases. They call upon those countries maintaining foreign bases to consider seriously their abolition as a contribution to world peace.

12. They also acknowledge that the North American military base at Guantanamo, Cuba, to the permanence of which the Government and people of Cuba have expressed their opposition, affects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country.

13. The participants in the Conference reaffirm their conviction that:

(a) All nations have the right of unity, self-determination, and independence by virtue of which right they can determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development with intimidation or hindrance.

(b) All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law, In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

The participating countries believe that the right of Cuba as that of any nation to freely choose their political and social systems in accordance with their own conditions, needs and possibilities should be respected.

14. The participating countries express their determination that no intimidation, interference or intervention should be brought to bear in the exercise of the right of self-determination of peoples, including their right to pursue constructive and independent policies for the attainment and preservation of their sovereignty.
15. The participants in the Conference consider that disarmament is an imperative need and the most urgent task of mankind. A radical solution of this problem, which has become an urgent necessity in the present state of armaments, in the unanimous view of participating countries, can be achieved only by means of a general, complete and strictly internationally controlled disarmament.

16. The Heads of State or Government point out that general and complete disarmament should include the elimination of armed forces, armaments, foreign bases, manufacture of arms as well as elimination of institutions and installations for military training, except for purposes of internal security; and the total prohibition of the production, possession and utilization of nuclear and thermo-nuclear arms, bacteriological and chemical weapons as well as the elimination of equipment and installations for the delivery and placement of operational use of weapons of mass destruction on national territories.

17. The participating countries call upon all States in general, and States exploring outer space at present in particular to undertake to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. They expressed the hope that the international community will, through collective action, establish an international agency with a view to promote and coordinate the human actions in the field of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

18. The participants in the Conference urge the Great Powers to sign without further delay a treaty for general and complete disarmament in order to save mankind from the scourge of war and to release energy and resources now being spent on armaments to be used for the peaceful economic and social development of all mankind. The participating countries also consider that:

(a) The non-aligned Nations should be represented at all future world conferences on disarmament;

(b) All discussions on disarmament should be held under the auspices of the United Nations;

(c) General and complete disarmament should be guaranteed by an effective system of inspection and control, the teams of which should include members of non-aligned Nations.

19. The participants in the Conference consider it essential that an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests should be urgently concluded. With this aim in view, it is necessary that negotiations be immediately resumed, separately or as
part of the negotiations on general disarmament. Meanwhile, the
moratorium on the testing of all nuclear weapons should be resumed
and observed by all countries.

20. The participants in the Conference recommend that the
General Assembly of the United Nations should, at its forthcoming
session, adopt a decision on the convening either of a special
session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to
discussion of disarmament or on the convening of a world disarm­
ament conference under the auspices of the United Nations with a view
to setting in motion the process of general disarmament.

21. The participants in the Conference consider that efforts
should be made to remove economic imbalance inherited from colonial­
ism and imperialism. They consider it necessary to close, through
accelerated economic, industrial and agricultural development, the
ever-widening gap in the standards of living between the few
economically advanced countries and the many economically less-de­
developed countries. The participants in the Conference recommend
the immediate establishment and operation of a United Nations Capital
Development Fund. They further agree to demand a just terms of trade
for the economically less-developed countries and, in particular,
constructive efforts to eliminate the excessive fluctuations in
primary commodity trade and the restrictive measures and practices
which adversely affect the trade and revenues of the newly-developed
countries. In general, to demand that the fruits of the scientific
and technological revolution be applied in all fields of economic
development to hasten the achievement of international social justice.

22. The participating countries invite all the countries in
the course of development to cooperate effectively in the economic
and commercial fields so as to face the policies of pressure in the
economic sphere, as well as the harmful results which may be created
by the economic blocs of the industrial countries. They invite all
the countries concerned to consider to convene, as soon as possible,
an international conference to discuss their common problems and to
reach an agreement on the ways and means of repelling all damage which
may hinder their development; and to discuss and agree upon the most
effective measures to ensure the realization of their economic and
social development.

23. The countries participating in the Conference declare
that the recipient countries must be free to determine the use of
the economic and technical assistance which they receive, and to
draw up their own plans and assign priorities in accordance with
their needs.
24. The participating countries consider it essential that the General Assembly of the United Nations should, through the revision of the Charter, find a solution to the question of expanding the membership of the Security Council and of the Economic and Social Council in order to bring the composition and work of these two most important organs of the General Assembly into harmony with the needs of the Organization and with the expanded membership of the United Nations.

25. The unity of the world Organization and the assuring of the efficiency of its work make it absolutely necessary to evolve a more appropriate structure for the Secretariat of the United Nations, bearing in mind equitable regional distribution.

26. Those of the countries participating in the Conference who recognize the Government of the People's Republic of China recommend that the General Assembly in its forthcoming Session should accept the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate representatives of that country in the United Nations.

27. The countries participating in the Conference consider that the German problem is not merely a regional problem but liable to exercise a decisive influence on the course of future developments in international relations.

Concerned at the developments which have led to the present acute aggravation of the situation in regard to Germany and Berlin, the participating countries call upon all parties concerned not to resort to or threaten the use of force to solve the German question or the problem of Berlin, in accordance with the appeal made by the Heads of State or Governments on 5 September, 1961.

The Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries resolve that his Declaration should be forwarded to the United Nations and brought to the attention of all the Member States of the World Organization. The present Declaration will be also forwarded to all the other States.