"...WHETHER AUTUMN SHOULD FOLLOW SUMMER:" THE DISCOURSE OF
GLOBALIZATION AND BRITISH PARTY POLITICS

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To my parents.
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ABSTRACT

British Prime Minister Tony Blair claimed that debating globalization would be akin to debating “whether autumn should follow summer.” This projection of globalization into domestic debates as an inevitable and constraining force is one of the most important developments in European politics since the 1990s. This dissertation uses an in-depth qualitative case study and discourse analysis of British party competition to examine the relationship between these developments. Why have British parties consistently referred to globalization as an objective facet, especially emergent parties whose appeal is built on challenging mainstream consensus? What might this tell us about the rhetorical strategies available to political parties generally?

To deal with these questions, I synthesize a theory of political rhetoric, drawing from William Riker’s work on political manipulation, or “heresthetics,” and Norman Fairclough’s “Critical Discourse Analysis.” My approach interprets parties as using discursive constructions, such as globalization, as tools to restructure voters’ underlying calculations. This challenges the existing literatures on party competition and critical political economy, both of which treat rhetoric and discourses as secondary to policy competition. I apply the theory through three discourse analyses of speeches and publications from different parties within the British system: Blair’s center-left Labour Party, the pro-independence Scottish National Party, and the anti-EU UK Independence Party.
Across the cases, I find that references to globalization closely parallel concrete political goals: Labour used the rhetoric of economic globalization to represent the world as fundamentally changed, forcing voters to reevaluate their perceptions of the party. The smaller parties deployed the same kind of language to project political responsibility, even as they mounted major challenges to the constitutional status quo. These findings challenge the conventional understanding of Blair’s globalization discourse as entirely ideological and complicate the assumption that new parties have been successful precisely because they challenge mainstream globalist consensus.
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Lastly, but certainly not least, I would like to acknowledge the immeasurable support, patience, and love of my partner, Laura. None of this would be possible without her.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The pace of change can either overwhelm us, or make our lives better and our country stronger. What we can't do is pretend it is not happening. I hear people say we have to stop and debate globalisation. You might as well debate whether autumn should follow summer.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair (2005)

Tony Blair spoke these words as Leader of the British Labour Party to its Annual Conference in 2005. The party had recently won its third consecutive General Election, and the Prime Minister was laying out the challenge that the Labour government would have to face in its next term. At the center of this challenge was globalization; it is no longer a question British or Labour values but “how we put them into practice in a world fast forwarding to the future at unprecedented speed” (Blair 2005). This is a world defined by mobile technologies and even more mobile capital, where Britain can no more afford to rest on its laurels than any other country, lest it be left behind in the economy of the future. There were threats, certainly—transnational terrorism, crime, the weakening of national borders—and there were opportunities. But in any case, and this is what is most striking from his speech, there was no choice in the matter. Globalization, though constituted by a complex bundle of technological advancements (especially in communications), global flows, national policy change, and regional institutions, has nevertheless become an inevitable development. It is as natural and irreversible as the turn of the seasons.

This image of globalization as an inexorable force has been a predominant trope of politics in the United Kingdom over the past two and half decades, as it has in many parts of the world. In the UK this has been most associated with “New Labour,” as the Labour Party was branded under the successive leaderships of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown from 1994 to 2010. Adoption of the language of “globalization” was part of the self-described modernization of the
party, which is credited with returning Labour to power after a disheartening two decades of general election defeats. Blair’s centrist globalism became an inspiration of so-called “Third Way” center-left leaders across Europe and North America. This was not a process without its critics, of course. The party’s Conservative opponents derided all of this talk as empty “spin.” Critics on the left, some of them veterans of the “Old Labour” that Blair left behind, argued that New Labour had merely surrendered the field by accepting the neoliberal discourse pioneered by Margaret Thatcher and consequently was unable to offer real political change.

But what is most puzzling about globalization in British politics is that it was not just New Labour that deployed this discourse, nor even just the mainstream parties (including also the Tories and Liberal Democrats) with which the party is said to have ideologically converged. On the contrary, it is anti-European Union party leader Nigel Farage who says of the EU that “I could not see the answer then and I certainly cannot see it now. To restrict trade in a global market, just as technology was liberating it, seemed and seems crazy” (qtd. in Daniel 2005: 13). And it is the nationalist First Minister of Scotland, Alex Salmond, who reminds his audience that “no-one in this party claims that an independent Scotland will be able to wish away global competition. We will still be affected by it, influenced by it and often challenged by it” (2013).

Indeed, the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the UK Independence Party (UKIP)\(^1\) have both explicitly deployed the language of “globalization” and the globalized economy in their official publications and through individual interlocutors. In these discourses, the inevitability of globalization appears, much as it does with New Labour. And these are discourses that are carrying increasing weight: As of 2014, both SNP and UKIP have become important players in

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\(^1\) A note on style: The acronym UKIP is generally read out as “you-kip” and is used without a definite article, in the same way as the Labour Party is often referred to simply as “Labour.” Usage with the initialism “SNP” is more varied, but for consistency and brevity I omit the definite article (excepting, of course, that in quotations the original style will be maintained).
the overall UK political ecosystem, with UKIP having taken a surprising first place in the May 2014 European elections, and SNP presiding over a long-awaited Scottish Independence referendum on 18 September 2014 (see also Table 1 below).

Why would these actors—one a regional party aiming for independence from the United Kingdom, the other a protest party advocating British withdrawal from the European Union—be talking about globalization? In particular, why would globalization appear in statements about the parties’ core aims and not just among the list of policy areas in an election manifesto? The discourse of globalization as it is generally deployed in British political speech refers to the increased interconnectedness of the world, the upward shift of effective power over economic outcomes to the global level, and the attendant decline of the nation state as the ultimate site of politics and governance. It is far from obvious that these parties should benefit from these ideas; both, from different directions, are making a claim on the urgent importance of statehood. Moreover, these are parties built around fundamentally challenging two key aspects of the settled consensus of British politics (the Union and the European Union).

In addition to being an important puzzle in its own right, the adoption of the globalization discourse by SNP and UKIP also forces us to rethink dominant interpretations of mainstream party behavior. The centrist turn of New Labour is understood as restricting the space for meaningful political competition (Hay 1997, 2007); correspondingly, the anti-establishment parties that have subsequently risen in prominence are supposed to have attracted votes by standing outside this consensus (Blyth and Katz 2005). Instead, we find the same understandings about issue on both sides of that divide; the policy conclusions are different but the language is much the same. This suggests that the role of globalization discourse within the wider game of party competition is a puzzle not yet satisfactorily resolved by existing analyses.
This empirical and theoretical puzzle suggests three broad questions: First, why do Labour, SNP, and UKIP represent the “fact” of globalization in such a consistent way, despite deep policy and ideological differences, and despite having opportunities to challenge the terms of that claim? This is the fundamental puzzle, because we would expect that parties would deploy overarching discourses that are more directly linked to the central policy arguments, or at least that they would take every opportunity to challenge and undermine the discourses deployed by their competitors (or at least look for separate niches). Second, how does the deployment of this discourse relate to those parties’ shifts in electoral strategy during that period? As I noted, the rhetorical emphasis on globalization is seen as part of the electoral revitalization of the Labour Party under Blair, but the connection is not well theorized. And to the extent that it has been, the explanation does not fit well with the similar rise of SNP and UKIP, because emergent parties are expected to pick up votes by challenging the mainstream consensus. Finally, how do SNP and UKIP make this representation cohere with their nationalist political ambitions? This is an important practical question if my approach is correct, because it is one thing to speculate on the ways that globalization discourse might support a party’s strategy, but political rhetoric requires a degree of coherence—or at least the public perception of coherence.

In this dissertation, I use the particular case of British party discourse around globalization to develop a new approach to party competition. The aim of this approach is to advance upon existing party competition theories by modeling parties as creative rather than reactive; by linking party discourse to political strategy rather than ideology; and by identifying the way that particular discursive “tools” are deployed by parties in their public rhetoric. Applied to these cases, this model shows how globalization has been articulated by these parties in

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2 Though otherwise quite different in their analyses, Hay (1999), Hindmoor (2004), Blyth and Katz (2005), and L’Hôte (2010) all make this connection
specific ways intended to create a new narrative about the political situation of the UK, thereby increasing their own standing as responsible and competent parties and thereby reversing negative patterns of electoral competition. I situate this argument theoretically by drawing on William Riker’s notion of heresthetics, to explain the way that parties work to alter their structural context rather than only operate within it; and on the concept of bricolage, which encompasses the way that actors assemble political argument using discursive elements from diverse sources. By building on Riker by incorporating the creative process of discursive bricolage, I am able to better explain important aspects of party behavior than both existing analyses of these parties or existing general theories of party politics.

**Literature and Research Design**

Of course, the answers to these questions are relevant beyond these three parties. Indeed, I argue that they can tell us much about the nature of the globalization discourse more broadly, as well as about the range of ways that parties compete for votes. Thus, in this dissertation I situate my analysis within two literatures: studies of the relationship between globalization and domestic politics (especially where globalization is understood as discursively constructed), and theories of political party competition.

In terms of the broader understanding of globalization, there has been little attempt to systematically reckon with the possibility that the prevailing understandings of globalization are an *endogenous* product of domestic political maneuvering. Further, neither the critical literature nor more conventional work has engaged with the full range of theories of party behavior and party competition mentioned above. For example, Hanspeter Kriesi and his coauthors (2008) provide an otherwise comprehensive analysis of the way that domestic party systems have been restructured by the salience of the globalization debate, but their model unreflectively accepts a
spatial model of competition, treating manifesto commitments as the main product of party activities. In this dissertation, I propose that there is room for incorporating the globalization issue into a wider understanding of party activity, as well an integration of insights about globalization discourse with various strategic accounts of party politics.

These theories of party competition can be summarized in terms of five ideal-types that I have defined (which are fully developed in Chapter 2): The Downsian Party competes by committing to certain positions within a known range of possible policies and maximizes its vote by moving to the center of the spectrum (at least in a two-party system). The Performance Party, by contrast, competes by promoting itself as the party most capable of delivering on certain policy positions that are shared among the electorate (“valence issues). The Cartel Party, by contrast, does not truly compete but colludes with other parties, to make the costs of policy commitments as low as possible. Another commercial model, the Market-Oriented Party, is distinguished by relying on a particular process of market research to determine the desires of the electorate and to develop achievable policy commitments that meet them. Finally, the Center-Constructing Party uses a variety of techniques to construct issue space so that its own position at the desirable center point and its opponents’ are at the extremes.

Theory

Building from the foregoing ideal-types, I have developed a new model of party behavior which I will apply to these cases in order to answer the questions above (a method of contrasting ideal-types that follow’s the “analyticist” mode; Jackson 2011). Specifically, I develop the model of the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party. “Heresthetics” captures the notion of political action as the manipulation of background. It was developed by William Riker (1982, 1986), as a way of responding to the theoretical impossibility of perfect preference aggregation in a population
(Arrow 1951). For Riker, this reflects a fundamental instability of politics, which is amenable to strategic manipulation. In the electoral context, this takes the form of there being no fixed standard by which voters evaluate parties; whether they vote on issues, economic performance, identity, etc. is fluid, and at least partly in the control of the parties themselves. Of course, Riker would not have understood this as extending to discourses about the world; but if discourse analysis is correct about the importance of language in ordering political reality, there is every reason to expect that heresthetician-parties would attempt to reshape the issue dimensions themselves through their language.

Thus, I consider the concept to be an analytical tool that highlights a particular aspect of political action (following the “performative” understanding of heresthetics in Hay 2009). This aspect is a kind of discursive heresthetic that encompasses the strategically-oriented dimension of political talk and text that will inevitably be shaped by a wide range of influences. Specifically, it refers to a specific kind of strategic action aimed at altering structural contexts as opposed to, for example, coercing or persuading individuals. Such a broad understanding, however, is difficult to operationalize empirically. Can it really be the case that discourses are rapidly shifting as parties are jockeying for advantage? Once we see parties as operating heresthetically in the realm of ideas and discourse, outside of the bounds of formal rules and known issue areas, the system begins to look radically unstable. And to a degree, the discursive system is unstable (e.g., the shift from Thatcherite nationalism to Blairite globalism in a relatively short span); but party victories often extend beyond a single issue or election and sometimes ideas are settled in the public discourse for some time. It is in this respect that the notion of bricolage is analytically useful. This is a French term, referring to the work of a handyman, or bricoleur (as opposed to a skilled craftsman or engineer), which was introduced to
social science by Claude Lévi-Strauss (1962). In particular, I follow the version of the bricoleur ideal-type developed by Carstensen (2011), an actor that effects changes in public ideas through the creative recombination of existing ideas (a “toolkit”) in creative, improvised ways. Crucial to this type is that the bricoleur is driven by goals exogenous to the ideas being used and relies on a limited pool of discursive resources. In other words, bricoleur parties may be free to transform the ideational environment, but they are constrained in doing so by the discursive raw materials that are available. Thus, viewed through the lens of heresthetic-bricolage, the globalization discourse becomes not the end of serious politics (feared by so many New Labour critics), but their continuation by an admixture other means.

**Methods**

Applying this ideal-type to the cases of Labour, SNP, and UKIP discourse involves three broad spheres of analysis: the parties’ strategic contexts, the parties’ discourses of globalization, and finally the parties’ globalization heresthetics. The first of these takes place outside of specific texts, and refers generally to the parties’ electoral challenges and the campaign decisions taken in response. The method for analyzing this aspect is a historical case analysis, focused on reconstructing the parties’ own understandings of their strategic position and the voter perceptions that they would need to shift. As sources for these reconstructions, I rely primarily on memoirs of key participants and on secondary accounts. These are supplemented by background knowledge obtained through a small number of in-depth, unstructured interviews. The information is presented chronologically in periodized narratives, which considered in light of the subsequent textual analysis, will help reveal certain relevant changes over time. I will also use these narratives to highlight differences between the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party model
and the interpretations that would follow from the approaches in the existing party competition literature.

The second sphere of analysis is the way that each party deploys the globalization discourse proper—that is, the description of the world as inevitably shrinking and undergoing a shift in the locus of political and economic power from the national to the global level. Though the presence of this discourse has been documented for New Labour, those analyses have not been designed to connect the discourse with party strategy, and SNP and UKIP have not been the subject of systematic discourse analysis at all. Identifying the globalization discourse will entail application of the qualitative textual analysis protocols of Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis. Though this approach is expressly associated with Gramscian social theory, the individual sociolinguistic tools are intended to be applicable outside of that ontology (Fairclough 2003). Concretely, the textual analysis focuses particularly on the way that various social processes are represented as being aspects of a phenomenon called “globalization,” and the way that parties construct their own political identities against this background. In linguistic terms, this will include analysis of grammatical mood (declarative, interrogatory, or imperative, with the first one dominant), semantic relations between clauses (or more often the lack thereof), and modality (what authors of texts commit themselves to in terms of knowledge or actions, the difference between ‘certainly’/‘probably’ and ‘must’/‘should’).

Finally, the third aspect of the methodology involves connecting the previous two, identifying a particular “globalization heresthetic” through which globalization discourse is made to serve party-political goals. Distinct instances of this exist with each party, but we can also speak of the parties having constructed a general globalization heresthetic as a political strategy available to others now that it has proven effective in the British political context (similar to how
the “Third Way” is both a specific New Labour discourse and a widely-applicable positioning strategy). This is significant because it may be the case that the globalization heresthetic—and therefore the globalization discourse that underpins it—may outlive any of the present cases if it continues to prove useful to new generations of party leadership. The heresthetic is constituted by a set of related arguments about globalization, Britain, and electoral politics. These arguments can be observed systematically in the form of specific rhetorical devices or figures that appear across multiple texts. In particular, I note four of these figures, some of which are employed by all of the parties, and some of which are specific to one or two of them: the new times thesis, arguing that political competition has been transformed by the advent of globalization; the isolation-engagement dichotomy, which casts international policy as an either/or choice between embracing globalization and retreating to isolation; the freedom-responsibility linkage (alternatively appearing as a freedom-relationships linkage in UKIP discourse), connecting national independence with the acceptance of responsibility instead of its abdication; and the natural-artificial dichotomy, which dismisses certain policy choices as outside of the “natural” process of globalization. Noting where these features appear will be a key aspect of the textual analysis, alongside the linguistic analysis of the globalization discourse.

Cases

In this section, I briefly introduce my findings in regard to the three parties that are the subject of my empirical analysis. By way of background, Table 1 summarizes relevant election results, showing the share of votes cast and the seats won for elections to the UK, European, and Scottish Parliaments since 1987. This documents the rapid electoral emergence of each of these since the late 1980s; note in particular the General Election gains for Labour, the Scottish Parliament election gains for SNP, and the European Parliament election gains for UKIP. As will
be discussed in the case narratives, these are the respective electoral venues that have been most important for each party.

Table 1. Labour Party, SNP, and UKIP Election Results (1987-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Vote Share* (Seats Won)</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>SNP</th>
<th>UKIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>30.8% (229) 1.3% (3)</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>39.0% (45) 3.0% (1)</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>34.4% (271) 1.9% (3) 0.1% (0)**</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>42.6% (62) 3.1% (2) 1.0% (0)</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>43.2% (418) 2.0% (16) 0.3% (0)</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Scottish</td>
<td>38.8% (56) 28.7% (35) ----</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>28.0% (29) 2.7% (2) 7.0% (3)</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>40.7% (413) 1.8% (5) 1.5% (0)</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Scottish</td>
<td>34.6% (50) 23.8% (27) ----</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>22.6% (19) 1.4% (2) 16.0% (12)</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>35.2% (355) 1.5% (6) 2.2% (0)</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Scottish</td>
<td>32.2% (46) 32.9% (47) ----</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>15.8% (13) 2.1% (2) 16.6% (13)</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>29.0% (258) 1.7% (6) 3.1% (0)</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Scottish</td>
<td>31.69% (37) 45.4% (69) 0.1% (0)</td>
<td>31.69%</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>25.40% (20) 2.46% (2) 27.49% (24)</td>
<td>25.40%</td>
<td>2.46%</td>
<td>27.49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *Scottish Parliament vote share refers to votes cast for constituency seats (seats won refers to all seats)
** 1992 UKIP election result refers to the predecessor Anti-Federalist League

A number of novel findings emerge from these cases. As I have noted, SNP and UKIP have not previously been the subject of systematic discourse analysis and it is notable that they reproduce many core aspects of the conventional globalization discourse, despite what might be assumed from their radical main policy positions. Even for Labour, the discourse of which has been already analyzed both in general (Fairclough 2000; Atkins 2011) and in relation to globalization specifically (L’Hôte 2010), we can observe variations in the party’s specific articulation of globalization that existing approaches have not taken into account. Applying the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party ideal-type to identify these discourses in the context of the parties’ ongoing electoral strategizing, I am able to systematically link public ideas to strategic
incentives in a way not attempted by existing analyses. Moreover, I am able to provide a single framework that incorporates three of the most important developments in contemporary British politics: the renaissance of the Labour Party, the success of nationalism devolved Scottish politics, and the emergence of a major Euroskeptic voice in national elections.

Throughout my analysis, I am making the methodological decision to treat the parties as unitary strategic actors. That is, the discourses produced by various aspects of the party (e.g., corporately-authored manifestos and individual leaders’ speeches) are treated as emanating from a single collective actor which is seeking to achieve certain strategic ends. Although internal politics and disputes appear as part of the rich case narratives, in my analysis these are treated as part of the background context in which the party operates. In terms of Peter Mair’s famous “three faces” of political parties (1994), this is closest to the image “party in central office;” that is, the party as an ongoing institution (as opposed to the party as a group of supporters or the party as members of a government). This is, of course, a major methodological simplification, and my analysis will not be able to capture the degree to which rhetorical choices result from individual beliefs or intra-party politics. However, it will also ensure that we do not lose the forest for the trees, either. For example, analyzing Blair’s globalization discourse in terms of Blair the individual might fruitfully show the ways that it reflected his personal beliefs about the world. But that would not mean that a strategic reading lacks analytical utility, considering that if Blair had not held such beliefs he might not have become leader when he did.

I should also note that these are not being analyzed here as totally separate cases. What I produce in the course of my analysis are actually three interconnected narratives, analyzing each party in terms of the ideal-typical Heresthetician-Bricoleur. Considering the cases separately, I highlight the ways that the very different factors specific to each case are relevant (and which
will be factors specific to them as parties, since the geographic and temporal context is constant. But considering the cases as an interconnected whole, I can get at the broader discourse that the three parties collectively produce and consume (draw upon) in the course of their strategic maneuvering—what I have called the globalization heresthetic.

The Labour Party

As recently as 1992, people were writing books with titles like *Labour’s Last Chance* (Jowell et al. 1994; see also Margetts 1997: 180). Yet, in the span of a single Parliament, Labour not only returned to prominence but achieved a stunning General Election landslide in 1997. The “New Labour” project orchestrated by Blair and his “modernizers” had been an unquestioned electoral success. Among observers of British politics, there is a widely-accepted narrative about how this came to pass: Labour, it is said, learned the lesson of having moved too far to the left in the early 1980s. In response, Blair and Brown’s New Labour made a hard turn back toward the right (or toward the center, depending on one’s perspective). The discourse of globalization is also usually included in these accounts, as part of the way that New Labour replicated the Thatcherite “logic of ‘no alternative’” argument (Hay and Watson 1999: 419).

And indeed, my analysis of representations of the world in New Labour texts looks quite a bit like this “no alternative” argument—what I have identified as the inevitability feature of the globalization discourse: Logically contingent features of globalization are instead obscured by explicit naturalization; and there is only a secondary role allowed for political agency within nation-states (generally in managing the effects of globalization, rather than shaping it directly). But it is less clear that these must only feature to reproduce a specific ideology and to support a Conservative policy agenda that New Labour has accepted. For example, the “neoliberal” globalization-as-constraint (on national politics) formulation of the globalization discourse,
which we expect according to the above reading, is much more prominent in some types of texts than others. There is also a change along this dimension over time, with the party becoming more concerned about delegitimizing demands from the backbenches once it is in government. These conclusions imply a politically-situated textual analysis, rather than treating the “globalization discourse” as a monolithic phenomenon.

As I will show, these kind of empirical findings are only produced through the approach that I introduced above; they both involve the indirect strategies that parties employ (heresthetics), and the way these take place through rearrangement of the public narratives about politics (bricolage). Most importantly, we can identify a relationship between the way that New Labour talks about the significance of globalization and its very concrete goal of overcoming public distrust in order to be treated as a party of government (not just a party of opposition). Though globalization was rarely the headline term in Blair’s or other figures’ speeches and publications, it provided an internally coherent but also wholly novel foundation for their arguments. This could serve to shift the implicit issue dimension on which voters evaluate from ‘which party is best to govern Britain in general’ to “which party is fit to prepare Britain for the new globalized world.”

The Scottish National Party

SNP is the predominant pro-independence party in Scotland, currently campaigning for a “yes” vote in an upcoming referendum on that issue while also governing Scotland on a moderate left-of-center platform. This current situation fits an ongoing pattern of the party being caught between the potentially conflicting demands of campaigning for office and campaigning

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3 Several smaller parties also support independence, including the Scottish Green Party as SNP’s formal partner in the Yes Scotland campaign for the upcoming referendum. However, SNP unquestionably remains the public face of the independence cause.
for independence. This challenge is related to a similar dilemma that the party faces in balancing support for the process of devolution with a continued radical claim for full national sovereignty. Devolution has gotten SNP to where it is, but by definition it consists of gradually handing down powers from the UK Parliament and Government to their Scottish equivalents short of independence. Existing readings of SNP discourse have focused on the “Scottish myth” (holding that Scotland has a fundamentally different, more communal culture than the rest of the UK; McCrone 2001) and the Europeanization of the devolution issue (Dardanelli 2009). These arguments constituted the common ground around which SNP and New Labour could converge, finally achieving this groundbreaking constitutional reform that had been debated for decades. But considering SNP’s ongoing quests for both independence and continued elected office, this reading leaves some gaps: On the independence side, if the key to Scottish distinctiveness is social policy, why would Scots need any more powers than that? Different SNP supporters may have different concrete responses to that, of course, but one of the advantages of focusing on organized actors rather than individuals is that the methodological complexities presented by specific motivation are ameliorated. On the electoral politics side, how do we square the party’s rhetoric with the reality that SNP has had no choice but to emphasize economic competence in its overall strategy, responding to the same system of “performance politics” as Labour and other British parties?

I find that we can explain the party’s globalization discourse in a way that answers both of these concerns. In electoral terms, the party follows a similar pattern to New Labour, with references to globalization as an objective factor serving to legitimize SNP as a responsible party to lead a devolved (and eventually independent) Scotland. Crucially, this serves to contrast the party with an isolationist variant of nationalism, a negative image with which its opponents
(especially New Labour itself) sought to associate it. Moreover, the party has been able to coherently tie this discourse to its more central independence claims by using claims about globalization to delegitimize gradual devolution. SNP argues that in the newly-globalized world, domestic autonomy is no longer a sufficient protection for Scotland’s unique economic and cultural interests, and that only an independent voice in global governance will do. It is to this end that we see representations in the SNP discourse of an inevitable “scaling up” of economic control—from national and sub-national to regional and global forms of authority—but without the often associated notion of an inevitable shift of power from political to economic actors (which would necessarily undermine calls for sovereignty).

The UK Independence Party

UKIP faces an ongoing challenge, a dilemma common to small parties according to which they must differentiate themselves strongly while somehow avoiding the perception of extremism and irresponsibility. On the European issue (and on others), the party is radically opposed to SNP and New Labour; but its electoral experience and rhetoric have significant parallels with theirs. Notably, UKIP has consistently paired its strong opposition to the EU an acceptance of the realities of globalization (linked via an emphasis on free trade outside Europe), as reflected in the Farage quote mentioned above. In principle, this particular discourse of globalization and Europe can dissolve the strategic dilemma by presenting the opposition to the EU as the proper cause for a truly modern, responsible party—as opposed, of course, to the corrupt elites who run the mainstream parties. It is a commonplace of contemporary New Labour rhetoric that in an ever-more-globalized environment Britain can no longer afford to part ways with the European Union, but UKIP draws upon the same vocabulary of globalization in a way that paints the EU in quite a different light.
UKIP’s particular appeal to globalization thus amounts to restructuring the debate on Europe, such that the party’s stark withdrawal position is no longer associated with an atavistic nationalism. This discursive relationship is carefully tailored to use the established association of globalism with economic progress (a kind of Thatcher-Blair consensus) to shift the public understanding of the parties in a particular way. Indeed, UKIP and SNP are quite similar in this respect, with both programs held together by the claim that political progress can be made only once the nation is free from supranational authority—be that Scotland free from the UK or, in this case, the UK free from Europe. But these parties are not often considered together, because UKIP is seen as part of the party family of right-wing populists, distinct from the regionalist nationalism characterizing SNP. And in contrast with the Scottish nationalists, UKIP has been less able to reconcile the different elements of its rhetoric. Anti-immigration politics has been an important part of its appeal in recent years, and associating that position with a sophisticated argument about globalization’s significance for regional orders has proven a challenge.

Plan of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized into seven chapters, including this Introduction. Chapter 2 contains focused literature reviews of two distinct areas: First, I discuss the existing literature on the interaction of globalization and domestic politics. Sidestepping the major debates about globalization in terms of its international political-economic implications, I focus on the way that the issue of globalization is said to constrain national political debates (according to “globalists”) or to be itself a product of those debates (according to “skeptics”). Second, I address the literature on party competition, distilling this wide-ranging field into the set of five ideal-typical models of party behavior that will serve to contrast with the contributions of my heresthetic-bricolage approach. In Chapter 3, I develop that approach by drawing on the two literatures to
map out a Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party. In the second part of the chapter, I present the methodology with which I will apply this new model to the cases of New Labour, SNP, and UKIP, a methodology that synthesizes multiple variants of textual analysis within an overarching analyticist framework.

The next three chapters contain the empirical analysis for the dissertation, covering the Labour Party (Chapter 4), SNP (Chapter 5), and UKIP cases (Chapter 6), respectively. These operate in parallel and each follow a similar pattern: I first review the existing literature focused specifically on each party, so that I can discuss the “value-added” of my approach in light of those as well as in light of the general literature reviewed in Chapter 2. Then I turn to the narratives that are the core of my analysis; dividing the recent history of each party into several time periods, I describe the party’s overall strategy and then present the textual analysis of its manifestos, speeches, and policy publications. These narratives thus incorporate each of the three spheres of analysis discussed above. In the concluding sections, I discuss key recurring features of the texts—the “rhetorical figures” that constitute the globalization heresthetic—as well as tie together the case narratives and textual analysis.

In Chapter 7, I conclude the dissertation by linking together the theoretical and empirical contributions of the analysis as a whole. I focus particularly on how we can step back from the individual party cases and see how political competition has shaped an overarching globalization discourse (and globalization heresthetic) within British politics.
CHAPTER 2

GLOBALIZATION AND PARTY COMPETITION

While studies of globalization proliferate, we remain relatively under-informed about discourses of globalization and associated issues of power and knowledge.

Colin Hay and Ben Rosamond (2002: 47)

In this chapter I lay the groundwork for my analysis by reviewing two relevant bodies of social science literature: In the first part, I discuss the ways in which globalization has been understood to intersect with national politics. In this I focus particularly on the ways in which it has been said to be transformative of domestic institutions and political alignments, and on the debate between “globalists” who treat globalization as an exogenous material pressure and “skeptics” who treat globalization as politically constructed. In the second part, I turn to the political science literature on party competition; from the relevant theories I distill five ideal types of party behavior, from which I will distinguish my own approach in the next chapter.

Each of these, of course, is a vast literature in its own right—party politics is one of the oldest strands of political science, and globalization has become one of the most prominent topics in contemporary international studies—and so the treatments here are necessarily condensed. My goal is to produce focused reviews that will be useful for developing my own analysis and allowing it to be distinguished from, and assessed against, existing readings. Therefore, I do not intend to relate the comprehensive history of any topic or school of thought. Nor am I aiming to judge these theories against any fixed criteria of accuracy or utility, though I do highlight some apparent theoretical inconsistencies and limitations where they are relevant in light of my own approach. Indeed, it will become clear in relation to party competition that different approaches have different analytic goals, and may each be useful within its own ambit. Finally, I should note that the literatures below are only those that shed light on the development of the theoretical framework in the next chapter. Reviews of the literatures relevant to each of the
parties that I am analyzing are included in the respective case chapters; party-specific analyses are included here only where they have been particularly relevant to the broader theoretical debates (as is especially the case for some treatments of New Labour).

**Globalization in National Politics**

Over the past two and a half decades, globalization has been a predominant trope of policy making in the West, at both the domestic and international levels. The term is a multifaceted one, with as many definitions as it has uses, but generally refers to the ideas “that the world is rapidly being molded into a shared social space by economic and technological forces and that developments in one region of the world can have profound consequences […] on the other side of the globe” (Held et al. 1999: 1). These twin ideas reflect what we might call the “temporal” and “spatial” aspects of globalization, respectively. In economic terms, this is usually linked to “sharp increases since the mid-1970s in trade, production, and capital flows across national borders” (J.L. Campbell 2004: 125; citing Sassen 1996). Politically, the dynamics of globalization are often understood to mean “a loss in the degree of control exercised locally […] such that the locus of power gradually shifts in varying proportion above and below the territorial state” (Mittelmann 2000: 6). In terms of national politics, the demands upon nation-states from the newly-globalized world have been invoked to legitimize substantial reforms of national economic structures, participation in increasingly powerful regional integration arrangements, and even revisions to core political party ideological commitments.

I focus here on the ways that globalization has been analyzed in respect of national politics. I have roughly categorized this work into two schools, “globalist” and “skeptical,” borrowing two-thirds of Held et al.’s influential typology of the “globalization debate” (1999: 3-10); their third pole, “transformational,” is mostly subsumed here into globalism. Under the first
heading, I discuss scholars who have analyzed dynamics and transformations in domestic politics resulting from globalization as an exogenous, material process. In the second section, I proceed to critique such an approach with reference to scholars who find globalization to be as much a discourse produced *within* national politics as an external force.

Globalist Readings

The intersection of globalization and national politics can be usefully studied at a range of levels, from the mechanisms of global diffusion down to the everyday practices of individuals (Antoniades 2010). Perhaps most widely analyzed and debated have been its effects on national political-economic institutions (taxation and regulatory regimes, welfare systems, etc.), where several scholars suggest that globalization has become one of the main drivers for change. John L. Campbell, for example, notes that institutional analysis (i.e., the “new institutionalism”) faces a “problem of globalization,” in as much as its traditional explanations for institutional continuity and change operate at the national level and ignore global dynamics (2004: 124). According to the most extreme readings, this presents an existential challenge for nation-state institutions as we know them (Ohmae 1990, 1995; McKenzie and Lee 1991). These approaches tend to claim either that the nation-state as a political unit will begin to disappear (Ohmae 1995), or that the institutional diversity among states will disappear, leading to homogenization (the “convergence thesis;” Tanzi 1995). Even where national institutions appear to be continuous, according to this school, they might have undergone a globalization-induced “hollowing out” process; as Anthony Giddens explains: “They are what I call ‘shell institutions.’ They are institutions that have become inadequate to the tasks they are called upon to perform” (1999: 37).

However, Campbell is careful to note that effects of globalization are usually mediated by national political-economic institutions, and that as a result institutional diversity may be more
resilient than the above thesis expects (2004: 170-71). Vivien Schmidt reaches a similar conclusion by applying her “discursive institutionalist” approach to the transformation of European economic systems (Schmidt 2002). The work is situated in the debate on how the twin dynamics of globalization and Europeanization have forced European states to alter their varieties of capitalism (particularly the “market”, “coordinated”, and “statist” ideal types represented by Britain, Germany, and France, respectively). Schmidt argues that there have been different degrees of change in these countries, despite the uniform pressures of European and global forces, and that these can be (at least partially) explained by the different legitimating discourses that were offered and their differing success in the three contexts.

Turning to party politics within states, scholars also identify a multifaceted process in which globalization induces changes in the terms of party competition, but is also mediated by the preexisting party system and social cleavages. In this vein, Kriesi and his coauthors (2008) unpack these dynamics through an analysis of party competition across Western Europe. Focusing on both the “demand-side” and “supply-side” of party politics (voter preferences revealed in surveys and party position revealed in manifestos, respectively), they show that Western European electoral competition is being increasingly restructured by issues relating to globalization. Though the degree of change varies across countries, they identify a new “integration-demarcation” axis that is orthogonal to, and sometimes even more salient than, the conventional left-right divide. “Integration,” in this case, refers to support for both European integration as well as the larger process of globalization (which the authors interpret as related and congruent). This new dimension, they argue, is rooted in a new socioeconomic cleavage.

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4 “Discursive institutionalism” (by analogy with the other “new institutionalisms”), uses the policy discourses (rather than static “ideas” or “culture”) within a state to explain certain kinds of policy outcomes (Schmidt 2008, 2010).

5 This therefore represents a “spatial model” of party competition; see the party politics literature review below.
between the “winners and losers” of globalization; e.g., highly-educated workers in the growing traded sectors benefit from integration, while low-skill workers in previously sheltered sectors lose out (see Schwartz 2001; Frieden 1991; Frieden and Rogowski 1996). Transforming this economic divide into a political cleavage, the authors “assume that citizens perceive these differences between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization, and that these categories are articulated by political parties” (Kriesi et al. 2008: 4). This reinforces predictions by other scholars about a rising “sectoralization,” and increased cultural differentiation, within national politics (Badie 1997; Olzak 1992). But as with Campbell’s and Schmidt’s readings of institutional change, the degree to which this potential dynamic is realized within party systems varies due to a variety of factors; actual country cases range from France as a “model case of party system transformation” to Germany as “the dog that didn’t bark,” with the UK somewhere in the middle with “moving parties in a stable configuration” (Kriesi et al. 2008: 77, 208, 183).

Together, these approaches point us toward the important role that globalization, as a supranational dynamic and as a new political cleavage, plays in contemporary party politics. These approaches also offer important insights into the process of political realignment that has taken place in recent decades. But as globalist accounts, their central explanatory logic relies on the assumption that material flows (collectively constituting globalization) can be said to act on national polities as an external and more-or-less inevitable force. It is not entirely clear that this is the case.

Skeptical Readings

To the contrary, the confidently globalist theories (often called the strong or hyperglobalist version of the “globalization thesis”) have coincided with a counter-trend of trenchant analyses showing that the representation of globalization as a new, external constraint
on states is misleading. As Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1999) influentially argue: current levels of international economic integration are not unprecedented; increased cross-border exchange (“internationalization”) is not the same as the formation of a truly global order; multinational corporations remain closely tied to their nation of origin (i.e., they are not truly “transnational”); and many of the constituent dynamics of globalization are the outcome, rather than the cause, of pro-globalization national policies. Even accepting the existence of certain global developments—trade flows, the communications revolution, the density of migration networks—it is far from clear that these would have a unique and predictable effect on national politics (see, for example, Garrett 1998 on the multiple possible trajectories available to social democratic parties).

Colin Hay and Ben Rosamond build on this uncertainty about the “material facts” of globalization to argue for a fundamental shift in the locus of political analysis on this topic, seeking to analyze instead the discourses that have built up around globalization and their autonomous political and social effects:

For however convinced we might be by the empirical armoury mustered against the hyperglobalization thesis by the sceptics, their rigorous empiricism leads them to fail adequately to consider the way in which globalization comes to inform public policy-making. It is here, we suggest, that the discourse of globalization must enter the analysis. For it is the ideas that actors hold about the context in which they find themselves rather than the context itself which informs the way in which actors behave. This is no less true of policy-makers and governments. Whether the globalization thesis is ‘true’ or not may matter far less than whether it is deemed to be true (or, quite possibly, just useful) by those employing it.

(Hay and Rosamond 2002: 148)

The most important development to be explained, from this perspective, is the degree of consensus that has indeed emerged around the central “fact” of globalization. Indeed, the reproduction of that claim in the policy process can cycle back to the real economy; as Hay has written elsewhere (with Matthew Watson), “globalizing outcomes [cannot be] simply the result
of global economic flows [but] also result from the ideas which prominent opinion makers hold about such flows” (1999: 419).

Taking ideas rather than material flows as the object of analysis still opens multiple directions for analysis. One approach has been to expose globalist claim to rigorous political-economic scrutiny, with the broad conclusion that they are linked misguided and ultimately dangerous economic policies (Hay 1997, 1999). But if “globalization” is a speculative bubble in the marketplace of ideas, waiting to burst, why is it so widely taken as fact in Western (particularly British) politics? Why do opposing parties reproduce, rather than challenge, each other’s claims about globalization? This is particularly striking compared with other debates that appeal to “objective” political-economic facts: Though political and societal actors do not agree on questions such as the ideal balance of stimulus and austerity (issues are similarly assumed to have a basis in economic facts), they can agree that these debates must take account of a global environment characterized by the disciplining power of global capital, etc.

On this question, answers have tended toward some variant of a class politics explanation: Global flows are interpreted as they are because that representation serves the interests of capital. This explanation is most direct in the critical theoretic literature, such as the formalized Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of Fairclough (1995, 2000) and the cultural theory of Stuart Hall, for whom this dynamic is more or less a continuation of the Thatcherite “great moving right show” (1979, 2005). Fairclough has argued in a series of publications that the use of the very language of global commerce (the “new capitalism”), by a new generation of European leaders (including Blair and New Labour), has ingrained the globalization discourse at a very deep level (2000, 2002, 2006). And though less explicitly critical in their orientation, Mark Wickham-Jones and Desmond King draw upon on Przeworski to similarly argue that the
power of capital to discipline governments inevitably constrains all parties’ thinking about economic policy (King and Wickham-Jones 1990; Wickham-Jones 1995; Przeworski and Wallerstein 1982; Przeworski and Sprague 1986). These approaches are important critical interventions, and have opened useful analytic debates about the degree of flexibility available to contemporary governments (though for the more permissive reading, again see Garrett 1998). However, this macro-structural approach cannot offer analytical leverage on all important questions, such as the variation in specific articulations of globalization among actors (including parties), which may prove important in forecasting the further development of the discourse. To begin to explore these kinds of questions, we need a fuller understanding of party behavior, particularly how they compete with each other. It is to this rich literature that I turn in the next section.

Party Competition: Five Ideal-Types

In this section I review a selection of the wide literature on political party competition. As I noted at the outset, my goal is to present the existing literature in light of which my approach (set out in detail in the next chapter) can be understood and applied. To this end, I have distilled the selected theories into five ideal types—the Downsian, Performance, Cartel, Market-Oriented, and Center-Constructing parties—stylized images of party behavior designed to capture specific aspects of the complex experience of real parties. These approaches range from two of the dominant mainstream theories of party behavior (Downsian and Performance) to more niche approaches that are particularly useful to the way that I am approaching my project (Center-Constructing). In some cases, particularly the Market-Oriented Party, the ideal type is developed in the original literature. In other cases, the authors are seeking to identify covering laws of

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6 For a more detailed discussion of ideal types, see the methodology section of the next chapter.
electoral politics, and likely would not recognize their theories in ideal-typical terms. However, as my goal is to provide a foundation for my own approach rather than to evaluate (let alone “test”) these theories, I find it more useful to frame them in my own terms than to consider them in the authors’ terms.

As this is a focused literature review, some important currents in party politics are necessarily excluded. For example, I exclude the mass party/catch-all party distinction (Duverger 1951; Kirchheimer 1966), which is considered mostly historical at this point. I also skip over the main competitor to the spatial and valence models: sociological (e.g., class-based) explanations for voting (Budge and Urwin 1966; Pulzer 1967), as by their nature these tell us little about the behavior of parties themselves, and also appear to have less relevance to contemporary elections (Butler and Stokes 1969; Franklin and Mughan 1978; Clarke et al. 2004).

The Downsian Party

Perhaps the best-known scientific theory of party competition, among academics and public commentators, is the “median voter theorem” associated with Anthony Downs. In short, this approach understands parties as maneuvering in policy space to attract votes by approximating the voters’ policy preferences. As a consequence of the structure of that policy space, it further expects competing parties to converge around the preferences of the median voter. Though it is most often traced back to a chapter in his *Economic Theory of Democracy*, this model does not really originate with Downs. He cites as his own inspiration Harold Hotelling, who included a centripetal tendency of political parties in a footnote to his economic theory about where businesses choose to locate (1929: 54). Further, Downs does not even use the familiar term “median voter”, which was coined earlier by Harold Black (1948). Nevertheless,

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7 For many of the observations in this section I am indebted to the excellent and accessible review of Downs in Andrew Hindmoor’s *New Labour at the Centre* (2004: 17-40), about which more below.
the median voter theorem and the broader “spatial” approach to party competition in which it is embedded remain closely associated with Downs. We can thus speak of an ideal typical “Downsian” party that operates by discovering the policy preferences of the median voter and approximating them as closely as possible. Though the theorem is often expressed as a universal law of party politics, observers have most recently held up parties like Blair’s Labour and Clinton’s Democrats as particular exemplars of the type (Hindmoor 2004: 21-22). \(^8\)

Crucially underlying the Downsian type is the notion of a fixed policy space that parties can treat as given, along one dimension or several. Such a “spatial model” posits that both voters and parties perceive an issue space characterized by one or more dimensions, each being a series of possible policies that are finite and can be arranged in a fixed-order. For example, in Downs’s original representation, there is a single “left-right” dimension, which can be concretely represented as the quantity of public ownership of industry. This dimension logically has two finite extremes (100% public ownership or none), is perfectly ordered (more public ownership is always “to the left” of less public ownership), and can actually be measured so that proximity to a voter’s ideal point is known (Downs 1957: 115-132). Clearly, this example is rather exceptional among political issues for its simplicity and clarity, but the analogy of policy positions to a physical space with fixed distances has been deeply influential. Combined with the assumption of parties as rational vote-maximizers, this produces the prediction that parties’ policy commitments will tend to converge on the preferences of the median voter.

