ASSESSING CITIZENS’ PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS: THE CASE OF URBAN SQUATTERS IN BISHKEK

By

Irina Novikova

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Chair:

David Rosenbloom, Ph.D.

Anna Amirkhanyan, Ph.D.

Sumanat Niebert, Ph.D.

Sonia Walti, Ph.D.

Dean of the School of Public Affairs

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ABSTRACT

What do we know about how citizens feel about their governments in the post-Soviet countries? Why do we need to know how citizens feel about public bureaucracies in the context of administrative systems notoriously known for their disregard of citizens’ needs and lack of operational transparency? In this project, I examine perceptions of local government responsiveness from the point of view of some of the most vulnerable urban dwellers, residents of informal settlements in Bishkek. In the context of weak accountability relationships between the state and its constituencies in the post-Soviet Central Asia, I see an opportunity to examine whether citizens have a role to play in affecting administrative dynamics. I start with an inquiry into whether and how perceptions of local government responsiveness as expressed by the urban squatter residents differ when attributed to different levels of the Bishkek’s municipal governance system.

Further, I examine potential effects of three major factors on people's perceptions of responsiveness: (a) residents' own actions to improve living conditions as reflected in their individual and collective petitioning of local municipal government agencies; (b) existing levels of access to urban services; and (c) the role of community cleavages related to residents' regional identities. I find that prior experience in demand-making activities as well as individual engagement in communal self-help measures are associated with higher levels of perceived
responsiveness of the local municipal government; however, such perceptions vary across levels of the municipal governance system. It appears that citizen participation is likely to encourage cooperative spirit within squatter communities and may contribute to building stronger trust in local government. There is also a strong indication that sizable disparities in access to basic urban services exist in urban squatter communities in Bishkek, and that such disparities are predictably associated with a negative effect on perceptions of local government responsiveness. When regional identities are factored into analysis, urban squatter migrants from the southern regions of the country appear to be much more likely to perceive the lowest levels of the capital's municipal governance system as being responsive to their needs. Finally, citizen perceptions are found to have practical implications for the co-production of urban public services. More specifically, positive perceptions of responsiveness are found to be associated with longer municipal program implementation periods potentially pointing to the link between citizens' perceptions of responsiveness and their willingness to exercise due diligence in public service co-production.
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CHAPTER 1

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIELD

Introduction and Key Research Questions

Bishkek, the largest city of Kyrgyzstan and its capital, represents most vividly the emerging challenges of urban development in Central Asian countries. Intra-city migration and the influx of rural job-seeking migrants into large urban centers over the last two decades has led the way to spontaneous urban development, frequently accompanied by illegal residence, "squatting," on both industrial and agricultural lands within and around the city boundaries. Bishkek might indeed represent the most extreme case among capitals of Central Asian states: some of the city's parks have been dismantled and occupied by squatters; armies of clay-and-straw houses are being built in the most hazardous parts of the city, where industrial wastes are plentiful and all habitation is prohibited; unfinished multi-storied apartment buildings left standing since the Soviet times due to the lack of funding for demolition have been vigorously populated by new tenants looking for cheap housing — despite the absence of most essential amenities, like water and sanitation; houses are being built on old urban dump sites where urban waste goes three to five meters deep and the foul smell is unbearable.

Both the municipality and the national government have long appeared unable to meet the demands of squatter settlers for basic public services such as water, sanitation, energy supply, roads, affordable health clinics, and schools. Many of the issues related to land tenure, construction permits, and dwelling registration remain unresolved. Meanwhile, land squatting continues. The enormity of the problem and constant pressure on behalf of squatters and non-squatters alike have forced the municipal government to become more open with the public, seek
avenues for dialogue with the most aggrieved residents, and set up some rudimentary institutional arrangements for citizen participation in local decision making.

In the context of weak accountability relationships between the state and its constituencies in post-Soviet Central Asia, I see an opportunity to examine whether citizens have a role to play in affecting administrative dynamics. I will investigate this effect indirectly — through collecting from various sources data and information that as pieces of the puzzle may contribute to a more holistic picture. This research project is an empirical inquiry that explores a potential link between citizen perceptions of local government responsiveness among residents of squatter settlements in Bishkek, the capital of the Kyrgyz Republic, and citizen-municipal government collaboration.