As Hindmoor notes, critiques and extensions of this approach (the “Downsian tradition” in political science) have focused on “the claim that parties must move to the electoral centre to maximise their vote” (2004: 25). Attempts have been made to further refine this approach by

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\(^8\) Building on Hay (1999), Hindmoor offers as examples Shaw (1994), Blyth (1997), Kenny and Smith (1997), and Heffernan (2000).
extending it to multiple issue dimensions, which more accurately reflects the structure of preferences in the electorate. In principle, the model operates similarly in multiple dimensions, but with policy “distances” measured in more than one dimension. But mathematical work in social choice theory by Arrow and others has shown that where there are multiple dimensions, a clear equilibrium point is not likely to exist (Arrow 1951; McKelvey 1976; Riker 1986: 142-43). Building on this insight, various scholars have put forward alternative models of ideal party behavior that nevertheless maintain the same spatial analogy. Cox (1987), for example, accepts Downs’s logic for a two-party system but demonstrates that, for a system with three or more parties, the incentive to converge on the center point in policy space no longer exists. More specifically, Enelow and Hinich (1982, 1989) describe conditions under which parties committed to policies can maintain their stance and still attract sufficient votes—where voters display a degree of party identification or care about candidate characteristics—an approach that has come to be called “probabilistic voting.” This, too, has been further supplemented by so-called “directional voting,” where voters prefer parties that they perceive as being on the same side of an issue as themselves, rather than necessarily the one closest—e.g., center-left voters who prefer a far-left party to a center-right one (Matthews 1979; Rabinowitz and McDonald 1989). Under that condition, parties would have very limited incentives to move to the center, though the empirical fact of centrist parties outperforming those on the extremes has driven a preference for “mixed” models that incorporate proximity as well as direction (Merrill and Grofman 1999). Finally, the spatial model has even proved useful for analysts who do treat parties as more than non-strategic vote-maximizers. For example, Meguid (2005, 2008) invokes fixed policy space in her analysis of mainstream party responses to “niche party” competitors. One of the strategies open to mainstream parties, in her model, is to simply take over the policy positions claimed by
an emergent competitor (e.g., as happened in several countries with environmental issues since the advent of Green parties). According to Downsian assumptions about voting, this would leave the niche party no grounds on which to compete (though of course it would also risk the larger parties losing some voters, by the same means).

While these theories suggest various models of party behavior quite distinct from simply approximating the median voter, they nevertheless remain seized of the spatial analogy and the assumptions underpinning it. The most fundamental of these assumptions is the existence of a fixed, knowable policy space with characteristics analogous to physical space. As Hindmoor notes, this potentially leaves them blind to the genuinely creative behavior of parties, the possibility that they actively construct policy positions rather than merely discovering them. Of course, as he goes on to discuss, these theories operate this way for a reason. The ultimate goal of scholars in this school is prediction, and the Downsian, centripetal party is in theory perfectly predictable. Questioning the approach’s assumptions in order to accept a creative role for parties makes such precise prediction difficult if not impossible (Hindmoor 2004: 31-32). But such are the trade-offs of social science.

The Performance Party

The most prominent competitor to the spatial approach is the valence model of elections, also called “performance politics” (Clarke et al. 2009). According to this model, the most crucial issues to voters are not the positional issues envisioned by the spatial model (level of taxation, degree of public ownership, levels of spending), but rather valence issues on which there is only one position with widespread support (sustained economic growth, clean government, public safety). Under this condition, parties compete over which can be most trusted to deliver in those areas (hence “performance”). The ideal-typical Performance Party, when in office, will focus on
achieving these objectives and communicating that success to the electorate; and, when not in office, will use various techniques to highlight the failures of the governing party and support itself as the most viable alternative.

Valence voting as an alternative to the spatial model begins with Donald Stokes influential critique of Downs (1963). As noted above, most of the scholars who followed Downs focused on critiquing or complicating the median-voter theorem, but Stokes questions the spatial analogy as a whole. Treating politics like space, he argues, “introduces assumptions about the unidimensionality of the space, the stability of its structure, the existence of ordered dimensions and the common frame of reference of parties and the electorate that are only poorly supported by available evidence” (1963: 369). Were these assumptions not to hold, he reasons, it would be impossible for a rational voter to choose a party in the context of positional competition. Though the Downsian approach can accommodate more complicated, multidimensional models that produce a more realistic representation of politics, this introduces new problems: First, there is the ability of parties to manipulate this constellation of issues, and therefore electoral outcomes, through agenda control and the like (McKelvey 1976; Riker 1980, 1986). Second, the more complex the spatial model becomes, the greater the problem of information costs; even if a clear multidimensional policy space exists in principle, in practice the effort it would require of voters, to think through their own preferences and research the positions of the parties, is more than they are likely willing to invest (Whitely 1995; Conlisk 1996). This “paradox of information” in the spatial model was actually acknowledged by Downs, who notes that “it seems probable that for a great many citizens in a democracy, rational behavior excludes any investment whatever in political information” (1957: 245).

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9 Of course, it may be the case that this is itself a useful model of politics, as indeed I propose below, but it does not aid the individually-rational approach for which Stokes aims.
Stokes, then, proposed valence politics as an alternative basis on which to model voting as a rational behavior. This model deals with the information problem by requiring voters to only consider a small number of issues that are most important to them, in line with more recent findings from social psychology about the limited number of “considerations” from which individuals will draw at a given time in order to answer political questions (Zaller 1992). Complex judgments about the voter’s position relative to the parties’ are replaced with a simpler judgment about the parties’ likely performance on valence criteria: “The focus on performance thus applies both to spatial and to valence issues. But the information-processing costs for dealing with valence issues are significantly less than for spatial issues” because spatial voting creates incentives for parties “to dissemble about their objectives with ‘cheap talk’ or misleading information” (Clarke et al. 2009; see also Crawford and Sobel 1982). Performance judgments, in other words, keep the parties honest by providing a clear standard against which they will be evaluated. The simplest operationalization of this theory is the reward-punishment (or retrospective voting) model developed by Morris Fiorina in an influential article (1978) and later book (1981). Generally associated with judgments of economic performance (but also applicable in principle to other valence issues like crime), and relying on very little information investment on the part of the electorate, this model conceives of voters as rewarding or punishing the incumbent party based on recent experience. It predicts that voters will support the incumbent party when they (the voters) are economically comfortable, but withhold their support or vote for the opposition when they are not. Though it is elegant in its simplicity, the approach is naturally limited. For example, it is asymmetric in that it provides limited insight on the dynamics of support for opposition as opposed to incumbent parties (Green and Jennings 2012), especially where they have been out of office for a long period of time, where there are multiple that voters
might choose. Likewise, it cannot predict whether voters will “punish” the incumbent by abstaining or by supporting the opposition (which makes rather a big difference to the outcome).

To produce a more comprehensive valence model, scholars in this tradition have identified additional mechanisms by which voters evaluate parties in light of valence concerns, beside simple reward-punishment. Most notable is the concept of heuristics, “shortcuts” that voters can use to make judgments about (all) parties under conditions of less-than-full information. A wide range of such devices have been identified, including very simple and imprecise ones such as the “affect heuristic,” judging based on one’s emotional reaction (i.e., “gut feeling”) about a party or candidate (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Marcus, Neumann, and MacKuen 2000). Another simple heuristic is partisan identification, which in this analysis is not a non-rational product of socialization (the “Michigan approach;” see A.A. Campbell et al. 1960), but a “running tally” of evaluations about the party’s governing performance over time (Popkin 1991, following Fiorina 1981). Thus, voting for a candidate purely because of partisan identification can be a rational calculation because the candidate will likely perform similarly to previous representatives of the party. From another direction, voters may use the image and reputation of the party leader as a shortcut to make a judgment about the party as a whole (the “leadership heuristic;” Clarke et al. 2004). Thus, in contrast to the ideal-typical Downsian vote-maximizers, the Performance Party focuses not on positioning its policies but on maximizing its delivery on valence policies while in office, and on improving its image (according to various heuristics) while in opposition.

Empirically, this model has proven very effective at explaining voters’ political choices, for example as reflected in responses to surveys. Harold Clarke and his coauthors, using extensive survey data from the British electorate, find that “the valence model dominates the
They show this to be the case even in comparison to mixed approaches that incorporate valence variables into otherwise spatial models (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000; Schofield 2003). However, it should be noted that Clarke et al. arrive at these strong results through a complex model that incorporates multiple heuristic mechanisms as well as multiple valence issues (including the economy, crime, and terrorism/security). This allows for useful analyses of the effect of changing valence dynamics (e.g., a shift from economic to security concerns) on different parties, but lacks the clear predictive power of a simpler reward-punishment type approach (i.e., being able to predict incumbent performance based on objective economic measures like GDP growth or unemployment rate). Also, while the authors do link changes in the most salient valence issues to major events (e.g., increased voter attention to security after the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks), it is not clear that these are purely exogenous shifts. This raises the possibility that parties may have a more active role than the theory generally envisages—being able to affect which issues are the primarily valence issues, rather than merely promoting their qualifications in respect to them.

The Cartel Party

The theories above, though currently the predominant approaches to party competition, are theories of voting rather than theories of party behavior per se. Of course, given their assumptions, this makes perfect sense; these approaches are premised on parties maximizing votes by “reading off” the relatively stable positions of the electorate. But it is also possible to theorize about the behavior of parties separately from the collective behavior of voters. After all, in the real world, beyond the methodological abstractions of policy space and median voter preferences, it is parties that must do the work of formulating, presenting, and (hopefully)

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10 In an earlier work, the authors had already ruled out the traditional theory of class-based voting (Clarke et al. 2004), at least for recent decades.
implementing policies. Though, as noted above, it may inhibit the ability to make precise predictions, many scholars have found analytical utility in modeling parties as more autonomous actors. One analogy popular in such approaches is the image of parties as akin to firms, bringing a very different kind of economic theory into party politics than did Downs. One very influential theory along these lines is the party cartel thesis associated with Richard Katz and Peter Mair. Casting this theory in ideal-type terms, the ideal-typical Cartel Party does not compete with other parties to maximize its vote share but rather colludes with them to establish and maintain a stable party system.

This approach was first introduced by Katz and Mair in the early 1990s, and has undergone several revisions and extensions since. In its original formulation (Katz and Mair 1995) the theory focused on the reaction of parties to partisan dealignment among the public, and the rising costs of media campaigning. At the time, many analysts had associated these phenomena with the decline of parties as an important part of democratic politics, but Katz and Mair see this as “largely misconceived” and rooted in an inappropriate reliance on the traditional mass party model (1995: 25). Rather, their theory holds that certain developed democracies (especially in Northern Europe) have experienced a transition from vigorous competition among catch-all parties to collusion among a new class of cartel parties interested in shoring up their position. The emergence of this new type of party has both internal and external dimensions (see also the detailed typology in Katz and Mair 1995: 18): Internally, the cartel party pursues a more “capital intensive” strategy relative to the catch-all party, reducing the importance of party membership, except to sustain a “legitimizing myth.” They also employ a policy of stratification between central headquarters and local party agencies (a “stratarchy”), wherein the latter are

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11 As a fitting symbol of its soon-to-be prominence, Katz and Mair’s argument appeared as the first article in the first issue of the subfield journal *Party Politics.*
given a relatively free hand but have limited control over the professionalized central leadership. Externally, the parties in the cartel become more closely entwined with the state, particularly in gaining access to state subventions to offset the loss of grassroots funding. In a more recent reappraisal of the theory, Katz and Mair continue to endorse most of the claims they made in their original argument, while acknowledging in the light of subsequent empirical investigations that “there were also limitations in that original argument” (2009: 754).

In the meantime, however, Katz joined with Mark Blyth to offer a significant extension of the theory (later largely endorsed in the aforementioned Katz and Mair 2009). This version of the thesis largely replaces state subventions with the coordinated constraint of policy options, as the central mechanism of “cartelization” (Blyth and Katz 2005). In essence, parties facing increasingly costly policy demands choose to deescalate political competition by converging toward the center. Radical demands are marginalized or explicitly rejected, leading to the same kind of “depoliticization” bemoaned by Hay (2007). And, because mainstream parties closely resemble an economic oligopoly (few participants, high barriers to entry), this arrangement can become quite stable even in the absence of an active conspiracy. A favorite example of the authors is the airline industry, where carriers can collude against the public merely by following each other’s publicly-known price signals. The authors’ basic thesis on how this applies to party politics is worth quoting at length:

> Once the limits of catch-all politics were reached and globalisation, or, perhaps better, ideas about globalisation, restructured the context in which states operated, party elites embraced these new ideas about the economy as a way of ratcheting down constituent expectations […]. In cartel terms, they were signaling other players that they were limiting quantities and encouraging joint maximisation. And, if other parties did the same, they could cartelise the market and get more profit (hold on to office) and security (minimal cost of electoral defeat) for less (in terms of policy commitments).

(Blyth and Katz 2005: 43)
Notably, globalization occupies a crucial dual role in this version of the thesis: As driver of cartelization, where the disciplines of the global economy have made traditional catch-all social spending too costly; and as instrument of the cartel, with the discourse about those disciplines legitimating the narrower range of policy options. It is an ambiguous dual role, however; though they carefully acknowledge that “ideas about globalisation” are as important to the restructuring of the economy as material facts, Blyth and Katz do not explore where those ideas come from or whether and how they might be produced by the parties’ own rhetoric.

Another important advance that Blyth and Katz claim for their version of the theory is that it appears to explain a wider range of national party systems than the original model. The UK, in particular, was considered a poor fit by Katz and Mair originally, but is used as a paradigmatic case here. In particular, cartelization is invoked to explain the moderation of Labour Party policy demands under Blair, as well subsequent reforms of the Conservative Party to more closely resemble New Labour (2005: 46).

The Market-Oriented Party

A less negative analogy of parties to firms is also possible, of course. Rather than members of a cartel, parties can be seen as competitors in a free market for votes. In a simplified, perfect competition model, this would resemble the Downsian vision; but it is also possible begun to apply a more complex model of the firm to political parties, one drawn from management studies. Particularly well-known, especially within political science (Johns and Brandenburg 2014: 91), is the market orientation model advanced by Jennifer Lees-Marshment: “A Market-Oriented Party designs its behaviour to provide voter satisfaction. It uses market intelligence to identify voter demands, then designs its product to suit them. It does not attempt to change what people think, but to deliver what they need and want” (2001: 30).
This ideal type is situated within a broader approach that called “comprehensive political marketing”, itself part of a longer tradition of political marketing theory (Lees-Marshalment 2001: 4). The foundation of this school is the extension of theories about marketing beyond firms, as first proposed by Kotler and Levy (1969), who focused on non-profit organizations but also envisaged applications to politics (much as Downs had earlier applied Hotelling’s theory of firm location to the spatial model of party competition). “Marketing,” in this sense, means much more than advertising, which is merely one technique. Rather, it extends to how firms “design their product and promote it,” to “the relationship between a firm’s products and resources and the response to it from customers,” and to how a firm can better “compete with its rivals to obtain a limited amount of consumer spending.” In short, marketing encompasses “all areas of a firm’s behaviour, not just the sales department” (Lees-Marshalment 2001: 22). Early studies of political party marketing within political science tended to ignore the management literature on marketing and focused solely on communications rather than this broader conception (e.g., Shama 1976; Farrel and Wortmann 1987; and Scammell 1995). More recently, scholars have begun to consciously employ marketing theory itself to the study of political parties, such as Wring (1996), Smith and Hirst (2001), and Henneberg (2006), as well as Lees-Marshalment (2001, 2011).

Comprehensive political marketing, as articulated by Lees-Marshalment (2001), uses marketing theory to develop a three-fold typology of political parties: The “Product-Oriented Party” focuses on producing the best possible product according to its own standards, and counts on voters to follow it. Note that the “product,” here, is the whole of the party’s behavior and identity; that is, not just policy commitments, but also leaders and leadership styles,
The Product-Oriented Party thus resembles the classic image of an ideological mass party, dedicated to implementing as pure a reflection of its (left- or right-wing) ideals as possible. The second type is the “Sales-Oriented Party,” which also remains committed to its traditional product, but recognizes that the electorate may not automatically accept it. This party responds by relying heavily on communications and advertising techniques to change voters’ minds, and consequently conforms to some of the less flattering public assumptions about contemporary parties. Finally, the “Market-Oriented Party” recognizes that it needs to respond to, rather than struggle against, public attitudes and preferences. As such, it places market research (which the Product-Oriented Party eschews and the Sales-Oriented Party subordinates) before “product design,” taking on characteristics that voters like and proposing policies that meet their needs and wants. This type is the centerpiece of Lees-Marchment’s analysis because she sees it as the only path to success for parties in the current era, when a decline in partisan socialization and the increased access to information makes the electorate more apt to hold parties to account.

Theoretically, this ideal type superficially resembles the Downsian party in following the preferences of key voters. However, it can be distinguished from the spatial approach in two ways: First, the typology is defined in terms of the process through which the party operates (especially the role and significance of market research) rather than the position of its product relative to absolute policy space. Second, and following from the above, political marketing recognizes the active role of the party. Voters have needs and preferences that must be met, but there is no obvious policy spectrum on which these can simply be discovered; rather, the party must combine research and policy knowledge to formulate a program and develop institutional

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12 Notably, this is in contrast to the way that the Cartel Party model deploys the analogy of a firm. While Blyth and Katz focus on policies and consider fiscal demands as the equivalent of market price (2005: 40), Lees-Marchment replaces pricing entirely (substituting “product adjustment”) in her political model of marketing (2001: 26)
arrangements that satisfy voter needs. In a similar way, the Market-Oriented Party can also be distinguished from the ideal-typical valence oriented party; political marketing encompasses the active processes of discovering the (valence or positional) issues most salient to the electorate. Of course, the approach shares with the spatial and valence models the crucial assumption that the electorate possesses stable, clear, and well-ordered preferences that can be used to determine party strategy. As I discuss below in relation to Andrew Hindmoor’s approach, this is not an entirely unproblematic assumption.

Empirically, Lees-Marshment develops the political marketing typology by mapping it onto the experience of British political parties from the 1980s-1990s: In the early 1980s, Labour was a classic Product-Oriented Party (with a socialist product) and consequently lost to the emerging market orientation of Thatcher’s Tories. Kinnock’s first attempt at party reform only made Labour into a Sales-Oriented Party (trying to put a less extreme face on the same product), and only Blair’s reinvention of New Labour as a Market-Oriented Party allowed a return to power. In the future, she claims, it will most often be the case that when a party “is the most-market oriented of its main competitors, it then wins the election” (2001: 211).

This is a strikingly-clear empirical prediction, and there have been attempts to test the hypothesis both quantitatively and qualitatively (Coleman 2006; Henneberg 2006; Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2009; Johns and Brandenberg 2014). These have generally raised doubts about the universal applicability of such a simple formula, but have also been beset by a high degree of conceptual confusion. For example, Johns and Brandenberg claim to test the assumptions underlying Lees-Marshment’s model (2014: 91). This is already a problematic way to approach the issue (as it conflates assumptions and claims), and becomes more confused when they conduct the test by essentially asking survey respondents whether they indeed prefer parties
that follow public opinion to those that lead (as well as whether they necessarily see a trade-off between those orientations). Not surprisingly, they find that voters do not see a trade-off and generally prefer parties that both strike a balance between leadership and following the public’s wishes. But does this really challenge (let alone falsify) Lees-Marshment’s claim? After all, skillful following of trends can look like leadership (i.e., being the first party to tackle an issue of growing popular concern); and if a balanced leading-following party is what the public wants, the Market-Oriented Party would provide it. In short, this approach treats political marketing theory as being based on the public understanding of the party’s strategy, while Lees-Marshment chose to focus instead on voters’ evaluations of the party’s end product.

The Center-Constructing Party

Mentioned above for his critique of Downsian approaches, Andrew Hindmoor (alternately a devotee, and sympathetic critic, of rational choice in general) has produced an ideal-type of party behavior that is an interesting mirror image of the familiar Downsian approach. The party of Hindmoor’s model is no less committed to occupying the electoral center—that is, to be perceived by voters as being closest to the center on major issues. However, this competition takes on a very different character because Hindmoor is willing to relax two spatial theory assumptions: What if the electorate is not endowed with clearly-known, fixed, and well-ordered preferences about each issue? What if parties had a role in constructing and not just operating within issue spaces? He argues that, even to the extent that voters are individual utility-maximizers, this does not imply that they can clearly differentiate between policy alternatives (2004: 31-2). Work in political economy has likewise shown that even agents’

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13 Hindmoor would be the first to note that his analysis is not a critique of Downs per se, but of the simplified extrapolations about the median voter theorem that have been so prominent in explaining contemporary politics (2005: 403).
most unambiguous interests, like market actors seeking to make more money, cannot be translated into preferences about policies without some exogenous set of beliefs about how the system functions (Hall 1993; Blyth 2003); even organized actors like unions and employer associations require this grounding of “common knowledge” to be established in order to function (Culpepper 2008). As a result, “policy does not map on to spatial position in a prearranged or fixed way,” and “the political centre cannot simply be associated with specific policies” (Hindmoor 2004: 36, 38).

Hindmoor’s alternative theory is that median voters (who constitute the “electoral center”) resolve this information problem by consistently favoring what they perceive to be the most centrist policy options (the “political center”). What this means for idealypical party behavior is that, to win, they must construct the issue space in such a way that their preferred position is at the center and their opponents’ are at the extremes. In other words, this is Downs in reverse; rather than successful parties converging on a center point defined by the electorate, the electorate converges on a point designed by successful parties (which is made central by shaping the space around it). Hindmoor identifies four broad strategies for effecting such a construction (2004): First, parties construct the center through rhetoric, using various techniques of argumentation to convince voters that their own position is moderate and that those of their opponents are extreme. Second, they construct the center through policy innovation, developing novel policies that are outside of the policy options already associated with the left- or right-wing (this is particularly important when a party’s existing program is perceived as far from the center). Third, parties can rely on the framing of issues, which is related to rhetoric, but focuses on public understandings about the policies themselves (e.g., whether abortion policy is about the right to choose or the right to life), rather than on the relative positions of parties. Finally, parties
can construct the center through *leadership*, projecting a steady centrist image through the personal characteristics and campaigning/governing style of the party’s leader. In each case, it should be noted, material limits are inscribed around party creativity: “Rhetorically skilled politicians can persuade an audience to change some of their beliefs. But they cannot persuade everyone of anything” (Hindmoor 2004: 59).

In theoretical terms, Hindmoor asserts that his approach contributes to and distinguishes itself from the literature on party competition by providing a nuanced understanding of the relationship between policy and position, a systematic treatment of political “spin,” and a recognition of the range of creativity and choice available to parties (2004: 204-209). Empirically, he illustrates the logic by applying it to the experience of the British Labour Party under Tony Blair. Hindmoor argues that it was the successful application of a constructing-the-center strategy was responsible for New Labour’s success. This is in contrast to more common Downsian readings, which infer an objective move to the right as the critical factor. For example, Downs famously conceiving of public ownership as the perfect objective correlate for the abstract left-right axis. But Hindmoor demonstrates that the Labour Party sidestepped such a fixed issue dimension by focusing its political arguments on the type and purpose of public ownership (e.g., *how* the National Health Service should be run, not *how much* of it should be privatized) in order to distance themselves from both “Old Labour” and Tory extremes (2004: 121-124). Blair’s center-constructing entailed a specific set of strategies which can be easily extrapolated to other proponents of the “third way” during the same period (though the theory is universal in principle and transcends the specific “third way” era).
Conclusion

As Kriesi et al. note, despite extensive research on the relationship between globalization and national governance and institutions, “the impact of globalization on politics has received hardly any attention” (2008: 320). And though that team of scholars has made one important contribution, the reviews above suggest that there is still much room for work in this regard. This is in part because too few scholars interested in the relationship between globalization and the day-to-day politics of parties and elections have taken up Hay and Rosamond’s call to “move beyond an understanding of globalization discourse as the linguistic expression of exogenous interests” (2002: 147). In other words, there has been little attempt to systematically reckon with the possibility that the prevailing understandings of globalization are an endogenous product of domestic political maneuvering. Nor has this work engaged with the full range of theories of party behavior and party competition. For example, the otherwise comprehensive analysis by Kriesi et al. unreflectively accepts a spatial model of competition, treating (positional) manifesto commitments as the main product of party activities. As I argue in depth in the next chapter, there is room for incorporating the globalization issue into a wider understanding of party activity.

Turning to those theories of elections and party competition, we can briefly summarize the ideal types that I presented above as follows:

- The *Downsian Party* competes by committing to certain positions within a known range of possible policies (e.g., relative levels of taxation and spending), and maximizes its vote by moving to the position with the greatest public support (usually a unique point near the center of the spectrum).
- The *Performance Party*, by contrast, competes by promoting itself as the party most capable of delivering on policy positions that are more-or-less universally shared among the electorate (like economic growth and clean government).

- The *Cartel Party* competes in basically the same way as the Downsian Party, but focuses on limiting the range of possible policies, in collusion with other parties, to make the costs of policy commitments as low as possible.

- The *Market-Oriented Party* competes in both spatial and valence terms, but is distinguished by relying on a particular process of market research to determine the desires of the electorate and to develop achievable policy commitments that meet them.

- The *Center-Constructing Party*, finally, competes for the same “median voters” as the Downsian Party, but does not rely on a stable and knowable policy space. Instead, this party uses a variety of techniques to *construct* such a space in the perception of voters, placing its own position at the desirable center point and its opponents’ at the extremes.

Read together, it is clear that these diverse approaches share many points of overlap as well as of contention. These leave room for integration and advancement. In particular, I propose to extend Hindmoor’s notion of parties as constructive to a performance politics model, similar to the spatial/valence integration of political marketing theory but without the assumption of an electorate with fully-formed preferences. Likewise, considering these in light of the globalization literature, I extend the notion of constructing policy space by including the possibility of parties also constructing broader notions like globalization. In other words, I treat the globalization discourse as an example of shaping beliefs about the world itself, and not just policy space. Consequently, we can see how parties use this construction to improve their standing in voter’s valence calculations (parallel but separate from their center-constructive efforts to shape
positional calculations). In the next chapter, I develop these revised assumptions into a theoretical framework for research.
CHAPTER 3

GLOBALIZATION AS PARTY COMPETITION?

But we have very little knowledge about the rhetorical content of campaigns, which is, however, their principal feature. Consequently, we do not know much substantively about how policies are presented, discussed, and decided upon. Consequently also, we cannot explain campaigns, and we cannot even give good advice to campaigners.


As the previous chapter shows, Hindmoor, Lees-Marshalment, Blyth and Katz, and the various followers of Downs have all applied their respective theoretical lenses to British party politics in the New Labour era. What use, then, is another reading? I assert three general goals for presenting the new approach detailed below: First, as suggested in the previous chapter, I intend to integrate strategic analyses of party competition with findings about the discursive construction of globalization. Aside from underdeveloped references to the “rhetoric and reality” of globalization in Blyth and Katz’s version of the cartel approach (2005: 41), the field has largely been left to studies of ideology rather than strategy. Second, and following from the above, I hope to advance the ideational reading of globalization by highlighting the degree to which globalization discourse is driven by electoral incentives, which among other things will speak to how resilient we can expect this discourse to be in the post-global financial crisis era. And third, in respect to the study of party competition generally, I will extend Hindmoor’s project of cataloging the techniques available for constructing political space, in this case including the discursive tools that parties use to construct public narratives about the world (in which electoral debates are in turn embedded).

In this chapter, I present the theoretical framework and methodology for my project. Taking off from the literature discussed previously, this consists of developing an alternative political party type—the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party—and discussing how I will employ this type to analyze the strategies and discourses of the Labour Party, SNP, and UKIP. This ideal-
type is a party that competes by restructuring the public discourses that ground voters’
calculations about parties. The globalization discourse, as discussed by Hay and others, is
precisely the kind of representation of the world—important to reasoning about policy but not
amenable to direct observation by most voters—that is most valuable for this kind of
manipulation. As I will show, when read in this context, globalization discourse is not
necessarily a neutral reaction to exogenous events, nor does it herald the end of serious politics
as feared by critical theorists and the party cartel school. It is the continuation of those politics by
other means.

**Theoretical Framework: The Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party**

In this section I develop a theoretical framework for my analysis by drawing-upon and
extending two existing concepts: The first is the theory of “heresthetics,” a particularly
promising alternative to the model of parties as reactive vis-à-vis issue space. This is a concept
developed by American rational choice theorist William Riker to refer to a particular type of
political strategy: “structuring the world so that you can win” (1986: ix). Building on Riker and
those who have continued his agenda, I propose that we can see this “structuring” of the world in
discursive rather than just material terms. But as I will show, this leaves the problem of
understanding the relative stability of politics; in other words, it does not seem that parties are
constantly redefining the world in whatever terms they prefer. To address this, I incorporate the
second concept, “bricolage,” according to which actors cannot create new discourses freely but
are limited to innovatively recombining existing elements. I argue that these can be synthesized
into a new ideal-type, the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party, which can shed light on different
aspects of party competition than those reviewed in the previous chapter.
Heresthetics

Though it would come to be developed as an empirical theory of politics, the notion of heresthetics arose out of Riker’s work on larger questions of democracy, which he was working out using quantitative analysis and formal modeling as part of the tradition of “positive political theory” (see Riker and Ordeshook 1973). In *Liberalism Against Populism* (1982), as the title suggests, he attempted to use rational choice theory to resolve the long-standing debate between “Madisonian” liberalism and “Rousseauistic” populism; the latter believing that legislation represents the collective will of the people, with the former rejecting this and being content with regulated competition among irreconcilable interests. For Riker, the debate is put to rest by Kenneth Arrow’s famous “impossibility theorem” and related work on instability within economics and political science (Arrow 1951; Black et al. 1958; Kramer 1973; McKelvey 1976; Plott 1976; Schofield 1978). Where a stable equilibrium does not exist, as these models show will usually be the case in a multidimensional issue space, Rousseauistic legislation is impossible and liberalism is the only viable option. Of course, this may be a broader claim than the findings really warrant. Ian McLean (a British scholar who is one of the contemporary popularizers of heresthetics) suggests that Riker overlooks the fundamental normative divide that still separates pluralist and majoritarian worldviews (2002: 546-47). Also, his version of populism may be a bit of a straw-man, imposing liberal assumptions about the nature of individual preferences into a much more radical approach (i.e., Rousseau’s famous “general will” was explicitly not the mere aggregation of “particular opinions”). However, what is important here is not the quality of Riker’s political philosophy but his insight that uncertainty among potential equilibria is not a theoretical weakness of analytic politics, but accurately captures the fundamental instability of politics—an instability amenable to manipulation. Also, it is important to understand that Riker did not attach any moral opprobrium to such manipulation; indeed quite the opposite. “Given the
absence of a general equilibrium of preferences,” he argues, “all agenda are biased toward one outcome or the other” (Riker 1986: 31). Thus, there is no “fair” solution except for all actors to be able to use their political skills to the utmost.

To describe this type of skill, Riker coined the term “heresthetics,” rooted in a Greek word for choosing and electing. Focusing on this concept allows him to move from analyzing the effects of different decision-making procedures (a major concern of existing rational choice analysis) to analyzing the ability of politicians to control the procedures whereby one of many conceivable equilibria becomes a fixed outcome. This was not intended by Riker as a rebuke of his rational choice foundations (though it is difficult to see how a predictive model could be developed about heresthetics, since it relies so heavily on creativity and political artistry); rather, he considered heresthetics the “practical supplement” to rationalist political science, in the same way that rhetoric sits within social psychology or grammar within linguistics (1986: x). This empirical application of the concept is developed in the follow-up to Liberalism Against Populism, tellingly titled The Art of Political Manipulation (1986). He distinguishes this art from rhetoric as “the art of verbal persuasion”, because “winners induce [alliances, coalitions, etc.] by more than rhetorical attraction. Typically they win because they have set up the situation in such a way that other people will want to join them—or will feel forced by circumstances to join them—without any persuasion at all” (1986: ix). The heresthetician will organize the system in favor of his preferred outcome through one of several means, including strategic voting and agenda control, which are more common in legislative/deliberative than electoral contexts. But the most widely-used, and most relevant to party competition, is the manipulation of issue dimensions. This technique entails rhetorical and policy choices that affect which issue dimension(s) will be presented to voters. This is the most effective tool because it relies on the
fixed preferences held by individuals about any given issue, according to a rational model. A party using heresthetics can leverage these attachments to certain positions by introducing (or “revealing”) a new dimension that changes voter calculus about which party is closest to their overall ideal point (i.e., separating itself from an otherwise similar party by emphasizing a new issue on which they are much closer to the electorate). As Riker explains, “[t]his manipulation works even though those who are manipulated know they are being manipulated because, once a salient dimension is revealed, its salience exists regardless of one’s attitude toward it.” (1986: 151).

Riker argues that this image of political action “depicts politics as it usually is, with politicians continually poking and pushing the world to get the results they want” (1986: 142). This articulation appears to claim heresthetics as a general model of politics (we might say that it is one ideal-type of political behavior). Yet, this has generally not been developed in subsequent literature. More frequently, analysts have followed McLean in treating heresthetics as a rare political maneuver that explains certain “surprising facts” (2002: 550). In this vein, case studies have shown that heresthetics can offer a useful reading of major political developments that are not well-captured by other approaches. These have included: Stanley Baldwin’s interwar revival of the Conservative Party by manipulating the tariff issue (Taylor 2005); Thatcher’s capture of working-class voters by using, among other strategies, the “right-to-buy” policy to change the calculus around council housing (McLean 2001); the emergence of a Labour-SNP coalition in favor of Scottish devolution, through Europeanization of the devolution issue (Dardanelli 2009); and New Labour’s policy on Bank of England monetary policy independence, a self-binding maneuver that removed the interest rate issue from the day-to-day government agenda (Dellepiane-Avallaneda 2012). But if we consider heresthetics as one ideal-typical form of
political competition (alongside the types outlined in the previous chapter) we can answer one of the strongest critiques of Riker’s model—whether any of his empirical examples is a strictly accurate representation of the historical case (McLean 2002: 548-50; Green and Shapiro 1996)—without assuming that it must be an occasional feature of politics.

Further, most of the aforementioned work also perpetuates a restrictive interpretation of heresthetics by neglecting the role of ideas and language in political competition. They still operate in an ideal-typically rationalist world where voters have well-developed preferences over policy outcomes. Neither the fluidity suggested by Hindmoor nor the more radical uncertainty of discourse theory is present. Of course, this is entirely consistent with Riker’s own worldview and understanding of the term, but that is no reason that we cannot now push the boundaries. Indeed, in some of the literature, a limited role has been allowed for rhetoric in terms of framing issues, such as with the successful “Europeanization” of Scottish devolution (Dardanelli 2009) or the coercive rhetoric of international diplomacy (Krebs and Jackson 2007). And recently, a more expansive notion of heresthetics, consistent with a “performative” understanding of social action, has been suggested by Colin Hay. In an article that uses a reinterpretation of the legend of King Canute to discuss issues of structure and agency, he cites Canute’s strategic “failure” to turn back the tide as a heresthetic move: Canute constructs “a public drama whose form is predicated, and relies for its effect, upon a set of prior expectations on the part of those for whom it is staged, which it sets out to challenge” (2009: 276). In making this claim, Hay sets out the following understanding of heresthetics, which is worth quoting at length:

In the most general terms, a heresthetician is a creative agent who strives to alter decisively the strategic context in which he or she finds him or herself so as to render it more amenable to strategies for realising his or her intentions. [...] Of course, the concept of heresthetics is by no means the only way to operationalise the rhetorical and the

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14 Riker himself incorporates rhetoric into his later work (1996), albeit in a very limited way; see the methodological discussion of rhetorical analysis below.
performative dimensions of political conduct; nor is it necessarily the most effective. [But] at least as used here, the concept entails no more than the assumption that political actors are strategic—that they devise strategies (however motivated) for the realisation of their intentions.

(2009: 276, 278)

In essence, heresthetics is here defined in relation to the actor (such as a party) and its strategy, rather than in terms of historically “surprising” political outcomes as in McLean’s interpretation. As Hay is suggesting, there is nothing inconsistent between this approach and an ideational understanding of political action (a fully constructivist understanding of behavior, of course, would be harder to square with self-interested strategic reasoning). Thus, as I will describe below, we can envision a kind of discursive heresthetics: parties using their position as sources of information for the electorate to manipulate, in Riker’s terms, the shared understandings about the world that are as essential to voter decision-making as the agenda and the issue-dimensions.

It should be evident that heresthetics under Hay’s interpretation is a broad concept that can potentially encompass a range of party behaviors, including those in the existing literature. Hindmoor, for example, acknowledges that his model of party behavior is closely related to heresthetics, particularly as he shares many of Riker’s specific critiques of the Downsian and other more limited rational models (2004: 41). The valence model is arguably another case.

Even though its promoters specifically claim that performance voting is more rational because it limits opportunities for political manipulation (Clarke et al. 2009: 38), the emphasis on limited-information heuristics undercuts this. In other words, there is the possibility for a “heuristic-heresthetics” whereby parties selectively manipulate certain known voter decision-making shortcuts, such as by putting forward as leader someone whose image is actually not reflective of the party as a whole. Finally, the Cartel Party is an interesting edge case. These parties are

15 Hindmoor cites heresthetics in his discussion of rhetoric, but it could also come under “innovation” (2004: 83), considering Riker’s assertion that “the fundamental heresthetical device is to divide the majority with a new alternative, one that [the heresthetician] prefers to the alternative previously expected to win” (1986: 1).
perhaps the most straightforwardly manipulative of issue structures, but are collectively seeking advantage over the electorate rather than over each other. We could perhaps speak of the party cartel as a collective- or collusive-heresthetic, but this would be well outside of Riker’s framework (not least because of his positive normative stance on the subject). For the moment, it is not necessary to adjudicate just how widely the heresthetics framework might be able to extend; I only wish to emphasize that the framework developed here is not the definitive application of heresthetics to party politics, but only one particular iteration.

Bricolage

A broad understanding of heresthetics, however, is as difficult to operationalize empirically as it is theoretically appealing. Once we see parties as operating heresthetically in the realm of ideas and discourse, outside of the bounds of formal rules and known issue areas, the system begins to look radically unstable. Can it really be the case that discourses are rapidly shifting as parties are jockeying for advantage? Well, to a degree yes; but party victories often extend beyond a single issue or election, and sometimes ideas are settled in the public discourse for some time. Indeed, the apparently stability of political issues over time has been cited as a weakness of Riker’s model (McLean: 547-48). In short, “What are the limitations of the discursive heresthetician?” In this section, I address this concern by introducing the concept of “bricolage.” This notion focuses our attention on the resources that are used to achieve strategic ends, and suggests that far from having a free hand, the heresthetician is crucially constrained by the tools at hand.

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16 While Riker was developing his theory about actors manipulating instability, much of mainstream rational choice theory was occupied with various explanations for why instability was not a problem at all (inter alia Tullock 1981; Shepsle and Weingast 1984; Schofield 1995).
The *bricoleur*, in French, is a kind of “handyman,” and the metaphor of social action as bricolage was introduced to social science by structural-functionalist anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss in 1962. The bricoleur is the counterpart to the “engineer;” where the engineer conceives a problem and its solution in their entirety and thus is able to choose the right tools for the job, the bricoleur makes do with the materials at hand and the task is largely improvised rather than premeditated (Lévi-Strauss 1962/1996). For Lévi-Strauss, the latter is by far the dominant way that humans behave in relation to society; indeed, in his structural worldview there is little room for novelty, only a continual play of the same cultural resources. However, the metaphor has proven popular, and many later scholars have adapted it to describe a more creative kind of activity. An influential contemporary example is institutional political-economist John L. Campbell, who considers bricolage to be a key mechanism of institutional change overlooked by existing approaches. In sum, Campbell understands bricolage to entail “an innovative recombination of elements that constitutes a new way of configuring organizations, social movements, institutions and other forms of social activity,” to which we might now add language and discourse (2005: 56). He further distinguishes two strands of the concept: “substantive bricolage,” which involves the recombination of existing institutional forms following an instrumental, problem-solving logic; and “symbolic bricolage,” which adheres more to the logic of appropriateness by recombining “symbolic principles and practices” (2004: 69-70).

Building on Campbell’s symbolic bricolage, and also concerned with mechanisms of institutional change, Martin Carstensen has outlined an ideal-type of “the political bricoleur” based on four dimensions: “mode of reasoning,” “structure of ideas,” “viability of ideas,” and nature of ideational change (2011: 155). Along each of these dimensions Carstensen contrasts the bricoleur with the contrasting ideal-type of “paradigm man,” a distillation of Peter Hall’s (1993)
policy paradigms notion. In essence, paradigm man is the polar opposite of Lévi-Strauss’s engineer, selecting neither his tools nor his use of them; these are codetermined by the paradigm in which the problem is defined. The bricoleur stands in contrast to both of these: the mode of reasoning is pragmatic and draws from multiple epistemological domains; the structure of ideas is heterogeneous and determined by political resonance rather than internal coherence (the mark of a paradigm); the political viability of ideas is based on their relationship to other ideas in circulation rather than their objective ability to explain the world; and the nature of change is evolutionary rather than crisis-driven (Carstensen 2011: 155-62).

Combining elements from Carstensen’s and Lévi-Strauss’s binaries, we can hone in on two aspects of the bricolage ideal-type that are most relevant for my analysis: First, unlike paradigm man, the bricoleur is not locked into the internal logic of the discourses he appropriates; rather, he recombines them in a way defined by the political logics he is answering. “Because of his undogmatic approach to politics, the bricoleur focuses on putting ideas together that may create the support necessary for them to get through the political process,” which entails answering “multiple logics simultaneously” (Carstensen 2011: 158). This leaves open the question of what goals the bricoleur is pursuing, if they are not defined by a paradigm, a question that is important because a key aspect of bricolage is that the ends are separate from tools. For example, when a bricoleur develops a definition of globalization, he is not concerned with how well this definition fits the phenomenon, but what other political work it can do for him. Otherwise it would be engineering, not bricolage. Another example of this, without actually referring to bricolage, is provided by Culpepper’s work on “common knowledge” and coordinated wage bargaining (2008). The respective union and employer

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17 I follow Carstensen in using the generic masculine “he” in this case, since it corresponds with the French *le bricoleur*, though there is probably an argument for beginning to introduce *la bricoleuse* into social science.
federations in that account had to agree on a new “frame of reference” for wage bargaining in the wake of changes to the global economy. But as organizations they are not constituted to debate ideas, “they would rather be arguing about wages and working conditions” (Culpepper 2008: 12). As a result, a premium is placed on finding some mutually acceptable understanding so they could return to the real work of bargaining; “once a candidate emerges from the field of competing ideas, the acceleration of a plausible coordinating idea becomes difficult to stop” (Culpepper 2008: 27). Ideal-typical political engineers would have dedicated themselves to discovering the understanding that most favored their own economic interests, but these actors are better modeled as bricoleurs, for whom the exogenous goal of returning to bargaining took precedence. It is in this respect that the fusion with hermeneutics can be useful, because that approach provides a framework for modeling political actors’ goals.

Second, unlike the engineer, the bricoleur cannot choose his tools but must work with what is at hand. Thus, while Campbells’s and Carstensen’s articulations emphasize creativity (in the tradition of challenging paradigm-centered theories), bricolage is also a theory of constraints on agency. The limited resources available to the bricoleur are emblemized by the image of his “toolkit.” A useful parallel is Swidler’s (1986) theory of culture, from which Carstensen draws the image of the “toolkit.” Responding in particular to the “culture of poverty” debate, Swidler argues that cultural differences can explain behavior not because they determine individual preferences (i.e., certain cultures value something, like leisure, over material success). Rather, cultures of poverty exist because a culture carries a limited range of social resources (a toolkit) from which to construct strategies of action. Individual members of a culture, she submits, will have many different goals that will change over time, but they will be collectively constrained by the tools (especially language and communication styles) with which they have been
acculturated. Where these tools differ substantially from the tools of the dominant cultural group, it will be more difficult for members of the minority culture to succeed in the predominant social system. Following this analogy, then, we can see bricoleurs as free to transform the ideational environment but constrained in doing so by the discursive raw materials that are available.

Synthesis: The Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party

Synthesizing these two concepts, we can envision a new ideal-type of party behavior, the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party. This would be a party that constructs the underlying foundations of the issue space by combining elements from a toolkit of existing political discourses. This resembles the Center-Constructing Party in terms of its focus on constructing political space, rather than merely operating within it. But it is less constrained than that party because it constructs politics at the fundamental level of political discourse, albeit within the bounds of the existing tools available. This type provides a framework for empirically analyzing both the strategic aims and the socially-constructive outcomes of party discourse, by relaxing assumptions about the fixity of issue space and the determinacy of discourse. In the specific cases to which I am applying it, it enables us to see parties deploying “globalization” in British politics as they both choose and build; as herestheticians and as bricoleurs.

Note that this ideal-type relies on particularly on the notion of discursive heresthetic that I discussed above, quite distinct from Riker’s or McLean’s narratives of political leaders manipulating known issues. In this representation, electoral politics is not a policy dialogue between parties and voters in a vacuum, but one taking place against a rich and variable background of political discourses. These discourses comprises narratives that circulate among politicians, the media, and the public—interconnecting narratives about the wider world as well as about the identities of the parties. Voters must make political decisions within this context and
not as abstract rational calculators; they reason about the best party for them *given* the inter-subjective understanding of what is at stake produced by discourse. A common problem for Labour, as I will show, has been narratives of past disappointment drowning out carefully targeted commitments in the present. This broad discursive sphere is thus as important to long-term party success as the narrower realm of policy competition; and to be successful, parties must work to transform and not merely accept this context. The Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party, then, is one that reconfigures aspects of the existing political discourse (bricolage) in order to change voters’ calculus in its favor (heresthetics). In the case narratives I identify a specific “globalization heresthetic,” through which introducing a particular articulation of globalization into the public discourse changes which parties are seen as legitimate contenders (a crucial threshold for attracting votes, as the valence model makes clear).

In developing such an integrated theory, and in beginning to apply it to the historical and textual evidence, I aim to show that it offers a more robust alternative to the existing models for offering an expressly party-political explanation of the discourse of globalization in British politics. As an illustration, we can consider the contrast with Cartel Party model, which happens also to expressly incorporate the rhetorical construction of globalization (albeit unevenly). The defining features of the Cartel Party are many, and I should note at the outset that I do not intend to address, let alone challenge, several of them: that major parties have adopted increasingly similar institutional structures that give more freedom to the leadership, have sidelined intermediate interest groups, and increasingly derive financing from sources other than mass membership contributions. That this has occurred in the UK is well-documented (Blyth and Katz 2005; Detterbeck 2005), and not particularly relevant to the question I am pursuing. Rather, the core feature of the cartel type to which the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party provides an alternative
is that the party’s basic goal is to stabilize party competition to reduce the “costs” of producing policies and of losing. Through heresthetics the goal is to win and to achieve lasting relative gains over an opponent—in one of the historical examples in the literature, Baldwin manipulated the protectionism issue in order to essentially destroy the Liberal Party with the intention of supplanting it (McLean 2001). Through the process of bricolage, these parties can assemble heresthetic strategies by constructing new terms of political debate which do not inevitably carry the fiscal costs assumed by the cartelization thesis. As both heresthetics and bricolage are extremely agent-centered approaches, they cannot offer the kind of deterministic predictions available to structural theories (such as Downsian models). Thus, the way that particular parties will develop their strategies will vary considerably from case to case. However, through this reading of contemporary British politics, I expect to show that the globalization discourse is not the end of conventional politics but their continuation by other means.

Inevitably, this analysis of the strategic use of globalization discourse will focus on a narrow slice of parties’ political maneuvering. This theoretical frame does not imply any claim that the globalization heresthetic was all-encompassing, or that other important uses of rhetoric were only subordinate to it. Rather, I consider the parties’ articulations of globalization as analytic case studies in the process of discursive heresthetic. It is a concept inherently above and apart from any specific policy commitments, which nevertheless provides a key narrative that the parties can introduce in place of the dominant narratives that are against their electoral interests. We cannot make the causal claim from this analysis that elections were won or lost because of the presence or absence of this discourse. However, I do claim that the rhetoric of these three parties as a whole cannot be understood apart from the role of “globalization,” and that the
contemporary meaning of “globalization” in the UK cannot be understood apart from parties’ strategic interests in constructing it in this way.

Methodology: Textual Analysis for Party Studies

In this section, I discuss the methodology through which I intend to apply the heresthetic-bricolage theoretical lens onto the empirical experience of British party politics. I open with brief discussions of how my approach is grounded in terms of philosophical ontology, drawing on Patrick Jackson’s “analyticist” mode, and of my case selection. I then proceed to discuss in some detail the approaches—critical discourse analysis and rhetorical political analysis—from which my specific methods are drawn. Finally, I conclude by pulling these together into a summary of the specific methodology that I will be utilizing.

Considerations of philosophical ontology are a relatively recent addition to the methodological debates of social science, but are important in understanding how social scientific inquiry is grounded in basic worldviews. Distinct from the more familiar “scientific ontology,” which addresses what kinds of things are knowable in the world (e.g., material versus ideational), “philosophical ontology” deals more fundamentally with the “hook-up” between our minds and the world that we are trying to perceive. It is “the conceptual and philosophical basis on which claims about the world are formulated in the first place” (Jackson 2011: 28; see also Shotter 1993; Patomäki and Wight 2000). Patrick Jackson operationalizes this broad concept by typologizing social-scientific inquiry into four broad methodologies: neopositivism (mainstream deductive, falsificationist social science), critical realism (associated with an exploration of unobservable causal powers), analyticism (the Weberian model of applying ideal-types to understand specific cases), and reflexivity (reflection of the process of knowledge-production itself). These are distinguished based on the researcher’s philosophical commitments, pre-
scientific “wagers” about the mind-world relationship that fall along two dimensions: the relationship between the knower and the known whether dualist or monist; and the relationship between observation and knowledge, understood as phenomenalist of transfactualist (Jackson 2011: 37).

As is probably clear from the emphasis on ideal-types in the theoretical discussion, I am situating my work within the analyticist category. Occupying the intersection of phenomenology and mind-world monism, this kind of social science is dedicated to producing a “disciplined ordering of the facts of experience” that is evaluated by its pragmatic function, rather than in terms of a correspondence theory of perception (Jackson 2011: 114). In practice, the primary product of this method is an “analytical narrative;” a coherent story that organizes the empirical facts so as to differentiate the general and case-specific factors that contribute to the observed outcome. Though similar in form, these are distinct from the analytic narratives that have become a major tool of rational choice theory (Bates et al. 1998), in that they are designed to produce knowledge about the world rather than to formally evaluate the assumptions of a model. This knowledge comes from relating the facts of the case to the ideal-typical depiction of the phenomenon developed by the researcher. An ideal-type is not meant as a representation of any concrete situation, “but a model of it […] that might—or might not!—express some of the relevant features of the object or process under investigation” (Jackson 2011: 146; interjection in original). When applied in particular narratives of social processes, ideal-types will by definition never be a perfect match with the observed situation; the empirical contribution of the analyticist method lies in these moments of dissonance, which point us to the factors outside of the ideal-typical framework that led to a particular outcome. As Jackson notes, these might be identified as case-specific empirical factors, or as alternative ideal-types (2011: 155). Taking the party ideal-
types from the previous chapter as an example, analyzing a contemporary election campaign by treating the competitors as Downsian Parties would involve looking for their signaling their location on positional issues, which would probably only be a minority of party statements. This limitation could, in turn, be explained by treating the parties instead as Performance Parties and observing the greater time that is spent arguing for qualifications on valence issues. These findings would not show (pace Clarke et al.) that one model is right and the other wrong—after all, the type of evidence for which we are searching is defined by the ideal-type itself—but rather the findings together would allow us to make an empirical claim about the relative shift toward valence competition.

My case selection, specifically the selection of a small number of parties in one country, follows from this methodological commitment. Jackson argues that analyticism is at odds with “comparison” as that term is understood in neopositivist methodology: “Analyticist science, properly understood, must terminate in a case-specific narrative,” because an ideal-type is only an “analytically general claim,” not an empirically generalizable one (2011: 152-53). As such, cross-case comparisons cannot make us more or less certain about our understanding of any particular case, though they may be useful for “grasping the peculiarities of each case” (Tilly 1989: 82). A project covering multiple cases, then, will be a collection of multiple, discrete analytical narratives. Greater diversity between these cases (as with a cross-national selection) will greatly increase the number of case-specific factors for which to account, again without offering any kind of validation. Thus, rather than introduce a broad range of cases I have decided to limit this project to three interconnected analytical narratives, analyzing Labour, SNP, and UKIP in turn as ideal-typical Heresthetician-Bricoleur Parties. Considering the cases as separate narratives, this approach will indeed constitute an “individualizing comparison” (in Tilly’s
terms), highlighting the ways that the very different factors specific to each case are relevant (and which will be factors specific to them as parties, since the geographic and temporal context is constant). And considering the cases as an interconnected whole, this will be an analytical narrative of the development of the British globalization discourse through multiple parties’ attempts at heresthetic and bricolage. In other words, “comparisons” will be made between the reading produced by my account and those that would be produced under alternative ideal-types (in order to contrast the approaches), but there will be no cross-case comparison designed to explain variance in the neopositivist sense.

Critical Discourse Analysis

Perhaps the most thoroughly-developed methodology for analyzing the nexus of language and politics is discourse analysis. There are a wide range of specific approaches that fall under this heading, ranging from conversation analysis (in positivist social psychology) to post-structuralist social theory (see Van Dijk 1997). These have in common the study of language in terms of discourse, understood as “an element of social life which is closely interconnected with other elements” (Fairclough 2003: 3). There is not space here to review this entire tradition, and instead I focus on a particular variant: the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) associated with British sociolinguist Norman Fairclough. I find the methods of CDA most useful for present purposes because they turn our attention to the specific aspects of texts through which political reality is linguistically constituted. In contrast to other discourse-analytic methodologies, such as that associated with Ernesto Laclau and Cantal Mouffe (1985), CDA grounds claims about the effects of discourse in actors’ particular words.

Developed by Fairclough in a series of works (1992, 1995, 2001, 2003), CDA is a form of “textually oriented discourse analysis,” meaning that it focuses on specific features of texts as
they relate to social and political forces. This can be distinguished from the more common social-theoretic discourse analysis pioneered by Foucault (*inter alia* 1972), which studies the relationship between broad elements of language across many texts. To develop its textual orientation, CDA draws heavily from pragmatic linguistics, the study of language as it is used to effect social action (Austin 1962; Grice 1975; Verscheuren 1999). But unlike pure linguistics, this approach is still attached to a broader project of critical social science. CDA is “critical” in two respects: in the general sense, in which it looks behind the stated content of political text to the meanings constructed by the language itself; and in a specific sense, as part of an emancipatory critique of the capitalist power relations that are reproduced in discourse.\(^\text{18}\) The former aspect is certainly shared between the present approach and CDA (in this sense most political science is critical). I depart from this approach on the latter point, but I would argue that for methodological purposes it is severable. The way that social agents construct meaning through texts is relevant however one understands the (super-)structural background.

CDA is also as much a research program as a specific method, and Fairclough and others have employed it in different ways over time. For my analysis, I draw specifically upon the qualitative, close textual analysis protocols laid-out in Fairclough’s *Analysing Discourse* (2003). This book is specifically intended as a methodological toolkit for social research, and so the specific socio-linguistic concepts that it develops are applicable outside of the critical theory tradition (Fairclough 2003: 191). This approach identifies three main elements of texts (which may be spoken or written): *genre*, the category of text in terms of intended social function; *discourse*, the representation of the world within the text; and *style*, the representation of the (individual or corporate) author’s identity within the text. For example, we might diagram a

\(^{18}\) Fairclough argues that attention to discourse is particularly important to critiquing what he calls the “new capitalism,” because “the language elements has become in certain key respects more salient, more important than it used to be, and in fact a crucial aspect of the social transformations that are going on” (2003: 203; see also 2006).
certain Labour Party political speech as follows: the genre is a campaign speech, intended to cause certain actions in the world (motivating people to vote, etc.); there is a socialist discourse, which represents social outcomes as products of economic inequality associated with unregulated capitalism; and there are the stylistic traits of a Labour politician. These elements can also be analyzed at a more specific level of analysis; e.g., party conference Leaders’ speeches as a genre, a “Third Way” variant of socialist discourse, and the style of Tony Blair as an individual. Note for the style that the “author” whose identity is being expressed need not be the literal author of the text; indeed, a style may be even more coherent where it is the result of speechwriters’ construction of a politician’s public image. Because I am analyzing parties’ representation of social processes as “globalization” to achieve political ends, I will focus primarily on the discourse element. But as I am also interested in the ways that leaders construct the parties’ political identities in relation to globalization (the “texturing of identities;” Fairclough 2003: 102), and in the specific types of texts that are used, there will also be some attention to genre and style.

I will draw broadly from the specific linguistic concepts presented by Fairclough, and will discuss them as they appear in the analytical narratives. However, three important concepts are worth outlining here:

- First is the analysis of *grammatical mood*, the broad distinction between sentence types—declarative statements, interrogatory questions, or imperative commands (Fairclough 2003: 115-16). This is classified as an aspect of genre, as it is closely related to the function that a certain text is designed to achieve (eliciting a response, impelling an action, etc.), but it is also related to discourse and style. Specifically, the construction of
globalization as an objective fact to be accounted for will be associated with greater use of a declarative mood.

- Second are the *semantic relations* between clauses, or sometimes the lack thereof. This is the way that sentences or clauses are grammatically connected, which determines certain “meaning relations” (Fairclough 2003: 87-89). For example, there are causal relations (one thing because another), conditional relations (if/then statements), temporal relations (before and after), and others. Semantic relations are another feature that is relevant across the different elements of text, but I will be mostly applying it to discourse. In particular, I will note the *absences* of semantic relations in the discourse of globalization. This lack of explicit relations means that causal claims are implied rather than stated, which makes them less likely to be specifically countered (what Fairclough calls a “logic of appearances” in contrast to a scientific “explanatory logic;” 2003: 95).

- Third, I address *modality*; this refers to what authors are willing to “commit themselves to” in a text (Fairclough 2003: 165; see also Halliday 1994). Modalizations (markers of different modality) can be either epistemic (dealing with knowledge claims) or deontic (dealing with actions). Thus, epistemic modality is the difference between “certainly,” “probably,” “maybe,” “doubtfully,” etc.; deontic modality is the difference between “must,” “should,” “can,” etc. This is an extremely important feature of political texts, which are primarily concerned with making a series of epistemic and deontic claims in a way that they are most likely to be accepted by the target audience. Note that, in both cases, powerful claims can be made either with markers of strong modalization (“certainly”), or with no modal marking (thus making an “unqualified” statement).
As the descriptions make clear, identifying these features is a task for qualitative analysis, in this case a close reading of relevant passages. While it would be possible to code sentences or track specific markers on a quantitative basis, these would provide limited insight into the “meaning relations” that are created within passages. The quantitative approach to texts, as in content analysis or corpus linguistics, can provide important insights that might complement close textual analysis (Stubbs 1996; De Beaugrande 1997). Certainly, the most cutting-edge approaches are a far-cry from earlier attempts to quantify political language (Riker 1996; discussed below). But for the present purpose, I rely exclusively on the “labor-intensive” work of qualitative CDA (Riker 2003: 9). This labor in practice consists of reading a wide range of speeches and publications to find passages where the globalization discourse is developed, and then closely reading to highlight the way that linguistic relations render a particular understanding of globalization.

Rhetorical Political Analysis

The major alternative to discourse analysis in understanding the relationship between language and political outcomes is the study of rhetoric. That is, the “tradition which has always been concerned with understanding persuasive, argumentative communication as a particular kind of public action; with the use of words to affect others in particular ways, so as to move them to act” (Finlayson 2007: 553). This can be distinguished from discourse analysis (in addition to the narrow differences of theory and method) by its focus on the nature of political speech as a distinct category, rather than the role of politics in speech and language generally. Though rhetoric in general is a much older discipline, stretching back at least as far as the classical philosophers, the systematic integration of rhetoric into modern political analysis has been less developed than in the discourse tradition. The Riker epigraph that opens this chapter
remains largely accurate; or as Finlayson and Martin more recently argue, “for all their ubiquity in political life and its analysis, we do not yet have a systematic approach from the perspective of political studies that seeks to relate the general phenomenon of the political speech to political activity and institutions more broadly” (2008: 46).¹⁹

The exception within mainstream political science has mostly been the relatively abstract study of rhetoric, which concludes that parties benefit from emphasizing distinctive positions and avoiding ideological space already “owned” by others (Riker 1996; Petrocik 1996; Meguid 2008). This limited work suggests that parties gain little benefit from using the same rhetoric as their competitors. For example, Riker (1996) identifies the “dominance” and “dispersion” principles in campaign rhetoric, which taken together mean that a particular issue will be emphasized only when a given party knows that it is dominant in volume and persuasiveness of rhetoric on that topic. This analysis is contained in his last book, *The Strategy of Rhetoric*, which was intended as a complement to his work on heresthetics—note the title, in contrast to his earlier *Art of Political Manipulation*, which reverses the usual treatment of rhetoric as artful and politics as strategic. However, his attempt to derive testable predictions about rhetorical strategy is limited both by its rationalist assumptions and by a relative unsophisticated method of textual analysis (simply counting references to different issues in Federalist and Anti-Federalist documents at the time of the US Constitution’s ratification debates). Similarly, Meguid (2008) combines dominance and dispersion with Petrocik’s well-known findings on party issue ownership (1996). She finds that when new issues enter into electoral salience, there is a limited window in which parties can contest ownership of specific positions; once ownership is established, further discussion only increases issue salience to the benefit of the “owner.” In the

¹⁹ Though it is interesting, in light of the preceding discussions, to note that they specifically cite McLean and Hindmoor as counter-examples (Finlayson and Martin 2008: 446).
end, both of these approaches remain wedded to a Downsian (perhaps post-Downsian) rationalism that assumes that the issue dimensions themselves are generally fixed and knowable; as a result they remain rather insensitive to subtleties in the way that issues are actually represented (as Hindmoor and others have noted).

More sophisticated has been Alan Finlayson’s attempt to revitalize rhetoric in the context of British political science, via a school of thought that he labels Rhetorical Political Analysis, or RPA (Finlayson 2007; see also Finlayson 2004; Finlayson and Martin 2008). RPA is partly a response to the prominence of CDA, and accepts the utility of that school’s work on sociolinguistic mechanisms but seeks to move beyond the Gramscian assumption that political speech is mostly “ideologically motivated obfuscation” (Finlayson and Martin 2008: 446). It focuses instead on political speech as argumentation, part of the fundamental contestation of key political questions. Methodologically, Finlayson draws from classical and modern studies of rhetoric to identify a number of key features of a given speech or debate: the “rhetorical situation” (Blitzer 1968), including the audience and the “rules of the game;” the type of question being argued, as in classical “stasis theory;” the way that issues are framed; and the general form of the argument, in terms of the Aristotelian genres of forensic, epideictic, and deliberative rhetoric (Finlayson 2007: 554-56). To provide a concrete example, Finlayson and Martin analyze Blair’s final Labour Party Conference speech: they show how he used the institutional features of a conference speech (opening with thanks, etc.) to shape his legacy vis-à-vis the party; how his stylistic choice of emphasizing contrasting opposites underpinned his argument about transcending political tensions; and how he developed an “ethos of paternal authority” to move delegates emotionally and thus calm fierce debates about the end of his
leadership (2008: 454-59). RPA can also be used at a more general level, such as Judi Atkins and Finlayson’s work (2013) on the rise of anecdotes as a popular feature of British political speech.

However, there are other ways to approach rhetorical analysis. In particular, the specific tools of CDA are not incompatible with the general goals of RPA, even though those schools of thought are divided by their substantive foci and the former’s critical social-theoretic assumptions. Thus, an approach that has been called “rhetoric in detail” (Johnstone and Eisenhart 2008) has begun to use CDA insights about the meanings attached to specific linguistic forms to analyze political speech as a discrete activity (in the rhetorical tradition). In addition to applying socio-linguistics to the substantive concerns of rhetorical analysis, this approach is also distinguished from CDA and the classical tradition of rhetoric by a commitment to “working upward from particular, situated instances of text and talk rather than downwards from abstract models of discourse” (Eisenhart and Johnstone 2008: 2). Though I do not entirely share the commitment of the authors in the Johnstone and Eisenhart volume to an “ethnographic” approach, this model is closest to the integrated methodology that I develop in the next section.

Synthesis: A Focused Textual Analysis Approach

Taking elements from each of the above discussions, my methodology in this dissertation involves commitments at three levels: At the level of philosophical ontology, I am committed to an analyticist approach that follows from the acceptance of phenomenalism and mind-world monism. At the level of substantive focus, I follow RPA in studying political talk and text as a distinct social activity driven by strategic considerations—in this case, driven by considerations of how the electorate’s decision-making context can be manipulated. And finally, at the level of specific method, I draw from CDA in taking linguistic features of texts as my primary observations. Taken together, this suggests what I call a focused textual analysis approach, which
uses socio-linguistics to understand the rhetorical action of parties as instantiated in specific texts, rather than analyzing the politics of language more broadly (à la Fairclough). I begin with a corpus of texts for each party, starting with their earliest deployments of the globalization discourse (roughly from the early 1990s to the present). These corpora can be divided into three main categories: election manifestos, public speeches (all of the Leaders’ annual conference addresses as well as other prominent speeches where globalization is a theme), and those white papers and other major policy documents touching on global issues that contain substantial discussion of globalization themes. The exact number and nature of texts varies from case to case, based on availability. Identifying texts outside of the manifestoes and conference speeches has been aided by background interviews, where some subjects specifically identified particular speeches and documents as being important to the development of the globalization discourse. All of the texts in each corpus are then read holistically in terms of their likely strategic intent, and passages addressing globalization are analyzed in-depth according to the CDA techniques discussed above. This macro-analysis forms the background for the overall analytical narrative, but for reasons of space I include detailed textual analysis of only selected passages that are particularly illustrative.

For related reasons, this approach should not be construed as a general “test” of any extent theory. First, the alternative ideal-types were my own analytic constructions, rather than the way these theories were originally framed; I would not be testing them “on their own terms,” so to speak. Second, in line with the analyticist tradition, I am not claiming that globalization discourse is fundamentally heresthetical or bricolage in an objective sense. Rather, I propose that these dual concepts provide an analytic framework that highlights specific aspects of the concrete case which are useful for understanding social processes. In this case, I hope to show
that the readings of these parties’ discourses in heresthetic terms will reveal concrete relations between discourse and strategy. Together, these analyses will elucidate the use (and therefore, the potential fate) of the globalization discourse in the British political context.

The texts analyzed, it should also be noted, were originally directed toward several very different audiences: manifestos to the voters and media, conference addresses to party members, etc.\(^{20}\) While I understand the collective action of parties to be aimed eventually at shaping voter decisions and winning elections, it does not follow that the only relevant texts are explicit campaign materials aimed at the electorate. Rather, the aim of my analysis is to highlight the specific discourse of globalization that is collectively produced—a specific “representation” of “the processes, relations and structures of the material world” (Fairclough 2003: 124)—because the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party aims to restructure the background narratives of political competition, which exist across different audiences. Indeed, it is in the crossover that many important narratives are generated (e.g., the way New Labour’s novel approach to the business world was narrated among the electorate). Finally, it also bears reiterating that this is an ideal-type and the heresthetic reading an analytical tool; I do not argue that party leaders must have been actually thinking of their communications as heresthetics, or that a strategic reading along these lines provides an exhaustive analysis of the purposes or effects of a given text.

This is not an exclusively textual analysis dissertation, however. Much of what distinguishes the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party from other types depends on connections between what is said in texts and the contemporary context of party strategy. To that end, my method combines textual analysis with historical narratives of each party, which enables connections to be made between textual elements and campaign strategy decisions. To construct

\(^{20}\) Of course, one should not identify audiences too narrowly, especially in the mass media age. Conference speeches, for example, have party insiders as their immediate audience but are also consciously crafted for the broadcast audiences who will view them, read about them, or hear the sound bites.
these narratives, I draw upon background interviews, as well as memoirs and the secondary literature, to illuminate the parties’ strategic aims in terms of heresthetics. This will situate temporally relative to important shifts in the parties’ strategic contexts and incentives (i.e., the need for Labour to focus on party discipline after victory in 1997). The latter is particularly important to this study because the ability to explain texts in dynamic terms differentiates my approach from alternatives that treat the globalization discourse as a fixed category. Throughout the historical analyses I will endeavor to contrast the predictions of a heresthetic reading with alternatives. It is this historical discussion, together with the textual analysis sections, that produces the analytical narrative applying the Heresthetician-Bricoleur type.

In addition to narrating the parties’ recent activity in terms of this ideal-type, I will also highlight some particular rhetorical features that emerge in texts across multiple cases. These features—which can also be thought of as devices, figures, or arguments—are the building blocks of an overall linkage between discourse and electoral strategy; a linkage which I call the globalization heresthetic. The devices include the new times thesis, the isolation-engagement dichotomy, the freedom-responsibility and freedom-relationships linkages, and the natural-artificial dichotomy. Cataloging these features allows for both a fuller understanding of the parties’ heresthetic-bricolage strategies, and are an example of the kind of specific empirical facts that are only highlighted through a particular lens (in this case the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party type).

Overall, the analysis can be understood in terms of three spheres of empirical findings that I will organize through the use of the heresthetic-bricolage approach: First, there is the party strategy writ large, which I interpret in terms of heresthetics and identify empirically through the case narratives. Second is the globalization discourse proper, which is a particular language used
to describe the world, and which produces significant political effects. This is the aspect that will be identified through the use of the socio-linguistic concepts from CDA outlined above. Finally, linking these two is the globalization heresthetic, which describes the way that the parties deploy the globalization discourse in order to achieve their strategic ends. This sphere comprises the five rhetorical devices mentioned above, which I will identify alongside the linguistic features in my textual analysis.

**Conclusion**

By way of conclusion, I can sketch out here briefly what this reading is likely to look like for the three parties I have selected. These should not be understood as expectations against which the approach will be tested, in neopositivist terms, but as very general summaries of the ideal-typical narratives. The inevitable mismatch between these sketches and the empirical findings will not be a strike against the approach but important information in its own right. The cases, as I have suggested, are intended to represent a wide-range of British parties: in terms of size, geographic base, ideological leaning, and role in the party system (Labour as a mainstream office-seeking party, SNP as an emergent, regional office-seeking party, and UKIP as a protest party). What they have in common is that they have adopted a similar vocabulary of globalization (the globalization discourse proper), and in terms of the ideal-type this suggests a common strategic agenda (the globalization heresthetic). This heresthetic entails each party using the construction of globalization as an inevitable force to signal their own willingness to accept such economic imperatives; in this way they can come in from the wilderness and be accepted by voters as responsible and (in the office-seeking cases) competent parties.

This return from legitimacy was most pronounced for the Labour Party, which less than a decade before it began a 13-year run in government was dismissed as an anachronism that might
win an occasional general election if it were lucky—and held together long enough. To be taken seriously as a contender for office, the party needed to erase this assumption, which would mean altering hardened aspects of British political competition and voter expectations and introducing a new grand narrative in which Labour was the natural party to lead. Thus this reading anticipates that, particularly in the period between Tony Blair becoming leader and the 1997 election victory, the globalization discourse will be articulated in a way that emphasizes the qualitative novelty and inexorability of globalization—in this way to disrupt conventional thinking about politics by positing a disruption in the global context of Britain. But the party also needed an internal strategy to maintain discipline and unity, especially after victory removes the fear of never returning to office. This suggests that a marked emphasis on globalization as objectively closing off traditional policy options (high social spending, etc.) will emerge after 1997, especially in channels directed at party (e.g., conference speeches).

According to a heresthetic-bricolage approach—despite all of the other differences between these parties in size, history, and policy agenda—we can expect something very similar from SNP and UKIP. As bricoleurs, they must use what is available; and as herestheticians, they are willing to use what works. Each of these parties faces a perception challenge not unlike unreconstructed Labour: SNP needs to show that it is not a radical or anachronistic nationalist party that can be trusted to lead the devolved government and thus might be able to succeed at independence. And though less concerned in practice with proving itself a party of government, UKIP similarly needs to distance itself from the image of atavistic isolationism, particularly to distance itself from the far-right British National Party. This reading holds that they are referring to globalization as they are because they are adopting the familiar strategy of using such discourse to signal modernity and to constrain dissenting voices, even though their substantive
policy goals (separatism and EU withdrawal) are sharply at odds with the globalist agenda in Britain as it is usually understood.
CHAPTER 4
NEW LABOUR, NEW NARRATIVE

Globalisation is a fact and, by and large, it is driven by people. Not just in finance, but in communication, in technology, increasingly in culture, in recreation. In the world of the internet, information technology and TV, there will be globalisation. And in trade, the problem is not there's too much of it; on the contrary there's too little of it. The issue is not how to stop globalisation…Because the alternative to globalisation is isolation.
Prime Minister Tony Blair (2001)

Pinpointing the origin of “New Labour” has been a source of controversy in the British politics literature, with a variety of watersheds proposed between the 1983 and 1994 leadership elections (e.g., Heffernan 2000 and Diamond 2004). As ever, these dates are contingent on what scholars take “New Labour” to mean, and for what analytic purpose they seek to historicize it—Heffernan and Diamond, for example, make opposing claims about the neoliberal and social democratic roots of New Labour, respectively. In applying the theoretical framework of heresthetics, the answer is clear: the evening of 9 April 1992, which was Labour’s third consecutive General Election defeat. This was the moment when the party’s modernizers realized that they had been playing a losing game. The story of the ensuing two decades would be their attempt to change the accepted rules of British politics enough to secure a lasting return to power.

The goal of this chapter is to apply the heresthetic-bricolage model of party competition to this period of Labour Party history. This will serve to develop the implications of this approach in more precise terms. This analytical narrative also highlights certain aspects of Labour’s rhetorical-discursive strategy: A recurrent discourse of globalization was present in the party’s rhetoric throughout this period (reflected in the epigraph above), in which the basic “facts” of globalization are immutable and inevitable and the only task left for politicians is to manage their nations’ adaptation to the new reality. In rereading the Labour globalization
discourse in its original context—expressly partisan rhetoric—a more complex logic can be ascertained than is evident in most readings of globalization. In treating Labour as a Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party, the grand claims about globalization, and of the adaptations it requires, can be interpreted as deeply party-political. Specifically, these political implications are rendered in such a way as to reach directly to the party’s heresthetic goal of reorienting the public understanding of economic competence to allow Labour to compete effectively against the Tories. As I show in the narrative that follows, even as the party had tried to reform itself in policy terms away from the far left, public discourse still held that Labour was fundamentally irresponsible and the Conservatives the more natural party of leadership. Thus, the party turned to a set of strategies that is outside what we can explain with mainstream party competition approaches, particularly the Downsian and Performance Party models, which are most often invoked to understand New Labour. Instead, by invoking globalization in the ways discussed below, the party turned the hierarchical narrative on its head by rendering the world as entering a new era for which “New” Labour was suited while the Tories remain woefully backwards.

The electoral fruit of this shift can be seen in the election results summarized in Table 2, which shows the percentage of votes won by the party in each election since 1987, as well as the number of parliamentary seats to which this translated. Note that the disproportionality of the first-past-the-post electoral system means that substantial but moderate vote gains can lead to a sharp increase in seats, and that parliamentary majorities can in some cases be secured with little more than a third of votes cast. As these results show, after making only modest gains between 1987 and 1992, Labour achieved a landslide in 1992. Moreover, the consistent victories by Labour until 2010 (despite declining vote share) suggest the “stickiness” of this discourse as it pertained to the party’s standing relative to the Tories.
Table 2. Labour Party General Election Results (1987-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Vote share (seats won)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>30.8% (229)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>34.4% (271)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>43.2% (418)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>40.7% (413)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>35.2% (355)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>29.0% (258)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Election victories in bold

This globalization heresthetic entailed a specific textual construction of globalization and specific ways of relating it to expressly-political arguments. In particular, I identify as constituent parts of this heresthetic two recurrent rhetorical figures, through which Labour used this discourse to advance underlying political goals: the new times thesis and the isolation-engagement dichotomy. These are important to a full understanding of Labour’s strategy and rhetoric during this period, as well as to a reinterpretation of British globalization discourse as a whole, because these mechanisms became the “raw material” for bricolage by other parties in the system. This redeployment of Blairite rhetorics toward the ends of parties antithetical to the New Labour agenda, SNP and UKIP, will be the subject of subsequent chapters.

The plan of the chapter is as follows: First, I briefly discuss the most common academic analyses of New Labour globalization discourse specifically; along with the broader party politics approaches discussed in the previous chapter, these are the conventional interpretations from which my analysis is distinguished. Second, I lay out my analytic narrative of New Labour strategy (and its immediate antecedents); this is periodized into three eras, and combines historical discussion and close textual analysis as described in my previous methodological discussion. Third, I conclude by identifying the common themes of New Labour discourse and strategy across these periods, discussing the two major mechanisms that I have mentioned, and
making some case-specific conclusions about the lessons of this analysis for the future of the Labour Party.

**Existing Readings: The Ideological and Policy Functions of “Globalization”**

What allowed the Labour Party to reverse its electoral fortunes so decisively, and how did its changing rhetoric feature in this process? About New Labour, at least, critical and mainstream academic voices tell much the same story. There is a common wisdom that Labour, having learned the lesson of moving too far to the left in the 1980s, made a hard turn back toward the right under Blair. Indeed, as this narrative runs, Labour eventually occupied the same political space as John Major’s Conservatives (“Blaijorism,” a market-liberal counterpoint to 1950s “Butskillism;” Hay 1997). Thus, Blair is said to have bought electoral success at the price of eliminating any meaningful issue competition between the major parties. Rhetoric about globalisation functioned as *an expression of*, and *legitimation for*, these co-opted economic positions. In essence, this is the interpretation that could be systematically modeled as Downsian Party or Cartel Party behavior (depending on whether matching voter preferences or constraining costly policies is emphasized).

These interpretations have been developed in some depth by a range of authors. One set of readings of New Labour explains its development as a product of specifically *electoral* dynamics, and in this respect incorporates the New Labour case into the broader theories of party competition discussed in the previous chapter. In these readings, it may be that Labour moved its policies to the center to follow the Downsian “median voter” rightward (“the most common explanation;” Norris 1999: 23), or that the party was responding to a general preference of the electorate for centrism *qua* centrism (as a Center-Constructing Party; Hindmoor 2004). At a higher level of analysis, the party cartel thesis argues that Labour chose to deescalate political
competition by converging toward the political center in order to escape the escalating economic cost (and hence reputational risks) of its core supporters’ economic policy demands. The “rhetoric of globalization” figures in to this analysis as a way of selling the cartel centrist to the party faithful and to the electorate (Blyth and Katz 2005: 43). This approach thus claims to explain both the policy and rhetorical convergence that has been observed (e.g., in longitudinal studies of party manifestos; Budge 1999).

Against these general theories, many analyses focused specifically on New Labour address the ideological functioning, rather than the political positioning, of New Labour’s globalization and modernization. In one such approach, Mark Whickham-Jones argues that Labour made a rhetorical shift toward the preferences of business as a rational response to capital’s capacity to sanction a future government through disinvestment (King and Wickham-Jones 1990; Wickham-Jones 1995). This is related to the electoral argument, but introduces a critical intervening dynamic: Rather than appealing directly to voters’ preferences, the party is indirectly appealing to voters’ desire for a government that presides over growth rather than disinvestment. This is therefore related to the politics of economic competence, contemplated by the Performance Party model (Clarke et al. 2009). This is an aspect to which I will particularly turn in the case narrative, because the recognition of the centrality of economic competence was a major turning point for Labour.

However, campaigning on economic competence is less straightforward in practice than in theory. This is first because the economic implications of particular circumstances are not objectively-obvious, but mediated by specific beliefs about the nature of the economy (Garrett 1998; Hirst and Thompson 1999; Hay and Rosamond 2002). As discussed in Chapter 2, “globalizing outcomes [cannot be] simply the result of global economic flows [but] also result
from the ideas which prominent opinion makers hold about such flows” (Hay and Watson 1999: 419). Under this critical-theoretic model (which sits apart from the party competition theories discussed above), the particular ideas endorsed by New Labour appear to stem from the enthusiastic adoption of neoliberal thought rather than purely rational calculation (Hay 1999), perhaps as a symptom of capitalist ideational hegemony (Fairclough 2000; Hall 2004). But even this insightful approach may not have wide explanatory power in the context of party politics, because leaders are not driven merely by individual “opinions,” but also by commitment to the public discourses that they themselves construct through political rhetoric.

In general, most studies of New Labour’s rhetoric and policies skate over this problem by treating ideas as emanating from either material realities or higher ideological commitments. For some, like Heffernan, Labour was operating in an intellectual space largely fixed by the Thatcherite inheritance and where the party’s advances in economic policy were ‘change amid continuity’ in a rather strict sense (2011: 165). On foreign policy, Judi Atkins (2013) discusses how the internationalist, neoliberal, and communitarian aspects of Blair’s core ideology combined awkwardly and led to key contradictions in his governments international action (see also Dixon and Williams 2001). Such an approach can apply to deeper institutional change as well, for example in studies of the new model of British governance that the Labour government created to further its vision (Bevir and Rhodes 2003; Clarke, Newman, and Westmarland 2008). Finally, where attention has been paid to New Labour rhetoric in particular, it has usually been understood as a proxy for underlying party beliefs and ideological commitments (Jahn and Henn 2000; L’Hôte 2010), or as a tool for legitimating specific policy decisions (Atkins 2011).

Though variously neopositivist, Gramscian, or interpretivist, what these approaches have in common is a focus on concrete policies as the primary explanans or explanandum; i.e., policies
as a tool for constructing a new Labour ideology (be it social democratic or neoliberal), or policies as the outcome of legitimating processes wherein globalisation and modernization discourses are deployed. What this leaves out is the operation of party competition itself. This operates at a level between policy and grand ideological conflict, and is structured around appeals to voters, which follow a logic distinct from either arguments about policy or hegemonic constructions. By applying the Heresthetician-Bricoleur ideal-type to this case I am able to analyze New Labour rhetoric and discourse as a product of political decisions, without making overly-strong assumptions about the formal-argumentative character of political discourse (Finlayson 2007), or about the ability of citizens to function as consumers in a political marketplace (Lees-Marshment 2002). As Riker observed, “we have very little knowledge about the rhetorical content of campaigns, which is, however, their principal feature” (1996: 4). We might also say that we know little about the campaigning aspect of rhetoric, which is often its principle feature. As a result, we are limited in what we can say about either the substance of discourse (because we do not fully understand its origins) or the practice of party strategy. The analytical narrative below is intended to encompass both of those goals.


The prehistory of New Labour, the Labour party’s political struggles between the 1983 and 1992 general elections, is often misunderstood. The Blair leadership’s rejection of the leftward strategy followed in the 1983 manifesto is well known. Equally important, but less often recognized, is the subsequent attempt (and failure) of a strategy that can be explained in Downsian terms: After the disastrous 1983 election, Neil Kinnock was elected to replace Michael Foot and embarked on a gradual modernization—and moderation—program in response to the widespread belief that the party’s move to the left in the 1983 manifesto was responsible
for the historic defeat. Core Labour strategy between 1983 and 1992 can reliably be classified in the spatial theory mode: policy adjustments were being toward the political center in order to appeal to the median voter rather than the party’s more left-leaning base.

The competitive demand for Labour to claim the center was reinforced by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) split and its subsequent electoral agreement with the Liberal Party. As the Alliance, these parties had almost equaled Labour in national vote share, and thus threatened to replace it as the natural center-left opposition to the Conservatives. The anti-Alliance aspect of Labour’s centrist strategy paid dividends in the collapse of Liberal-SDP vote share in the subsequent election (Hughes and Wintour 1990). Buoyed by the relative gains of that 1987 vote (which was never expected to be won), Kinnock remained as leader and launched a comprehensive policy review designed to rebuild the Labour manifesto for the next general election. This became a crucial venue for the party’s young modernizers, like Blair and Brown, whose roles in the review working groups gave them an unprecedented platform to influence the party’s direction (Hughes and Wintour 1990; Gould 1998: 88-90). Though there were serious debates about best practice, especially in macroeconomic policy, the review was still largely driven by poll data on public preferences, conforming to Downsian expectations (Wickham-Jones 1995: 472).

There was more to party strategy in this period than tacking toward the median voter. The extensive polling that was required in that effort was part of a larger shift toward the “modern” campaign techniques that had been earlier pioneered for the Tories, famously by advertisers Saatchi & Saatchi (Gould 1998: especially chapter 2). The theory of political marketing describes 1983-1987 Labour as in transition from a Product-Oriented to a Sales-Oriented Party (Lees-Marshment 2001). In this model, the policy reforms are secondary; what is crucial is the
shift in emphasis from the intellectual refinement of an ideal Labour manifesto to the aggressive marketing of what they had. Most notably, the party’s communication apparatus focused on improving the public image of Neil Kinnock—responding to, but also reproducing, the personalization of politics associated with Thatcher.

This was accompanied by more contentious, and less successful, attempts to make-over the public image of the party at large through organizational change. The Policy Review\textsuperscript{21} itself represented a centralization of power by the leadership, being presented to the 1989 conference as a single document (“Meet the Challenge, Make the Change”) that bypassed individual motions and amendments (Hughes and Wintour 1990: 198-201). Kinnock also made a sharp move against supporters of the left-wing Militant Tendency, going so far as to eliminate some party branches whose extremism was seen as an electoral liability. Structural change proved more elusive, however: The power of the trade unions in party decision-making was identified in opinion research as a major source of public distrust of Labour, but the leadership’s inevitably-controversial plan to redress this by replacing the union “block vote” with “one-member-one-vote” (OMOV) was soundly defeated in conference (Hughes and Wintour 1990: 198-201). Finally, Kinnock attempted to institutionalize the new marketing-centric model of campaigns with the creation under Peter Mandelson of a Campaigns and Communications Directorate and a less formal Shadow Communications Agency (SCA) (Gould 1998: 56-8; Mandelson 2010: 81-2). But the move toward professionalization also proved deeply divisive within the party, and these institutions and their successors would be constantly under fire from traditionalists and even from the leader’s office (where it was seen to threaten Kinnock’s authority).

\textsuperscript{21} Unless otherwise noted, the capitalized phrase “Policy Review” refers to the 1989 review (“Meet the Challenge, Make the Change”), though there have been others.
With these exceptions, Labour Party strategy in this period overall can be explained by a combination of existing party competition theories: the Downsian Party move to the political center most strongly, as well as the emphasis on burnishing Kinnock’s image as a strong leader, consistent with the Performance Party and Market-Oriented Party models. This kind of behavior coincided with the Conservative government apparently losing its touch. The Community Charge—a local taxation reform better known as the “poll tax”—was the mirror image of Thatcher’s wildly successful council house right-to-buy policy. It had a sound strategic objective (heresthetical, even), but was so far divorced from public preferences that it generated a massive backlash. Conservatives in Scotland, where the tax was piloted a year earlier than in the rest of the country, were particularly hard-hit and have arguably never recovered (McCrone 2001). In effect, the impact of Labour’s move to the center could be amplified by contrasting it with the Tories’ apparent dogmatism. Moreover, in terms of potential valence voting, the British economy had entered a recession for which it would be difficult for a three-term government to deflect blame (on valence voting, or “performance politics,” see Clarke et al. 2009).

Thus, while opinion on the Conservatives improved after Thatcher’s replacement with the more moderate John Major, polls ahead of the 1992 General Election still reflected an optimistic scenario for Labour (Gould 1998: 151-53). Even in the case of a hung parliament, Labour could take comfort in the likelihood of some accommodation with the (now-merged) Liberal Democrats. But the actual result, while recording a substantial swing to Labour, saw the Conservatives maintain a slim (21-seat) but workable majority. While much investigation would follow regarding the accuracy of the polling techniques used, it appears that there was a real shift away from Labour late in the campaign. This can be linked to a relatively straightforward Tory strategy emblemized by the famous “Tax Bombshell” poster, which highlighted projected tax
increases to pay for Labour commitments despite the manifesto’s explicit assurances on tax (Gould 1998: chapter 4; Mandelson 2010: 133). In essence, the Conservatives were inviting the public to doubt the sincerity and reliability of Labour’s policy changes.

Indeed, beyond its universal importance to election campaigns, the taxation issue here is a perfect example of the hazards of applying the Downsian model to concrete situations. Extensive quantitative and qualitative opinion research was conducted on the electorate’s views of taxation and spending, which consistently revealed a preference for spending on public services over tax cuts (Hughes and Wintour: 136-39). Accordingly, much of the attention in the Policy Review was devoted to getting that balance right, and in communications on highlighting the costs to popular services of Tory cuts. The tax policy emerged from the review as one of the least-contested positions, unchallenged at the ensuing 1989 conference (Hughes and Wintour 1990: 142); the party believed it had found a winning formula. In the event, however, tax returned in 1992 as a losing issue for Labour. “Reading off” the public’s expressed preferences appeared to have failed.