More specifically, the project aims to integrate existing perspectives on local government responsiveness and answer the following questions: What are the dimensions of local government responsiveness as perceived by urban squatter settlers in this development context? Are there important linkages between such perceptions and the residents’ efforts to improve their own living conditions via political and community participation? How are perceptions different among different groups of residents in illegal settlements in the context of the actual amount and quality of urban services provided by the city and its service agencies? Finally, can there be a link between citizen perceptions of local government responsiveness and the outcomes of collaboration between municipal government and urban communities?

To answer these questions, I will divide this research project into two related parts. First, I would like to establish whether and how perceptions of local government responsiveness expressed by residents of urban squatter areas differ across levels of municipal government. To accomplish this, I will examine the potential role of informal institutions and related non-
electoral political participation, including petitioning local government authorities and service agencies for better basic services and improved living conditions and initiating communal self-help measures. Secondly, I will examine the role of effective access to basic infrastructure and urban social services as reported by the residents of the informal communities. Finally, I will look into the potential effects of regional identity, based on migrant's point of origin, on perceptions of local government responsiveness.

After gaining a better understanding of potential drivers of perceived local government responsiveness, I will proceed to explore empirically whether perceptions of local government responsiveness may have a practical implication for the Bishkek government's ability to mobilize and collaborate with settlers in the context of a municipal community grant program. This research is focused on only the first year of implementation of this program, started in 2008 and still ongoing at the time this project was completed; for reasons that will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2 under the rubric of coproduction of public services.

**Contribution to the Field**

This project is expected to provide a contribution to the understanding of accountability relationships between citizen and government in the following ways.

First, the concepts of political accountability, government responsiveness at the national and local levels, and citizen trust in government institutions loom large in the studies of democracy and democratization. Traditionally, such studies are grounded in the understanding of political dynamics in mature Western democracies. During the last two decades, the questions of government accountability and popular support for good governance have become of paramount importance in low- and middle-income transition countries in the post-Soviet space. However, there are very few studies that examine the relationships between governments and citizens in
these countries in a manner that allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the cultural context and dynamics of post-Soviet state (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Radnitz, 2010; Radnitz, Wheatley, & Zürcher, 2009). This project is expected to deepen the understanding of accountability relationships between citizens and their governments in the context of a post-Soviet state in transition, one with very specific political and institutional settings for urban governance.

Second, accountability studies tend to focus primarily on the links between perceptions of government responsiveness and formal political participation such as that seen in direct and representative democracy (Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Bowler & Donovan, 2002; Bowler, Donovan, & Karp, 2007; Cho, 2010). In transition countries, there are still very limited opportunities to exercise one’s right to vote to the degree that it will influence resource allocation or put the pressure on the government to provide improved services. Instead, informal demand-making and petitioning of government officials remain the primary channels for change, especially for the urban poor. More importantly, such petitioning almost always takes place at the local level, which makes studying responses to citizens demands by local governments and municipal service agencies ever more critical. This project is thus focused specifically on such informal demand-making mechanisms to understand the link between non-electoral political participation and perceptions of local government responsiveness.

Third, the research on urban poverty and informal urban settlement dynamics has occupied a stable niche in the studies of urban governance, political economy of service delivery in developing countries (especially in Latin American and East Asian countries), political science, and other branches of social science research. However, the issue of informal urban settlements and especially squatter settlements, originating only in the late 1980s and the early
1990s, is a relatively new phenomenon in Central Asian cities. National and especially local
governments have long been and are still particularly ill-equipped to deal with the growth of
informal settlements that have sprung up in both peri-urban and urban spaces. Informal
settlements are predominantly perceived by local governments and the public at large as
"invasions" by rural poor migrants into urban spaces, which by itself appears to be the least
accurate description of the underlying dynamics. One of this project’s objectives of instrumental
value is to acquire a better understanding of who these urban squatters are and what mechanisms
local government can employ to establish better communication them while improving the
capacity of both sides to work together on a host of urban development issues.

Finally, I aim to develop a framework to analyze local government responsiveness, both
from the citizens’ and local government’s perspectives, that builds upon the understanding of the
nature of the state. One of the central arguments of this research project is that both citizen
perceptions of responsiveness and modalities for local government response are conditional upon
the functioning of the post-Soviet state in Kyrgyzstan. I am building upon emerging theories of
post-Soviet state administrative and governance practices to identify and test the key ingredients
of responsiveness in the context of Kyrgyzstan.