A lone bright spot of the 1992 election was newly instituted, and oft-maligned, focus group research. While internal and independent polling alike had incorrectly captured voter intentions, influential Labour strategist Philip Gould was identifying persistent doubts in his qualitative research. Voters, especially marginal voters in key demographics, continued to talk about the party in negative terms (Gould 1998: 158). The divergence between those results and the quantitative polling is significant in terms of evaluating approaches to party competition because the logic of large-scale polling closely resembles the assumptions of spatial model. The
apparently-closer link between focus group discussions and actual voting, by contrast, suggests that a narrative form better reflects voter calculus.

In particular, the focus groups showed that the public’s shared images of the parties had changed little despite Labour’s internal reforms and marketing efforts (Mattinson 2010). Participants still identified a typical Labour politician as working class and a trade unionist, though that vision bore little resemblance to the actual shadow cabinet. Meanwhile, a typical Conservative was wealthy, older, and impeccably dressed. Asked to describe the figures, participants duly criticized the Tory for greed and a lack of compassion (mirroring poll results), but nevertheless considered him the natural leader of the two. The Labour politician, for his part, was labeled quarrelsome and intolerant of material ambition. Conventional notions of the Conservatives as the natural party of government and Labour as the sympathetic but immature opposition remained intact. Particularly interesting, from a perspective of political discourse, is that participants often lacked the vocabulary to express their positions; even many who explicitly opposed the excesses of the Thatcher government could evocatively describe Labour extremists (reds, communists, etc.), but had no similar epithets for Tory extremism (Gould 1998).

These findings reveal the extent to which the Labour Party had been playing a losing game since 1983. Rather than viewing electoral competition as a contest among equivalent actors that differentiate themselves by policy choice or specific valence commitments, as the Downsian and Performance Party models assume, voters seem to have established a more fundamental hierarchy between a party of government and a party of opposition. Indeed, none of the existing ideal-types discussed above can explain this aspect of parties’ strategic environment. But this is precisely the kind of competition embedded in public discourse that the Heresthetician-Bricoleur type is designed to explain.
It was in this environment that the next generation of Labour Party modernizers came to power. After the sudden death of Kinnock’s immediate successor John Smith, Tony Blair was elected as leader in 1994, the first selection through a new “electoral college” arrangement that reduced the voting power of the trade unions. Gordon Brown, the party’s leading light on economic issues, was chosen as Shadow Chancellor. The expressed goal of the new leadership was uncompromising: “electric shock therapy” for the party. In short order this would entail further institutional reforms, a recommitment to sophisticated marketing strategy under Mandelson and Gould, and a new name. The “New Labour” moniker was fully intended as a shot across the bow of those in the party who remained critical of modernization, as well as a clear signal that in contrast to the pre-1992 gradualism, the party was now making a clean break with the past (Gould 1998: chapter 6). The “rebranding” of the party might have been just more unsubstantiated window dressing, however, had it not been accompanied by an effort to shift the unfavorable political narratives that had doomed the 1992 campaign.

It was in this that the globalization discourse could play a role. Though globalization was rarely the headline term in Blair’s or other figures’ speeches and publications, it provided an internally coherent but also wholly novel foundation for their arguments. This was precisely the narrative core that efforts like the Policy Review had lacked (Hughes and Wintour 1990: 204-7). Within a heresthetic framework we can identify two strategic goals at play here: first, to shift the implicit issue dimension on which voters evaluate from “which party is best to govern Britain in general” to “which party is fit to prepare Britain for the new globalized world;” and second, to constrain and deemphasize the traditional left-right dimension so as to discourage left-wing challenges to the party’s unity and stability. This is a marked shift from the party’s approach

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22 Smith had leveraged his own popularity, and post-defeat anxiety, to succeed in this particular reform where Kinnock had failed.
only a few years earlier: “Globalization” does not appear at all in the Foot and Kinnock rhetoric, and related concepts on global interdependence lack the emphasis on inevitability and are used to advance explicitly left-wing arguments. Kinnock’s final conference Leader’s Speech, for example, used “global” and “interdependent” once each, not to refer to the economy but to environmentalism and development assistance, respectively (Kinnock 1991).

And it is a shift that is not easily understood by thinking in terms of the existing approaches to party competition. In principle, shifting and shrinking if issue areas can be represented in spatial terms, and this is one of the principle preoccupations of the Cartel Party. However, that approach assumes that concepts like globalization have a relatively fixed meaning. Thus, a reading of Labour’s globalization discourse from the perspective of Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party resembles, but is in key ways distinct from, extant approaches (both the party types and the critical theory and discursive analysis literatures on globalization). Most importantly, it provides leverage to explain how the discourse is actually deployed and how it develops over time. Both the critical approaches and the cartel party thesis accurately identify features of the globalization discourse such as depoliticization (in terms of the left-right dimension) and naturalization of political phenomena (e.g., “globalization” itself). However, as they explain this discourse in terms of totalizing strategies they cannot give analytical purchase on when different aspects of the globalization discourse might operate separately. Thus, we can distinctly differentiate the heresthetic-bricolage reading by highlighting instances of this differentiation of discourse.

Speeches

Overall analysis of Labour Party speeches and campaign materials between Blair’s ascent to the leadership in 1994 and the election of 1997 shows a consistent pattern of globalization
being referenced to further a specific form of argument about British politics: the world has irreversibly changed, the traditional debate between different models of national economy are irrelevant, but there is an opportunity for a new politics centered on preparing Britons for a global future. This is an example of the new times thesis, with a particular emphasis on associating the image of a new era with the constructed identity of New Labour as a young party well-positioned for it. This is quite distinct from the “discourse of ‘downsizing’ expectations” characteristic of a Cartel Party (Blyth and Katz 2005: 40).

Blair’s first address to the Labour Party Conference as leader, in 1994, is notable on several levels. First, there is a rare instance of Blair referring directly to the discursive component of partisan competition: “The tide of ideas in British politics is also at last on the turn. […] No longer believing in their own language, [the Conservatives] turn to ours. […] Today politics is moving to our ground” (Blair 1994). Though the concealment of human agency in the constructions of the first and last sentences marks a step back from actually claiming a heresthetic victory, it is clear that this is a strand of political strategy that is best explained by the heresthetic-bricolage approach. Second, key rhetorics are deployed that will appear throughout this period of party discourse: Blair refers to globalization (albeit without the word itself) as the marker of a new political epoch, concerned with “security in a changing world” and building “the strong and active society that can provide it” (Blair 1994). He further builds the identity of the Labour Party around superior expertise in managing economic conditions, buttressed by prudent policy commitments and through passages where the language of business is applied to governance. Finally, Blair uses Europe to present the Tories as naïve isolationists, out of touch with contemporary realities: “Britain’s interests demand that this country be at the forefront of
the development of the new Europe. [...] Under my leadership, I will never allow this country to be isolated, cut off or left behind in Europe” (Blair 1994).

The Leader’s Speeches in 1995 and 1996 continue these themes, in particular with a growing emphasis on the party’s economic pragmatism: “Labour will be the party of sound finance and good housekeeping. World interest rates and inflation rates are low; in Britain we will keep them this way. There will be defined targets set and kept to” (Blair 1996). The need for this identity was a lesson of 1992, of course, and it is the linkage to globalization discourse that was designed to put it within reach the next time around. In discussing education policy, for example, Blair asserts that after the Cold War arms race, “the knowledge race has begun and we will never compete on the basis of a low-wage, sweat shop economy. [...] Education must be for life. That is hard economics” (Blair 1995, emphasis added). Moreover, he specifically ties the importance of education to the technological conditions of globalization:

Look at the potential of it. Look at industry and business: an oil rig out in the Gulf of Mexico has metal fatigue, it can be diagnosed from an office in Aberdeen. European businesses will finalise a deal with the Japanese with simultaneous translation down the phone line. [...] Knowledge in this new world is power, information is opportunity and technology can make it happen if we use it properly and if we plan and think ahead for the future.

(Blair 1995)

Again there is intertextuality, wherein the language of business is incorporated into political rhetoric. And again a careful balance is struck, between presenting globalization as inevitable (businesses will finalize deals, knowledge is power) and allowing room for agency (if we use it properly, if we plan ahead). It is this mix of unconditional and conditional (or epistemic and deontic) claims that situates New Labour’s as eminently pragmatic but also distinctive—i.e., new economic realities are undeniable, but this won’t necessarily stop the Tories from being “the most feckless, irresponsible, incompetent managers of the British economy in this country’s history” (Blair 1995). Again, it is hard to see how the Cartel Party model, with its emphasis on
systemic stability, could explain the clear attempt to achieve relative gains over the
Conservatives through this articulation of the discourse.

For his part, Brown’s (briefer) Party Conference speeches in this period as Shadow
Chancellor are more traditional examples of the genre. In apparent contrast to his later reputation
as the party’s more level-headed figure, he leans heavily on moralizing: “Nothing characterises
the greed, the waste and the short-termism of the Tory years better than what they are now doing
to our railways. The only network they want to preserve is the old boys' network and the only
train that will always run on schedule is the gravy train” (Brown 1995). These speeches also tend
to refer less to global developments, and the differences with Blair’s speeches may represent
internal differences over Blair’s vision of post-ideological politics. However, there are key
exceptions: On economic policy, Brown argues that “the new economy is also global, and the
new Britain that we seek can only be built from a platform of stability from which opportunity
and dynamism will flourish” (Brown 1995). Further, in a rhetorical move that more closely
resembles Blair’s strategy, the Shadow Chancellor incorporates the egalitarian ethic itself into
the discourse of inevitable globalization: “In 1992, […] we talked about how starting from
Labour's basic values we could construct a new economic approach for Britain. We agreed that
in the battle to achieve social justice in the global economy of the 90s we could no longer rely on
the economic weapons of the 40s or the 70s.” (Brown 1996). The militant terminology here
seems very “Old Labour,” but the logic of the argument is in line with New Labour newly-styled
identity as a party for globalizing times.

We can also find evidence of a globalization heresthetic outside of the conference
speeches. Indeed, the intellectual foundations of the globalization discourse more broadly were
largely constructed outside of those more routine addresses. A key example is a January 1996
speech that Blair gave to a Japanese business association in Tokyo. According to a party veteran
I interviewed, the speeches given during his tour of Asia as Leader of the Opposition, being
keyed to business audiences, were particularly clear encapsulations of the discourse that the
leadership had taken to using internally. The following passage, which I proceed to analyze
below, is reprinted in Blair’s *New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country*23:

The driving force of economic change today is globalisation. Technology and capital are
mobile. Industry is becoming fiercely competitive across national boundaries. Consumers
are exercising ever greater power to hasten the pace of this revolution. Travel,
communications, and culture are becoming more and more international, shrinking the
world and expanding taste, choice, and knowledge.

The key issue facing all governments of developed nations is how to respond. I reject
protectionism as wrong and impractical. If this is so, then to compete in the global market
two things must be done. A country has to dismantle barriers to competition and accept
the disciplines of the international economy. That has been happening the world over, to
varying degrees in what might be called the first era of response to globalization.

(Blair 2004: 118)

Immediately striking in the first paragraph is the purely declarative grammatical mood,
with each sentence a direct statement of fact. In terms of style, then, Blair is embracing the role
of politician-as-expert who lays out certain unobjectionable facts that are logically prior to his
policy claims. This is reinforced by the structure of the second paragraph, where the
“issue…response” relation closely resembles a classic “problem-solution” framework
(Fairclough 2003: 91). New Labour here is, literally, a party that puts reality ahead of
convictions. But the expertise claimed here is of a particular kind: As with many non-academic
descriptions of globalization, the first paragraph consists of statements not linked by any explicit
causal expressions; this is a “logic of appearances” that obscures contingent relations among
these features and thereby represents globalization as a given in toto (Fairclough 2003: 94-5).

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23 Though I refer to the 2004 edition, this collection of speeches was originally published in 1996, and was intended
as a pre-election expression of Blair’s political philosophy. Its inclusion further reinforces the utility of examining
this text in particular.
There are of course implicit relations, but these are discourse-dependent, relying on particular understandings of economic behavior. For example, though the role of concrete actors is acknowledged with reference to consumers, the potential that they might use their “ever greater power” to do other than make “travel, communications, and culture […] more and more international” is excluded. Thus any actual agency of consumers is immediately curtailed by placing them as components of a market-driven process that follows its own globalizing logic.

This representation of globalization as a set of objective developments in the world (an epistemic claim) grounds the normative force (deontic modality) of the second paragraph. Indeed, it is a strong deontic modality—not ‘should’ but ‘must’—with the implicit question of the first sentence (“how to respond”) being immediately answered rather than being left open for deliberation. The international economy, connected in the first paragraph with positive images of consumers, travel, and culture is now shown in an alternative light as a source of discipline to countries. What this discipline requires (beyond “dismantling barriers to competition”), and how it operates, are left unspecified. But that question is rendered moot by the assertion that all this already happened in the “first era of response to globalization.” Thus potential debate on whether and how to “accept the disciplines” is doubly closed: This has already been undertaken (presumably in the form of Thatcherism in Britain), and it was done out of absolute necessity, so there is nothing more to debate on that account.

In a passage that is also an early example of the rhetorical figure that I call the isolation-engagement dichotomy, this paragraph also sees the first appearance of a subjectively marked modality (“I reject protectionism...”). This is surprising, as it seems weaker than the objective claims made elsewhere. However, the assertion that protectionism is impractical as well as wrong, and that the point is reiterated by the claim that “a country has to dismantle barriers to
competition,” clearly mark this position as more than a subjective opinion. Instead, the personal pronoun functions to highlight Blair’s personal commitment to accepting economic realities, presumably in contrast to previous Labour leaders. Note that he does not invoke the party in this passage, though he does later in the text where there is a subjective marker.

In that subsequent paragraph, which it is not necessary to quote at length, the passivity of the “first era of response to globalisation” is contrasted with New Labour’s ambition to lead Britain into the second era. Extending his claimed expertise to prediction, Blair argues that the future world economy “will be dominated by those countries that save, invest, and above all develop the potential of […] their people” (Blair 2004: 118). Accordingly, his Labour party will supersede earlier political projects by actively investing in human capital and encouraging innovation, while recognizing that “some of the changes made by the Conservatives in the 1980s were inevitable and are here to stay” (Blair 2004: 118). Note that he acknowledges the necessity of those reforms without actually crediting the Conservatives (“inevitable”), and by specifically invoking the 1980s further reinforces that they belong to the now-closed earlier era of accommodation (as well as to the period of Margaret Thatcher and not of John Major).

Manifestos

The only national election text produced during Blair’s tenure as leader of the opposition is the manifesto for the landmark 1997 general election (the 1994 European manifesto was written just prior to the Blair era, under the interim leadership of Margaret Beckett). In that 1997 manifesto, globalization is far from pervasive, which as would be expected focuses on specific (mostly domestic) policy commitments. But the way that these commitments are framed as part of a larger project is important, specifically in this case where the party is clearly attempting to make the “New Labour” narrative stick. As Blair’s introduction states, “[t]he reason for having
created new Labour is to meet the challenges of a different world” (the new times thesis again). The nature of this new environment is defined only elliptically: the reader learns that the left-right conflicts of the past “have no relevance whatsoever to the modern world,” and that “[i]n a global economy the route to growth is stability not inflation” (Labour Party 1997). This second passage is particularly striking, both for its directness and for what it implies about globalization, since the reader must infer that it is the characteristic of being global that carries this imperative.

This use of “global economy” as a causal explanation in and of itself also appears in this curt introduction to the party’s macroeconomic policy: “In economic management, we accept the global economy as a reality and reject the isolationism and ‘go-it-alone’ policies of the extremes of right or left” (Labour Party 1997). In H.P. Grice’s terms, there is a clear conversational implicature that “accepting the global economy” means more here than accepting that economies exist in other places. Rather, the globality of the economy is represented here as impelling certain policies. A key passage in the manifesto’s conclusion expands upon this theme:

There is a sharp division between those who believe that the way to cope with global change is for nations to retreat into isolationism and protectionism, and those who believe in internationalism and engagement. Labour has traditionally been the party of internationalism. Britain cannot be strong at home if it is weak abroad. The tragedy of the Conservative years has been the squandering of Britain's assets and the loss of Britain's influence. (Labour Party 1997)

The third-person, putatively objective assertion about the division between visions is a direct heresthetical attempt to rearrange dividing lines in British politics, in a way that makes them seem natural rather than newly imposed. The reference to Labour traditions even reinforces this by appealing to a pre-existing history. In this way, especially in the context of the earlier claim about accepting the reality of the global economy, Labour can rhetorically position itself on the right side of history (which cannot be the side of “retreat”) without making a direct claim that would be open to question.
Consistent with a heresthetical understanding of political strategy, focused on containing the left and outmaneuvering the Tories, passages throughout New Labour texts in the 1994-1997 period represent globalization as the new material context of contemporary politics. Read in isolation, these references can be seen as consistent with claims that globalization discourse serves a purely ideological purpose. But read in context with the rhetorical claims around them, there is an evident strategy of “texturing” (in Fairclough’s terms) an electorally motivated identity: the New Labour party as having the combination of prudence and innovation necessary to be competent stewards of a modern economy. The end product may thus resemble the ideal-typical Performance Party, but the Heresthetician-Bricoleur model can explain the indirect route that the party takes to achieve that end.

Case Narrative Part 3: Party Unity and the European Dimension, 1997-2010

The Heresthetician-Bricoleur model can also explain shifts in in the discourse, particularly those that coincide with changes to the party’s strategic positioning, such as when making the transition from opposition to government. We can see this dynamic at work when we focus on the post-1997 General Election period in Labour Party history. Prior to that breakthrough—a once unimaginable landslide victory for the party—the New Labour leadership had been able to sidestep threats to party discipline and unity through an overwhelming drive to finally return to office. This pressure, however, could not be easily maintained once this had been achieved. Consistent with a heresthetic-bricolage representation of this period, party texts in this period show a corresponding rise of the globalization-as-constraint rhetorical formation, directed at key factions such as the trade unions and their allies in the cabinet. Though assumed by both the discourse analysis and party cartel literatures as the essential core of Labour’s globalization discourse, it appears from analysis of the texts over time that this articulation was
deployed at a specific moment in response to specific political incentives. Thus, the Cartel Party and interpretivist traditions that consider globalization discourse to be significant because of its fixed meaning in Blair’s ideological construction miss its function as a flexible tool of party strategy.

For his part, Blair attempted to maintain the single-minded electoral mentality by emphasizing that the real historical watershed for Labour would be two full terms. Nevertheless, demands inevitably emerged from the party’s left-wing for policies that would assuage their base. A common attitude was that “New” Labour had been a useful electoral framing that could now be discarded in favor of more stridently leftist policies, to which Blair was always quick to reply that “it’s worse than you think; I really do believe it” (A.J. Campbell 2007). This reflects one part of the leadership’s strategy to maintain unity, an emphasis on objective globalization having tied the party’s hands. After using the “I really do believe it” line again in his 2001 party conference speech, Blair noted that though his government had enacted many important pro-labor measures (like the minimum wage), it would also be standing firm on its pro-business positions; “Why? Because in a world leaving behind mass production, where technology revolutionises not just companies but whole industries, almost overnight, enterprise creates the jobs people depend on” (Blair 2001).

A further aspect of New Labour strategy that can distinctively be explained by heresthetics and bricolage is to be found in examining the intersection of the globalization discourse with the issue of European integration. This polarized issue dimension is particularly important in British politics not because it is necessarily the top priority for most voters, but because of its potential to divide an otherwise-successful party, which had been amply demonstrated by Major’s Conservatives. Throughout the post-1992 era, the British public has
had views on the EU that ranged from ambivalent to deeply skeptical and even openly hostile, yet Labour maintained a consistently europhilic position, at least by British standards (James and Opperman 2009). Even the eventual policy decision to remain outside of the Euro is a case of the exception proving the rule: The party actually declared strong support for the single currency in principle, but couched their reluctance to commit the UK in terms of objective criteria that Brown had designed to be impossibly stringent. This is the opposite of what would be expected if they were pandering to euroskeptic\textsuperscript{24} opinion, and it is difficult to read this consistent cheerleading for European integration (e.g., Mandelson and Liddle 1996: chapter 7) in terms of convergence on the median voter position (a Downsian Party) or even in constructing a median position (a Center Constructing Party). The Cartel Party thesis has similar difficulty explaining the party competition around Europe in this period, even though the EU features in Blyth and Katz’s logic. They consider the EU as providing a site for cartel parties to displace (rather than debate) difficult political choices. Yet, at least in Britain, Europe became a sharp wedge issue that facilitated competition between Labour and the Conservatives even after they had converged in other areas.

The Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party model, by contrast, includes the expectation that the party as a skilled bricoleur can construct a salable political argument (or at least will attempt to construct one) out of even so unpopular a topic, particularly by combining it with an established discourse like globalization. In this reading, New Labour embraces the EU not to consolidate a cartel or appease the median voter, but to further distance itself as forward-looking and pragmatic from a dogmatic and archaic Tory opposition. Further, and unlike other theories, my approach helps us to understand the way that particular discursive formulations figure into party

\textsuperscript{24} Conventions on these points vary, but in this chapter I will use the non-capitalized and non-hyphenated American spelling “euroskeptic” (rather than euro sceptic, Euroskeptic, or Euro-skeptic), except that in direct quotes the original style will be retained.
strategy (outside of the narrow role for rhetoric within the Cartel Party and Center-Constructing Party accounts).

Speeches

The new times thesis, mentioned earlier, is particularly prominent in Blair’s speeches of this era, even though early on he references globalization only obliquely. Indeed, in the 2000 address even the word “global” does not appear anywhere in the text. But more prevalent are vague references to accelerating social change, to “a world with its finger on the fast forward button” (Blair 1997). In contrast with this technological metaphor, the 1998 and 1999 speeches both mention a “spectre,” but with very different referents: First, there is “the spectre of global economic crisis, [which] leaps on the back of change, spinning the world ever faster” (Blair 1998). The “spectre” is more broad at the following year’s conference; here it is “technological revolution” that “haunts the world” (Blair 1999a). In both cases, these apparitions are rhetorically substantiated through a logic of appearances. In the latter, Blair even dispenses even with verbs in illustrating the technological revolution—“Global finance and Communications and Media. Electronic commerce. The Internet. The science of genetics”—somehow, these disparate phenomena collectively “drive the future” (Blair 1999a). The political implications of this accelerating change are also made clear; as expressed in 1998: “The challenge is real and there are only three choices: resist change - futile; let it happen - laissez-faire - each person for themselves, each country for itself; or, the third way, we manage change, together.” This statement both reiterates the epistemic claim of an irreversible globalization and maps it onto Blair’s triangulation strategy: resisting change is Old Labour, laissez-faire is the Conservative Party, and managing change (significantly, “the third way”) is New Labour.
Blair’s most famous foreign policy address in his early years in office was given outside of the UK: the famous “Doctrine of the International Community” speech to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in 1999. Like the Japan speech, he took the opportunity of speaking before a specialized audience overseas to develop the New Labour discourse on globalization more fully than during the set-piece speeches at home. However, the conception of global integration presented here is more fully political, less economic, than in the earlier address:

I believe the world has changed in a more fundamental way. Globalisation has transformed our economies and our working practices. But globalisation is not just economic. It is also a political and security phenomenon. [...] We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or no. We cannot refuse to participate in global markets if we want to prosper. We cannot ignore new political ideas in other countries if we want to innovate. We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we want still to be secure.

(Blair 1999b)

The claim in the opening sentences of this selection is a familiar representation of globalization as an epochal break (albeit with an unusual use of the subjective marking “I believe”). The rest, however, is stylistically focused on globalization-as-constraint, with the admission that we may not like internationalism and the repeated use of “cannot.” In content it is more nuanced, because a positive and active notion is embedded in each imperative (“to prosper,” “to innovate,” and “to be secure”), in contrast with the passive and negatively-charged main verbs (“refuse,” “ignore,” and “turn our backs”). Thus globalization is rendered as producing an inflexible imperative (“cannot” rather than ‘should not’), but one that impels positive action rather than only closing off alternatives.

Brown’s speeches in this period return the focus to the economy, as befits his position and his party role. Having been given the day-to-day responsibility of instilling party discipline (especially within the cabinet itself), a policy-constraining version of the globalization discourse features prominently in his efforts, in addition to policy decisions that constrained debate, such
as Bank of England independence taking monetary policy off the table (Dellepiane-Avallaneda 2013). In his first conference speech as Chancellor of the Exchequer, the “Iron Chancellor” declared:

And I tell you, we have learned from past mistakes. Just as you cannot spend your way through a recession, you cannot in a global economy simply spend your way through a recovery either, in place of irresponsible Tory short-termism, there will be no risk with inflation, no irresponsible fine-tuning, no massaging of the figures, no short-term dashes for growth, but what the country wants: a long-term strategy for our public finances, the encouragement of long-term investment for our future and, in place of the boom and bust years, long-term stability for Britain. That is the essential platform for high and sustainable levels of growth and employment, the aims of the 1945 government that I now reaffirm in 1997.

(Brown 1997; emphasis added)

The unqualified epistemic modality associated with the earlier Labour texts on globalization is present here as well (especially the repeated use of “cannot” in the second sentence). Likewise, there is an explicit opposition created between current party attitudes and the “past mistakes” of Old Labour (which are themselves framed as a departure from the revered Atlee government). But while pre-election discourse generally emphasized the opportunities for Britain under a Labour government, in this formulation Brown has no problem saying “no” to alleged past practices in the name of “a global economy.” The indirect reference to globalization is particularly interesting in this context, because it does not seem rhetorically essential; is it not bad enough for the policies to be “irresponsible”? Rather, this invocation serves as a reminder that Brown is not speaking from his own position (i.e., as a politician with certain centrist preferences), but from the role of expert declaring the objective facts of the (global) situation. This expertise cements his identity to the party and the electorate as a leader capable of economic stewardship even if it means hard choices.

This thread also runs through Brown’s 1998 speech, which also contains the “third way” framing used by Blair in regard to dealing with global change. However, the discourse largely
drops out of Brown’s 1999 and 2000 speeches. While there are references to “new world pressures” on the British economy, and to the “technological revolution” that can be exploited by a wise government, the focus overall is on domestic social policy, in particular Labour’s “New Deal” labor market programs (Brown 2000). In the context of internal party politics, this would seem a significant development. It may be the case that the leadership was relaxing its concerns about the party’s left-wing, or that Blair and Brown reasoned that rallying around external party competition would be more fruitful. The latter is reflected in the Chancellor’s references to Europe, which feature an emphatic opposition to Tory euroskepticism. Drawing again on the stylistic features of economic expertise, through an unmodalized epistemic syntax, he declares that “Europe is where we are, where we trade, from where thousands of businesses and millions of jobs come” (Brown 1999). The second and, especially, the first of these claims are quite bold in the context of British discourse on Europe; that the UK is apart from Europe and that her natural trading partners are in the Commonwealth are widely-rehearsed commonplaces. Brown’s argument here is thus an important intervention, which is strengthened by the association of an identity claim (“Europe is where we are”) with his trademark economic pragmatism (“thousands of businesses and millions of jobs”). He goes on to argue describe the party’s vision as “not Britain isolated in Europe under the Conservatives but Britain in Europe with Labour—and in Europe to stay” (Blair 1999a).

This dichotomy is deployed frequently in discussions of the EU across the text corpus, and becomes an important aspect of New Labour’s discursive heresthetic. An example is this passage from Blair’s 2001 Party Conference Leader’s Address, the first in his second term. This speech includes more extensive discussion of globalization in general than most other non-specialized party texts. This is due at least in part to exogenous circumstances: the Conference
took place less than a month after the September 11th attacks in the United States, and foreign policy was much higher on the public agenda than usual. We observe some of the militarization of language characteristic of the “War on Terror”—“There is no compromise possible with such people, no meeting of minds, no point of understanding with such terror. Just a choice: defeat it or be defeated by it. And defeat it we must”—but Blair also takes the opportunity to weave in a particularly New Labour discourse:

Globalisation is a fact and, by and large, it is driven by people. Not just in finance, but in communication, in technology, increasingly in culture, in recreation. In the world of the internet, information technology and TV, there will be globalisation. And in trade, the problem is not there's too much of it; on the contrary there's too little of it. The issue is not how to stop globalisation. […] Because the alternative to globalisation is isolation. Confronted by this reality, round the world, nations are instinctively drawing together. In Quebec, all the countries of North and South America deciding to make one huge free trade area, rivaling Europe. In Asia. In Europe, the most integrated grouping of all, we are now 15 nations. Another 12 countries negotiating to join, and more beyond that. […] That is why, with 60 per cent of our trade dependent on Europe, three million jobs tied up with Europe, much of our political weight engaged in Europe, it would be a fundamental denial of our true national interest to turn our backs on Europe. We will never let that happen.

(Blair 2001)

The representation of globalization here is familiar, drawing on the same discursive feature as in earlier texts: unqualified epistemic claims voiced with omniscient third-person expertise, including the explicit naturalization of political phenomena (“nations are instinctively drawing together”). A subjectively-marked claim only appears in the final declaration, where the “we” that is the Labour government is associated with the previous sentences “our” (presumably the British people). Linking these two claims is a logic of inevitable progress that echoes the “first era of response to globalization” argument from the Japan speech, with regional integration standing in for deregulation in that argument. Thus the choice to stay with Europe is textured as part of a seamless process of modernization (using the logic of the isolation-engagement
dichotomy), while on the strategic level it is actually a major rhetorical escalation to translate this logic to the international sphere, given the sensitivities surrounding national sovereignty.

Subsequent conference speeches continue to reproduce key aspects of the party’s globalization discourse. In 2002, Blair refines his periodization argument in more social-theoretic terms: “Eventually, the 1980s saw a reaction by the individual against collective power in all of its forms. Now with globalization, a new era has begun. People are no less individualist, but they are insecure.” The passive voice of the first sentence elides the role of actors in that development (e.g., Thatcher), and the third-person language overall positions Blair as an objective expert on the public’s concerns (compare the stylistic counterfactuals of “we are insecure” or “you are insecure”). And in 2005, he raised the globalization discourse to new heights of naturalization and depoliticization by claiming that “[y]ou might as well debate whether autumn should follow summer.” As in 2001, that speech features more extensive discussion of globalization than elsewhere, and as in 1995, a balance is struck between the need for (Labour) expertise and the need for (Labour leadership): “In the era of rapid globalisation, there is no mystery about what works: an open, liberal economy, prepared constantly to change to remain competitive” (Blair 2005). The implicit argument here is that only New Labour is wise enough (contra Old Labour and the Liberal Democrats) to accept the open market but dynamic and forward-thinking enough (contra the Conservatives) to pursue the constant change that it requires.

Finally, as we would expect from a political-strategic reading of the texts, Brown’s speeches in his new role as leader begin to resemble Blair’s more than they do his own addresses as Chancellor. In his first leader’s speech, at the 2007 Conference, Brown speaks more in promises than in caveats: “global economic competition” is a challenge to be met, and the UK
“will be the great success story of the global age.” In 2009, the last such address before the 2010 General Election defeat closed the New Labour era, sees Brown come almost full circle to the party’s pre-1997 rhetorical style. The recent financial crisis is taken as marking the dawn of yet a new phase of globalization (see the discussion of the 2010 manifesto, below), and the logic of a new party for new times return as a way of separating Labour from culpability. “[A]s we rise to the challenge of change so this coming election will not be a contest for a fourth term Labour government, but for the first Labour government of this new global age” (Brown 2009).

Manifestos

The first national election text produced by New Labour in office was the joint manifesto for the local and European elections in 1999. The text is weighted more heavily toward the local elections, and toward the record of the party’s first year in office, with the globalization discourse is deployed less frequently than in other texts. This would seem to be an aspect of party rhetoric that is explained better by the Performance Party and Market-Oriented Party rivals than by the Heresthetician-Bricoleur model. There are some rhetorical heresthetics present, however, including both the new times thesis and the isolation-engagement dichotomy: The Conservatives are described, in terms of temporality, as “the party of the past” who “do not believe it is the job of the government to equip Britain for the future”; and on Europe, as having caused Britain to be “isolated” to such an extent that “it is difficult to believe that the Tories are a mainstream political party” (Labour Party 1999: 15, 19). Burnishing its pragmatic expertise, the party maintains that “any decision about joining the single currency must be determined by a hard-headed assessment of Britain’s economic interests” (18; emphasis added). This passage is in bold under the section heading “Delivering a better deal for Britain,” which uses obviously commercial language to depoliticize decisions on Europe. This undercuts internal doubts about
Europe by invoking economic imperative, as well as implying that the Tories (and other Euroskeptics) are more concerned with the anachronistic luxury of nationalism than with the “best deal” in a competitive global environment. References to deep-seated public skepticism of the EU are (not surprisingly) omitted, but it can be inferred that bucking public opinion is part of the policy’s “hard-headed” appeal.

The 2001 and 2005 general election and 2004 European election manifestos emphasize the global dimension of Labour’s argument more clearly. In the former, under the chapter heading “Britain strong in the world,” appears this claim: “We face a choice between an inward-looking chauvinism that leads to isolation and a modern patriotism where the British national interest is pursued through international engagement” (Labour Party 2001: 37). This clearly lays out the isolation-engagement dichotomy that is central to Labour’s political positioning on global policy, through a sentence structure that imposes obvious normative weight: “chauvinism” is contrasted with “patriotism” (different affects attached to the same concept), and “inward-looking” with “modern.” The latter also makes an implicit association between modernity and ‘outward-looking’ (the unvoiced antonym of “inward-looking”), which carries the temporal argument about globalization. Further, the acknowledgement of a political choice in the opening phrase transposes a purely-discursive truth claim (‘globalization requires engagement’) onto a heresthetic (‘to accept modernity is to vote Labour’). Elsewhere, it is similarly asserted that “[i]n a fast changing global economy, government cannot postpone or prevent change,” but that it can do more than “the old Tory way of walking away leaving people unaided to face change” (Labour 2005: 18).

The 2004 European manifesto follows this broad pattern. It begins with the deployment of the globalization discourse proper: “In an increasingly globalized and interdependent world,
our prosperity and our way of life are affected more and more by what goes on beyond our shores. Isolation and withdrawal is not only undesirable, it is unthinkable if we are to remain a strong and successful nation” (Labour Party 2004: 5-6, emphasis added). But as before, this is immediately transposed onto partisan heresthetic, with the subsequent section headed “…don’t let the Tories wreck it again…” and arguing that “the Tories are more extreme than ever” in describing their pledge to renegotiate British EU membership (7). By relying on the discursive presumption that a globalized world necessitates engagement (the alternative, after all, is “unthinkable”), Conservative euroskepticism is rendered equivalent with economic recklessness—the high crime of a British party aspiring to government.

These were the last national manifestos produced under Blair’s leadership, as well as the last written before the global financial crisis significantly altered the context of British politics. As the 2009 manifesto argues:

Today we live in an age of unprecedented change. As the economic hurricane sweeping the world has shown, events outside our borders have a direct effect on us here in Britain making our strong engagement in the European Union more important than ever. As we face the current economic crisis we will retain our strong international alliances to secure the action needed to create jobs, fight climate change and build a fairer world.

(Labour Party 2009: 6)

This passage appears under the section heading “Winning the fight for Britain’s future” and constructs a familiar image of globalization, but using discursive resources with very different connotations. This draws into sharp relief the externalization and abstraction from agency that are common to New Labour representations of globalization: the financial crisis is a natural disaster, originating outside of Britain’s borders. Human agency returns in the concluding sentence, but it is entirely forward-looking, not including any sense of responsibility for recent events. Meanwhile, the possibility that the crisis ought to signal some degree of international

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25 The elipses is in the original, as the phrase is intended to follow on from the mainfesto’s title, “Britain is Working.”
disengagement is simply excluded: “International cooperation has never been more fundamental to our national interest than it is today, [because] this is a global crisis and it requires a global solution” (Labour Party 2009: 4). This reference to the crisis lends an additional urgency to the (now shopworn) assertion that “[t]he Conservative Party rejects the idea of partnership with the EU [and] would leave Britain isolated and lacking the power to deliver to the British people” (4).

According to the 2010 general election manifesto, New Labour’s last gasp, “the world has been rocked by the first great crisis of the new global economic age” (Labour Party 2010: 2). Elsewhere in the text, it is implied that the crisis has actually inaugurated a new phase of globalization: “We are proud of our record [since 1997] but today we are running for the future. We have to address a world that is very different now” (3; emphasis added). In the foreign policy section, this is referred to as “The next stage of national renewal” (Labour Party 2010: 66), and this emphasis on transformation is representative of the document as a whole. There is much less emphasis than in the past on “hard-headed” economics and much more on “bold” and “progressive” solutions. While the Tories are said, as ever, to be “stuck in the past,” the rhetorical strategy appears much more focused on ambition than on competence. Though the party is at pains to say that, in its first and second terms, it acted wisely with regard “to the ways things were then” (3), there appears in this to be tacit acknowledgement of the inadequacy of their expertise. It is this recognition that accepting the inevitability of a global economy is not the same as managing that marks the quiet closure of the globalization heresthetic.

Government Policy Documents

The party’s rhetorical logic is developed most extensively in the policy documents produced by the Labour Government. Many such documents, including green and white papers as well as less specific policy analyses were produced during New Labour’s time in office. The
two documents analyzed here exemplify the discourse deployed in the various texts dealing with economic and foreign policy. The first is a white paper on training and continuing education called *21st Century Skills: Realising Our Potential*. Globalization is presented as the essential impetus for the policies that are proposed:

The global economy has made largely extinct the notion of a ‘job for life.’ The imperative now is employability for life. Competing on the basis of low wage costs is not an option. We must compete on the basis of our capability for innovation, enterprise, quality, and adding greater value through our products and services. All of that is dependent on raising our skills game.  

(Department for Education and Skills 2003: 11)

The first sentence of this passage is significant insofar as the globalized economy is represented as the active agent in the “extinction” of the “job-for-life” model. In fact, it is arguable that such a guarantee was never as prevalent as social democratic mythology has painted it. In presenting it as an unquestioned truth, however, Labour is reinforcing the periodization argument by contrasting current conditions so starkly with the past.

An example of New Labour’s globalization heresthetic deployed in the EU issue area can be found in a 2007 document called *Global Europe: Meeting the Economic and Security Challenges*. The text consistently links the question of Europe’s constitutional future with the discourse of globalization through an explicit logic of progress:

For the context of the European project has changed considerably. In the decades immediately after 1945, the challenge was to rescue Europe from the destruction of the Second World War: to help reconstruct the fabric of our countries, rebuild and strengthen democracy, and link the interests of Western European states by integrating their economies to secure a long-lasting peace. The emphasis was understandably on strengthening internal integration, moving on from the idea that decisions should be taken nationally to the idea that they could be made across the European continent. Many assumed that a common market would become a single market, that the single market would engender a single currency, and that ever closer European economic cooperation would progress into political union.

Today, however, it is the far-reaching and fundamental changes of globalisation to which Europe’s nations need to respond. The issue now is not just how the enlarged EU of 27 Member States work effectively, but how these member states reach out to the rest of the
world. As José Manuel Barrosso, the President of the European Commission, has noted, “…global Europe must be an open Europe. It must be an outward-looking Europe. And it can and must resist those whose response to globalisation is to retreat behind protectionist barricades.”

(Cabinet Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2007: 3)

This passage represents a dramatic intervention into the European debate at the domestic and EU levels. The substantial controversy that accompanied (and accompanies) the integration of markets is written-off as a debate for the past. As in Blair’s “first era of response to globalisation” narrative, necessary actions are said to have been taken that cannot be reversed, with a new direction now needed in response to a global economy. The possibility of a transition from common market to political union is not openly disputed, but the fourth sentence’s use of the past tense, modalized with “many assume”, and followed by the contrastive “however,” all suggest without stating it that that project is no longer appropriate. The specter of isolationism is also invoked again, phrased as protectionism and accompanied by words that carry a negative connotation like “retreat” and “barricades.” Thus, a vision is produced that the document tellingly labels “a positive, pro-European but realistic approach” (Cabinet Office/Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2007: 1). The ongoing agenda of reinforcing Labour economic competence is present here, as is the post-2001 agenda of constraining left-wing opposition as debates about the EU’s institutional form are closed in favor of a less controversial focus on external policy.

Findings and Case Conclusions

We can observe in these texts representations of the world that match the globalization discourse identified in critical readings of Fairclough, Hay, et al.: Through a combination of linguistic choices related to mood, semantic relations, and modality, the contingent features of globalization are elided by explicit naturalization (“autumn following summer,” an “economic
hurricane”) and political agents are allowed only secondary roles (“managing change” within the confines of globalization). These are indeed crucial to New Labour’s overall discourse, not only to reproduce a certain ideology (though they may do that, as well). In fact, using the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party ideal-type to analyze the articulation of “globalization” in terms of texts’ political intent reveals important patterns that are not evident otherwise. For example, the “neoliberal” globalization-as-constraint formulation is much more prominent in speeches than in manifestos. This is not surprising considering the differences in audience and tone between these genres of rhetoric: The speeches are directed toward internal party audiences or specific interest groups (as with international business for the Japan speech) with the goal of controlling and channeling expectations, while the manifestos aimed at a broad audience of voters qua voters and tailored to the promises the party can make (not the ones they cannot). There is also a change along this dimension over time, with the party in office becoming more concerned about delegitimizing demands from the backbenches. These conclusions imply a politically-situated textual analysis rather than one that abstracts the “globalization discourse” from the texts and treats it as monolithic. And they both show the unique contributions of a model of party behavior that considers the indirect strategies that parties employ (heresthetics), and the way these take place through interventions in public narratives about politics (discursive bricolage), against alternatives that can only explain direct campaigning through policy.

And though these observations support the utility of the present approach, the more important and original findings are in identifying the specific rhetorical figures through which the party connected globalization to its heresthetic ends. Two in particular, aligning roughly with the temporal and spatial dimensions, stand out:
• The *new times thesis* is a claim that reaches back to the origin of “New” Labour itself. The “New Labour, New Britain” slogan was an encapsulation of the argument that this was a party truly designed for a new era of politics. On the discursive side, the thesis treats globalization as a recent and radical break from the political economy of the past, represented as a “new world” and a “changing world” where the old models of living and governing (like a “job-for-life”) are irrecoverable. Moreover, the transition to a new era is ongoing and actually accelerating (a “world with its finger on the fast forward button”). This reaches the party’s strategic aims in two ways: First, it renders necessary the party’s rejection of “Old Labour,” and therefore internally acceptable and externally believable. Second, in competitive terms, it allows for an explicit rejection of Tory positions without reopening debate about Thatcherism—those reforms can be accepted (“the first era of response to globalization”) without prejudice to the decisions of today, which concern a new era. Through both of these, New Labour is changing the rules of the electoral game by freeing itself from the assumptions (about Labour’s unreliability and the Conservatives’ aptitude for economic management) that had shaped the 1992 outcome.

• The *isolation-engagement dichotomy* operates in spatial (rather than temporal) terms, and while also appearing in the earliest New Labour texts, becomes particularly frequent after the party is in office. This rhetorical strategy presents globalization as impelling robust international engagement and cooperation, with the only alternative being a self-defeating isolationism. This can be presented either explicitly (“the alternative to globalisation is isolation”) or indirectly (“nations are instinctively drawing together”). The political function of this dichotomy is to transform the European and foreign policy
differences between Labour and the Conservatives into a divide between success and failure in a globalized economy. Though deployed elsewhere as well, this is particularly useful on the European issue because of the Tories’ increasing euroskepticism over this period. Even where New Labour’s actual policy was tentative, such as on adoption of the Euro, the logic underlying this rhetoric was supported: By couching the Euro question in terms of strictly economic criteria, Blair and Brown preserve the claim that the Conservatives’ principled, sovereignty-related objection is a manifestation of archaic isolationism.

Both of these strategies are examples of bricolage, of ways that skilled political actors connect broad (sometimes intentionally abstract) claims to strategic ends. Crucially, the arguments also become features of the country’s overall political discourse in their own right, available for (re)use by other heresthetician-bricoleurs.

Subsequent chapters explore the way that other parties have used these and other mechanisms to make globalization heresthetics of their own. At this juncture, however, it is appropriate to note how this analysis responds to the conventional readings of New Labour and what it says about the party’s current activities. Overall, this approach takes Labour’s rhetoric globalization as the central object of analysis rather than assuming that it is epiphenomenal to ideological or policy positions. In so doing it demonstrates a plausible interpretation of New Labour that suggests much more modest conclusions about the state of Western party systems than the claims of rampant depoliticization extrapolated from the widely-accepted cartel party account. And for those interested in explaining the individual strategic decisions of parties, the utility of this reading suggests a need to look beyond adoption of stylized “policy positions” and give more attention to the productive effects of political speech. Finally, it carries a crucial
lesson about the way that ideas about globalization shape policy and politics (in Britain and elsewhere): Critics of mainstream globalization discourse who are looking for structural changes (such as the global financial crisis) to disrupt this paradigm are looking in the wrong place; the globalization discourse is likely to maintain its predominance as long as parties can find strategic applications.

Related to this, the approach also sheds light on debates about the Labour Party’s present and future. Hay has argued that the only way forward for British economic policy is articulation by the Labour opposition of a coherent crisis narrative, for which material preconditions are in place and “merely the ideational cue” missing (2011: 3). But Finlayson is right to observe that potential cues are present, but held back by political factors (2013: 83). Following the above analysis, we can say more precisely that what is missing is the heresthetic—the strategy through which a crisis narrative would pay political dividends. Left-leaning observers of the current party have acknowledged the importance of strategic action moving forward, what David Coates refers to as a “progressive hegemonic campaign” in support of a leftward shift (2013: 38). Certainly, the party’s electoral challenge is a familiar one, “to establish economic credibility” (Curtice 2013): According to a March 2013 poll, “only 22 percent of voters trusted Ed Miliband, [Labour’s] leader, and Ed Balls, its financial spokesman, to make the right decisions on the economy” (Reuters 2013).

What might a post-New Labour economic competence heresthetic look like? The experience with globalisation suggests that grounding heresthetic on specific concepts that the party can (re)define can be effective. This appears to be Miliband’s goal in appropriating the British trope of a “One Nation” party, as in his 2012 conference address (the term appears 48 times in the speech). Yet “One Nation” is a problematic totem around which to (re)construct
credibility; the term is historical (and therefore backward-looking) and the term is abstract. The latter may be its greater undoing, because it evokes ideology rather than pragmatism. It may be an ideology with which few would argue, but that was also true of Labour’s unsuccessful rhetoric under Kinnock. Likewise problematic is the focus on the banks in Miliband’s 2012 leader’s speech (“bank” or “banks” appears 14 times) and elsewhere in party rhetoric (Turner 2012). This may be an accurate reflection on public sentiment toward bankers, but it is not a general narrative around which the party can build an image; instead, it’s circa-1992 ‘reading-off’ poll data all over again. Meanwhile, the Tories are engaged in what would appear to be a more promising strategy of redefining the financial crisis itself (Hellwig and Coffey, 2011), which is much more like globalisation in that it carries real meaning for voters while being outside of their ability to directly observe and evaluate. Finally, Labour has tried to reproduce Blair’s temporal argument: “[W]e can’t go back to Old Labour. […] But so too is it right that we move on from New Labour” (Miliband 2012). But the triangulation strategy is probably too explicit here, and again the rhetoric lacks a suitable master narrative.

Further research on the discourses of the contemporary Labour Party will be necessary to reveal whether this has been merely a failure of imagination, or if instead the globalisation heresthetic is actually still (electorally) working well enough that it is allowed to remain below the surface. If that were the case, prospects for the radical alternative awaited by Hay et al. would be dim.
CHAPTER 5
THE INTERNATIONALISM OF SCOTTISH NATIONALISTS

Stop the world, Scotland wants to get on.
Winnie Ewing, SNP MP, by-election victory speech, 1967

Independence would give Scotland the responsibility for making decisions about its future as part of an international, globalised environment, making a full contribution to the interdependent world.

The period of New Labour ascendency in Westminster also witnessed a political sea change to the North, in Edinburgh. The creation of a Scottish Parliament—endorsed by a 1997 referendum (one of the Blair government’s first major actions) and holding its first elections in 1999—created a new venue for British electoral competition. This was expected to be a venue dominated by Scottish Labour, who indeed controlled the first two parliaments (with the support of the Liberal Democrats). However, by the end of the New Labour era the biggest winner clearly had been the Scottish National Party (SNP), the pro-independence bloc that had functioned for six decades mostly as a protest party in Westminster elections:26 In 2007, SNP was able to form a minority government with its plurality in the Scottish Parliament; and in 2011, the party commanded a surprising outright majority, despite a proportional electoral system. Table 3 summarizes the Scottish Parliament election results after devolution, and particularly highlights the scale of SNP success from 2007 on; not only could the party form a government, but by 2011 came to command almost double the popular support that it had registered in the first Scottish election in 1999. As in the previous chapter, this table shows vote share and seats won. The Scottish Parliament uses a parallel voting additional member variant of proportional election, with voters casting ballots for individuals in first-past-the-post

26 SNP was formed in 1934 out of a merger of the left-wing (and pro-independence) National Party of Scotland and the right-wing (and pro-autonomy) Scottish Party.
constituency seats, and for party lists in multi-member regions. For clarity, Table 3 shows the vote share only for the constituency seats, but shows the total seats won.

Table 3. SNP Scottish Parliament Election Results (1999-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Constituency vote share (seats won)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>28.7% (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>23.8% (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>32.9% (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>45.4% (39)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Election victories in bold*

This rise is more dramatic even than New Labour’s, considering SNP’s history as only a protest party. But this rise is also similar to Labour’s, in that it took place against the same background of British electoral dynamics. SNP has had no choice but to emphasize economic competence in its overall strategy, responding to the same system of “performance politics” as Labour and other British parties. The potential for the globalization discourse here is to legitimize SNP as a *responsible* party to lead a devolved (and eventually independent) Scotland by contrasting the party with an isolationist variant of nationalism. An interview subject who is an SNP Member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP) noted a dual stance as a party of “nationalists and internationalists” has always been a defining feature of SNP. These are considered to be complementary rather than competing orientations. Similarly, Alex Salmond’s leadership of the party from 1990-2000 and again since 2004 have been marked by a strong rejection of the “fundamentalists” who opposed accepting devolution (or any other measure short of independence) and an increased electoral professionalization (Lynch 2002: 191-219).

Of course, rhetoric and discourse must be generally coherent to be persuasive. One of the major alternative understandings of SNP rhetoric is the “Scottish myth,” which argues that the party built its identity around the belief that Scotland has always been a fundamentally more
communal and egalitarian society than England and thus requires distinctive public policy (McCrone 2001: 90-100; Béland and Lecours 2008: 101). Alone, this leaves the party vulnerable to the charge that devolution is enough to preserve Scotland’s unique political culture. By applying the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party ideal-type, we can explain an alternate current in party discourse: a nationalist variant on the globalization heresthetic. In policy terms, SNP has worked to delegitimize devolution by asserting that in the globalized world, domestic autonomy is insufficient, and that only an independent voice in global governance will do. But as I will show, in the specific rhetorical constructions that it uses, the party has also connected this independence argument to an electoral goal of refashioning its image into a responsible party of (at least regional) government.

Thus, in this chapter I intend to further develop the application of the heresthetic-bricolage approach to British parties’ globalization discourse, and to contrast the empirical understanding we gain from this approach with alternatives in the conventional party politics and SNP-specific literature. I do so here by examining the party’s rhetoric after 1988 (when the party modernized itself through a new “independence in Europe” framework) to show how its references to globalization simultaneously reflect a logic of economic competence (in the same way as contemporary New Labour discourse) and an internationalist argument for independence. The plan of the chapter is as follows: First, I review the existing literature on SNP, particularly on its relationship to globalization, to show that these approaches do not fully capture the multi-faceted nature of the party’s rhetorical strategy. Second, I proceed to a three-part analytical narrative, discussing the relationship between textual deployments of globalization and concrete developments in the party’s competitive position. Third and finally, I conclude by discussing my findings and offering some interim conclusions about the party. I outline the way that the product
of the SNP’s discursive bricolage integrates globalization discourse into an independence rhetoric, and observe where the SNP variant of the globalization heresthetic reflects, but also where it differs from, the dominant use of globalization developed by New Labour. To summarize these findings up front, I observe globalization connected to heresthetic strategy via three recurring rhetorical figures in this case: the isolation/engagement dichotomy and a new times thesis used to emphasize the party’s “realism” and also identified in Labour discourse in the previous chapter; and the novel construction of a freedom-responsibility linkage, where competence is projected by associating, rather than opposing, freedom and responsibility in the context of independence.

**Existing Readings: Independence- or Office-Seeking Party?**

There are currently two broad strands of literature on SNP: approaches that treat the party as an independence movement, and approaches that treat it as a vote- and office-seeking party. In reality, of course, SNP is both. These approaches are not really in opposition; rather, what distinguish them are their particular substantive emphases and the entities to which they tend to compare SNP. The independence literature focuses on the subject of Scottish independence (or autonomy), analyzes the party in terms of its strategy for achieving that goal, and tends to compare it to other well-known separatist movements (most commonly the Quebecois and the Catalans). The party politics literature on SNP, by contrast, is concerned with the party’s performance in elections, analyzes independence only as the centerpiece of its political platform, and usually compares it either to its British competitors or to the family of small regionalist parties in Europe. The heresthetic-bricolage approach, it should be clear, is more in line with the latter school, as it is not concerned with the prospects or significance of independence as such.
However, the independence literature provides an important grounding because it includes analysis on the role of globalization, which tends not to appear in the party politics studies.

Specifically, much of the work on SNP as an independence movement considers Scottish nationalism to be a particularly strong variant of the “new regionalism” (Keating 1998), or “new nationalism” (Laible 2008), that is emerging in world politics. This new wave of nationalism is pragmatic rather than romantic, and is said to be in part the product of globalization. As Keating argues, “one of the factors encouraging the growth of stateless nationalist movements is the very weakening of the state [caused by] global interdependence” (2009: 207; see also Keating 1998). According to this view, the secular decline of existing state authorities associated with globalization does not mean a decline in the desirability of statehood by “stateless nations” like Scotland. Rather, it has created more space for them to emerge. In more concrete economic terms, this school argues that globalization and Europeanization affirmatively promote new nationalisms “by cutting the benefits of integration and by reducing the obstacles to independence or the various forms of autonomy” (Paquin 2002: 55; see also Holitscher and Suter 1999 and Sorens 2004). This literature marks a stark shift from the previous assumption that secessionist movements are hostile to globalization as “corrosive of traditional values and an impediment to grand political projects” (Sorens 2004: 728, summarizing inter alia Keating 1996).

Applying the new nationalism approach to SNP’s particular articulation of nationalism, Hepburn (2009), argues that the party has developed a “post-sovereign” understanding of independence (see also Tierney 2005). This understanding entails Scotland becoming a coequal member of an interdependent, multi-layered system of governance with “degrees of

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27 This strand also includes another set of important debates about the meaning of “Scottish-ness” in SNP nationalism—e.g., the ethnic versus civic nationalism question (Keating 1997: 690; Lynch 2002: 4-5)—but these are outside the scope of the present study.
independence” in different policy areas. Thus, an emphasis on globalization and Europeanization in SNP discourse is expected, and is explained as a rational response to the prospects of “independence in a post-sovereign world” (Hepburn 2009: 200). Such an approach is premised, of course, on the acceptance of a strong version of the globalization thesis, that an international political-economic order that incentivized large, powerful states has been irrevocably superseded: “Globalization has eliminated this system and is preventing its reconstruction” (Paquin 2002: 56; emphasis added). If globalization is better understood as a contingent social construct, as argued earlier, then the emergence of the new regionalism cannot have been entirely inevitable. In that case, the inclusion of globalization in SNP ideology may stem from a different source, such as electoral incentives as I am proposing.

This synthesis has not often been attempted because the party politics literature on SNP tends to exist parallel to the independence movement approach (sometimes as different publications from the same scholars; e.g., Lynch 2002, 2011). As with the study of party politics generally, there are a number of different strands to this analysis. The most basic divide is between organizational and party competition approaches, which take internal and external perspectives on the party, respectively. One of the most prominent organizational approaches to SNP is the “party lifespan” theory, originally pioneered by Pedersen (1982), which applies an evolutionary perspective to the institutional and strategic changes that parties undergo as they pass “thresholds” over time.28 “Different stages in a party’s evolution can be identified, each characterized by its own dominant and different quality” (Elias and Tronconi 2011: 3). SNP, for its part, has by now passed all of these thresholds, albeit its “threshold of governance” came only at the regional level (Lynch 2011). From this perspective, it is the changed institutional

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28 I am leaving aside a second research avenue in this vein, the surveys and demographic studies of SNP members and supporters (Curtice 2009; Mackay and Kenny 2009; Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012), as I am focused here on elite communications.
environment that accompanies this evolution which can explain the recent developments in SNP strategy and rhetoric. In other words, signaling economic pragmatism through its rhetoric is an inevitable decision for a party which has become mature and professionalized thanks to the resources made available by devolution (in terms of seats, financing, and public exposure).

Finally, the external, party competition approach interprets SNP actions in light of the electoral incentives the party faces vis-à-vis its competitors. Sometimes these are analyses of policy position in the Downsian Party tradition, usually where the SNP is included among all parties in studies of general elections (e.g., Endersby and Galatas 1998). More often, however, studies focused on SNP electoral strategy incorporate the Performance Party model, likely reflecting the dominance of that tradition in Britain since the 1990s. Looking at the 2011 election, Johns, Mitchell, and Carman use extensive survey data from the Scottish Election Study to show that “the SNP won its majority for the most mundane of electoral reasons: most voters thought it could do a better job in office than its rivals” (2013: 158). This was a confirmation of findings by Johns et al. (2010) about the 2007 election. Though entirely in line with dominant readings of British politics generally (Clarke et al. 2009), this finding in reference to SNP is important. In showing that economic performance criteria were more important in determining votes than position on the independence question, these analyses make clear that SNP can (indeed, ought to be) treated as a “normal” party in terms of political competition. This is largely why the independence movement and party politics readings exist separately, because the latter do not consider the former of great importance in the task of explaining elections (which conversely means that electoral dynamics cannot be that important to shaping the independence argument). This electoral understanding of SNP strategy does not mean that the existing analyses of the party are complete, but gives us an entrée to apply the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party
model. The general critiques of the performance politics literature discussed earlier—the fundamental difficulties of individuals assessing economic outcomes and attributing responsibility—are exacerbated in the Scottish case because of the division of power between London and Edinburgh. This approach also faces difficulty in explaining SNP success before 2011, which was the first time that voters had any governance track record to assess. Further, these analyses cannot in themselves explain how it is that independence and elections have become so separated that many who oppose independence vote for SNP. I aim to encompass each of these questions below.


The 1980s and early-1990s were an important time for SNP, because the years of Conservative government handed the party its best argument yet that the Union actually meant the imposition of English rule, even though it was a down period in terms of electoral success. SNP had seen its greatest prior breakthrough in the 1970s, taking advantage of the great unpopularity of the Westminster establishment, and Labour in particular, during those years. The apex came in the October 1974 General Election (the second to be held in that turbulent year), when the party won 11 seats at Westminster on the strength of 30.4% of the Scottish vote. Before this remarkable success, SNP had been resolutely a small protest party, winning parliamentary office only at the occasional by-election, never holding these seats at the subsequent General Election, and relying upon accompanying publicity to keep the party and the independence issue alive. The issue could not be ignored by the major parties after the SNP success, and the Labour government floated the first plans for devolution in the interim between the two 1974 elections. After some Parliamentary fits and starts, Labour put through the Scotland Bill of 1978, which provided for a referendum the following year on the creation of a directly-elected Scottish
Assembly. SNP had long been divided on the question of accepting home rule short of independence, and this continued through the mid-1970s. However, the leadership was unified on the pragmatic necessity of supporting any level of devolution on offer, the 1976 Conference was convinced to approve this stance (by a slim 58% to 42% margin), and the party enthusiastically campaigned for a Yes vote in the 1976 referendum (Lynch 2002: 146-151). In the event, the Yes side received 51.6% of votes cast, but this fell short of the 40% of registered voters threshold that had been set by the Act. This clause had been a compromise with the significant number of opponents of devolution on the Labour backbenches (who only narrowly failed to block the bill entirely), and indeed proved to be a poison pill. Nationalists have long considered this an undemocratic injustice.

The disappointment of the failed referendum unleashed a torrent of internal grievances and a sharp electoral decline for the party (Lynch 2002: 157-158), and in 1983 it reached its post-1970 nadir of 11.7% of the Scottish vote (earning it only 3 MPs). The most important manifestation of this discord was the formation of the “79 Group.” Officially called the Committee for Political Discussion, and nicknamed for the year it was formed, this was an internal pressure group advocating a more solidly left-wing stance for the party. The 79 Group diagnosed the party’s stalled momentum, in the words of one of the founding member and party Vice Chairman Margo MacDonald, as the result of the failure “to join the great debate on economic strategy in a way which linked Independence to better, and fairer, economic and industrial policies” (qtd. in Wilson 2009: 202). The group was extremely well organized, and it campaigned actively at the local level to take control of branches and use their votes to push its
position at conference. The leadership, now under National Chairman Gordon Wilson,\textsuperscript{29} was fearful of the 79 Group’s growth and activism. In part this was a fear of economic radicalism (though the party as a whole had been drifting gently to the left for some time), but even more so of the potential for factionalism, which many saw as crippling the contemporary Labour Party (Wilson 2009: 201-218).\textsuperscript{30} After acrimonious debate, the leadership eventually pushed measures through conference declaring membership of factions incompatible with SNP membership. The 79 Group leaders were subsequently expelled from the party in accordance with this measure in 1982, but with generous provision made for reinstatement as a compromise. Most were indeed eventually reconciled, including now-First Minister Alex Salmond and others who would come to form the next generation of SNP leadership. Though the 79 Group lost its battle for recognition and for a far-left platform, in the long-run it was important for the development of the party. The group had imported from leftist movements a sharp political focus and tight-knit organization, which the party had long lacked; the 79 Group thus catalyzed the electoral professionalization of the modern SNP (Torrance 2009).

Despite its internal conflicts, SNP was to become a major beneficiary of the broader political trend of the era: Scotland became a bastion for Labour at a time when the Tories under Thatcher were dominating elections elsewhere in the UK. Though the Labour votes might have come at SNP’s expense, the situation gave the nationalists a powerful argument for independence. That is, because Thatcher’s support was overwhelmingly English, her government was in a very real sense foreign rule in Scotland. SNP trumpeted the possibility that ministers for

\textsuperscript{29} With a tradition of collective leadership, SNP did not formally appoint a “Leader” until 2004; from 1963, however, the National Chairman, after National Convener, was unambiguously the most powerful figure in the party (Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012: 17).

\textsuperscript{30} Though the 79 Group was the most organized, the concern was broader, as a right-leaning faction called Siol nae Gaidheal was marching at party rallies with broadswords and daggers (Wilson 2009: 204-205).
the Scottish Office and Tory seats on Scottish committees might have to be filled by English MPs, undermining the principles of the “administrative devolution” of the period.\(^{31}\) Tory performance in that election was not quite so bad as that, losing 11 seats in Scotland and retaining 10, but the strategy as a whole appeared promising. When the government decided to introduce its controversial “poll tax” in Scotland a year ahead of England, the left of the SNP pushed the party to organize a non-payment campaign in protest, thus outflanking Labour as the strongest Scottish opposition to Thatcher. Many in the leadership, including Wilson, feared the impact that such radicalism would hurt the party’s precarious credibility, as we would expect given our earlier observations on the importance of perceived economic competence. Nevertheless, the non-payment campaigned led to some short term gains over Labour, cementing an overall left-wing positioning as the best route forward for the party (Lynch 2002: 180-185).

The other major policy decision made by the party in this period was the embrace of European integration in the form of an “independence in Europe” platform. Though general enthusiasm for Europe was not new to the party, it was formally declared at the 1988 party conference that the party favored independence as a member of the then-EC, rather than independence full-stop. Partly this was motivated by Europe appearing a friendlier venue for social policy than the Tory-dominated UK. But it also had important ramifications for the independence argument and SNP’s overall rhetorical strategy. As Dardanelli argues, the change can be understood as a heresthetic, designed to “mainstream secession [and thereby] to change radically the politics of Scottish self-government by making independence for the first time a credible alternative to devolution and the status quo” (2009: 61). This was most successful vis-à-

\(^{31}\) “Administrative devolution” was the term given to the system, dating from the late-19th century, of separately administering most state activities in Scotland, under the control of the associated Scottish Office (for an extensive review see Mitchell 2003). Conventionally, the Secretary of State for Scotland and the junior ministers were Scots themselves, but this obviously would be impossible if the party in government lacked enough Scottish MPs.
vis the calculations of other parties, especially Labour. By mainstreaming independence in this way (and conversely delegitimizing the unitary status quo as outside of the European norm), it was structured to be Labour’s second-best option, after devolution but before the status quo, whereas in 1979 they had preferred the status quo. By thus narrowing the distance between the preferred outcomes of SNP and Labour, enough of an alignment between them was possible to produce a successful devolution referendum in 1997. Though Dardanelli does not use both concepts together, we can see this as a key example of a part of SNP strategy that is explained by the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party type; the heresthetic aim of aligning SNP and Labour preferences was achieved through the discursive bricolage that threaded Europeanization and devolution into a single argument.

In terms of party competition, this period as a whole can be seen as a time of transition between different modes of niche party strategy. For most of its existence, including the heady days of 1974, SNP was basically a classic protest party, attracting votes from those dissatisfied with the status quo by remaining committed to a pure version of its anti-system position. By the advent of devolution in 1998, the party had become a more sophisticated political player, though its greatest successes would have to wait. Though this transformation of the party was not as abrupt as that from Old to New Labour, it was similarly marked by a critical shift in strategy associated with a move toward heresthetics and a focus on economic competence. In other words, as the party shifted away from a pure protest mode, the conventional models of party competition discussed in Chapter 2 came to be better explanations of its behavior (especially the Performance Party model). Considering the way that the Heresthetician-Bricoleur type builds from these models, it is also reasonable to expect that this moment is when my approach will have the greatest empirical leverage. The adoption of “independence in Europe,” though it was
part of a longer trend, can be seen as a tipping point in this direction. For this reason, I begin the discourse analysis for this case with the first texts produced after that point.

It should be noted that, though not as stark as the shift to New Labour, this moment also roughly coincides with the transition to a new party leadership, with Alex Salmond first becoming National Convenor in 1990. Having been fully reconciled to the “independence in Europe” mainstream after the 79 Group split, Salmond bested Margaret Ewing in the 1990 selection with 72% of delegates’ votes (Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012: 46). Though the candidates were both from the younger generation, a clear transition was still taking place—Margaret is the daughter of long-time SNP MP and MEP Winnie Ewing, who had been a visible figure for the party since 1967 (her Hamilton by-election victory).\(^{32}\) Though the Ewing family continues to be an important part of the SNP leadership, the aristocracy of the party’s first era of success had been dethroned. Salmond is an important figure for SNP, not only as the strong leader who shepherded the modernization of the party but also as an embodiment of the new type of politician on which it has come to rely: Drawing parliamentary candidates from the private sector is a key difference between SNP and the other parties (particularly its chief rival, Labour), and Salmond is himself a veteran of the financial sector, an economist by training who worked on oil and gas issues for the Royal Bank of Scotland. To some degree, looking outside the political establishment was inevitable, as SNP did not have a cadre of career politicians on which to draw (its few councilors, MPs, and MEPs being inadequate the number of Scottish Parliamentary seats it would have to fill). However, it is still very notable that much of the new

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\(^{32}\) Commensurate with her symbolic prominence—during her time as an MEP, the French-language media in Brussels gave her the title *Madame Ecosse* (“Mrs. Scotland”)—Winnie Ewing served in the figurehead office of Party President from 1987-2005. She also had the good fortune to be the oldest among the first batch of MSPs, entitling her to take the chair at the opening, until the election of the Presiding Officer: “I want to begin,” she said, “with the words that I have always wanted either to say, or hear someone else say—the Scottish Parliament, which adjourned on March 25, 1707, is hereby reconvened” (Ewing 2004).
generation came specifically from the world of business, whereas previous leaders came to politics through the more conventional tracks of academia and the law (Wilson and Winnie Ewing were both solicitors by profession, for example). This experience among its elected officials would be important to SNP cultivating a reputation for economic management as well as to avoiding the reputation for over-professionalization that would taint New Labour. This individual factor is a “coincidental cause,” in analytical terms, not systematically incorporated into the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party or rival types. However, it underscores the empirical significance of performance politics, in terms of which we can explain the party’s otherwise surprising embrace of globalization discourse.

Manifestos

The first articulation of the newly-established “independence in Europe” position directed at the public was the SNP manifesto for the June 1989 European Elections. It is particularly notable in that it places this argument within a spatial and temporal logic similar to those later adopted into New Labour’s globalization heresthetic. Both the isolation-engagement dichotomy and the new times thesis are encapsulated in the opening paragraphs:

The people of Scotland face a crucial choice at these European Elections. If they support the Conservative, Labour or Democrat parties, they will be voting to isolate Scotland, to place Scotland at the periphery of the United Kingdom and of Europe.

If they support the Scottish National Party, they will be sending a clear message that Scotland demands a positive, forward-looking and imaginative future as an independent member of the European Community.

(SNP 1989: 2; emphasis added)

The first passage is an unusually-explicit example of structuring the meaning of an electoral decision through discourse; grammatical and political agency are jointly accorded to the voters, such that the party is less making a promise about its own actions than a warning about those of the electorate. This is effected directly through the conditional semantic relations (“if they...
support…they will”) and indirectly through the reliance on declarative mood (stating the outcome of a particular decision rather than explicitly calling for it). Scottish voters’ endorsement of the British political establishment is linked to the continued isolation of Scotland from the European mainstream. Thus the familiar isolation-engagement dichotomy is here deployed for an interest particular to a protest party: the delegitimization of its conventional competitors. This is earlier than this argument was expressed by New Labour, suggesting the parallel development of this strategy, rather than appropriation of the strategy directly from Blair. In my terms, this suggests the primacy of heresthetics (a similar response to certain strategic incentives) over bricolage, at least in this case.

More specifically, this dynamic is linked to a temporal logic of modernization, the new times thesis. According to this argument, being engaged in Europe equates with a “positive, forward-looking and imaginative future.” Later in the document, the party frames independence as “the opportunity to break free from Westminster and the failures of the past, and build a new future as an equal partner in Europe” (SNP 1989: 33). Having been foreshadowed by the title “Scotland’s Future—Independence in Europe,” these kind of references to the future appear throughout the manifesto. Meanwhile, conventional nationalist paeans to Scotland’s history are conspicuously absent. The only references to the past are in calls for the “re-establishment” of the Scottish Parliament and Scotland’s education reputation, but even here the allusion to prior glories is embedded in an active verb. As nationalisms go, the overall style is decidedly un-romantic.

Direct reference to globalization does not yet appear in the SNP rhetoric of this manifesto—the token of modern internationalism here is clearly Europe—but there are some early echoes: In the section on economic policies, investment in training and retraining is
justified as “essential if European industry is to be competitive in ‘tomorrow’s world,’”
“tomorrow’s world” being an early version of the technological-change aspect of the
globalization narrative (as well as another futurist symbol; SNP 1989: 12). Again, conditional
semantic relations are inserted in the context of a declarative mood and epistemic modality—the
conditionality means that Scots are free to support SNP policies or not, but it is framed as a
question of facts, not values. This argument is similar to the ones used at that time in favor of
closer integration by the European Commission (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989); SNP bricolage
was apparently a gradual process, with the “independence in Europe” framework slowly
transitioning into the globalization heresthetic that will be highlighted in later texts.

In contrast, a distinctly globalist representation of the world economy appears in the
following paragraph of the same manifesto (in the discussion of economic policy under an
independent government):

Unemployment is still too high throughout Europe, and the over-riding priority of all
governments should be to return to full employment. The SNP recognises the interactive
nature of the global economy in which we live. The Scottish Government will join other
European Governments in encouraging the climate for growth which will make a
substantial dent on unemployment in Europe.

(SNP 1989: 14; emphasis added)

The reference in the highlighted sentence is to an interactive “global,” rather than “European,”
economy, despite the emphasis on Europe in the surrounding sentences. This leaves some
(strategic) ambiguity about whether the implications of this interaction are limited to
considerations about European integration. Moreover, the active verb here is “recognises,”
limiting the actor (the party) to a receptive role. As we have seen in New Labour discourse,

economic globalization is given meaning through implication and a logic of appearances: The
“interactive nature” of the economy is apparently relevant to tackling the issue of unemployment
(considering the sentence’s placement in the passage), but the exact relationship is not defined.
Also, this deployment of the globalization discourse is particularly directed toward shaping the image of the party: Though a claim about the world itself is embedded in the highlighted passage (“…in which we live”), it is in full a declarative sentence about the party.

The party’s next major manifesto, for the 1992 General Election, is different in form. In the pre-devolution era, General Elections held a special position in the campaign for independence because of SNP’s argument that the party returning a majority of the Scottish MPs would constitute the necessary mandate for independence negotiations. For this reason, these manifestos tend to be more focused on arguments for independence than on anything the SNP members might try to accomplish at Westminster in the meantime.33 However, aside from an early outline of the “six steps to Independence”34 and of the party’s preferred constitutional arrangement (SNP 1992a: 2-4), the document still maintains the characteristics of the manifesto genre. As such, it is an organized litany of policy commitments, but for an SNP-controlled independent Scottish government in the future to implement. So because the party’s independence framework promises an election to a new Scottish Parliament immediately, and voters would have a chance to weigh-in on these promises at that stage, this is actually a manifesto for two elections at once.

Setting aside the potential inconsistencies here—i.e., if Scots are being asked to support independence in principle, regardless of their particular policy preferences, what is the role of all the SNP policy commitments?—the discursive function of this approach is important. In essence, the manifesto is projecting an image of what an independent Scotland would look like and of the

33 It should also be noted that there may actually have been more that the MEPs could do than the MPs, because of the less strictly-adversarial culture and structure in the European Parliament compared to majoritarian Westminster. (see Ewing 2004).

34 SNP almost always capitalizes “Independence;” making it a proper noun connotes a concrete moment yet to be achieved, rather than merely an abstract aspiration.
kinds of quotidian issues of tax reform and rural development with which a Scottish Government would be occupied. Independent Scotland is thereby rendered a more concrete and conceivable proposition, concurrently undermining the perceived permanence of the Union. In this respect, the overall strategy is bolstered by the almost-banal “six steps” framing of the path to independence, which renders the process manageable and straight-forward: “Step Two: We win the majority of Scottish seats at the election. That gives us the mandate to negotiate Independence. […] Step Four: The negotiations should be completed within six months […]” (SNP 1992a: 3). The actions described are unprecedented and likely to be extremely complex,\textsuperscript{35} but this is elided by the instruction-sheet framing. Uncertainties like “should be completed” only highlight the sense of inevitability because they are presented without comment or concern. Together, the effect of the party’s language in the manifesto is to enact its central, epistemic claim: “Independence is the immediate, logical, and clear-cut answer to the question of how Scotland should be governed” (SNP 1992a: 2).

A number of the rhetorical features identified in the previous manifesto are present here as well: The implicit but clear rejection of backward-looking romantic nationalism appears in the opening sentence of the introduction: “Scotland is a living, breathing, exciting country” (SNP 1992a: 2). Likewise, the foreword invokes the isolation-engagement dichotomy, in a way that also incorporates the new times thesis: “At this General Election we are faced with our most important choice for many generations: […] A choice to go forward into the mainstream of Europe, or be stuck in the backwater of Britain. And every Scottish voter will have to choose which route to take” (SNP 1992a: 1). This “backwardness” trope is a popular one for the party,\textsuperscript{35} The party claims, to the contrary, that “the path to Independence has been well mapped-out by other countries,” and that “nearly fifty Commonwealth nations have harmoniously untied the knot linking them to London” (SNP 1992: 2). This is a very loose analogy, however, as the Commonwealth realms were in a much different position legally and practically. A closer constitutional parallel would be Ireland (joined to the UK by its own Act of Union), and that process was (and continues to be) much less clean than this presentation.
and also appears in UKIP’s nationalist discourse (albeit applied to the EU). The phrasing of it here is also a telling play on the trope of inevitability, as Scots are explicitly given a choice but with one option clearly associated with the march of time. Thus, the voters can feel empowered even though the uncompromising epistemic modality leaves no room for them to contest the claims themselves. Finally, in terms of shaping the image of the party itself (rather than the nationalist cause), the manifesto presages a predominant feature of subsequent SNP talk and texts: “The SNP is a responsible, modern political party rooted in the tradition of European social democracy” (SNP 1992a: 16; emphasis added).

By 1997, in the wake of the resurgence of the Labour Party under Blair’s modernizing camp, SNP begins to present an explicit argument about the relationship of globalization and independence. This appears clearly in its manifesto for the critical 1997 General Election: “With a secure independent Parliament at home, the benefits of international cooperation and full and equal membership of international organisations would greatly strengthen Scotland’s ability to defend and promote its interests in a world that shrinks each day” (SNP 1997: 30). Note here, in rhetorical terms, that independence happens “at home” while the international context is associated with the more conciliatory notions of “cooperation” and “membership.” The classic globalization trope of a shrinking world is thereby made to coexist naturally with a robust nationalism (not chauvinist nationalism, but Scotland as a collective actor, promoting and defending its interests). In linguistic terms, this is marked by the conditional relationship between the two clauses being expressed with a strong epistemic modality (“would,” not could). As in other SNP texts, the structure of the claim presents multiple possibilities, but treats the outcome of independence in a globalized world as certain.
Thus, globalization becomes a logical part of SNP discourse, but it is much more than one among several policy arguments for independence. Elsewhere in the 1997 text, the party significantly sharpens the *electoral* implications of this synthesized discourse. In a sidebar quote, longtime SNP figure and then-MEP Winnie Ewing describes Scots as “an internationalist people, who look outwards to the rest of the world – in contrast to the insular, Little Englander mentality at Westminster” (SNP 1997: 6). This is a strong contrast to draw in the context of British discourse at the time, when Tony Blair was using charges of isolationism to undermine the governing credentials of the Tories (e.g., Labour Party 1997). Indeed, the SNP language mirrors the New Labour strategy of associating an outward-looking orientation with a forward-looking one, and both of these with sound economic management. To the former point, Salmond’s introduction to the 1997 manifesto argues the SNP’s message of independence “challenges the sterile, *out of date*, and bankrupt political British system and looks *above it* to the *brighter prospects* that await us in Europe and the world” (SNP 1997: 4; emphasis added). Scottish independence, in this rendering, would not merely mean a territorial (i.e., spatial) rearrangement but a temporal jump from past to future.

Further, the party is quick to argue that this eagerness for the future is not another kind of romanticism, but a considered economic policy. References to the future, the new times thesis, are directly connected to economic policy proposals: “The 21st century will be the century of information […] and an SNP government will set as a policy objective the commercial support of the Internet” (SNP 1997: 29). Perceived economic expertise, the *sine qua non* of electoral success, is constructed here through the role performance of politician-as-expert (Fairclough 2003: 91), which is associated with unconditional statements about the future (such as “…*will* be the century of information”). This argument could have been made using deontic modality (e.g.,
“Scotland must set…”), but the naturalization implied by epistemic modality is central to the discourse. Clearly, “brighter prospects” and a non-“bankrupt” political system are valence issues, but this is not the rhetoric of a Performance Party promising and highlighting concrete achievements. Rather, this rhetoric is better understood as the product of heresthetic bricolage, in that links together diffuse epistemic claims to indirectly restructure the public understanding of SNP competence.

Policy Documents

Though it does not refer to globalization explicitly, an important development of SNP economic thinking in this period is a document called *The SNP’s Medium Term Recovery Strategy*. This short policy publication was designed to accompany the 1992 General Election manifesto, and provides both a costing of the commitments in the manifesto as well as model-based projections of how the economic programs would grow the Scottish economy. Consequently, much of the document is technical, but the parts that are not make the striking argument that SNP’s vision of independence is as much economic as political: “The SNP has never argued for Independence on purely constitutional grounds. Independence in Europe is not an end in itself. Rather, the economic power of an independent Parliament will be the means towards security vital economic and social objectives in Scotland” (SNP 1992b:1). Note again the use of epistemic claims in the future tense (“*will be* the means”) to ground this argument in “objective facts” rather than normative ideology. The document as a whole reinforces the claim by using a litany of concrete plans and precise projections to “textualize an identity” for the party of economic expertise.
Devolution was supposed to “kill nationalism stone dead,” at least according to the now-infamous 1995 words of Labour’s Shadow Scottish Secretary George Robertson. That it has had much the opposite effect is now clear, but it was less so in the early years of the Scottish Parliament. While the very existence of the Parliament was a boon to SNP party in terms of the resources and public platform it provided for the “official opposition,” the results of the first two elections were disappointing. In both 1999 and 2003, the party was about 10 percentage points behind Labour in both the constituency and list voting,\(^3\) relying on the latter to secure most of their seats; more significantly, there was a noticeable decline in votes and seats from the first election to the second (Curtice 2009). If the story ended here, we might find the Downsian Party an adequate model to explain the party’s trajectory: With Labour coming around to the median Scottish voter’s preference for devolution, SNP appeared to be out of options. However, the emphasis on performance politics would continue, particularly

The early disappointments did lead to a short-lived change in leadership: In 2001, Salmond announced that he would step down from the leadership and not seek reelection to the Scottish Parliament, instead seeking reelection to Westminster and focusing on leadership of the small SNP group there.\(^3\) Salmond was succeeded by his preferred candidate, John Swinney, another veteran of the financial sector and long-time economic policy specialist for the party. To a degree, Swinney can be seen as the Brown to Salmond’s Blair, with the crucial difference

\(^3\) Scottish elections use a mixed-member proportional system, called the Additional Member System in UK parlance, with 76 first-past-the-post (FPTP) seats supplemented by 56 regional party list seats. Curtice notes that the latter constituted an “electoral lifeline” for SNP, which had always suffered in FPTP elections because its support was spread very evenly across Scotland (2009: 56-59).

\(^3\) Devolution law allows individuals to hold office as MSPs and (Westminster) MPs simultaneously, but the SNP decided as a matter of policy that its members should not do so. Those (like Salmond) who had won their seats at the 1997 General Election were allowed to keep them for the duration of that Parliament, but would afterward have to choose. Since then, Westminster candidates have been drawn from those unable to win seats at the Scottish level.
being their overall positive relationship (though Swinney had actually supported Winnie Ewing in the 1990 leadership contest). He focused his efforts on reforming the party’s organization to suit its new role as an active parliamentary party, further centralizing power and developing a more professionalized campaign and communications staff. These reforms were largely successful and accepted by the party, but Swinney lacked the charisma and political skill to lead the party to renewal. By 2004, he was under increasing pressure from a restless fundamentalist wing (who saw little gain from Salmond and Swinney’s gradualist approach), and resigned after losses in the European Elections that year. Salmond, though he had earlier pledged not to run again, emerged to challenge for the leadership. In accordance with Swinney’s reforms, the top office was now officially called Leader, and was elected by postal ballot of members rather than by the Party Conference. This perfectly suited Salmond’s high public profile, and he bested fellow-79 Group veteran Roseanna Cunningham (who had been the undisputed front-runner before his entry) with 75% of first preference votes (Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012: 45-46).

In addition to the advantages of Salmond’s skill, a key part of what turned around the party’s electoral fortunes was an important policy decision taken in 1999, which we can interpret theoretically as a second heresthetic for the party (after Europeanization)—if not in its intention, at least in its effects. It was at this point that the party leadership changed its proposed procedure for independence, promising that a referendum will precede any independence negotiations, whereas previously an SNP majority in Scotland was supposed to constitute a mandate for separation (Lynch 2002: 247-249). There were surely multiple motives for this, not least the recognition of practical realities; given international norms and the precedent set by the devolution procedure, independence without a referendum would be inconceivable. Indeed, largely because it was already considered a foregone conclusion, there was no major controversy
surrounding the decision. However, the electoral significance of this change (for whatever reason it was made) is best understood in heresthetic terms. Indeed, it is the mostly classically “Rikerian” of the strategies discussed here: By breaking the relationship between a vote for SNP and a mandate for independence, this move radically changed the dimensionality of Scottish elections by being able to consider SNP alongside all of the other parties. The party’s original mandate logic likely did not weigh heavily on voters in times when the prospect of an SNP majority seemed remote. But the greater potential for the party in devolved elections would have forced voters who were skeptical of independence to make a difficult decision, absent this heresthetic.

Manifestos

We find limited references to the globalization discourse in the party’s manifesto for the first elections to the devolved Scottish Parliament in 1999. The wider world appears as a space of competition rather than the sphere of cooperation highlighted in 1997: “Scotland should be a fully employed, high value, high growth economy, capable of competing effectively in global markets” (SNP 1999: 11; emphasis added). The weak modalization marked here by “should” is unusual, but fits the overall theme of the SNP globalization heresthetic. Linguistically, it can be seen as either epistemic, if read as “the way it would be if not for current conditions,” or deontic, if read as “how things ought to be.” In either case, it is being used to contrast with the situation of Scotland within UK, and so the uncertain modality serves to disrupt the naturalization of the status quo. In other words, the global markets are a given but the Union is a potentially-temporary condition.

The reference to global competition takes on a nationalistic edge in the ensuing policy discussion of research and development: “Too often in the past the fruits of research have
directly benefited other countries with Scotland often only securing branch plant operations” (SNP 1999: 12). This is a marked shift in tone, with the almost-mercantilist implications of the latter claim suggesting a partial rejection of the dominant globalization discourse. Read together with the 1997 Manifesto, one might get the impression that the fundamental openness of the Scottish people had been taken advantage of by global market forces. But such a shift, related to a slight turn away from independence in the document as a whole, is logical in the post-devolution political context: By providing a platform for SNP to articulate and defend a Scottish national interest without necessarily requiring independence, the Scottish Parliament opened the door for a more robustly-nationalist electoral strategy. As a result, the “threat” aspect that is always part of the globalization narrative can be highlighted without fear of appearing quite so “isolationist.” This is an example of the complexities inherent in applying an ideal-type to a concrete case; the globalization heresthetic that SNP shares with Labour and UKIP is less consistently expressed here, but the strategic reasoning behind that inconsistency can still be explained in the general framework of heresthetic-bricolage.

There is a different thread to the globalization discourse running through the 2001 General Election manifesto, reflecting internal uncertainty about the party’s direction during a leadership transition (from Salmond to Swinney and back). Though the overall tone is ‘big picture’ in the way that SNP’s Westminster manifestos generally are (since there is little that a small party can concretely achieve there), the word “global” does not appear at all. The nationalist narrative here is instead temporal: “We believe strongly that there is a modern role for Scotland’s democratic government as a keystone in building a modern Scottish society in Scotland” (SNP 2001: 4). However awkwardly worded, the rhetorical structure of this claim could hardly be more direct in invoking the new times thesis by linking the concepts of
“Scotland” and “modernity.” This forward-looking tone is reiterated in the policy discussion, which includes for example a “Scottish Fund for Future Generations.” On Europe, meanwhile, the pro-EU line is maintained but with the caveats that the party “rejects moves to a European ‘Super State’, […] seek[s] a stronger commitment to subsidiarity [and believes monetary union] can only be achieved when the conditions are correct, when an acceptable exchange rate is delivered and where public consent has been given in a referendum” (SNP 2001: 15). This is much more careful and gradualist language than was used previously, again associated with the desire of the post-devolution SNP to focus on burnishing its credentials as a party of Scottish interests and not just Scottish independence.

Modernization and globalization have been closely linked in the wider British discourse, particularly by New Labour, but the linkage is conspicuously absent here. Overall, the emphasis is less on making nationalism seem responsible than making the alternative seem irresponsible: “At the Westminster election the people of Scotland have a choice. A choice between the Scottish National Party that stands for Scotland and which campaigns for Independence or the London Parties which have failed our country for too long” (SNP 2001: 2). The use of “Westminster election” to refer to the General Election is significant here, suggestive of an English affair in which the SNP only reluctantly engages. Further, the SNP is said to stand for Scotland first, and for independence only second. Indeed, the choice offered is between parties, not between independence itself and the status quo. Consequently, there is a more conventional partisan approach without evidence of the globalization/competence rhetoric. But the linguistic structure is familiar; rather than using an imperative mood or deontic modality to call upon Scottish voters to choose SNP, the party presents the options in a declarative mood.
The shift in SNP discourse, at least in its fullest extent, would be short-lived. The “wider world” into which an independent Scotland would enter returned to the fore in the 2003 Scottish Parliament manifesto. Under the very direct heading “Outward Looking Nation,” it is averred that “Scotland has always been an outward looking nation. With Independence we can once again take our full and rightful place in the international community” (SNP 2003: 24). Though there is a weaker epistemic modality in this passage than in previous accounts (“can” rather than “will), the heavy emphasis on time (“has always been” and “once again”) serves to shape the notion of independence in a particular way. The hypothetical moment of “Independence”—again, consistently capitalized as a proper noun precisely to remove that uncertainty—is rendered not as a disjuncture but as a continuation of the past. This is a core claim of contemporary SNP nationalism, but would be much harder to maintain if not for the reassuring references to the “international community” incorporated into this discourse; the international affairs section of the text has repeated references to “partnership,” “cooperation,” and Scots “playing our part.” The understanding of contemporary world order constructed by these references underscores the putative “uncontroversiality” of independence. And, despite the implication of the earlier passage that the current “international community” is basically the same one that the Scots left in 1707, this is a representation intimately bound up with the discourse of globalization.