Theoretical Framework and Methods

As an end target of this research project, I explore a potential link between citizen
perceptions of city government responsiveness and the ability of the city administration to
engage the citizenry in the joint production of public services in the context of an innovative
community grant program. I construct an initial framework to understand some key factors
shaping the citizen's perspectives of municipal government responsiveness. I start with
exploring whether and how perceptions of local government responsiveness differ in
distinguishing between three levels of formal authority: the city administration or mayor's office (first-tier executive authority); the city district administration, nested within the city administration (second-tier executive authority), and the block committee, the self-government level within the city district and municipal territorial unit (See Figure 1.1.). Building upon a governance framework, a service satisfaction paradigm, and the theory of formal and informal institutions in the post-Soviet space, I examine the effect of three sets of critical factors: presence of informal institutions of participation and social mobilization, access to urban service delivery, and fractionalization of irregular communities along regional identity lines.

Subsequently, building upon this understanding of citizen perceptions of responsiveness, I examine whether such sentiments may be instrumental in facilitating cooperation between the citizens in squatter areas of Bishkek and the Bishkek city administration (See Figure 1.2.). The focus is on the municipal government's ability to carry out social mobilization activities including (a) community consultations, (b) identification of investment priorities, and (c) mobilization of community co-financing required for investment projects to be implemented. I determine the duration of social mobilization activities as the outcome reflecting the successes and challenges faced by the municipality in working with constituent communities.

I rely on a number of data sources for this research project. My main source is the quantitative and qualitative data generated by an extensive study of squatter settlements in Bishkek in 2007. The quantitative component consists of a household survey of Bishkek slum residents. The total sample size is 1,000 respondents. The objective of the survey was to identify key development issues persistent in the informal settlements of Bishkek. The qualitative component consists of about 45 focus group transcripts and key informant interviews. I complement these data sources with an extensive review of administrative information about the
grant project and online newspaper articles about major events taking place in informal settlements.

**Irregular Settlements are a Global Problem**

This study focuses on the residents of informal settlements in Bishkek, the capital of the Kyrgyz Republic. While unregulated urban expansion and relentless growth of slum-like squatter communities is a quite new phenomenon within the post-Soviet space, these issues have been anything but uncommon in the cities of the global South for the last six decades or so. The policy responses characteristic for the 1950s and 1960s to the unplanned urban growth typically included demolitions of urban slums, mass relocations to high-rise public housing blocks, and policies of inaction, i.e., deliberate exclusion of slum-residents from provision of public services and infrastructure (Cities Alliance, 2003). According to the Cities Alliance (2003), which represents a global partnership of international, national, and sub-national institutions and organizations committed to the issues of urban development, political activism of slum dwellers and civil society advocacy organizations in the 1970s brought about an increased awareness of the failures of policies aimed at forced resettlement and slum demolition. As a result, regularization and urban upgrade of informal settlements with minimum displacement started to be propagated as a more sustainable policy response (Kessides, 1997). This is not to say that forced evictions and slum demolitions are no longer practiced — they continue to occur on a wide scale in modern times as well (UN-HABITAT, 2010; Yessenova, 2010). To cite one of the earlier reports of the United Nation Human Settlements Programme's (referred to as UN-HABITAT), "…urban squatter settlements, once they are formed, tend to become a permanent feature of the cities over the years" (UN-HABITAT, 2000).
Another policy discovery was related to the realization that upgrading of urban slums and formalization of settlements required more than mere provision of affordable housing and assurance of access to urban infrastructure: institutional reforms were required to address the concomitant issues of legal and political rights of the urban poor residing in such communities and equity in distribution of basic infrastructure and social services. The first urban upgrade projects designed to tackle these issues included poverty alleviation and livelihood enhancement measures, as well as coordinated efforts to improve residents' land tenure and access to social services such as education and health (Minnery et al., 2013).