This relationship is expressed more clearly in the following passage from the foreign policy section of the 2005 Westminster manifesto (headed “An Outward Looking Scotland”):

In today’s interdependent world, what it means to be independent has changed. It is about taking decisions for ourselves and being accountable for them. It’s about having the tools to build a better country by taking responsibility and deciding how we want to use our sovereignty - when to pool it and when to retain it. As more and more decisions are taken supranationally in a globalised environment, having our own voice to defend our national interests and protect our distinctive culture is more essential than ever.

(SNP 2005: 34)
Here we can observe the disjuncture conventionally associated with globalization, the new times thesis that Blair used elsewhere to distance New Labour from the politics of the 1970s and ‘80s. That there has been an important change is stated without modalization or subjectivization—that is, the claim is presented with no reservations and as an objective fact rather than the position of the party. The facts of interdependence, in the first sentence, and of the globalized environment, in the opening of the second paragraph, are introduced merely as presumptions rather than claims with semantic relations to other aspects of the argument (which could be more easily challenged). Crucially, then, this passage is neither an argument about interdependence (taken as a given without elaboration) or an argument about Scottish independence; rather, it is the underlying meaning of independence that has changed. The specifics of the Scottish case, and of SNP’s policy toward it, are thus rendered as following from this overarching transformation. Unlike in the 2001 modernization argument, the party is not suggesting here that this temporal development renders Scottish independence more necessary, but merely that it has changed the contours of what independence will be when it occurs. This is a more modest claim in empirical terms, making it less likely to be challenged, but a significant rhetorical move because it gives license to the party to shape voters’ imaginings of an independent, SNP-led Scotland. This Scotland would be oriented toward “responsibility” in the taking of decisions within a “globalised environment.” This Scotland would have new “tools” and a “new voice” for achieving collective goals. And it would be sovereign, but only as sovereign as it freely chooses to be.

Speeches

In contrast to the manifestos and other printed texts, major SNP speeches of this era do not deploy the globalization discourse with very much frequency. The “international
marketplace” appears in Salmond’s 2004 conference address, but only in terms of the need for “a competitive economic environment, […] infrastructure, […] and capital markets which allow Scots to bring their products to the international marketplace.” In 2005, the reference is more pointed but still indirect: “No one argues that it is possible in the modern world to protect every business from takeover. However, no normal country allows its key strategic companies to disappear without considering the public and competition interest” (Salmond 2005; the immediate reference here is to the possible foreign acquisition of privatized energy provider Scottish Power). The structure of this declarative claim implies that some inevitable dynamic of “the modern world” constrains the ability of states to control corporate takeovers (albeit not completely—an inconsistency that is glossed over with a lack of explicit semantic relations to explain it). However, it also connects this invocation of the inevitability of globalization with a sharp attack on the status quo, in that devolved Scotland is apparently not a “normal country.” Thus, in this passage, Salmond reminds his audience that SNP is a party that accepts economic realities, while also suggesting that it is the unionist parties who are outside the pale of normality, much as the party has done with references to the European mainstream since the 1989 manifesto. And indeed, the passage is followed by just such a continental invocation: “The Germans do not allow it [unregulated takeover]. And neither do the French” (Salmond 2005).

Policy Documents

In 2004, SNP MSP and future Scottish Justice Minister Kenny MacAskill authored a treatise called Building a Nation: Post Devolution Nationalism in Scotland, which argues that the only way out of the party’s post-devolution malaise is to develop itself into a holistic social democratic force. Similar to what Mandelson and Liddle’s The Blair Revolution was for New Labour, this was an independent intervention that nevertheless served as an intellectual
development of the direction that the leadership was taking the party. It also contains some of the
more frank discussion of the relationship between globalization and nationalism to emerge from
the SNP camp:

Scotland is in transition but what to? It’s a journey being made not just in the Devolution
settlement but also in all aspects of Scottish society. From the constitution of the
economy to religion to race Scotland is changing. Pressured from without by the effects
of Globalisation and from within by a Parliament growing in powers and stature. It is a
small Nation on the periphery of a growing EU and a shrinking world. Post 9/11 and its
fall out what is clear is that all Nations no matter how big and powerful are
interdependent. What then does Independence mean in an interdependent world and why
is it relevant?

(MacAskill 2004: 15)

MacAskill goes on to answer these questions (an unusual use of imperative mood) with the
claims that “Independence is not inconsistent with an interdependent world but essential to
participating in it,” and that “[j]ust as Scotland has to become comfortable with Devolution,
Globalisation, and a New World Order, so the SNP must adapt to the new terrain” (2004: 15-16).

This passage exhibits the mainstream British globalization discourse in a very pure form:
globalization comes only “from without;” the world is “shrinking;” this is revealed in a self-
evident way by 9/11; and societies and parties “must” become accustomed to it. The logic of
appearances (i.e., lack of causal semantic relations) is particularly notable in the quoted
paragraph—the key sentence beginning “pressured from without…” is actually a fragment,
literally devoid of explicit transitions to the rest of the argument. Overall, this discourse can be
seen as the new times thesis strategically applied in the same way as in New Labour’s
globalization heresthetic, in that it projects a “new terrain” for political competition in which
only modern political parties can be successful: “There is not simply a new Parliament but new
political ground. The debate has moved on irrevocably from being a straight forward left right
debate” (MacAskill 2004: 16). The possibility of an SNP whose long-term aim is not success in
the realm of performance politics is thus closed off, to the party itself and to the public perception. At the same time, the party is still playing the independence game at the same time, and skillful bricolage is necessary to make this two-level game hold together within the same rhetoric. In this case, the contrast of big nations and small nations (which nowhere appears in Labour discourse) is highlighted, but also obliterated by the notion of “interdependence.” Similarly, the *status quo ante* is rendered no longer possible by the notion of the inevitable “transition” of Scotland, but the agency of SNP is still demanded by the fact that the transition to what is still (literally, in the first line) an open question.

**Case Narrative Part 3: The Party in Power, 2007-2013**

This third era begins with the crucial 2007 Scottish Parliament election. At that poll, SNP took 47 out of 129 seats, against 46 for Labour. The nationalists had won a plurality, and the governing Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition could not muster a majority. Consequently, SNP was given the opportunity to take office as a minority government. Relying mainly on the Conservatives and the smaller parties to pass its budgets, Salmond’s government was remarkably successful in sustaining a stable minority administration. At the next election, in 2011, they actually won an outright majority of 69 seats, taking constituency seats from all three of the other major parties (including 16 from Labour, which had also lost in the General Election a year earlier). This was a highly unexpected result, given the proportional electoral system. Moreover, it appears from surveys to have been based much more on traditional electoral dynamics than support for independence, which has been largely flat (around 30%) since devolution (Johns, Mitchell, and Carman 2013). Nevertheless, the party continued to pursue independence with the platform of office. After the majority victory, this was impossible for

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38 It was during the minority government period that SNP officially rebranded the devolved administration from Scottish “Executive” to Scottish “Government,” a shift with both practical and symbolic motives (Unger 2013).
Westminster to ignore. And it did not hurt that the lukewarm polling on independence suggested that it would likely be rejected in a yes/no referendum. Consequently, Salmond and Prime Minister David Cameron agreed to a plan for a referendum, which was subsequently approved by legislation and is now scheduled for September 2014.

Even aside from the specific arguments of the party lifespan school, the entrance of a party to office is obviously an important moment. This has not gone unnoticed in analyses of SNP; two books that deal wholly or in part with the party include the words “from protest to power” in their titles (Hassan 2009; Elias and Tronconi 2011), and another subtitled “transition to power” (Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2013). However, I do not observe the same stark changes in political language that we might expect, and that I observed with New Labour after 1997. The likely reason for this is the specific situation of the independence campaign: Rather than drifting further from its past and converging toward the mainstream parties as it spends more time in office, the party actually has to refocus its efforts on independence as the prospect actually comes within reach. This raises a question with which both the party itself and analysts have to contend: How does a redoubled effort for independence coexist in the same party rhetoric as a competence-centered drive for reelection? The narrow focus of existing party competition theories cannot explain much in this area; even the Performance Party, though it is an adequate explanation for the election results considered in isolation. Rather, in using the lens of the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party, we can see how independence and the politics economic competence continue to be indirectly linked via globalization discourse.

Manifestos

True to the pattern it has developed for Scottish elections, SNP focused more on concrete policy than grand questions of sovereignty in the 2007 Scottish manifesto. Accordingly, global
order is invoked in relation to economic policy rather than prospects for independent foreign policy. In fact, some of the arguments could have been cribbed directly from New Labour discourse of the preceding decade, such as the relationship between the globalized economy and education policy: “We will aim to ensure that people of all ages can access relevant, valued and quality assured training opportunities throughout their working lives to keep pace with the rapidly changing demands of the global economy” (SNP 2007: 54; emphasis added). This pledge carries many of the prominent (and controversial) implications of mainstream globalization discourse: It is a presumption (rather than an explicit claim) that the global economy is rapidly changing, and is placed at the end of the sentence in a way that reinforces the “taken-for-grantedness.” The political goal presented is to deal with, rather than resist, these changes. And the individualization of the problem presents a clear but unambitious role for government. To wit, the party goes on to promise in declarative terms that an SNP government “will work with employers to help them with the practical support they need to tackle skills shortages and work […] to promote activities which help increase the employability of individuals” (SNP 2007: 54; emphasis added). Though the challenges of the global economy may be inevitable, in other words, the party will still be active. The particular activity, however, will be pragmatic and inwardly-oriented; through this rhetoric SNP can perform the identity of strong leadership while also maintaining an image of realism (accepting the “realities” of globalization) that is crucial to public perceptions of economic confidence.

SNP’s two most recent manifestos were produced in consecutive years, for the 2010 General and 2011 Scottish elections, and share many features in relation to portrayals of the global. First, of course, the financial crisis by this time loomed large in public thinking. In both texts the crisis is presented as a common global challenge: “We believe that, like virtually every
other country across the world, we need further economic stimulus” (SNP 2010: 8; emphasis added) and “we have faced and overcome the biggest global economic shock for four generations” (SNP 2011: 2). While SNP certainly critiques the current austerity policies of the “London parties,” from the perspective of nationalist politics these passages seem like a surprising missed opportunity to construct the crisis as the particular consequence of prior English political decisions. This would not be implausible, particularly in terms of liberalized financial markets, but even the paragraph in the 2010 manifesto devoted to banking is entirely forward-looking. This choice makes more sense through the lens of globalization discourse and a politics of confidence. The party’s claim to economic leadership is not based on any kind of radical break with the post-Thatcher consensus, but rather a pragmatic adaptation of these globalist principles to the particular conditions of Scotland. Not only would the former open the party to claims of extremism it is most eager to avoid, but it would shift the overall focus of political discussion from independence to deeper questions of economic philosophy (not entirely settled within the party). To this end, it is more important in the manifesto to remind voters of SNP’s awareness and acceptance of global economic realities than it is to open a much wider-ranging debate by re-narrating the New Labour boom.

Speeches

Alex Salmond made the SNP’s first major speech as a party in office in the form of an acceptance speech to the Scottish Parliament following his election as First Minister. Globalization is discussed only obliquely in this speech, a pattern that would be repeated in subsequent speeches of this era. The reference is to the constraining aspect of the globalization discourse, and is articulated in temporal terms: “In this century, there are limits to what

39 In contrast to the traditional practice at Westminster, the Scottish First Minister is formally nominated by Parliament before being appointed by the Queen.
governments can achieve. But one thing any government I lead will never lack is ambition for Scotland” (Salmond 2007). The nature and extent of these limits is not discussed; the passage is better understood not as a logical argument for independence but as a stylistic move echoing New Labour. SNP’s great ambitions for Scotland, Salmond suggests, will always be tempered by recognition of the limits of what can be achieved “in this century” (a temporal reference that serves to invoke the new times thesis).

References to globalization are even more limited in subsequent conference speeches (until 2013, see below), despite their continued presence in other texts, perhaps because of the need for Salmond to distinguish his rhetorical style from Blair’s. However, they do appear in speeches to more specialized audiences. In 2008, for example, First Minister Salmond gave a speech at Harvard during a US tour called “Free to Prosper: Creating the Celtic Lion economy.” This is comparable to Blair’s Japan speech in terms of developing his party’s view of the economic mechanisms of globalization. The title of course references the so-called Asian Tiger economies and their spectacular growth over the previous decade. Salmond argues that a similar “Arc of Prosperity” exists in Northern Europe, including Ireland, Iceland, Norway, and, potentially, Scotland. This notion attracted some derision after the financial crisis, to the extent that this very speech became an object of controversy (Green 2011), but what is important for the present purpose is the particular way that he articulates globalization:

Here we can turn to Professor Tom Nairn, or for that matter Harvard's own Professor Alberto Alesina, and others like them, who see the emergence of a 'New Deal' for small countries at the heart of globalisation. During the first half of the last century and perhaps later, smaller nations faced two major disadvantages in the global system. One was guaranteeing their security. The other was gaining access to markets. However, over time global markets have opened to countries large and small while the threats to international security do not come by and large from territorial acquisition but from international terrorism. And in this environment, the disadvantages of smaller nations have disappeared, and they are now exercising their natural economic strengths. Flexibility.
In this formulation, as expressed by SNP elsewhere, the most important impact of globalization for Scotland is to level the playing field between small and large countries. Rather than rely on textual implications, however, in this case Salmond includes explicit semantic relations of causality to make a reasoned argument that this effect arises from globalization superseding the two main functions of large states. Of course, this argument is not reasoned in any great detail, but instead rests on an opening appeal to academic authority—a contrast to the politician-as-expert style used elsewhere, but nevertheless reinforcing an image of SNP pragmatism and thoughtfulness. This decision serves to deflect detailed economic debates—which are rarely politically fruitful—while still allowing SNP to position itself as a party that is aware of the economic importance of globalization. Also noteworthy is the reference to a “New Deal” for small countries; even for SNP and Salmond, this is an unusually positive attribution to globalization.

By the time of Salmond’s 2013 Leader’s Speech to the SNP Conference, the prospect of independence had never seemed so close: the address was given less than 11 months before the scheduled date of the independence referendum. Thus, the speech is dominated by arguments directed specifically at the referendum campaign. Notably, in this respect, the brief discussion of economic globalization is one of the only passages to not strike an unambiguously positive note: “Friends, no-one in this party claims that an independent Scotland will be able to wish away global competition. We will still be affected by it, influenced by it and often challenged by it. No-one in this world owes Scotland a living” (Salmond 2013). The last sentence evokes hard-headed commonsense through intertextuality, recontextualizing a classic trope of domestic social policy debates onto the international stage. Similarly, the reference to “wishing away”
competition creates an extremely stark dichotomy, where the only alternative to the party’s realism is pure magical thinking. The radical argument, that there is a concrete alternative to participating in global competition on existing terms, is excluded thanks to the declarative mood and unconditional epistemic modality. Salmond goes on to reiterate the party’s basic argument that independence will give the Scottish Parliament the power to properly equip Scotland to compete in the globalized world. This is certainly an important point in the argumentative dimension of the speech, presenting the rational case for independence, the particular phrasing and placement of this passage allow for a strategic reading as well

Policy Documents

The argument about globalization and independence is discussed in more depth in a preliminary white paper on plans for independence, published during SNP’s first term as the party of government in Scotland:

As an independent nation, Scotland would be similar to other sovereign nations across the world. In recent years, many countries have gained independence, recognising that it is right that sovereign nations are responsible for their own decisions, while still working in partnership with other nations. At the moment, Scotland is a nation within a larger state, unable to speak for itself on all relevant matters. Independence would give Scotland the responsibility for making decisions about its future as part of an international, globalised environment, making a full contribution to the interdependent world. (Scottish Government 2009: 18; emphasis added)

This passage is immediately striking because it contains a clear invocation of what I call the freedom-responsibility linkage. In conventional political language, freedom and responsibility are opposed to one another; but here the fruit of independence is responsibility. Consider an alternative wording for the second sentence, “it is right that sovereign nations are free to make their own decisions, while still working in partnership with other nations.” This subtle change would create the impression of the international community as a constraint on the hard-won freedom of action of sovereign states.
This notion of constraint is of course a popular understanding of the significance of the “globalised environment.” By emphasizing freedom and responsibility, however, two relevant implications are produced: First, international partnership becomes a vehicle to complement and enhance sovereign action, thus placing the prospect of an independent foreign policy into a more positive light. Second, and more important in electoral terms, it associates nationalism with the responsibility to take (sometimes difficult) decisions. Whereas other Scottish parties are content to let Westminster steer the ship, so this argument runs, SNP is prepared to provide the economic leadership that the electorate demands. And whereas unionist discourse associates independence with irresponsible isolationism, exemplified by inter alia a 2007 Tony Blair editorial in The Daily Telegraph, the SNP rhetoric of responsibility turns that on its head—not by refuting it claim-by-claim, but by transforming through discourse its underlying premises about independence and globalization.

Findings and Case Conclusions

Any analysis of SNP is overshadowed by a basic question of interpretation: Is the party best understood as a “normal,” vote- and office-seeking party? Or is it more a particularly well-organized nationalist movement? At an ontological level, I presume the latter for the purposes of this study. At an empirical level, it does appear that SNP has emphasized economic competence in their overall strategy, following a “performance politics” strategy that we have come to expect for British political parties. Salmond’s leadership has been marked by a strong rejection of the “fundamentalists” who opposed accepting devolution (or any other measure short of independence) and an increased electoral professionalization (Lynch 2002: 191-219). In the era of the Scottish Parliament, the party has contested elections with concrete proposals for regional government as well as promises of independence (Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012: 36-37).
This is the first prong of what Cuthbert and Cuthbert (2009) call a “triple challenge” for SNP: convincing voters they are the best to manage devolved Scotland, while showing that devolution is insufficient and independence is necessary, and demonstrating that an independent Scotland would be economically sound itself.

Of course, rhetoric and discourse must at least appear coherent to be persuasive. For example, attempts to fine tune individual policies according to voter demand, without connecting them through a core narrative has been shown to be ineffective in British elections (e.g., Labour’s pre-1992 Policy Review; Hugues and Wintour 1990). It is for this reason that it has been so effective for SNP to draw upon the globalization discourse that New Labour was contemporaneously making a part of mainstream British political rhetoric. As I have noted, the use of grammatical mood and modality to make epistemic rather than deontic claims mirrors the way that New Labour presents globalization as an established fact and an inevitable feature of political reality. Likewise, these discussions of globalization feature a lack of causal (or in some cases, any) semantic relations, relying on a logic of appearances rather than explaining the connections between global developments, domestic policy, and the prospects for an independent Scotland. The effect of this language is to remove political agency (since the causal links, which might be altered, are ignored) and to nationalize globalization as a holistic phenomenon. This often takes the form of making absolute claims about what globalization will mean for Scotland when and if it is allowed independence. The findings about the globalization discourse and its linguistic articulation are not new in relation to Labour, but this is the first time that SNP has been subject to such analysis.

But for nationalist parties, connecting this kind of globalization discourse *coherently* with their larger goals—sustaining all three prongs of Cuthbert and Cuthbert’s “triple challenge”—is a
thorny problem. A common reading of SNP discursive strategy centers around the deployment of the “Scottish myth”, which holds that Scotland has always been a fundamentally more communal and egalitarian society than England and thus requires distinctive public policy (McCrone 2001: 90-100; Béland and Lecours 2008: 101). But alone, this would leave the contemporary party vulnerable to the charge that devolution is enough to preserve Scotland’s unique political culture (especially with future extensions of fiscal powers, the so-called “Devo Max” option; Mitchell 2011: 32). By identifying the role of the globalization heresthetic, my approach advances on the Scottish myth reading by explaining the party’s post-devolution rhetoric.

Thus, by looking at the product of the SNP’s heresthetic-bricolage, we find a narrative that integrates globalization discourse into a rhetoric for independence. This has remained relatively consistent even though this is largely the same discourse used by opponents to independence among the mainstream parties (particularly New Labour). The significance of globalization for Scotland, according to this narrative, is that it excludes the notion of a purely domestic economic policy. The rhetoric of a “responsibility for making decisions in a globalized environment” is a far cry from the 79 Group’s demands for more Scottish activism on keeping factories open (so far as this would require “wishing away” global competition). Concurrently, the central claim against London is no longer the maladministration of Scotland per se, but the failure to act for Scotland’s interests internationally. In a globalized world, so the logic runs, domestic autonomy is insufficient and only a sovereign voice in the chambers of global governance will do.

Thus, the SNP globalization discourse is a particularly nationalist one. But the narrative functions at more than one level, and can also be fruitfully read as part of the common globalization heresthetic also deployed by New Labour and UKIP. As a heresthetic strategy, it
serves two purposes: First, it manipulates the independence issue dimension itself, turning it from a debate between Scottish values and British economics success into one between Scottish economic success and regressive British values. Second, it serves an electoral purpose by manipulating valence considerations in Scottish Parliament elections; because the independence cause becomes a question of good policy rather than romanticism, so does SNP as a party become identified with pragmatism and reliable economic management. Even if the party could never achieve a monopoly on these associations in the public mind, publicly laying claim to them at least allows it to compete directly with Labour rather than as a subordinate.

At the level of “rhetoric in detail” we can see this globalization heresthetic enacted through three of the recurrent rhetorical strategies that I have identified. Two of these overlap with New Labour and one is novel (though shared in part with UKIP, as I will demonstrate):

- The new times thesis, as defined in the previous chapter, is the claim that globalization is a recent and radical break from the political economy of the past, represented as a new world where the old models of living and governing are irrecoverable. SNP uses this reasoning partly in the same way as New Labour, to reorient political debates away from the left/right conflict and thereby legitimate a new player in Scottish party competitions (though SNP itself is not new, its role as a major competitor is). As MacAskill wrote, “[t]he debate has moved on irrevocably from being a straight forward left right debate” and produced a “new terrain” for politics (2004: 16). In addition, SNP also uses this thesis as part of formations that secure its identity as a realist party; i.e., reminding an audience that “no one argues that it is possible in the modern world to protect every business from takeover” (Salmond 2005).
• The isolation-engagement dichotomy, which presents globalization as impelling robust international engagement and cooperation and the only alternative being a self-defeating isolationism, is also a discursive strategy that SNP shares with New Labour. Notably, however, it does not seem that this was adapted from New Labour. The notion that the constitutional status quo meant “isolation” for Scotland appears as early as 1987. Thus, this appears to be an example of parallel development of a useful framing under similar conditions. The SNP version of the dichotomy also differs somewhat from New Labour’s in being tinged with a more temporal aspect: Scotland is isolated in the UK because the latter is a “backwater” falling behind the social progress of Europe. Thus this formulation reinforces the political thrust of the new times thesis as well as making a direct contribution to SNP’s arguments.

• The freedom-responsibility linkage, finally, is the SNP strategy that is not shared with New Labour. Independence here is understood giving “Scotland the responsibility for making decisions” within “an international, globalised environment.” As noted earlier, this is striking because in conventional political language, freedom and responsibility are opposed to one another, yet here the fruit of independence is responsibility. Through this linkage, nationalism is associated with the responsibility to take decisions, including sometimes difficult ones. SNP, it is implied, accepts that independence in globalized world means substantial adjustment, but is prepared to provide the economic leadership that the electorate demands. Whereas unionist discourse associates independence with irresponsibility, this linkage rejects that discourse by challenging its underlying premises about independence and globalization. It is also notable that this feature parallels an
aspect of New Labour domestic policy discourse, the emphasis on personal responsibility within the welfare state, which served a similar end (Dwyer 1998; Powell 2000).

From this isolation of SNP’s discursive-heresthetic strategies related to globalization, we can observe the complexity of the process of bricolage. In some cases it appears that successful strategies are adopted by other parties in the system, as with SNP’s use of the new times thesis hewing closely to Labour’s. But in others, it seems that parallel development and novel developments can occur where multiple parties face the same strategic demands against the same cultural background. Taken together, there is no simple narrative of parties building on each other’s rhetoric; however, we can begin to see how the British discourse of globalization taken holistically is actually built up from various parties deploying it in ways that serve their immediate interests.

Finally, we can also make some preliminary conclusions about what this all means for SNP going forward. Most pressing, of course, is the ‘Yes’ campaign on the September 2014 independence referendum. All of the rhetorical features discussed here are likely to play a part, though direct references to globalization will have to be managed carefully in light of post-financial crisis public sympathies. However, the most important challenge that the party faces in this campaign is managing uncertainty. Just as SNP and Labour had to change electoral perceptions such that voters would trust them, so too must the nationalists now convince voters that independence will not be too radical of a break. Because the ‘No’ campaign will rely on the perception of the Union as inevitable, SNP can use a strategy deployed several of the texts discussed here, using a series of concrete commitments and quantitative projections to make independence seem already real. Invoking globalization discourse tied to independence is potentially a crucial adjunct to this approach because it carries its own claim to inevitability.
CHAPTER 6

UKIP’S GLOBALIST EUROSKEPTICISM?

I could not see the answer then and I certainly cannot see it now. To restrict trade in a
global market, just as technology was liberating it, seemed and seems crazy.
Nigel Farage MEP, on the European Union (qtd. in Daniel 2005: 13)

The rise of SNP and the revitalization of Labour in the 1990s coincided with the creation
and rise of a brand new party. In 1993, the UK Independence Party (UKIP; generally read out as
‘you-kip’) was formed with the central policy commitment to take the UK out of the European
Union, at the feet of which the party’s rhetoric lays blame for the ills of contemporary Britain. It
has since become an influential player in British party system, particularly because of its strong
showing in European Parliament elections (see Table 4, below). On its key issue, of course, the
party is radically opposed to SNP and New Labour; but its rise from obscurity and public distrust
to electoral significance (if not unqualified success) resembles the others’ on a smaller scale.
Certainly, the rise of UKIP over the past two decades has been more gradual than the recent
ascendance of Labour and SNP (though is much quicker in historical terms given those parties’
longer histories). As Table 4 documents, UKIP began with an almost-negligible showing in its
first European Parliament election, seemed to plateau by 2009 as a consistent fixture but not a
major contender, before nearly doubling its vote share in 2014.

Table 4. UKIP European Parliament Election Results (1994-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Vote Share (Seats Won)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>7.0% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>16.0% (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>16.6% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>27.49% (24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Election victories in bold
Notably, UKIP has consistently paired hard euroskepticism with an embrace of free trade and an acceptance of the realities of globalization, as reflected in the above epigraph from now-Leader and long-time party spokesman Nigel Farage. In this chapter, I argue that this position can be understood as a heresthetic strategy aimed at overcoming the dilemma of small parties that must differentiate themselves clearly from the mainstream while avoiding the perception of extremism and unsuitability to lead. In principle, if not always in execution, UKIP’s particular discourse of globalization and Europe can dissolve this tension by presenting the euroskeptic cause as the proper concern of a modern, responsible party. It was a commonplace of New Labour rhetoric that, in an ever-more-globalized environment, Britain can no longer afford to part ways with the European Union. According to Labour’s reasoning from the spatial logic of globalization, Europe is the key to the UK’s continued success in the world, economically and otherwise. Yet anti-EU UKIP draws upon the vocabulary of globalization in a way that paints the EU in quite a different light. This particular appeal to globalization—framed as a matter of “common sense” as is popular with the party—can be read in heresthetic terms: UKIP is trying to restructure the debate on Europe such that its stark withdrawal position is no longer associated with an atavistic nationalism. In other words, the invocation of globalization can be seen as a key attempt to texture (in Fairclough’s terms) a distinctly modern identity, not unlike New Labour’s explicit break with its more radical “Old Labour” past.

Indeed, UKIP and SNP are quite similar in this respect. Both of their programs are held together by the claim that major progress on pressing social and economic challenges can be made only once Scotland can govern itself independently of the UK, or Britain can govern itself independently of the EU (respectively). But as I discuss in my review of the literature, these parties are not often considered together, because UKIP is seen as part of a right-wing populist
party family distinct from the regionalist nationalism characterizing SNP. However, while UKIP is certainly both right-wing and populist, that does not mean that its key positions are not also nationalist, following the conventional definition of nationalism as the belief that the boundaries of the state should be aligned with the boundaries of the nation (defined in ethnic or civil terms; Gellner 1983). This focus is in fact a key point that distinguishes UKIP from other right-wing populists (such as the far-right British National Party with which it is often negatively associated), who tend to argue that a more thorough-going domestic reorganization (even purge) of politics and society would be required to solve contemporary political problems.

The chapter is organized into five sections: In the first, I review the existing readings of UKIP in the academic literature, and discuss limitations and possible extensions of these approaches. Second, I begin the analytical narrative of the case with a brief discussion of the party’s “pre-history,” the political foundations that are important to understanding its later development. Third, I continue the case narrative by analyzing the first decade of the party’s history (1993-2013), when it was still developing its voice and dealing with major internal tension. Fourth, I conclude the case narrative with an analysis of the party from 2004 through the present. Finally, in the fifth section I conclude by discussing the findings of the case analysis and their significance for my overall argument.

Note that in the sections including textual analysis, I have selected a smaller number of texts for close reading than in previous chapters. This reflects both the smaller number of texts that deal directly with globalization—my goal in selecting examples is to document how that specific discourse is articulated and developed—and the fact that fewer texts from UKIP are available—as a small and new party, there was much less effort at recording and archiving speeches and publications. But identifying texts in this methodological approach is not a
counting exercise; exactly how often a given discourse is articulated does not necessarily tell us very much about the nature or significance of the globalization heresthetic. It is also not my goal to accurately model the party’s rhetoric and strategy as a whole, so it is not necessary to highlight all of the other discourses that might be “competing” with globalization. By selecting texts where the globalization discourse in particular is developed, I can answer the fundamental questions of why the discourse is articulated in this way by a euroskeptic protest party, and specifically how its variant of the discourse is held together.

**Existing Readings: Euroskepticism, Right-Wing Populism, or What?**

There has been relatively little academic literature produced on UKIP, likely because it emerged as a serious vote-winner only recently and because its future prospects are uncertain. As with SNP, however, the literature that exists can be divided into two main currents: one analysis focused on the party’s unique political agenda, the other more interested in placing it within broader patterns of party competition. Both currents can be distinguished from the typology I presented in Chapter 2 because they focus on stable features of the party rather than on styles of political competition. The first current (which, generally speaking, emerged earlier) understands UKIP as standard-bearers of a strong euroskeptic movement within the UK; the second, more recent current has drawn from the comparative literature on right-wing populist parties to explain UKIP’s position in the British party system. Notably, and probably not by accident, this theoretical division follows the active political debates about the nature of the party. In the sections below, I review each of these currents before discussing existing and potential approaches that move beyond them.
The Euroskeptic Party

Key to the persistent understanding of UKIP as an (at least potential) electoral dark horse contender is the simple pair of observations that the party opposes continued EU membership and that throughout its existence a sizeable portion of the British public has expressed deep misgivings about the process of European integration—the percentage who say they would vote for withdrawal in a hypothetical referendum has hovered around 40% between 1994 and 2003 (Baker et al. 2008: 104). The simplest frame for interpreting the party, then, is as a “single-issue party” carrying the banner of British euroskepticism (Usherwood 2008). In particular, UKIP is identified with the current of “hard” euroskepticism (Szčzerbiak and Taggart 2003, 2008), also called “eurorejectionism” (Kopecky and Mudde 2002), which rejects both the principle of ever closer union as well as the current state of the EU institutions.41

Note that the overall “euroskeptic party” approach is in some ways similar to the treatments of SNP as an independence or nationalist movement. However, UKIP is rarely discussed in these terms, perhaps because its “independence” goal is actually considered more remote than Scottish separation. For this reason, and the current ascendance of the alternative right-wing populist approach, UKIP is rarely classified with or compared to SNP as a nationalist party. Yet UKIP’s basic claim—that the highest priority for the British polity is to assure that it is fully governed by the national state—essentially meets Gellner’s definition of nationalism as “a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” (1983: 1). UKIP may indeed be a better fit with Gellner’s ideal type than SNP because it rejects the

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40 It should be acknowledged, however, that the electoral math is not quite this simple: during the same period, the number who considered Europe an “important issue” only averaged about 30% (Baker et al. 2008: 106).

41 Note that while “euroskepticism” has become broadly accepted in academic and political discourse, more specific terms are still contested. For example, sympathetic chroniclers of the party tend to use the more positive “eurorealist” (Gardner 2006), but Kopecky and Mudde’s similar-sounding “europragmatist” refers to a different current entirely.
latter’s “post-sovereign” understanding of independence. There is also empirical support for a nationalist label for UKIP, as the party members have described themselves in those terms (Gardner 2006: 40) and have described the Scottish and Welsh nationalist parties as inspirations, even though they have very different understandings of who are the rightful nations (Daniel 2005: 23). Nevertheless, the current literature on UKIP continues to avoid this interpretation and remains focused on euroskepticism (really more a policy position than a philosophy) and populism, discussed below.

Whatever the label, the consequence of this approach for the study of UKIP as a party has been a focus on the structural challenges facing “single-issue” parties, to the exclusion of other relevant dynamics. According to Simon Usherwood (a British scholar of euroskepticism and among the small corps of academic UKIP experts), the party’s history has been defined by a fundamental tension “between those who feel that the objective is fundamental to the nature of the party and cannot be compromised at any point, and those who accept a need to be flexible in the short run, in order to have a better chance of achieving the objective in the longer term” (2008: 256). He considers this tension endemic to single-issue parties, akin to the famous fundi-realo divide of the German Green Party in the 1980s (Paterson and Southern 1991; though this comparison should not be taken too far). In essence, so this argument runs, the context and institutional form of a political party impels certain actions that may be at odds with its core philosophical principles. Thus, as I discuss in the case narrative, the organizational advantages gained by the party taking up seats in the European Parliament outweighed concerns about legitimizing that institution. Of course, this was not without cost in terms of internal dissension, and such a difference of opinion among elites can exacerbate tensions between leadership and
While these observations are not particularly surprising or unique (they almost certainly apply to the early Labour Party, not to mention SNP and others.), they are important for the broader study of the European dimension of electoral politics. Conventional wisdom had considered European issues (and European elections) to be “second-order,” subordinate to the “first-order” competition between parties of government over bread-and-butter issues (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Marsh 1998). However, the existence of independent euroskeptic parties suggests that a growing number of voters consider European integration a “first-order” issue. This is reinforced by data showing that the pattern of euroskeptic mobilization in the UK tends to track European rather than domestic political events (Usherwood 2007), and by an increasing recognition of social movement-style opposition to the EU outside of the party system (Fitzgibbon 2013). Still, outside of these advances over existing approaches, this line of analysis has spoken more to the study of euroskepticism as an idea than to party politics as a field (i.e., in its framing as “party-based euroskepticism;” Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003).

The Right-Wing Populist Party

The major alternative understanding of UKIP, which has recently become more prominent relative to the euroskepticism work, is more grounded in comparative work on parties and party systems. This strand interprets UKIP as part of an emergent European family of right-wing populist parties, with its anti-EU position a particular expression of a more fundamental tendency to interpret society as being fundamentally divided between the people (noble) and the elites (corrupt). This type of party has been given several different labels in the literature, with slightly different definitions: Abedi and Lundberg call UKIP “a right wing-populist Anti-
Political Establishment (APE) party,” with the APE characteristic as the primary feature (2009: 72, drawing on Abedi 2004), others follow Mudde’s terminology of “populist radical right parties” (PRRPs) (2013: 1); while Eatwell settles for “the extreme right” (2000). The label, in this case, is less important than the underlying political force that UKIP is said to represent.

UKIP is said to be populist in that it “asserts that there is a fundamental divide between the political establishment and the people” and anti-establishment in that it “challenges the status quo in terms of major policy issues and political system issues” (Abedi and Lundberg 2009: 74). The additional prefix “right-wing” is not often systematically addressed, but has become a commonplace in reference to UKIP’s mostly-Tory origins and its (“small-c”) conservative positions on immigration and the welfare state.

There are basically two ways of empirically establishing UKIP as a right-wing populist party: directly, by reference to its policies and rhetoric; and indirectly, by reference to how it fits into the party system, particularly the type of voters it targets. On the first account, Abedi and Lundberg document examples of populist logic in UKIP communications, such as claims that all of the establishment parties are basically the same and that its own leaders do not consider themselves politicians, but rather “people from all backgrounds who feel deeply what the majority of British people feel” (2009: 76). They also note that the eurorejectionist position is not only a challenge to the status quo in policy terms, but an attempt to “turn back the clock” in terms of the British constitution (2009: 75). In terms of indirect evidence about the party, Lynch, Whitaker, and Loomes present data from election surveys in 2009 and 2010. These data show that UKIP votes tended to correlate geographically with votes from the far-right British National Party, and that the party’s voters were “slightly older, more likely to be male, white and drawn

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42 Abedi and Lundberg include a third criterion for populist APE parties, “[a] party that perceives itself as a challenger to the parties that make up the political establishment” (2009: 74), but this seems redundant in context of the other two.
from social classes C2, D and E [skilled working class, working class, and non-working], but less likely to have a degree, compared with voters for the three main parties” (Lynch, Whitaker, and Loomes 2012: 747-49). These findings lend empirical support to the claim that UKIP is fundamentally a populist party drawing support from generally disaffected voters on the right.

In the end, this interpretation comes back to a similar place as the “euroskeptic party” alternative, but from within a different literature: There is still a tension between principle and pragmatism, in this case seen to be endemic to populist parties. In particular, the democratic organization that would follow populist norms sits awkwardly with the central organization required of successful political parties. Abedi and Lundberg link this particularly with the “party life cycle” approach discussed in the previous chapter: “We argue that until the party reaches the appropriate stage in its life cycle, UKIP will find it impossible to take advantage of any electoral good fortune that might come its way” (2009: 85).

Syntheses and Extensions

Of course, whether or not the authors would think of them in these terms, the euroskeptic and populist interpretations of UKIP are ideal types, which are neither collectively exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. The party can, and does, have euroskeptic and populist (and nationalist) elements. In fact, some recent empirical data suggest that this conceptual blending may also the party’s concrete reality; according to this view, the party’s recent success can be seen as the product of an informal electoral coalition between “strategic eurosceptics and polite xenophobes” (Ford, Goodwin, and Cutts 2011). The former are anti-EU voters (usually center-right) who want to send a message to the large parties (especially the Tories) by voting UKIP; the latter, adhering to the populist image, are more closer to the far-right (especially on the immigration issue) but consider UKIP a more palatable choice than extreme right alternatives.
This dynamic illustrates a different dilemma than the tensions found in the above literatures; the party is required to be definitively anti-EU, so that it can serve as a useful signal for the “strategic eurosceptics,” while maintaining the image of reasonability that is attractive to the “polite xenophobes.” This challenge and the party’s responses to it are not easily explained within the existing frameworks that I presented in Chapter 2. Generally, for reasons of methodological simplification, these treat voting as a unitary phenomenon—voters all being driven by a single set of considerations (be they positional, valence, or otherwise). A key feature of the heresthetic alternative, however, is that we can understand the way that parties take advantage of the multiplicity of actual voter motivations by drawing together coalitions that would not exist if the party pursued a straightforward vote-maximizing strategy.

Of course, this dilemma-cum-opportunity is common to niche parties (Meguid 2004, see also the application of her “niche party” framework to UKIP in Lynch, Whitaker, and Loomes 2012) and similar to the SNP’s “triple challenge” (Cuthbert and Cuthbert 2009). It is also a dilemma facing any party struggling for legitimacy, and for which the politics of economic competence and globalization provides a potential solution. This is not merely the behavior of the ideal-typical Performance Party (which we would expect to suppress divisive positional issues like Europe), but a more complex strategy that incorporates the control of discourse. Though useful for their own purposes, all of the analyses cited above have tended to focus more on broad party strategies and on the characteristics of supporters as established by surveys. What this leaves out is how these public perceptions are actually achieved and sustained in practice—that is, how you can be polite and xenophobic and euroskeptic at the same time, while maintaining a basic degree of coherence. These analyses also tend to treat UKIP separately from trends in mainstream party competition, especially the tendency toward a politics of economic
competence. Rather, the logic of the party cartel is implicitly invoked, suggesting that populist parties like UKIP are outliers who collect the residual votes of those opposed to the performance politics of the mainstream cartel members. But as I have argued, perceived economic competence has become an important part of the image of a successful party. With UKIP committed to being a party, rather than a protest movement, this aspect of modern party identity will continue to be important. Also, the Heresthetician-Bricoleur understanding of this can be distinguished from the similar reading produced using the Market-Oriented Party lens, because the former allows us to understand constructions of issues that are beyond the desires voters might express in market research. At least in principle, the globalization heresthetic is strategic tool that would benefit UKIP in legitimizing itself (the politeness part), much as it was for legitimizing SNP and (re)legitimizing Labour.

Finally, and before proceeding to the case narrative, a brief note on secondary sources is in order. The definitive academic history of UKIP has not been written. This chapter follows much of the party-specific literature above in drawing primarily on the two published accounts that exist, Mark Daniel’s Cranks and Gadflies: The Story of UKIP (2005) and Peter Gardner’s Hard Pounding: The Story of the UK Independence Party (2006). Both are unabashedly “insider accounts;” Gardner is a long-time party member and regional organizer, while Daniel was employed for a time as a communications consultant and remains openly sympathetic to the party’s aims. As with any such chronicle, there are advantages and drawbacks for academic researchers. There is an obvious question of bias, but also a great degree of access. Daniel, for example, bases his journalistic narrative on a large number of personal interviews that would be difficult to replicate, while Gardner’s more formal history draws from his own diary and recounts details of conference debates and the like that may not be recorded anywhere else. Both
are clearly interested in promoting the party and dispelling critiques (especially about far-right sympathies), but in sourcing from them I avoid such editorializing passages except as primary examples of the party’s self-representation.


The pre-history of UKIP can be traced with some precision to the founding of the Bruges Group in 1989, a think tank and pressure group consisting of mostly-Tory academics and policy experts who were critical of European integration post-Single European Act. The name is in reference to Margaret Thatcher’s 1988 speech at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium (Thatcher was also the Group’s honorary President). In this address, remembered as the “Bruges Speech,” the Prime Minister famously declared that her government had “not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European superstate exercising a new dominance from Brussels” (Bruges Group 2014). These words marked a galvanizing moment for British euroskeptics (as they would later come to be known). This was especially true for those on the right, because the moment signaled a reversal in the traditional Labour and Conservative positions on European integration (Gardner 2006: 29).

The Bruges Group was both a symbolic rallying point for the nascent euroskepticism as well as a very practical organizing space for new forms of political action. Taking advantage of this was Alan Sked, a member of the Group’s Academic Advisory Council and a History and European studies lecturer at the London School of Economics. Unlike most of the members, Sked’s background is Liberal rather than Tory (he was once President of the League of Scottish Liberal Students), and he had previously shared the Liberal Party’s enthusiasm about the
by the time of the Single European Act (1986) and the negotiations that would lead to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, he became convinced that European integration had become a dangerously illiberal force. During his time in the Bruges group, Sked further became convinced that working through the existing political parties was not going to be effective in pushing British de-integration. The only solution, he believed, was to offer voters a genuinely euroskeptic option in the upcoming General Election (Gardner 2006: 28-35).

The fruit of this vision was a new party called the Anti-Federalist League. Sked sent a letter to all members of the Bruges Group in November 1991, calling on them to join him in this endeavor and about 150 did. According to the letter, the League’s manifesto would focus on immediate withdrawal from the European institutions and the renegotiation of a simple free trade agreement; its electoral goal would be to field as many candidates as possible in the 1992 General Election as long as the major parties remained pro-Maastricht. This was intended in particular to put pressure on the Conservative government, to show John Major that “to sign at Maastricht will entail political suicide for him and his party” (qtd. in Gardner 2006: 35). In the event, the League was able to field candidates in only 16 seats and received only 0.55% of aggregate votes cast in those constituencies. Its best showing was 3.4% in Staffordshire Moorlands, and this accounted for almost half of its total votes (2,125 of 5,007 nationally). Sked himself stood in Bath, against then-Conservative Party Chairman Chris Patten, receiving 117 votes (0.7%). Of course, not much could be expected of a brand-new and mostly-amateur party in a General Election. However, the seeds of a euroskeptic party had been sown and the League

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43 It is interesting to note that in this period Sked was also outspoken in support of a more robust British policy during the Gulf War—he alienated other members of the Bruges Group when he accused John Major of abandoning Iraqi Kurds. Were it not for their differences over Europe, and the normal tribalism of British party identity, Sked might have been a Blairite.