Urban governance and institutional reforms have slowly become integral parts of the urban upgrade processes. Such reforms are expected to include changes in regulatory framework that would allow formalization of squatter lands in the public domain through urban master planning and zoning (UN-HABITAT, 2010). Other elements aim at addressing the issues of intergovernmental relations and coordination between the national government and sub-national/local governments to mobilize resources for and ensure implementation of upgrade programs. Yet another major governance issue has emerged as fostering participation of the informal settlement residents themselves to ensure long-term sustainability of upgraded environments (Werlin, 1999). Some scholars go as far as to state that it is the "soft power" relationship between political leadership inclusive of public bureaucracies and the governed that leads to long-term success in urban upgrading: such soft power would include expanding "…the two-way flow of communication, promoting legitimacy, maintaining supervision, cultivating contractors, protecting independent spheres of authority, and developing conflict resolution procedures" (Werlin, 2010, p.452).
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, multi-sectoral large-scale upgrading projects became more common, while the issue of slum upgrade was also starting to occupy a solid position on a global development agenda: the United Nations, when adopting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000, included "a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020" as one of its targets (UN-HABITAT, 2004, p.4). The definition of slums also underwent a number of refinements over the years. Historically, the notion of slums had been used to denote old residential quarters that had become dilapidated, obsolete, and lacking basic services, while shanty towns had been used to refer to new informal settlements spontaneously emerging as a result of unplanned urban growth (UN-HABITAT, 2003). In 2002, UN-HABITAT introduced a new streamlined policy definition of slums to track progress under the MDGs, and this definition still stands. Accordingly, a slum household is

a group of individuals living under the same roof lacking one or more of the conditions such as access to improved water; access to improved sanitation facilities; sufficient-living area, not overcrowded; structural quality/durability of dwelling; and security of tenure. (UN-HABITAT, 2003, p.18)

This new definition was used to produce the first global baseline estimate of the share of the population residing under slum conditions. Importantly, under this definition the slums may refer to both older formal and new informal settlements so long as one of the five conditions mentioned above applies. The slum population was estimated in 2010 to be at around 39 percent of the total urban population in the world or around 770 million people (UN-HABITAT, 2010). Not surprisingly, this figure does not tell much if not broken down by regions of the world, further by nation states, and even by cities inside them. The highest concentrations of the slum

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1 Incidentally, this UN-HABITAT report provides a captivating summary of all types of "indigenous" slum definitions from 30 global cities. Only one city from the Commonwealth of Independent States, Moscow, is included, and definitions there refer primarily to old dilapidated housing stock as opposed to newly emerging informal settlements, which are becoming a growing problem as well.
population were found on the African Continent (61 percent) and the Asia and Pacific Region (42 percent) whereas the share of slum population across the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) located in Central Asia, however, also exhibited quite high proportions of slum dwellers: 51 percent in Uzbekistan, 56 percent in Tajikistan, and 52 percent in Kyrgyz Republic compared to just 10 percent of slum population share across the Commonwealth of Independent States (UN-HABITAT, 2003). About 227 million people are estimated to have been lifted out of the slum environment between 2000 and 2010 – a change driven primarily by improved urban conditions in China and India. Despite such improvements, close to 830 million people were still reckoned to reside in slum conditions as of 2010; in relative terms, however, the share of the slum population among the urban population had decreased from 39 percent to roughly 33 percent (UN-HABITAT, 2010). Yet, having close to a billion people living under slum conditions in urban agglomerations continues to be a staggering and disquieting fact of modern life.

Most recent empirical evidence indicates that in the long term urbanization, under conditions of economic growth and reasonably low income inequality, is strongly and positively linked to higher living standards and reduced poverty rates overall (UN-HABITAT, 2010). Therefore, slums are frequently viewed as a "necessary evil" on the way towards a more prosperous and highly urbanized future. The core of the lingering complexity from a policy standpoint is that there are no specific patterns in the resulting shelter deprivations or types of slums: the issue is acutely local and global at the same time, which proscribes a universal approach to slum upgrade. Here is how the Global Urban Observatory puts it:
…In all of the cities where the urban landscape is dominated by slums, improving the lives of slum dwellers first requires the implementation of macro-economic programmes that can lift households from deprivation to adequate living standards, providing for the missing elements in their environments: housing infrastructure and finance, improved water, improved sanitation, or durable housing units with adequate living space. However, these macro-level programmes must be associated with micro-level schemes, including micro-credit, self-help, education and employment. Housing services may be available, but families will use them only if they are affordable. (UN-HABITAT, 2010, p.41)

While a general approach may be commonly understood, the exact policy instruments will differ from place to place, even within the space of a single country. This is the reason why in its most recent re-conceptualization of urban prosperity the UN-HABITAT assigns the central role to the government institutions and laws. Urban prosperity is represented through a wheel with five spokes standing for economic productivity, solid urban infrastructure, quality of life, equity and social inclusion, and environmental sustainability – all connected to the central hub of government institutions, laws and urban planning (UN-HABITAT, 2013). The overall approach is historically consistent; the re-evaluated role of the government institutions, however, is clearly front and center.