44 As Mark Daniel notes, this is a party name that only a scholar of the 19th century would devise (2005: 9).
received limited but crucial media attention: not very many people heard about Sked’s effort, but several of those that did went on to become key players in his movement, including Nigel Farage (eventual MEP and UKIP Leader), Gerard Batten (MEP and London mayoral candidate) and others (Daniel 2005: 10-12).

After the election, Sked began the process of organizing the league into a permanent party: a National Executive Committee (NEC) was formed, and an agreement reached to focus on the 1994 European Elections (albeit without the intention of actually taking up any seats won). In the meantime, Sked contested two by-elections under the Anti-Federalist banner, improving on his previous tally with 1% and 1.6%, respectively (Gardner 2006: 37).

Overall, this period set the tone for the soon-to-be UKIP in three respects: First, a general strategy was established of focusing on elections over other ways of mobilizing opposition—as a League/UKIP founder explained to me in a background interview, the party generally distrusts not only the major parties but also direct instruments like referendums, because they are subject to more manipulation and fear-mongering than elections (a position that has softened substantially in recent years). Second, Sked declared a formal position of non-discrimination and non-exclusion in membership and policy, noting in his August 1992 newsletter that “[w]e now have to seek the widest possible political base in this country” (qtd. in Gardner 2006: 37). Third, and crucially for this analysis, the League was careful to cultivate an international perspective, with Farage often speaking about his German wife and his cultural commitment to Europe (Daniel 2005: 13) and the NEC receiving representatives of the Danish anti-Maastricht campaign (Gardner 2006: 37).45 These observations illustrate the limitations of the Downsian Party model, which is adequate to explain attempts to attract the distinct cluster of voters with a strong

45 The meeting was in July 1992, Danish having narrowly rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum the previous month. This was obviously encouraging to the League, though Denmark would eventually approve a revised version of the treaty in May 1993.

The formal transformation of the Anti-Federalist League into the UK Independence Party occurred at a meeting of the NEC on 2 September 1993 (described in Daniel 2005: 14-20 and Gardner 2006: 38-39). At previous meetings it had been determined that the League, in name and form, was still too close to the academic pressure group model of the Bruges Group. Sked was reluctant to commit to a fully-fledged popular party, but was willing to follow the majority who were set on this course. After a long debate among options ranging from “British Independence League” to “The Freedom Party,” the committee chose the name “UK Independence Party” as the best encapsulation of the party’s position that also did not have any prior associations. The prefix “UK,” unusual among British parties, was a compromise between a more general name and the potential nationalist connotations of “British.” The committee also approved a party constitution, drafted by Sked; it followed the usual pattern of a Leader, NEC, and Annual Conference, but with particularly strong security of tenure for the leadership. Finally, with the European Elections on the horizon, the meeting had to address UKIP’s relationship to the European Parliament (EP) should it win seats. Sked argued for continuation of the League’s established position that any UKIP candidates returned should deny recognition of the EP by refusing to take up their seats. Others believed that the platform and resources available to MEPs was worth a deviation from pure principle. As Gardner relates, Sked believed that this “‘empty

46 Though the party’s main goal was to win seats at Westminster, since the goal of withdrawal could only be achieved by pressuring the British government, it was also common ground that the party needed to be present to register protest votes in the European elections.
chair’ policy would be ‘a standing rebuke to the Eurofederalists’ pretensions to represent the British people” (2006: 38). This position was carried at the meeting and would hold for the time being, but the policy was soon to be reconsidered.

Thus constituted, UKIP participated as planned in the 1994 European Elections, which would be the last such elections held under the first-past-the-post system. Competing in 24 of 87 EP constituencies, the party had a modest showing of 3.3% of the vote in the contested seats. Still, the election acted as a catalyst for recruiting new membership, with nationwide subscriptions at around 3,000 by August 1994 (Gardner 2006: 33-35). Attention now turned to the 1997 General Election, but UKIP’s efforts were complicated by the arrival of a competing euroskeptic party. The simply-named Referendum Party was the self-financed project of wealthy financier Sir James Goldsmith, and was less a single-issue party than a single-policy party, campaigning solely for a referendum to be held on continued British membership in the EU (see Carter et al. 1998). The resources Goldsmith poured into advertising, and his flamboyant personality, meant that his party quickly eclipsed UKIP in the public’s attention. This triggered a complicated debate within the party about how to respond. Fortunately for party unity, Goldsmith had settled on a reformist position of remaining in Europe under the guarantee of no further integration without a referendum. Within UKIP, principled commitment (to full withdrawal) and pragmatic calculation (that the party risked being swallowed by Goldsmith) thus pointed in the same direction, and the party subsequently refused any electoral agreement with the Referendum Party. In the event, neither would have much impact on the result of the election: Goldsmith’s party contested every seat in which the incumbent failed to commit to a referendum (547) and took only 3% of the vote; UKIP contested the 194 seats that it could

47 The Referendum Party spent over £7 million on press advertising, produced two cinema ads, mailed a 20-minute promotional video to 100,000 homes, and later a 12-minute video to 5 million (Carter et al. 1998: 365; Daniel 2005: 40).
manage, and took 1.1% in those constituencies. The most that can be said is that the two together appeared to have cost the Tories 18 seats. But UKIP had at least survived the first major threat to its survival as an independent party and began “the transition from minor pressure group to national political force” (Daniel 2005: 42).

The slow-but-steady growth of the party, however, masked serious internal divides. The most immediate schism was triggered by an issue of perennial concern for UKIP—real or perceived infiltration by activists from far-right parties. In this case, the threat was apparently real: A postgraduate student of Sked’s named Mark Deavin had been appointed to head the party’s research department in 1995, but it was revealed on a television news program in 1997 that he was also involved with BNP and may have been intentionally sent to destabilize UKIP. Sked publicly and stridently disowned Deavin, but the publicity damage was done. It was also exacerbated when Farage was photographed meeting Deavin over lunch on the day the program aired. Farage always claimed that he was trying to head off any legal action over Sked’s strong remarks, but in later disputes the incident would reemerge as evidence of potential far-right sympathies on Farage’s part (Gardner 2006: 72). Looked at in isolation, this sequence of events seems unimportant and more than a little farcical. However, the association of UKIP with BNP has always been a serious perception issue for the party. Accusations of jingoism and xenophobia were made by competing parties and hostile media outlets as early as the 1997 election cycle (Gardner 2006: 55-57), despite the party’s protestations. The embarrassment of the Deavin affair also strained relationships between Sked and other members of the leadership, at a time when many thought that the party needed single-minded action to attract members and

48 In addition to the fact of his membership of BNP, Deavin had published a book associating European integration with a Jewish plot to encourage “non-White immigration” (Daniel 2005: 37); the public believing that this represented UKIP’s own position would be disastrous.
activists from the now-defunct Referendum Party. After a series of back-and-forth recriminations, attempted expulsions, and threats of legal action between the Leader and the NEC, Sked resigned (from office and membership) in July 1997 (Daniel 2005: 47-48; Gardner 2006: 74-81). In subsequent years, Sked continued his activism outside of party politics, and became a frequent critic of UKIP through newspaper editorials and television interviews.

Sked was replaced as Leader (after Craig Mackinlay served briefly in an acting capacity) by retired entrepreneur Michael Holmes. Holmes promised “a new beginning” for UKIP and aimed for it to “evolve into a mainstream political party strong enough to challenge the other three main parties at both local and national elections” (qtd. in Gardner 2006: 83). In line with this ambition, Holmes ushered in a reversal of Sked’s “empty chair” policy regarding the EP. Henceforth, any UKIP MEPs elected would take up their seats and use them as a platform to scrutinize the European institutions and report back waste and corruption they expected to find. The next European Elections were in 1999, for which the party was optimistic because the voting system had been moved to party-list proportional representation (PR). Despite struggles with financing, UKIP was able to field lists in all of the multi-member “euro-constituencies,” and on the day found itself with its first electoral breakthrough: 3 UKIP MEPs (Holmes, Farage, and Referendum Party defector Jeffrey Titford) were elected on 7.1% of the national vote, besting the Greens for the status of first among “other” parties (Gardner 2006: 108-109). Not surprisingly, however, it was not possible to carry this success over to the 2001 General Election; back in the realm of first-past-the-post, UKIP received only 1.48% of the vote, though Farage took a

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49 Goldsmith had passed away shortly after the General Election, and the party transformed itself into a non-partisan pressure group called the Referendum Movement.

50 UKIP was, and is, opposed to PR on principle but elected to remain quiet on the matter given how much it stood to gain; in any case, as part of New Labour’s agenda the change was a fait accompli (Gardner 2006: 96).
respectable 7.8% in his constituency and the party claimed that its participation helped seal the Conservatives’ second defeat (by highlighting Tory incoherence on Europe; Daniel 2005: 102).

Of course, it did not help that the party had been engaged in yet another vicious leadership struggle. Holmes fell out with the NEC over a number of (individually minor) issues rather early in his tenure, and by late-1999 it had escalated into a pitched battle involving changed locks at headquarters, stolen records, emergency general meetings, and the initiation of legal action (Daniel 2005: 68-73; Gardner 2006: 116-35). In the end, the membership voted out both the Leader and the NEC, but the latter were soon reelected while Holmes was forced to withdrawal. Titford was elected to replace him, and led the party through the 2001 General Election, but stepped-down in 2002. This cleared the way for the election of Roger Knapman, a former Tory MP and Parliamentary Private Secretary, and thus by far the most politically-experienced Leader UKIP had seen.

The party that he presided over at this point is one that had just barely survived several major schisms, but was beginning to find a consistent strategic direction. Though the party had been producing more-or-less comprehensive (if not especially detailed) election manifestos, UKIP strategy and messaging was still overwhelmingly focused on Europe rather than encompassing other issues. This allowed it to efficiently take advantage of the publicity surrounding major debates on the single currency and an EU constitution, but arguably limited its growth. And despite the best efforts of the leadership to present the party as a “common sense” alternative for euroskeptics, there was difficulty in escaping an extremist reputation. The niche party dilemma of having to be alternative but not too radical was firmly in place, but

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51 One of the charges against Holmes is one that euroskeptic critics have often made against the party generally: getting too comfortable and “going native” in the European Parliament. One of Holmes’s internal opponents recalled an awkward incident where he actually wore his MEP ID badge to an NEC meeting in the UK (Daniel 2005: 67).
UKIP’s political inexperience and internal strife put it in a difficult position to build the kind of discourse that could move it beyond this problem, as can be seen in the texts below.

Manifestos

Unfortunately, many of UKIP’s early texts are hard to come by if they still exist at all. The party’s first manifesto as UKIP, for the 1994 European Elections, is one that I have not been able to locate. I thus begin this section with the 1997 General Election manifesto. This is still an important founding document; it must be recalled that, though the party has achieved its highest-profile success in European elections, its official position prioritizes Westminster elections because only action by the British government or Parliament could effect a UK withdrawal.

In that manifesto, the first section laying out the principle argument for withdrawal, after the Preface and Introduction, deals with “Trading Relationships” in the following terms:

Our release from the EU’s external trade barriers will allow stronger trading links with countries outside Europe, in South East Asia for instance, and with our natural trading partners of the Commonwealth who were sorely snubbed when we joined the EU. Given our language and business methods, it is with these dynamic and developing countries that our trading advantages lie. Our interests do not lie in further cosy trading relations with the countries of the EU, which are intent on binding their economies with their centralised bureaucratic structures, and whose economic stagnation is currently being aggravated by the struggle to meet the fiscal requirements for joining the single currency. […] Nobody can predict the precise patterns of foreign trade and investment which will follow our withdrawal from the EU, but neither can our future trading patterns be predicted if we do not withdraw. All that can be said is that withdrawal will open opportunities rather than closing them, and rather than being too small to survive alone, the UK will be in a strong bargaining position to make full use of these opportunities. The wealth of the UK has always been built on free trade worldwide, and the UKIP would look forward to giving UK businesses free rein to pursue world trade in generating our future wealth.

(UKIP 1997)

The entire first paragraph is in a declarative mood (even though it underlies an imperative claim) and evinces a strong epistemic modality—e.g., unqualified claims about what withdrawal “will allow” and where UK interests “do not lie.” In terms of semantic relations, note also the lack of
even an active verb, and thus any space for agency, in the phrase “release…will allow stronger trading links.” The outcomes of a complex political process (UK withdrawal from the EU) thus are rendered natural and inevitable. Clearly, these passages represent a sharp (but indirect) rebuttal to contemporary New Labour claims about states “instinctively drawing together” in the face of globalization. But this is not a critical appraisal in which economic relations are denaturalized; to the contrary, the Commonwealth countries are the “natural trading partners” for the UK. Indeed, it appears that such links would be spontaneously restored once Britain is “released” from Europe’s “barriers.” This opposition, a rhetorical device that I call the natural-artificial dichotomy, is an important aspect of UKIP’s claims.

Stylistically, the Commonwealth and South East Asia are explicitly identified with the positive and forward-looking labels of “dynamic and developing.” Relations within the EU, meanwhile, are “cosy,” which suggests stasis (leading to “economic stagnation”) rather than the aforementioned dynamism, as well as perhaps an intimacy among elites antithetical to the public interest. Also note in this passage that the first-person plural refers exclusively to the UK, rather than the party, which would seem to reflect UKIP’s aiming at populist appeal. Also notable is that the second paragraph opens with a reversal of the now common politician-as-expert rhetoric, even while maintaining the declarative grammatical mood (and its naturalizing effect), by claiming that “nobody [an informal noun] can predict the precise patterns.” This appears to be a sidelong glance at the detailed economic models that might be invoked by other parties, and fits a larger UKIP pattern of rejecting such scientism in favor of common sense-type appeals. In this case, the common sense of the situation (prefaced with the false modesty of “all that can be said”) is that the wider world represents “opportunities” that would be “opened” by leaving the EU. This claim subtly encapsulates the core neoliberal narrative of globalization: Being more
outward-looking will always produce more opportunities than not. In the final sentence (also the first in which the party is invoked) this claim is applied both backward onto Britain’s past (has always been built) and forward onto its future (UKIP looks “forward to giving UK businesses free rein to pursue…”). In short, the globe contains a myriad of economic opportunities which UK businesses will successfully grasp if only they are liberated from Europe (of which UKIP alone is capable). The first half of this expresses the conventional globalization discourse in a way that would be unobjectionable in a New Labour text, while the latter (in an example of bricolage) carefully recontextualizes this discourse into a euroskeptic argument. This is restated in the conclusion of the manifesto, with a strong epistemic modality: “When the UK is rid of the EU and all the senseless restrictions, the prospects for international trade and UK industry will be bright as enterprise is freed from red tape” (UKIP 1997).

The 2001 General Election manifesto deploys the discourse of globalization in a similar way, (and this time somewhat more explicitly, the first subsection under “The Economy” being “Trade and Globalization”):

When Britain leaves the European Union, we shall be able to take full advantage of trading opportunities throughout the world, and not just in Europe. With its external tariff barriers, the EU prevents us from trading freely and fairly on the world stage, particularly in agricultural products. The UK Independence Party supports genuine free trade.  

[...] Through the Commonwealth, Britain has links with some of the world's fastest growing economies, such as those of the Indian subcontinent. Our relationship with the United States remains unique. These connections equip us to take advantage of global opportunities. EU membership, by contrast, holds us back in the world - it locks us into an over-regulated system based on the principle of 'the state knows best'.

(UKIP 2001)

In addition to the points about the general argument made above—continued, for example, in the choice of “shall” in the first sentence, which emphasizes the declarative mood—there are two passages of particular interest here. The first is the use of subjective language about the party at the end of the first paragraph (“the UK Independence Party supports…”); the party is texturing
its own identity in the context of this discussion on global economics. And, as we have seen with the other parties, it does so by grounding its policy preference in an objective rather than normative foundation: What UKIP supports is “genuine free trade,” rather than (by implication) the false promise of trade liberalization offered within the confines of the EU. That “genuine free trade” serves the real interests of the British people is so deeply assumed by this discourse that it goes without saying. As we have already seen, this natural-artificial dichotomy is a popular rhetorical device for UKIP, a key part of its variant of the globalization heresthetic.52

The second passage of note is the discussion of the role of the state in the second part. UKIP is actually closer to the archetypal neoliberal discourse of globalization here than is New Labour. In sharp contrast to the latter’s common claim about the state serving to prepare Britain to deal with globalization, such agency is here rendered superfluous. Britain’s trading connections (which are “natural,” of course) are what “equip [it] to take advantage of global opportunities.” Blair’s formulation, as I have argued, functioned to reassert political party agency in the context of globalization-as-inevitability; UKIP avoids that problem by laying claim to a different sort of agency, as the UK’s liberator from “EU membership [that] holds us back in the world.”

Other Publications

During his time in the leadership, one of Sked’s primary vehicles for developing his ideas about Europe and about the party was a newsletter of which he kept personal control. In the first issue after the transition from Anti-Federalist League to UKIP, in January 1994, he makes a charge to the party in the following terms:

52 The emphasis on “genuine” free trade as an unquestioned goal, and the associated dichotomy with artificiality, also appears in a declaration that Farage incorporates into almost all of his speeches: “We seek an amicable divorce from a political European Union and a genuine free trade agreement which is what we thought we signed up for in the first place!” (qtd. in Gardner 2006: 166; emphasis in original).
The press will want to know whether we are up to the task of setting the agenda for an independent Britain in the twenty-first century. So too will the younger people who have absorbed the social changes of the last thirty years. Our programme will not therefore be one of turning the clock back to the 1950’s or any other period in the mythical history of Merrie England. On the contrary, we shall have to develop policies which meet the challenges of tomorrow and we shall have to seek votes not merely from former Conservatives (this is not a Conservative rejects party) but from Labour and Liberal Party members and from anyone else who has a vote. This is a serious party and it will only deserve to be taken seriously if it can appeal to all sections of British society.

(qtd. in Gardner 2006: 39)

This passage is a remarkably prescient description of the political challenge that UKIP would face in being taken seriously (as forward-looking and as something other than a glorified Tory faction). In essence, it lays out a call for a political strategy that, analyzed in heresthetic-bricolage terms, can be fruitfully read as a globalization heresthetic. It signals the “seriousness” of the party through its acceptance of socioeconomic transformations as inevitable. This document has a different purpose than the party’s manifestos and public speeches, notable in its imperative grammatical mood and deontic modality (“we shall have to seek”), but it still maintains some epistemic claims characteristic of the globalization discourse. For example, the clear implication that an undefined “tomorrow” entails “challenges” that are of a different order than those in the past—a clear restatement of the new times thesis. And Sked pairs that claim (in the fourth sentence) with his call for broadening the UKIP base, implying that preparing for the “challenges of tomorrow” is as much a political as an intellectual endeavor. There is also, of course, the repetition of “serious” in the closing sentence—in total, this passage encapsulates a discursive-heresthetic route that UKIP could take, consistently pairing its efforts at “seriousness” and broad appeal with a globalist rejection of “mythical Merrie England.”

On globalization-related issues outside of economics and immigration (on which more below), UKIP has not generally developed a clear discourse. It can be noted, however, that its vision of globalism (like SNP’s, as it happens) does not include the Blairite commitment to an
interventionist brand of liberal internationalism: During the debates leading to the 2003 Iraq War, the NEC approved a formal policy stating that UKIP would support military action only “if it was sanctioned by a UN resolution” and was in the “UK national interest.” The national interest is defined to include border security, protection of Britons abroad, protection of economic interests (“including the promotion of free and fair international trade”), and maintenance of international law. Absent these principles being at stake, “UKIP would not normally sanction interference in the internal affairs of another sovereign state” (qtd. in Gardner 2006: 172). Blair’s notion of globalization entailing a fully interdependent international security environment is implicitly rejected.

Case Narrative Part 3: Consolidation and Electoral Success, 2004-2013

The 2004 European Elections were another major breakthrough for UKIP. The party returned 12 MEPs, tied with the Liberal Democrats; in four regions constituencies the party had bested Labour to come in second, including finishing only a 0.5% behind the Conservatives in the East Midlands (Gardner 2006: 221). The (generally pro-EU) newspaper The Independent described the major parties as “crushed under the wheels of UKIP’s bandwagon” and the result as “sending shockwaves through the political establishment” (2004). The poor showing in a midterm election of a Labour government now well into its second term was not surprising, but the Conservatives falling relative to UKIP (vote share dropped 7% and they lost 9 seats) was a major development.

Two party-level factors were at play here, in part explaining the outcome, and also shaping the party’s discourse: First, the campaign was substantially more professionalized than in the past; Knapman had managed to recruit American political strategist Dick Morris to provide strategic advice on a pro bono basis—the two had actually met on a cruise and Morris
was convinced by the UKIP Leader of the righteousness of the cause. Along with the (very expensive) paid services of British publicist Max Clifford (an avowed Blairite except on Europe), Morris’s counsel made the party much more sophisticated and targeted in its messaging. The second major development was the injection of a celebrity factor when Robert Kilroy-Silk was recruited to the party. Kilroy-Silk was an ex-Labour MP (he had resigned his Liverpool seat in response to pressure from the Militant Tendency in 1985), who had become a well-known television presenter before being fired from the BBC in 2003 over a controversial op-ed critical of Arabs in the lead-up to the Iraq War (Gardner 2006: 188). This controversy only increased his populist appeal in certain sections (as a martyr of “political correctness”), and his charisma and name recognition earned him the label “the housewives’ candidate.” After some maneuvering, the leadership put him at the top of the East Midlands list, helping to secure the party’s unprecedented 26% tally there. In sum, then, UKIP’s ambition to become a mainstream party was further advanced as they embraced the sophisticated marketing and image-crafting that was now essential.

But the strategy was not without risks, and not surprisingly the recruitment of Kilroy-Silk led to another round of infighting as he began to maneuver to replace Knapman (who was due to stay in office until 2006) in the run-up to the 2005 General Election. Once again the party was divided, now between those who felt that Kilroy-Silk’s stardom was too valuable to lose and others who thought him a dangerous loose cannon. In the end, the latter prevailed and Kilroy-Silk left the party after being denied an early opportunity to stand for the leadership (Daniel 2005: 160-62). It is impossible to say whether this was a missed opportunity or narrowly-averted disaster (Abedi and Lundberg argue that he simply arrived too early in the party’s life cycle;
2009: 84), but it certainly represented a step in the maturation of the party that it survived a dispute with so popular a figure.

The General Election came and went the next year without the long-awaited first-past-the-post breakthrough; the party maintained its fourth-party status with 620,000 votes nationwide, but "no seats were won, no seats were even nearly won" (Gardner 2006: 283). However, it should be noted that the party was beginning to claim some role in important policy victories: British adoption of the Euro had been ruled out in the near term; the establishment of elected regional assemblies in England (which UKIP considered part of a European agenda of hollowing out the nation-states) was moribund; and euroskeptics received a guarantee from New Labour of a referendum on the EU Constitution, though it happened that it was killed off in France and the Netherlands before that became necessary (Gardner 2006: 285-88). These indirect victories due to UKIP’s presence (David Cameron’s more recent guarantee of an eventual “in/out” referendum is another), are difficult to measure with precision, but are important to understanding the role of the party and its discourse in British politics.

On the internal politics front, Knapman stepped-down at the end of his term in 2006, and Farage was elected Leader for the first time. He would turn the post over briefly to ex-Tory peer Lord Pearson in 2009 to focus on his own 2010 General Election campaign (where he broke with convention by challenging the sitting Speaker of the House of Commons, John Bercow). However, after that campaign failed and Pearson suddenly resigned after (yet more) internal tension, Farage was reelected and continues to lead the party. An original member since the Anti-Federalist League days, and UKIP MEP continuously from 1999, Farage was a central figure even in the years when he wasn’t formally leader, similar to Alex Salmond in SNP. Also like Salmond, Farage came originally from finance, having been a successful commodities trader
in the City and a director of several companies. Politically, he was a loyal Thatcherite Conservative until the time of Maastricht, when he came to feel betrayed by the Major government. Given his market liberal political commitments and vulture capitalist reputation, Daniel describes him as “at first sight […] the classic Thatcherkind” (2005: 12). He has become most famous for his passionate speeches, especially acerbic attacks on European officials in the EP. His leadership (especially since 2010) has also seen UKIP reach an electoral high-water mark, with the party achieving its greatest success in Westminster elections to date by finishing second in three by-elections between 2011 and 2013.

The UKIP of this decade is quite different from the party that Sked founded and Knapman inherited. Spurred by Morris’s advice, the party has dedicated itself to broadening the electoral base by expanding its base of issues (though still tying everything back to the EU in some way). The most famous “new issue” for the party has been immigration, along with related debates on citizenship and multiculturalism. By some measures, this has been as important a driver of the party’s recent success as euroskepticism (Ford, Goodwin, and Cutts 2011). But at the same time, UKIP has in effect moved from one horn of its dilemma to the other—it has escaped being tied to events in Europe as a single-issue party, but at the cost of creating a tension between its “strategic euroskeptic” and “polite xenophobe” supporters (thus creating a new demand for heresthetic management). It appears that the nuanced discourse this would require, linking limited immigration to a forward-looking economic agenda (Sked’s “serious party”), has been lacking. Gardner describes the party’s new focus on immigration issues in these terms: “In some ways our move into this area of politics seemed careful and planned. In other ways, it seemed populist and crude” (2006: 194).
Manifestos

While the Westminster manifestos discussed earlier followed the conventional lines of proceeding issue area by issue area, the iteration produced for the crucial 2004 European Elections followed a more experimental layout. The document uses an FDR-inspired framing device of “5 essential freedoms,” which are: “freedom from the European Union;” “freedom from crime;” “freedom from overcrowding;” “freedom from bureaucratic politicians;” and “freedom from political correctness” (UKIP 2001). The shift from the more intellectual euroskepticism of the party’s earlier to a more populist tone is obvious in this framing; replace “the EU” with “NAFTA” and these could be headings of a speech by Ross Perot or Pat Buchanan. Under “freedom from the European Union,” the party becomes even more informal by putting most of its discussion in a question-and-answer (almost “FAQ”) format. For example:

Q. Wouldn’t this [EU withdrawal] affect investment in the UK?  
A. No. Foreign companies invest in the UK because we have a highly skilled workforce and low taxation in comparison to other EU nations. We also have a more stable currency (the euro fluctuates wildly), whilst our English language makes trade much easier.  

(UKIP 2004)

This informal, dialogical presentation puts some of the same discourse as previously into a more populist frame. It also lays out the relations between its claims fairly explicitly, rather than relying on a logic of appearances. But there remains the gap in political agency characteristic of the globalization discourse: The basic claim is still that once the decision is taken to leave the EU, Britain’s international economic relationships will flourish more-or-less automatically, as a consequence of preexisting or fixed (“English language”) characteristics. However, the globalization discourse and its relation to UKIP’s euroskeptic are not developed in as much depth; in place of a discussion of the Commonwealth, the section moves on to questions like
“Would our farmers lose out without the Common Agricultural Policy?” and “Ok, so what would you do about my council tax?”

However, the difficult side of the populist turn in terms of maintaining a modern and globalist image is also present in this text. UKIP’s policy on immigration falls under the heading “freedom from overcrowding,” where overcrowding due to “mass immigration” is linked to a number of perennial populist complaints (road traffic, a slow train system, long waits at doctors’ offices, etc.). The labor (as opposed to capital) mobility aspect of the conventional discourse of globalization is obliquely acknowledged, but considered a threat rather than an opportunity: “With the fourth largest economy in the world, the UK is a very attractive destination for people seeking a better life. The trouble is the UK is already full up” (UKIP 2004). The party simply sees no disconnect between this logic and the classic free trade position it espouses in its economic policy discussions. There are no glaring inconsistencies between these sections of the text itself, but the failure to address the linkage that is made between flows of goods and flows of people in the mainstream discourse (such as New Labour claims about the economic necessity of at least skilled immigration) suggests that the heresthetic potential of the globalization discourse is not well integrated with UKIP’s new populist strategy. Note that the claim about immigration above relies solely on a declarative mood and on an epistemic rather than a deontic modality—instead of making a call to control the borders, the party merely states the allegedly-objective fact that Britain is “full up.”

A number of other examples of the strategic redeployment of neoliberal globalism can be found in UKIP’s most recent Westminster manifestos. In the 2005 General Election manifesto, “Trade” appears as the first heading in the economic policy section, rather than any domestic spending by axing all superfluous regulations and any ‘work’ connected with the EU” (UKIP 2004).
policies—hardly a common practice for British parties. Under this heading, UKIP articulates the economic import of its position in the following terms:

Our release from the EU’s common external tariffs will also enable us to strengthen our trade relationships with countries outside the EU such as the countries of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the Far East and our natural trading partners in the Commonwealth who share our language and business methods. At the same time we shall regain our independent seat in the World Trade Organisation which we shall use to counter any trade restrictions from the EU and to press for further expansion of global free trade. More open trade will also do far more to help less developed countries than any amount of aid or debt forgiveness.

(UKIP 2005: 5)

The contrast could not be clearer with the New Labour government’s warnings about euroskeptics as dangerous isolationists (e.g., Labour Party 1999: 19). Much as SNP rhetoric managed to do with “responsibility,” here we find independence equated with “relationships” rather than autonomy (much less isolation). We can speak of a freedom-relationships linkage that functions in much the same way as SNP’s association of freedom and responsibility. This is achieved by constructing the relationship between the EU and the broader realm of international trade in a very specific way. The EU is positioned as an obstructer of trade liberalization rather than a vehicle, as the Union’s official narrative would have it. The common external tariff is rendered as a prison from which the UK requires “release;” and this prison separates the British not just from the Commonwealth—which by itself would represent a traditional imperial discourse—but also from the new economic dynamos of NAFTA and East Asia. Finally, the closing reference to development is important, as a common trope of neoliberal economic discourse is deployed to position UKIP firmly in the mainstream in terms of caring about poverty alleviation. Taken together, this passage imagines a post-EU Britain not as an island apart but as a progressive state more engaged than before in a mutually-beneficial global order.
In the 2010 General Election manifesto, we find that international trade has been effectively downgraded, appearing along with foreign (rather than economic) policy as the number 10 policy heading. However, the discourse appears even more strikingly globalist:

While UKIP is realistic about the difficult economic and political challenges Britain faces, we take a positive view of Britain’s place in the world - a stark contrast to the defeatist and apologetic stance taken by other parties. UKIP recognises Britain as a global player with a global destiny and not a regional state within a ‘United States of Europe’. (UKIP 2010: 10)

The vision of the global in this passage is again significantly different from the isolationist populism of which UKIP was accused by New Labour. Indeed, it invokes the isolation-engagement dichotomy while reversing Labour’s framing: it is Europe that is seen as a fundamentally provincial space, against a global economy that is linked with the future (“a global destiny”). This assertion is also presented as an evident fact rather than a normative position of the party with the verb “recognizes.” Alongside the opening caveat (especially “realistic”), this articulation paints the image of a party level-headedly tackling Britain’s economic challenges—not a group of wild-eyed nationalist radicals. In this representation, it is the mainstream parties who are out of control, having “shamefully contrived to break their last manifesto commitments” on the Lisbon Treaty and “run roughshod over the concerns of farmers and rural people” (UKIP 2010: 2, 14).

It must be noted that in both of these manifestos the language used by UKIP in regard to immigration—though it is an issue arguably inseparable from globalization—is quite different: “The first responsibility of a British government is to its own population, not to those who would like to settle here” (UKIP 2005: 11). In addition to this statement of principle, the standard liberal economic argument that there is a need for large numbers of immigrant workers (here attributed to New Labour) is dismissed as “untenable” (a notably epistemic claim). Indeed, the immigration “problem” is construed as a threat to effective nationhood itself: “As a member of
the EU, Britain has lost control of her borders” (UKIP 2010: 5). This more exclusionary rhetoric fits into the classically populist interpretation of the party, as well as with a Downsian understanding of party competition. Indeed, studies of UKIP voters suggest that the party’s distinctively strident policy position on immigration has been crucial to its electoral appeal (Ford, Goodwin, and Cutts 2011). However, it is the incorporation of this rhetoric (and similar examples elsewhere) with the discourse of trade openness that is important for the present interpretation. First, this shows that the globalization discourse in the UK is not fixed, because other interpretations (e.g., SNP and New Labour) would associate economic and immigration openness, especially in terms of highly-skilled migrants. Second, this juxtaposition across the text as a whole reflects the balancing of distinctive positions (“zero net immigration”) and reassuring rhetoric (“continuing trade with the EU—also stronger trading links with non-EU countries”) which is crucial to navigating the party’s heresthetic dilemma.

Speeches

The public statements of Kilroy-Silk during his short time with UKIP are emblematic of the party’s sometimes inchoate rhetorical strategy. His various unscripted comments on immigration and multiculturalism were particularly strident and potentially damaging to the party: Pakistanis cannot be British, the French are “devious,” Africa is responsible for its own problems, Iraqis are “not grateful for being liberated,” and his border control suggestion was “to station paratroopers a mile from the [Channel] Tunnel” to herd illegal immigrants back out (Daniel 2005: 130). On the other hand, in his maiden speech in the European Parliament after his 2004 election, the housewives’ MEP was unusually “on message:”

My constituents […] do not wish to see the Constitution enacted because they see it as based on obsolete economic and political theories of the 1950s, of the fear of war and an outdated threat of communism. They see it as creating a Europe that is inward-looking, that is bureaucratic, that is restrictive, whereas we should be creating a Community that is
innovative and outward-looking, that reaches out to the rest of the world, that is flexible and democratic.

(qtd. in Daniel 2005: 150)

Though the passage is in a declarative mood, and is made more “objective” by taking the form of reported speech, it contains an unusual use of weak deontic modality: statements about what “we should be creating.” This language is also remarkably similar to the vision for Europe that New Labour would present several years later, in the wake of the Constitution’s eventual failure (Cabinet Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2007, on which see my discussion in Chapter 4). As in that text, a temporal claim, rooted in the assumptions of globalization discourse, is made that openness and an “outward-looking” perspective is an inherently-superior approach in the new global era. Most notably, both the new times thesis (“obsolete…theories”) and the isolation-engagement dichotomy (“inward-looking” versus “innovative and outward looking”) are on clear display here. The “inward-looking” and “restrictive” model of Europe allegedly contained in the proposed EU Constitution is explicitly linked with an old era, the features of which no longer bear on the world. UKIP, by implication, is a more serious party than the enthusiastic europhiles because it recognizes this objective fact.

In a widely quoted European Parliament speech five years later, Farage completed this argument by making the converse connection between pro-EU politics and (unserious) radicalism: In reply to a speech by EU President Herman van Rompuy, he exclaimed that “I suppose I could applaud your having a sense of humor, but isn’t this really just the bunker mentality? Your fanaticism is out in the open. You talked about the fact that it was a lie to say that the nation state could exist in the 21st century globalised world” (Farage 2010). Thus, the potentially damning political claim of UKIP as regressive extremists is rebutted indirectly, and an alternative vision of the relationship between globalization and Europe is constructed implicitly. Note the lack of clear semantic relations between the elements of this argument; the
crucial claim that traditional nationhood is compatible with a globalized world is brought into this rhetoric as an assumption rather than an explicit assertion to be defended. Regionalism, then, is construed as an ideologically-driven misunderstanding of the global, and euroskepticism becomes the highest form of political-economic pragmatism.

This style of directly reversing the kind of claims made against the party appears again in Farage’s Leader’s speech to the 2013 UKIP conference (and again he weaves the new times thesis and the isolation-engagement dichotomy into the argument):

I believe that leaving the Union and reclaiming our destiny will create the most exciting opportunity for national renewal in our lifetime. […] We get our own seat in on the bodies that actually run the world. We get back the ability to strike free trade deals. We can abolish tariffs on African produce and do more to raise living standards there than any amount of aid. There are those who say we can’t go it alone. That our global influence will decline because we are small. Those are the true voices of Little England. We speak for Great Britain.

(Farage 2013)

The most direct rebuke to the party’s critics is the dialogically-phrased passage about those who argue for the necessity of integration being “the true voices of Little England.” In a sense, this is a spatial reinterpretation of Blair’s temporal claims about defeatism among those who think that British greatness has passed—a fully independent “Great Britain” is UKIP’s “cool Britannia.” Aside from the unusual mix of future and present tense (“will create…we get”), which serves to generate a sense of immediacy, this passage contains the expected grammatical features: a declarative mood, an epistemic modality that is only marked by subjectivity in the first sentence (“I believe”), and a lack of explicit semantic relations.

Taken together, these amount to a subtle deployment of the discourse of globalization as inevitable fact. For example, it is taken for granted that international bodies “actually run the world.” This is likely a somewhat melodramatic reference to a single body, the World Trade Organization, which is the only powerful international organization within which the EU
members are bound to collective decisions (because of the customs union). But it is a significant phrase, in as much as it clearly rejects a romantic-nationalist vision of the British state, in this sense echoing SNP claims about the need for a seat at the European table. Finally, there is also the seemingly-incongruous invocation of the trade-not-aid perspective on development, in the fourth sentence. In addition to unqualified acceptance of the (highly contested) economic foundations of that claim, this passage puts a human face on the party’s international policy that is also grounded in a claim to economic expertise. UKIP, so the reasoning runs, better understands the real needs of developing economies in the international economy than do the aid-obsessed bureaucrats in Brussels.

**Findings and Case Conclusion**

Reading UKIP in the terms of heresthetic-bricolage reveals the degree to which its rhetorical strategy is still incomplete, especially compared to New Labour and SNP. Faced with pressure to appeal to both “strategic eurosceptics and polite xenophobes,” the party has been mostly muddling through. Such is usually the case with bricolage, but here the tensions pushing apart different strands of argument seem to be as strong as the linking arguments that the party has attempted. The commitment to explicit populism rules out a principled liberal euroskepticism (arguably Sked’s original vision). Instead, the globalization discourse stands apart from other aspects of the party’s messaging, as an attempt to send multiple signals at once. This discursive relationship is carefully tailored to use the established association of globalism with economic progress (a kind of Thatcher-Blair consensus) to shift the public understanding of the parties in a particular way. It retains the now-familiar use of declarative mood, epistemic modality, and a “logic of appearances” lacking in causal semantic relations to render a particular vision of neoliberal globalization as an objective fact. The role of the logic of appearances is especially
important here, because UKIP discourse lacks any attempts to authoritatively explain the relationship between globalization and euroskepticism (i.e., any equivalent of Blair’s Japan speech or Salmond’s “Celtic Tiger” address). This lack of causal specificity—referring to the “global economy” in a way that evokes a system of mainstream discourses but without going into detail— is precisely what makes it possible for the party to remain strategically silent on the role of labor mobility in globalization so as to segregate the immigration issue. This selectivity represents a particular variant of bricolage—bricoleurs can only use the tools available, but they do not have to use all of them.

In addition to rendering euroskepticism compatible with a globalized world (counter to Blair’s best efforts), this bricolage also serves a heresthetic end. The goal here is to manipulate the structure of competence-based voting in order to buy the party space between the twin challenges of extremism and mainstream cooptation (by the Tories). Though UKIP relies more than Labour and SNP on populist appeal as well, it has nevertheless been a key part of its campaigns to signal an association with sound (globalist) economic principles. Thus it can maintain a purist, populist commitment to full withdrawal from the EU (distinguishing it from the Conservatives) without appearing as dangerously radical in the context of modern performance politics.

Concretely, we can identify several recurrent rhetorical figures in the text that echo the other parties’ strategy of using the globalization discourse to shift political narratives in a way that raises the party’s perceived legitimacy. In some cases these follow the kinds of arguments made by those parties, while in others they creatively challenge them:
• The new times thesis, which I have discussed in each of the preceding chapters, appears in the language of “opportunity for national renewal” and rejection of “obsolete economic and political theories from the 1950s.”

• Likewise, the isolation/engagement dichotomy is reinterpreted through the persistent image of the UK trapped within Europe, unable to take advantage of a globalized world full of advantages. In this reading, participation in European integration is not a form of engagement, but a way of isolating Britain from the wider world (especially its “natural” trading partners in the Commonwealth).

• UKIP also deploys a freedom-relationships linkage that is much like the freedom-responsibility linkage, which I identified in SNP discourse. UKIP is adamant that freeing the UK EU bureaucracy would actually “strengthen [UK] trade relationships with countries outside the EU,” especially with the Commonwealth and the United States.

• Finally, UKIP introduces a natural-artificial dichotomy, following on the above, to describe different kinds of international bonds. Britain is said to have “natural trading partners in the Commonwealth,” while the party stands for “genuine free trade.” The institutionalized relations of the EU, by implication, are artificial and thereby illegitimate. This rhetorical device can be read as a notable example of discursive bricolage: It draws upon and resonates with the “naturalization” component of the mainstream discourse of globalization, but not by merely restating it. Rather, it explicitly rejects the claim that recent developments (like regional integration) are natural, but maintains the core assumption that political phenomena can be natural and that identifying the natural course is political best practice.
Together, then, these devices show a mixture of styles on the part of UKIP, vis-à-vis the broader globalization politics that I have discussed. In part, the party is replicating specific rhetorical strategies with proven political effect (as with the new times thesis), but it can also be seen as constructing novel strategies (like the natural/artificial dichotomy) that draw on the same fundamental toolkit.

In particular, the similarity between UKIP and SNP is striking, when analyzed in terms of heresthetic-bricolage: Consider the SNP passages about an “outward-looking Scotland” and the UKIP claims of Britain’s “global destiny;” if the major nouns were switched (Scotland/UK and UK/EU), the language would be indistinguishable. Though its anti-EU position is not often understood in this way, UKIP is essentially calling for Britain to rejoin the world just as SNP is demanding for Scotland. Considering that these parties have no direct linkages to speak of, nor are even in direct competition (UKIP being virtually absent in Scotland, not least because it opposes devolution), this parallel is remarkable. This parallel cannot be explained only in terms of global realities, because if this were simply a case of globalization objectively requiring a “new nationalism,” why would this not apply to issues as fundamental as immigration and regional integration? Rather, it seems plausible from analyzing these texts that there is a strategic, even heresthetic electoral agenda at work.

Of course, parties’ discourses are the product of multiple factors. For example, it may not be entirely accidental that UKIP and SNP espouse versions of economic globalism under leaders who both have backgrounds in finance (Farage and Salmond), though nor is it necessarily an accident that such men became the leaders. It is also notable that the clearest articulations of the globalization heresthetic by UKIP occur in the Farage and Kilroy-Silk speeches to the European Parliament quoted above. Certainly those two figures have little in common personally, so it
seems that the place of the speeches is a relevant factor. Away from home audiences, where there is generally going to be more pressure to incorporate a populist dimension into speeches (and to talk about immigration), the party leaders apparently felt more able to develop a more coherent globalization discourse.

But in any case, by applying the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party ideal-type, we can systematize certain observations. Most notably, we are able to explain the relationship between Britain leaving Europe/rejoining the world and the rhetorics of responsibility and realism. UKIP as well as SNP have positioned themselves firmly as nationalist and internationalists, a phrase which SNP likes to use for itself and which UKIP might as well. This is not so much a new way of being nationalist as a new way of doing nationalism, conditioned by the electoral incentives of performance politics and inspired by the successful example of Labour Party modernization.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The hard truth for all of us in this hall is that a party that started out taking on old thinking became the prisoner of its own certainties. The world was changing all around us—from global finance to immigration to terrorism—New Labour, a political force founded on its ability to adapt and change lost its ability to do so.


As these damning words from the new Leader of the Opposition attest, the New Labour era that had begun with the party’s 1992 defeat came to an end on the day of another General Election: May 6, 2010. The 2010 election saw a roughly 90-seat swing from Labour to the Conservatives. Though the overall result was hung parliament, and the possibility of a Labour-led coalition existed in theory, the prevailing political mood was that the party’s time was up.

Though much about the party, its policies, and its rhetoric had changed during the 13 years in office—especially during the transition from Blair to Brown—this was the truly decisive moment when the identity of the Labour Party was definitively altered for the first time since Blair declaration of “New Labour, New Britain.” But with the label (and enthusiasm) gone, how much of the rhetorical content of New Labour is changing? Are the “certainties” in which New Labour had become trapped really going to be rethought? To an extent, this is a question for ongoing research; as I suggested in the Labour case conclusion, the party under Miliband is still in the process of establishing a new discourse, and ongoing analysis of this process will be necessary.

Tellingly, however, 2010 was not the end of the expansionary era for either SNP or UKIP. Indeed, by 2014 these parties have arguably reached their high points: UKIP finished first in the European elections with over a quarter of votes cast (exceeding expectations by edging out both major parties), and SNP is presiding over its long-promised Scottish Independence referendum on 18 September 2014. Clearly, the contemporary forms of these parties have
outlived New Labour even though they came of age around the same time and in the same conditions. More to the point, they continue to advance a discourse of globalization consistent with those that all three parties began to deploy in the 1990s (presumably one of New Labour’s “own certainties”). As recently as their 2013 party conference addresses, Alex Salmond took the time to remind his audience that “no-one in this party claims that an independent Scotland will be able to wish away global competition,” and Nigel Farage emphasized the opportunity to “get our own seat in on the bodies that actually run the world.” At least as far as these parties are continuing to shape the public discourse in Britain, and it appears that they might actually be expanding their influence, the certainty about globalization appears likely to stay.

This brings us back to the three motivating questions that I presented in Chapter 1: Why do Labour, SNP, and UKIP represent the “fact” of globalization in such a consistent way, despite deep policy and ideological differences, and despite having opportunities to challenge the terms of that claim? How does the deployment of this discourse relate to those parties’ shifts in electoral strategy during that period? And how do SNP and UKIP make this representation cohere with their nationalist political ambitions? In this chapter I tie these threads together by reviewing the conclusions and contributions of the preceding theoretical discussion and case narratives. It is the nature of the analyticist methodology that the theoretical advancement, the refinement of the ideal-type in question, is strictly separate from the empirical findings of the inquiry; the ideal-type is a construct that is woven into the analysis rather than being a product of it. And as there is no assumption about the model being actually reflected “in the world,” there is no testing or correction of the theory as in a neopositivist account. However, the narratives can be used to consider the theory by contrasting this ideal-type against alternatives, to show what kinds of empirical features it can explain that they cannot. Accordingly, this chapter proceeds in
three parts: First, I reflect on how the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party type shaped the party narratives in specific ways, and distinguish these from the narratives that could be produced using the other types discussed in Chapter 2. Second, I consider the concrete empirical finding that emerges from the three narratives considered together, the existence of a “globalization heresthetic” and the specific rhetorical features that sustain it. Third and finally, I discuss extensions of the analysis beyond the context of these cases, in terms of both the theoretical and empirical aspects.

Applying the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party Type

In this section, I review how my heresthetician-bricolage analytical framework has been applied to reinterpret the strategic activities of Labour, SNP, and UKIP. As I have noted, these narratives highlight aspects of party competition that are not encompassed by the existing party models (discussed in Chapter 2). In particular, the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party approach serves to advance upon the existing party politics literature in several important ways. Most importantly, it moves beyond the dominant positional and valence voting approaches by treating parties as creative rather than reactive. It also links party discourse to political strategy rather than ideology, and concretely identifies the way that particular discursive “tools” are deployed by parties in their public rhetoric. It also advances on Hindmoor’s similarly-creative approach by “decentering” it, recognizing that parties have means though discourses like globalization to construct valence as well as positional issues.

It is important to reiterate that these ideal-types are analytical constructs only—not empirical phenomena. Thus, I do not claim to be discovering the existence of a Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party as a distinct type of actor; nor am I claiming that existing approaches are objectively incorrect in their analysis. My approach can thus be considered in parallel with the
others, as part of a collective conversation about party competition. After all, it would not be very meaningful to claim that heresthetics and bricolage exist because they are both very broad concepts, at least as developed here. And in any case, the ideal-types determine the way that my analytic narratives are constructed; they may be more or less useful in highlighting interesting empirical features, but the method does not produce an “objective” factual narrative against which they could be judged as true or untrue. Thus, the goal of this section is not to “test” my approach against the existing theories, nor to attempt to “falsify” any of them. Rather, I intend to develop the theoretical approach by noting the different empirical features that it explains, in contrast to those encompassed by the other approaches.

I do so below by summarizing the case narrative for each party in turn, particularly with reference to the Heresthetician-Bricoleur type and its alternatives. Before proceeding to this, however, it is worth reviewing the types that I discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The most prominent models in the mainstream study of party competition are the Downsian Party and the Performance Party, which correspond to the spatial and valence theories of electoral behavior, respectively. These models represent party competition as a process of alignment between the party’s commitments and the known interests of voters—matching policy commitments to median voter preferences for the Downsian Party, or emphasizing the ability to deliver on consensus issues for the Performance Party. These can be distinguished from the ideal-typical Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party because they only explain the aspects of empirical party behavior that are reactive rather than creative. Consequently, they do not tell us much about issues (like globalization debates) where voters cannot be expected to stable and well-developed preferences,

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54 Again, this can be distinguished from McLean’s (2002) conception of heresthetics as an empirical concept present in certain (rare) cases but not others. His understanding is rooted in a more “realist,” or “mind-world dualist,” understanding of social science inquiry (Jackson 2011).
nor about any attempts parties might make to alter median voter preferences or perceptions of performance.

As alternatives to those models, the Cartel Party and the Market-Oriented Party draw from economic and management literature rather than extrapolating directly from theories of voting. These models treat parties like firms competing in a market for votes, which can be secured by colluding to achieve a stable vote-share at the lowest “cost” in terms of policy commitments (in a cartel), or by producing a better “product” than competitors (through shrewd political marketing). These types can explain more active and creative behavior by parties, such as the Market-Oriented Party developing novel policies to meet voter needs, and the Cartel Party leveraging globalization and Europeanization to justify a more limited set of policy commitments than in the past. However, the Cartel Party only encompasses such manipulation where it serves to stabilize the party system and the Market-Oriented Party can still only function when voters have a clear and fixed set of political needs that can be uncovered through market research.

The final ideal-type that I distilled from the existing literature is the Center-Constructing Party, which is rooted in a critique of the Downsian spatial model but which also provides an alternative to the existing approaches in several respects. Within this model, parties are understood as attracting the median voter not by positioning themselves at an objective center point but by constructing a center point and casting alternatives as extreme. It thus explains party behavior where they are actively manipulating voter perceptions with the goal of relative gains over opposing parties (not just cartel-like stability), taking advantage of issues on which public preferences are fundamentally uncertain. These novel features are shared with the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party, but that type is more than a variant on the Center-Constructing Party. The latter is, by nature, limited to positional issues where it makes sense to speak in spatial
terms about the center versus the extremes. As I have noted, the Heresethetician-Bricoleur model encompasses parties’ construction of public their standing on valence issues (like economic management). It also explains more specific empirical features, such as the detailed way that party rhetorics are constructed. In the sub-sections that follow, I develop this distinction by noting the unique aspects of the three party narratives that I laid-out in the preceding chapters.

Labour

As the most widely-studied of the three parties here, it is not surprising that the analytical narrative of New Labour covered some ground that has been covered by others. Notably, we have seen representations of the world that match the globalization discourse identified in critical readings of Fairclough, Hay, et al.: The contingent features of globalization are elided by explicit naturalization (“autumn following summer,” an “economic hurricane”) and political agents are allowed only secondary roles (“managing change” within the confines of globalization). But when these are placed in the context of Blair and Brown’s ongoing effort to redefine the party’s place in the British political system, we can see that there is more going on than merely reproducing a certain ideology (though there may be that, as well). Most notably, there is the change in specific articulation of the globalization discourse over time, with the party in office becoming more focused on the “constraints” aspect of the globalization discourse relative to the 1994-1997 period, in response to demands from backbenchers. This is a feature of the case narrative that would not be identified in an analysis built around the Downsian or Performance Party ideal-types. Even to the extent that discourse is a relevant consideration for those models (e.g., as a proxy for “actual” policy positions), such reactive approaches can only explain change related to shifts in the preferences and opinions of the electorate, not dynamics internal to the party. Similarly, the Cartel Party model specifically explains the use of the
globalization-as-constraint formulation, but by treating it as fundamental to globalization discourse, cannot explain variations over time. Indeed, the overall arc of the party that I describe—an emphasis on globalization in tandem with a shift away from Downsian targeting after 1992 and toward a politics of economic competence—is one that does not fit clearly with alternative models: The Performance Party can explain the reason for an economic competence strategy but not the relationship it might have to globalist discourse; the Cartel Party can explain the role of globalization in distancing New Labour from the high-cost policies of Old Labour, but not how this could simultaneously serve to decisively undermine (rather than collude with) the Conservatives; and the Center-Constructing Party model incorporates the goal of equating extremism and irresponsibility, but not the way that articulating discourses about the world fits into that process.

We can also analyze the differences in the approaches at a more focused level. For example, the neoliberal globalization-as-constraint formulation is also much more prominent in speeches than in manifestos. In light of the electoral-strategic argument, this is not surprising. There are key differences in audience and tone between these genres of rhetoric, with the speeches are directed toward internal party audiences or specific interest groups (as with international business for the Japan speech) with the goal of controlling and channeling expectations, and the manifestos aimed at a broad audience of voters qua voters and tailored to the promises the party can make (not the ones they cannot). Again, this is hard to systematically explain in terms of existing models of party competition, in this case because of their focus on policy content as the “real” object of competition. Using the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party analytic, by contrast, focuses our attention on the way that the day-to-day talk and text, which constitutes electoral politics, actually works. Even the Market-Oriented Party model, though the
most attentive of the alternatives to nuts-and-bolts campaigning, tells us little about the specific articulation of broad ideas. Issues like globalization are clearly important to parties, given the time spent deploying and developing them in speeches and documents, but are beyond the kinds of specific policies and talking points derivable from pure market research.

SNP

Like Labour, SNP faced a strong imperative to make itself electorally relevant, in its case as a potential party of regional government and not just a protest party (as Labour had expected devolution to render it). To answer this political demand, the product of the party’s bricolage is a narrative that integrates globalization discourse into an independence rhetoric, even though it is largely the same discourse used by opponents to independence among the mainstream parties (particularly New Labour). The significance of globalization for Scotland, according to this narrative, is that it replaces a domestic understanding of economic policy with an understanding of the domestic economy as inseparable from international politics. In institutional terms this marked a major transformation for the party; the rhetoric of a “responsibility for making decisions in a globalized environment” is a far cry from the 79 Group’s demands for more Scottish activism on keeping factories open. Concurrently, the central claim against London is no longer the internal maladministration of Scotland per se, but the failure to act for Scotland’s interests internationally. Having explicitly rejected a romantic vision of nationalism, SNP has positioned itself in terms of public image a party focused on the practical task of articulating Scottish interests in a globalized environment. This kind of novel narrative, overlaid on an established policy (of independence), is a key aspect of politics that is captured by the Heresethetician-Bricoleur Party model and not the major alternatives.
The SNP case shows, in particular, the limitations of the Downsian and Cartel Party approaches in making sense of recent political developments. The fact that SNP has transformed itself and its place in the party system, despite a constant and modest level of support for independence among voters (Johns, Mitchell, and Carman 2013), shows that there is much that is not incorporated into the spatial model. Meanwhile, the Cartel Party approach can tell us little in cases where challenger parties are not only successful but successful on the ideational terms of the mainstream parties (i.e., globalization discourse). Blyth and Katz incorporate the rise of populist and radical anti-system into their model, but only by assuming that they will reject the cartel’s consensus (2005: 54-55). The Center-Constructing Party model, by contrast, would produce a narrative closer to the one I have presented here; the bricolage discussed above could be seen as a way of framing independence as the “political center.” However, the consistent linkage of independence with “responsibility” rather than “centrism” (see the discussion of the “freedom-responsibility linkage” below) suggests that a model that also incorporates valence considerations tells us more in this case than Hindmoor’s attachment to the spatial metaphor.

Finally, the application of my approach to SNP’s globalization heresthetic also highlights the complexity of the process of bricolage. The model, as I have defined it, does not specify the specific mechanisms by which the discursive toolkit will be shared between actors. I treat discourse as a kind of open resource, a public commons into which language is donated and from which it is taken. This is a workable methodological simplification, but we can see that it ignores process and temporality. In this case, we see that sometimes it appears that successful strategies are adopted directly from other parties in the system, as with SNP’s use of the new times thesis hewing closely to Labour’s. But other times, it seems that parallel development and novel developments can occur where multiple parties face the same strategic demands against the same
cultural background. The difference between genuinely novel forms of bricolage (arguments built from discursive “first principles,” as it were), and adaptations of the discourse of others, are hard to clearly distinguish in practice. Bricolage might be understood as a simple narrative of parties building on each other’s rhetoric, but it seems that that will not explain some of the key empirical features here. In this case, a model more like the Market-Oriented Party, with its concrete understanding of market research, might be more insightful on this point (notwithstanding the other limitations of that approach).

UKIP

Finally, we turn to UKIP. As I noted in the case conclusion, this party can be read as a much more imperfect fit with the vision of an ideal-typical Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party, or at least of a particularly successful one. Having been organized as a kind of hybrid between a purely tactical single-issue party and a more broad populist movement, UKIP has been faced with pressure to be both strategically euroskeptical and politely xenophobic (or at least politely populist). At least by the time of Farage’s assumption of the leadership, the decision had been made (or at least fallen into by default) to operate in the realm of explicitly populist politics; absent an extremely creative rhetorical move, this rules out the principled liberal euroskepticism of Sked’s original vision, and the broader electoral approach that might follow. Instead, we see a party attempting to send multiple signals at once. Such a mixed strategy is naturally going to be difficult for any one ideal-type to explain satisfactorily. The closest fit is probably the Market-Oriented Party, since polling of British voters generally shows that populist euroskepticism is not a bad approximation of what they are looking for. But the key question to be answered about UKIP is not why they would pursue populist domestic policies and tactical euroskepticism, since there are committed blocs of voters associated with each, but how that careful balance is
sustained. On this most of the mainstream approaches provides much insight, because they all
generally assume that the preferences of the majority comprise a set of naturally complementary
positions. Partial exceptions would be cartel theory and Hindmoor’s model: In the former, UKIP
might be an archetypal anti-system party which is the counterpoint to the Cartel Party, except
that again UKIP reproduces rather than challenges the consensus on globalization. In the latter,
the Center-Constructing Party is expected to be able to group policies at the center because they
have no inherent spatial position. However, the radical populism of UKIP seems at odds with a
strategy that privileges the middle-ground. Rather, through the lens of heresthetic-bricolage we
can interpret the party’s strategy as one of positioning itself at the extreme of the Europe debate
while rendering that the only responsible position.

The result of this strategy is a discourse that is carefully articulated so as to use the
established association of globalism with economic progress (a kind of Thatcher-Blair
consensus) to shift the public understanding of hard euroskepticism. Such a heresthetic
manipulates the structures of competence-based voting in order to buy the party space between
the twin strategic threats of perceived extremism and mainstream cooptation. Together, then, we
see a mixture of styles on the part of UKIP, vis-à-vis the broader globalization politics that I have
discussed. Unlike the alternatives mentioned above, the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party model
can explain both the party’s replication specific rhetorical strategies with proven political effect
(as with the “new times thesis”), but it can also be seen as constructing novel strategies (like the
“natural/artificial dichotomy”) that draw on the same fundamental toolkit.

Globalization as Discourse and Heresthetic

In this section, I turn from theoretical refinement to the empirical contributions of this
analysis. As I have noted, in Jackson’s model of analyticism the analysis “must terminate in
case-specific narrative” in which ideal-types “are a means for constructing case-specific explanations, and not ends in themselves.” (2011: 152). In other words, the overall empirical finding of this dissertation is not the existence Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party, which is only a stylized analytical construct. Rather, the finding is the empirical pattern that this analytical device has allowed us to identify, or rather to distinguish from the messy background of other concrete factors: the globalization heresthetic. This refers to the parties’ strategic practice of articulating “globalization” as a novel and inevitable phenomenon, in a way that manipulates the background understandings of British politics in order to cast the parties as legitimate contenders. It can be seen as having two main components: the globalization discourse itself, and the specific rhetorical features that produce heresthetic results. Those features are the recurrent tropes that I have highlighted at the end of each case narrative: the new times thesis, the isolation-engagement dichotomy, the freedom-responsibility linkage, and the natural-artificial dichotomy. After briefly discussing the globalization discourse below, I will discuss each of these in turn. It is by tying the discourse to the parties’ strategic contexts, by way of these specific rhetorical devices, that the heresthetic-bricolage model produces an empirical observation beyond what has already been said in CDA and other accounts of political discourse.

Labour, SNP, and UKIP have all deployed very similar discourses of globalization, as I have noted, because they echo the articulation that Blair and Brown pioneered as part of the rhetorical style of New Labour. Succinctly stated in two passages from Blair’s “Japan speech,” this discourse holds that: “The driving force of economic change today is globalisation. […] A country has to dismantle barriers to competition and accept the disciplines of the international economy” (2004: 118). This was built, of course, from the “toolkit” provided by Thatcherite economic discourse, the famous “TINA” logic that “there is no alternative” to neoliberal
reforms. But New Labour put this discourse together in a different way, stressing the newness of globalization over its constraining properties—emphasizing the first half of the above quote (“the driving force today”) over the second half. With this grounding of a Labour-Tory consensus on the forces of economic change, SNP is able to also present “a world that shrinks each day” as a given and construct independence in a way that “challenges the sterile, out of date, and bankrupt political British system and looks above it to the brighter prospects that await us in Europe and the world” (SNP 1997: 4). And UKIP, for its part, “recognises Britain as a global player with a global destiny” (2010: 10).

The Globalization Discourse

Each party articulates its claim about globalization differently, but relies on a common set of assumptions about global order and change (the globalization discourse proper). These assumptions are (re)produced in public discourse through particular linguistic choices made in the parties’ talk and text:

- The grammatical mood of passages dealing with globalization is almost invariably declarative; they make claims about the world, or about the parties themselves. While it is not surprising that these examples of partisan rhetoric lack interrogative mood (except occasionally, such as UKIP’s question-and-answer manifesto format); after all, it would undermine the authoritative position of political parties vis-à-vis the electorate to be asking questions rather than providing answers. However, the use of declarative over imperative mood is more notable, as it serves to naturalize the phenomena that are labeled “globalization.” An imperative mood that calls for specific action by the public or the party would imply a strong role for political agency, whereas the naturalized discourse suppresses human agency by treating globalization as inevitable.
The type of *semantic relations* used between claims in the party texts varies more widely. For example, temporal relations are used to establish chronology in certain deployments of the new times thesis (discussed further in the next section), such as the “first era” logic in Blair’s Japan speech. However, there is a notable pattern of descriptions of globalization lacking causal semantic relations (or sometimes any connecting words at all). This lack of specific causal explanations means that the parties’ globalization claims most often rely on a logic of appearances, which actually reinforces the discursively constructed inevitability of globalization by eliding the specific connections in the argument that might be challenged or changed.

Finally, the use of *epistemic modality* is also a critical linguistic choice that supports the dominant globalization discourse. While political parties might just as easily rely on deontic modality, arguing for how the political world *should* be organized according to their values, these parties discuss globalization almost exclusively in epistemic terms (truth claims rather than normative appeals). This builds upon the other features to produce an understanding of globalization as an inevitable feature of contemporary political life. And by keeping claims about the significance of globalization separate from normative positions, it preserves the parties’ room for maneuver in distinguishing specific policy choices from the broader discourse in which the parties’ ground their identities. Collectively these choices amount to making a “pervasive claim [about] the new ‘global’ economy,” which analyzed in isolation could be seen as part and parcel of the same ideology-sustaining discourse of the Thatcher years (Fairclough 2003: 9). But reading through the lens of bricolage—where the precise arrangement of a construct is as important as the nature of the elements that comprise it—we can identify more nuanced and differentiated political arguments
being made. Below, I detail the four rhetorical devices that mark the globalization heresthetic (as distinct from the globalization discourse constituted by the linguistic features above).

New Times Thesis

Of the rhetorical figures discussed here, the new times thesis is the one most central to the globalization discourse proper. Indeed, accelerating interconnectedness as a novel feature of global lived experience is a definitional element according to the “hyperglobalist” and “transformational” accounts of globalization (Held et al. 1999). Yet there is more to this figure than merely claiming that the current era of globalization is qualitatively new. The archetypal expression of this thesis has been offered by Blair in a number of places; for example: “I believe the world has changed in a more fundamental way. Globalisation has transformed our economies and our working practices. […] We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or no” (1996b). But this transformation is not represented as a one-time event, but an ongoing process—“a world with its finger on the fast forward button” (Blair 1997). Moreover, it is a process that has occurred in stages. The “first era of response to globalization” (Blair 2004: 118), which entailed the purely neoliberal process of lowering trade barriers and liberalizing economic regulations, has now come and gone. This is a representation of the 1990s as something like an “even newer times.” In these times, as the 1997 Labour manifesto asserts, many aspects of previous eras “have no relevance whatsoever to the modern world,” for better (antagonistic left-right politics) or for worse (the promise of a “job-for-life”).

The notion of a new form of political competition for the globalized era is particularly important for the heresthetic utility of this rhetorical figure. In the SNP discourse there is talk of a “new terrain” to which politics has “irrevocably” moved, from the “straight forward left right debate” (MacAskill 2004: 16). These interlinked claims (post-ideological politics and the
irrevocability of the move) echo the earlier New Labour claims. These allowed Blair to pick and choose in terms of policy: a claim was established for Labour leadership—“The reason for having created new Labour is to meet the challenges of a different world” (Labour Party 1997)—while at the same time leaving no doubt that “some of the changes made by the Conservatives in the 1980s were inevitable and are here to stay” (Blair 2004: 118). Similarly, though more comfortable than New Labour in being labeled a left-wing party, SNP benefits from this de-emphasis on left-right politics because of its particular policy agenda: A post-ideological framing of political competition opens space for a focus on national independence. More importantly, it opens this space while claiming the legitimacy of a serious party, in the same way as New Labour, by explicitly “recognizing” the inevitability of globalization (e.g., manifesto commitments designed “to keep pace with the rapidly changing demands of the global economy;” SNP 2007: 54). This is a major shift from a time when mainstream discourse treated SNP with distrust precisely because it did not fit clearly into the left-right class conflict.

UKIP, as I have noted, deploys the new times thesis less often, and in a different way, than Labour and SNP. For example, consider the Farage comment to Mark Daniel with which I opened the UKIP case narrative: “I could not see the answer then and I certainly cannot see it now. To restrict trade in a global market, just as technology was liberating it, seemed and seems crazy” (2005: 13; emphasis added). “Now” and “just as” appear as markers of the present, and liberation by technology certainly refers to the globalist new times thesis; but here it is political events (European integration) interrupting the flow of history, rather than historical events disturbing the flow of politics. Overall, references to temporality in UKIP discourse tend to be either backward- or forward-looking, referring to a time when the UK was outside European institutions or when it will be again. Hence, “leaving the Union and reclaiming our destiny will
create the most exciting opportunity for national renewal in our lifetime” (Farage 2013), with “leaving” and “reclaiming” as future events that nevertheless recall the past. The lone exception, making an archetypal “new times” statement in pillorying the EU appeal to “obsolete economic and political theories of the 1950s” (Kilroy-Silk, qtd. in Daniel 2005: 150), is notable only for its rarity. This is logical considering the party’s key policy goal—a “hard euroskeptic” turning-back of the clock—but in terms of party strategy it is notably in contrast with the SNP approach just discussed. This may be simply a failure by UKIP to fully deploy the globalization heresthetic in this respect. But it may also be a necessary compromise with the populist aspect of the party’s political strategy, which does not sit well with the Labour/SNP strategy of legitimation through acceptance of historical change.

This is the kind of “coincidental cause” (an empirically-relevant causal factor that is not encompassed by an ideal-type; Jackson 2011: 150) that necessarily complicates any analytical narrative. But the contrast only highlights the strategic aspect of the new times thesis as it appears in Labour and SNP discourse. Taken together, these passages can be read as an articulation of globalization that is related to a particular narrative of British politics: the decline of left-right ideological competition and the rise of the more sober post-ideological party. Of course, it is hardly new to say that the globalization discourse is related to the de-emphasis of the traditional class-based political cleavage—this is central to Hay’s claim of “depoliticization” (2007) and the party cartel thesis (Blyth and Katz 2005)—but the contrast with UKIP shows that a strong emphasis on “new politics for new times” is not inherent in the globalization discourse. Rather, this operates as part of a globalization heresthetic with the strategic function of opening space for new players (SNP and post-1980s Labour as realistic parties of government). Crucially,

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55 Were I attempting to construct a comprehensive account of UKIP rhetorical strategy, I would invoke a second ideal-type here to formalize this dimension (a Populist Party type, perhaps, or a Downsian vote-maximizer reflecting public opinion), but that is outside the scope of this project.
this approach *indirectly* undermines claims to being the only respectable parties—by the Tories (for Labour), or the mainstream parties in general (for SNP)—without having to directly rebut the historical narratives on which those claims are founded. That is, by invoking a new era, New Labour stakes its claim without having to revise the public narrative about Tory success in the past (indeed, openly endorsing some of Thatcher’s policies), and SNP makes its case without needing to convince Labour converts that they were somehow wrong to vote on class lines in the past. Conversely, these claims are difficult for their opponents to directly challenge, because they are built from discursive resources that those opposing parties themselves imbued with legitimacy. In this light, the Conservatives’ inability after 1997 to articulate a convincing alternative to “Third Way” globalism may be seen as an illustration of heresthetics working “even though those who are manipulated know they are being manipulated” (Riker 1986: 151).

**Isolation-Engagement Dichotomy**

Though it is the new times thesis that appears most often in the globalization heresthetic, the isolation-engagement dichotomy is also prominent, and is not so easily explained by purely ideological accounts of discourse. Tied to the spatial rather than temporal aspect of globalization, this dichotomy opposes the necessity of robust international engagement with a self-defeating isolationism, and is found in a similar form in each party’s rhetoric. As articulated by Blair (2001), this aspect of the globalization heresthetic comprises two claims: the explicit declaration that “the alternative to globalization is isolation;” and the related assertion that in response to “this reality, round the world, nations are instinctively drawing together.” It is clear from the context of this claim that the alternative of isolation is unacceptable; indeed, it would be a rejection of “reality” and of the “instinctive” need for states to align themselves. Though deployed in the service of very different policy arguments, this rhetorical opposition is also
present in SNP’s framing of a choice to go “into the mainstream of Europe, or be stuck in the backwater of Britain” (1992a: 1), and UKIP’s warning of British relegation to “a regional state within a ‘United States of Europe’” (2010: 10).

In terms of the discursive toolkit available, there is an obvious echo between Blair’s “alternative to globalization is isolation” framing and the famous TINA discourse of Thatcherism. And again, analyzed only through the lens of CDA, it would seem to do the same ideological work both of denying the legitimacy of an “isolationist” policy and of closing off the possibility of any middle ground. It does have this effect, but the distinction between the two phrasings is also telling: In textual analysis terms, the TINA claim is monological in contrast to the dialogicity of this new arrangement of the same elements. In other words, while TINA denies the existence meaningful alternative voices, the isolation-engagement dichotomy explicitly acknowledges this possibility, in order to associate it with opposing parties. For example, their isolationism (on Europe) has made it “difficult to believe that the Tories are a mainstream political party” (Labour Party 1999: 19), while UKIP’s commitment to engagement with the world beyond Europe is “a stark contrast to the defeatist and apologetic stance taken by other parties” (UKIP 2010: 10). In this way, TINA might be the stronger rhetoric with which to legitimate a specific policy, but the isolation-engagement dichotomy serves a more expressly party-political end.

This strategic maneuver, of mapping party antagonisms onto this spatial aspect of the globalization discourse, appears consistently across the three party discourses. This is remarkable considering that the parties are deeply divided on the substantive issues with which it is associated. In particular, Europe tends to be the focus, occupying one side of the dichotomy or the other depending on the party in question. For Labour, the Tories are backward isolationists
for being divided on Europe; for SNP, both major parties are lumped into an isolationist English political establishment; while for UKIP, all of the above parties are isolationist for choosing to emphasize European integration rather than engaging with the wider world. This suggests that, in policy terms, the parties are working out the implications of the isolation-engagement dichotomy in very different ways. Were their discourses the products of a principled argument on the issues, we would expect specific questions to be debated: How would an independent Scotland engage in Europe differently than the UK? Is European integration, along current lines, a companion or a hindrance to global cooperation? But of course these kinds of arguments are not engaged by the parties in a substantial way. Such a debate would clarify the common understanding of “globalization,” that is, to what is being referred when each party deploys that signifier. But such clarity runs directly counter to the power of a “logic of appearances” discourse.

Freedom-Responsibility Linkage

Unlike the previous two features, the freedom-responsibility linkage (and its variation, the freedom-relationships linkage) are particular to the SNP and UKIP discourses. It refers to the reversal of the conventional understanding of “freedom” and “responsibility” as opposed concepts, connected only through uneasy tension. The usual formulation is reflected in the trope of democratic politics that freedom and responsibilities must be balanced. This rhetoric, however, implies that they are not only complementary (rather than opposed), but actually linked—at least when it comes to national independence. As the SNP independence white paper reads: “Independence would give Scotland the responsibility for making decisions about its future as part of an international, globalised environment, making a full contribution to the interdependent world” (Scottish Government 2009: 18). In other words, because of globalization, Scottish independence is not the abdication of the responsibility for coexisting within the UK,
but the acceptance of new responsibilities of participating in the world. This articulation is important in that it uses globalization discourse to reverse the mainstream argument that these niche parties are fundamentally irresponsible. Now, what is it about “today’s interdependent world” that means that “what it means to be independent has changed” to include “taking decisions for ourselves and being accountable for them” (SNP 2005: 18)? This is not clear. Again, the discourse follows a “logic of appearances” in which the exact relationship between responsibility and globalization is not explicitly defined.

The freedom-relationships linkage that appears in UKIP discourse functions in a similar way. Specifically, leaving the EU is framed not as a breaking of important international ties, but as an opportunity to reinvest in Britain’s relationships outside of Europe. Indeed, these relationships are apparently being weakened by continued participation in the European project, in as much as leaving would “strengthen trade relationships with countries outside the EU (UKIP 2005: 5). Direct references to globalization do not appear with this figure, contrary to the great emphasis on it in the SNP variation. However, it should be noted that the UKIP rhetoric contains both a negative and a positive claim. The negative claim about the insularity of the EU is not necessarily related to globalization, but the notion of a world with authority concentrated at the global level is implied in the positive claim: “At the same time we shall regain our independent seat in the World Trade Organisation which we shall use to counter any trade restrictions from the EU and to press for further expansion of global free trade” (UKIP 2005: 5). Free trade and international relationships are thus associated here with the global trade regime of the WTO, and placed in opposition to the restrictive EU. This is hardly the only way that these elements could be connected—trade within the EU is more free than most trade amongst WTO members—but it
is an arrangement that sustains a positive understanding of global trade relationships while placing UKIP on the right side of the argument.

Together, these features constitute a distinctly nationalist aspect of the globalization heresthetic. Even though nationalism and globalization are normally understood as opposed concepts (like freedom and responsibility), SNP and UKIP have reconciled them by interposing the claim that sovereignty is essential to a nation controlling its destiny in a world defined by global (rather than local) authority. That is, the political and economic decisions that most affect the Scottish (or British) nation are now being taken at a level beyond the UK (or Europe), rendering necessary an independent seat at the EU (or WTO). Though overlooked by some broad analyses of globalization discourse, this point is neither new nor entirely surprising. As discussed earlier, studies of the “new” nationalism suggest that globalization can bolster separatist claims “by cutting the benefits of integration and by reducing the obstacles to independence or the various forms of autonomy” (Paquin 2002: 55). But looking closely at the language actually used, we do not see that point developed and argued explicitly. Rather, what we find is the juxtaposition of “freedom” with “responsibility” and “relationships,” reflecting the heresthetic aim of redirecting the globalization discourse against claims by competing parties that Scottish nationalism and hard euroskepticism are irresponsible policies (and therefore extreme, and therefore electorally undesirable). Indeed, it is the status quo positions of the mainstream parties on these issues that are rendered as irresponsible, by associating them with “trade restrictions” and other qualities that the mainstream globalization discourse itself renders unacceptable.

Natural-Artificial Dichotomy

The final rhetorical device that I have identified within the globalization heresthetic is more-or-less unique to UKIP’s particular discourse. However, it is not a case-specific feature (in
the same way as the party’s populism) because of how deeply it is intertwined with the construction of the broader globalization discourse. This feature is the natural-artificial dichotomy, according to which certain international relationships are natural (and therefore desirable), and others are artificial (and therefore undesirable). An emblematic example of this is the UKIP manifesto claim that withdrawal from Europe would allow the UK to improve ties “with our natural trading partners of the Commonwealth who were sorely snubbed when we joined the EU” (UKIP 1997; emphasis added). Once again, interpreted as a formal argument this claim raises more questions than it answers—most notably, why is the European project less “natural” than the colonial project that produced Commonwealth trade ties?—but this kind of rhetoric works through the associations that it produces rather than a persuasive causal argument. This dichotomy is also present in UKIP’s claim to support “genuine free trade,” which implicitly opposes its policy to a false or artificial alternative, namely trade within the EU. Moreover, this genuine trade is implied to be better for the UK because of the possibility to engage with emerging economies, which are associated with the discourse of globalization: “Britain has links with some of the world’s fastest growing economies, such as those of the Indian subcontinent. […] These connections equip us to take advantage of global opportunities” (UKIP 2001).

This dichotomy can be considered part of the overall globalization heresthetic because of the way it deploys key elements of the globalization discourse proper, thereby reproducing and leveraging them. Specifically, it draws upon and resonates with the “naturalization” component of the wider discourse (“whether autumn should follow summer,” etc.). But notably, it does so not by merely restating it, reminding the audience once again of globalization’s inevitability. Rather, it emphatically rejects the New Labour claim that European integration is natural (“nations instinctively drawing together”), but maintains the core assumption that political
phenomena can be meaningfully described as natural and that identifying the natural course is political best practice. Thus, while the parties continue to diverge on questions such as European integration, and rhetorically maneuver around each other for advantage, the discourse actually becomes closed more tightly around them, defining the broad terms of political debate.

**Significance and Future Research**

In this final section, I move beyond the questions I posed about Labour, SNP, and UKIP, and consider the significance of this analysis for the broader study of party politics. Overall, the goal of this project has been to systematically reinterpret three of the most important trends in British politics over the last twenty years: the renaissance of Labour, the resurgence of Scottish nationalism, and the emergence of a euroskeptic alternative to the Tories. As a means to that end, I have taken the rhetoric of globalization as the central object of analysis, rather than assuming that it is an epiphenomenon, and applied to it the novel ideal-typical framework of heresthetic-bricolage. This suggests much more moderate conclusions about the state of Western party systems than the claims of rampant depoliticization extrapolated from the Cartel Party and other popular accounts. In terms of the individual strategic decisions of parties, the utility of this reading suggests a need to look beyond adoption of stylized “policy positions” and give more attention to the productive effects of political speech. And in terms of the way that ideas about globalization shape policy and politics (in Britain and elsewhere), this analysis suggests that looking for structural changes to disrupt paradigms is misleading; the globalization discourse is likely to maintain its predominance as long as parties can find strategic applications.

In the following sub-sections, I consider two points in depth. First, I outline the (theoretical) significance and applications of this approach to political science beyond the party...
competition accounts discussed above. Second, I address the specific (empirical) question of what we can expect from the globalization debate in Britain moving forward.

Future Research on Political Parties

There are a number of ways that we can extend this approach, given the theoretical advancements on existing party competition models that I have outlined. Firstly, additional British parties could be incorporated into the analysis: the Conservatives and Liberals of the current coalition, of course, have deployed and continue to deploy the globalization discourse. These parties would be coming from different places strategically, and so the analysis would likely look somewhat different. The kind of discursive heresthetic that would, for example, revitalize the staid image of the Conservative Party and undermine the claims of New Labour might be quite different from the globalization heresthetic presented here, though we can expect that it would also borrow elements from the globalization discourse. Further research in this direction would provide us with a more comprehensive representation of British party politics in this period, but because of this difference would necessarily be less precise in the claims that we could make. Likewise, a parallel analysis could be extended to other party systems in this era, examining how French, German, or American parties deploy the globalization discourse to strategic ends. But because the discursive resources available to parties in other societies would be so different, it would be even harder to say that we are analyzing the same empirical phenomenon, except in the most general sense.

There is no reason, however, that the heresthetic-bricolage approach needs to be limited to empirically similar cases. For the reasons of specificity mentioned above, I selected parties within the same national context, but there is nothing about this approach that is limited to Britain, or to globalization. The party politics of globalization discourse is a good example to
illustrate and develop the approach, because claims about global transformation are particularly useful for partisan manipulation due to distant from the lived experience of individual voters. But heresthetics and bricolage are broad analytical concepts that we could apply to gain additional understanding about a range of political debates in different times and places. This approach could shed new light on widely studied debates about the nature and purpose of the welfare state, for example; the broad waves of ideological shift on those questions might turn out to be better explained as the rhetorical maneuvering of specific parties. Likewise, it could be used to capture dynamics in political debates happening presently, such as attempts by parties in many countries to control the narrative about responsibility for the global financial crisis. Applying this analysis, we may conclude that rhetoric may be tied to strategic situations more than ideological or policy considerations. Parties with different policy prescriptions may nevertheless construct the same narrative of the crisis, or parties that are similarly committed to austerity may still construct different narratives to blame each other assure their respective election prospects.

This suggests a broader research program of developing the Heresthetician-Bricoleur type as a general model of political competition. This would fulfill both Riker’s vision of recognizing heresthetics as the central motivation of politics, and the critical discourse/rhetorical analysis goal of recognizing language as the central constitutive feature of politics. In theoretical terms, it will remind analysts and observers of political debate that broad ideas like globalization and nationalism are as subject to underlying political maneuvering as policy commitments. And in practical terms, I hope that it can help the participants in political debates to better understand the terms of the competition. Globalization, for example, has been often debated as a high-stakes

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56 Indeed, there is no need to limit ourselves to parties. The concepts could be jointly used to analyze any kind of political actor, including other organizations, individual politicians, and even states in an international relations context. But this would entail a different ideal-type, integrating the concepts into new theories and literatures, and so I limit myself to parties in this discussion.
question of high politics, of the economic ordering of the world. And it is true that “the ideas
which prominent opinion makers hold about [global] flows” may indeed have such important
policy consequences (Hay and Watson 1999: 419). But when interested individuals and
organizations want to weigh in on these debates, it will surely be important for them to know
whether and to what extent these grand claims are actually linked to the quotidian politics of
winning elections and undermining opposing parties—the low politics of globalization.

The Future of Globalization Discourse in Britain

Though this is fundamentally a dissertation about the theory of party competition, it also
makes specific empirical claims about the globalization heresthetic. Why are these findings
important? In part, it is because they force us to rethink simplistic assumptions about the
ideological role of discourse and rhetoric by reminding us that such language is embedded in the
strategic competition of parties as well as in larger structures of power. Most directly, however, I
argue that this model tells us where to look for future changes in the dominant political-
economic discourses in Britain: Rather than looking in the realm of material economic
developments and policy changes, assuming that the discourse will be driven by structural
transformations as in a punctuated equilibrium model (e.g., Hall 1993), we must look to the play
of party competition in the electoral arena. It is only the bricolage of new and more
heresthetically effective discursive arrangements that will displace the globalization discourse.

At the end of Chapter 4, I addressed this issue in regard to the rhetorical and heresthetic
strategy of the post-2010 Labour Party. There are ongoing intellectual debates in the UK about
what direction Labour discourse ought to take in the light of the Global Financial Crisis and the
austerity policies of the Conservative-led coalition government. Participants in this debate
generally agree that the party has to pursue a major change in the terms of political discourse—
what David Coates calls a “progressive hegemonic campaign” to supplant austerity with a renewed idea of social democracy (2013: 38)—in order to both achieve real economic progress and to make itself electorally relevant. Yet as Riker might say, we know little about the rhetorical content of progressive hegemonic campaigns, and as a result cannot even give good advice to progressive hegemonic campaigners. Hay (2011) and Finlayson (2013) argue that there must be some kind of “crisis narrative” that would implicitly or explicitly challenge the inevitability and desirability of economic globalization (at least as currently understood). But they disagree on the process for getting there, with Hay arguing that the missing ingredient is an “ideational cue” (a counter-claim to globalism, essentially) and Finlayson maintaining that plenty of alternative claims exist that are rather held back by political factors. This is further complicated when we recognize that debates on austerity are cross-cut by the issues of Scottish independence and EU membership, cleavages that provide platforms for SNP and UKIP to offer their own counter-narratives, distinct from the official Labour opposition.

What unites the Hay and Finlayson accounts is an implicit model of discursive competition between parties. This model assumes that the competition over ideas runs in parallel to the competition for votes; that is, that parties seek to advance their own preferred political narratives by directly challenging and undermining the discourses of their competitors. Thus, these scholars both assume that Labour will logically seek to supplant the dominant discourse of globalization, neoliberalism, and austerity with a new crisis narrative. The model of the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party, however, highlights a different dynamic at work. Parties seem to build upon, rather than undermine, the preferred narratives of their opponents; the logic of bricolage is that it is easier to rearrange elements than to build from scratch. After all, the policy

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57 Of course, it is also true that these authors believe (strongly) that Labour should pursue this agenda in the interests of sound policy and economic justice. However, if they do not also assume that this would be in Labour’s electoral interests, then their contributions are lacking a crucial argument about getting the party to embrace normative ends.
changes that SNP and UKIP seeks are much more extreme than those of the contemporary Labour Party, but even they have not sought to directly challenge or replace Westminster’s globalist consensus in pursuing their nationalist ends.

Moreover, our specific findings about the elements of the globalization heresthetetic further reinforce the conclusion that we are more likely to see continued rearrangement of the dominant narratives than a wholesale reorientation. The isolation-engagement dichotomy might seem the most vulnerable to direct challenge post-financial crisis, because the benefits of engagement no longer seem so obvious. Yet the appeals to global cooperation in the immediate wake of the crisis, especially from Brown, would seem to militate against this. The new times thesis, conversely, could obviously be recast in reference to the financial crisis, with or without changing the way it operates heresthetically. My model would not assume that the different properties of the current period, compared with the transformative era to which Blair referred, will much constrain heresthetician-bricoleurs in their work. Indeed, it would seem that the triple linkage between global change, economic imperatives, and the image of the “responsible party” is alive and well in the discourse of austerity. Likewise, it appears that SNP and UKIP will continue to reinforce the globalization heresthetic via the freedom-responsibility linkage, which seems all the more pointed in a period where engaging directly in global governance seems a heavy burden indeed.

The questions that this leaves, in terms of where the discourse is headed, are how resilient the particular term “globalization” will be in the discursive toolkit, and how creative future heresthetician-bricoleurs can be in turning the globalization heresthetic to alternative ideological or policy ends. It is an axiom of heresthetics that “creativity cannot be predicted” (Hindmoor
and so I will not speculate on specific answers to these questions beyond the observations that I made in the case chapter conclusions. This is where there is an important role for further empirical research along these lines. But to the extent the Heresthetician-Bricoleur Party model provides useful insights into party rhetoric to date, it also carries a warning about the resilience of these constructions. As long as a particular narrative appears to be paying dividends in terms of a party’s heresthetic strategy, it is unlikely to change. This is especially true in this case, where the same underlying narrative support multiple parties’ strategies in such a way that they are reliant on mutual legitimation of the globalization claims: “globalization” would not have been so useful to New Labour except that it was already supported by Thatcherite discourse, and would not have appealed to SNP and UKIP if were not already being sustained by New Labour. If we are normatively concerned about the persistence of this discourse (like Hay, Finlayson, and Coates), we might even speak of a “heresthetic trap” into which the parties have put themselves. It is possible, of course, that some leader or party will devise a heresthetic strategy that fits a counter-hegemonic narrative into an electorally-appealing argument, drawing on globalization or some other concept in the discursive toolkit. Considering that this is the kind of maneuver that Labour failed to achieve throughout the 1980s, however, it seems likely that this will take some time to achieve.

As Hindmoor (2004) and McLean (2002) suggest, this is likely a major reason that the approach has not become widespread in rational choice theory or American political science generally, despite Riker’s overall influence.
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