The definition of the government's role sits at the heart of the debate about informality as the defining feature of slums. It is frequently assumed that modern governments are expected to play a benevolent role by uplifting slum residents from urban poverty and extending basic services to them through infrastructure upgrades. Practical experience may be somewhat different. Yessenova (2010) meticulously documents how slum upgrades and subsequent formalization of property rights became a vehicle for shifting the urban poor elsewhere in various countries around the globe where slum upgrade projects were hailed as big successes. The author argues compellingly that formalization of property rights does not automatically
imply guaranteed economic and tenure security and may transform itself into dispossession by legalization:

It has been established, however, that legality, no matter how much it is desired, has negative consequences for the poor. Market value of the legalized assets, land in particular, rises sharply, attracting speculators and developers who push the original owners out. Informality, on the other hand, discourages speculative transactions, helping to keep property value low and assets intact." (Yessenova, 2010, p.39)

The obvious conclusion is that slums are inhabited because other legal housing markets are not accessible or affordable: for example, when weak rental markets prohibit migrants from finding affordable rental housing in a city. Informality, thus, may be viewed as a necessary requirement for housing affordability. Tolerance of informal housing results also from the benefit the population affords the city through provision of a cheap source of labor for small businesses — especially in the local trade activities. Consequently, the word of caution about the expected caring role of governments in the context of developing countries comes from the expectation that governments will frame their response to slums within a broader economic policy that may not necessarily address the issues of social justice. In the case of a Central Asian country neighboring to Kyrgyzstan, for example, forced evictions introduced at the same time as formalization of squatters' rights were tied to a growing demand for land to be used for elite real estate development — even after informal land invasions had been tolerated or ignored for a number of years, even for several decades, prior to such evictions (Yessenova, 2010).

Slums in the Post-Soviet Countries

The discussion of unhampered urbanization and resultant deprivations of slum dwellers is typically dominated by the dynamics of two world regions, the African continent and South and East Asia; some meager crumbs of information are available on the urbanization challenges
faced by the nations within the post-Soviet space, particularly in Central Asia. This is not to say that urban slums do not exist in that part of the world — quite the opposite. The region exhibits its own idiosyncrasies in the history of urban development (Coulibaly, 2012). For example, frequently, the largest city of a country tends to have one large urban agglomeration taking up an overwhelming population share of the country or a region within the total urban population. There are also issues with the peripherization of such prime cities which may be defined as urban sprawl involving a large number of informal settlements on the periphery of a prime city. Finally, the dilapidation of the Soviet-era housing stock continues at an exponential rate in the absence of comprehensive urban upgrade programs.

There is also a number of lasting institutional legacies begotten by the Soviet central planning system. For example, city planning had always been part of the centrally planned economic policy, which implied that any urban development was based on centrally determined targets or norms of physical and social infrastructure in accordance with approved master plans. In effect, any population center, down to its districts, was expected to have more or less the same mix of basic infrastructure services and social facilities such as schools, kindergartens, hospitals and clinics. Furthermore, Soviet cities were historically planned around industrial enterprises and factories as part of the country's rapid industrialization policy; as a result, much of the centrally located land that would otherwise be considered prime for development purposes in the modern context was found to be occupied by industrial facilities (Bertaud & Renaud, 1995). After the economic collapse experienced by the former USSR countries in the early and mid 1990s, the industrialized urban zones where economic entities ceased to operate and immediately adjacent residential areas inclusive of social infrastructure succumbed to extreme decay and dilapidation. Another legacy pertains to ownership rights: land and housing stock had been owned by the state
or public enterprises, and population migration was strictly regulated by the residency permit system (the so called propiska which is still enforced in many of the post-Soviet countries including Russia and all Central Asian countries).

In the case of Kyrgyzstan, long-standing housing shortages existing prior to the country's emergence as a nation-state in 1991, and high levels of internal migration after 1991 are considered to be the two key driving forces behind the emergence and subsequent growth of informal settlements in Bishkek since 1989. After a wave of housing privatization initiatives introduced in the early 1990s, the nascent housing markets of many post-Soviet cities and towns were characterized by an acute new demand for housing accentuated by severe housing shortages accumulated in urban areas over previous decades. On top of existing shortages, prime cities were hit by the waves of internal migration from the secondary and tertiary urban and, when population movement restrictions were lifted and people started leaving rural areas in search of jobs and better livelihood, even more waves from rural areas (Schuler, 2007). Although there are no exact figures on internal migration, Coulibaly (2012) indicates that there may have been as many as a net 200,000 migrants from rural areas absorbed by Bishkek between 1990 and 2008. Given that the country's urbanization rate is predicted to grow further, reaching an estimated 50 percent by 2050, the flow of migrants to Bishkek should be expected to continue in the foreseeable future (United Nations, 2014). The urbanization trends are shown in Figure 1.3. Another indication of the worsening slum situation is the overall historical dynamic of slum growth in the Central Asian region of the CIS: between 1990 and 2001 the slum annual growth
rate in the Asian countries of the CIS was positive (about .11 percent) whereas it was negative in the European countries of the CIS (about -.33 percent)\(^2\) (UN-HABITAT, 2006).

The issue of slums in Bishkek and in the country in general is much broader than the emergence of informal settlements in its two largest cities, Bishkek and Osh, the second largest city.\(^3\) As noted before, the international estimates show that as of 2001 about 52 percent of the urban population was residing under slum conditions (UN-HABITAT, 2003). Given a limited number of informal settlements existent at the time, it may be inferred that a substantial share of the recorded slum population was residing in the Soviet-era obsolete residential structures, composed of both housing blocks and stand-alone family houses, in the capital and other smaller towns. Available data also show the slum population in Kyrgyzstan to be highly concentrated: about 85 percent of slum households lived in areas populated with 75 percent or more slum households during the period between 2000 and 2005 (compared to 56 percent in Kazakhstan for the same years) (UN-HABITAT, 2010). These estimates are related to all types of slum settlements and not just the new squatter sites in Bishkek.

**Growth of Informal Settlements in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic**

*Emergence and Growth of Informal Settlements*

Squatting of municipal lands within Bishkek and agricultural lands around it to build individual housing units first started in the period between 1989 and 1991. The process was ignited by the city government’s failure to satisfy long-standing demands for housing from city residents.

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\(^2\) For comparison purposes, annual slum growth rates were 4.53 in Sub-Saharan Africa and 2.28 in Eastern Asia (including China) (UN-HABITAT, 2006).

\(^3\) As of 2010, Osh population was estimated at roughly 260 thousand people, and the Bishkek population, around 885 thousand people (United Nations, 2010).
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teachers, doctors, and other white- as well as blue-collar workers. Those first squatters were predominantly native Bishkek dwellers, born and raised in the capital. Most of them were able to mobilize and set up an association of self-builders that could become a political force in its own right, able to lobby the municipal and national governments for recognition and inclusion into city service networks (Parkinson & Talipova, 2005). From around that time, individual housing areas built on squatted lands started to be referred to as novostroikas. Haphazard legal and illegal land development continued in waves throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium. As more migrants moved to Bishkek in the 1990s and early 2000s in search of better economic opportunities, they also settled in informal communities. At the time of the survey in 2007, about half of the residents of the first twelve novostroikas founded in 1989, constituting about one-third of all households in informal areas, migrated from regions other than the Chui oblast, the administrative region containing Bishkek; the percentages of migrants from other oblasts tended to be much higher in other communities — averaging around 70 percent. By 2012, informal settlements occupied an estimated total area of more than 4,400 hectares with an estimated population of about 260,000 people, based on the information provided by the Bishkek government (K-News, 2012, March 16).

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4 In the Soviet Union, all housing was provided by the government; before an individual or a family could receive an apartment, they would have to live with their extended family members or in dormitories typically provided through employers.

5 "Novostroika", as translated from Russian, literally means "new development" or "new housing" referring to new private housing construction activities. Other related terms used are zhilmassiv, which can be translated as "residential community," and samozahvat, used to denote land invasion. For communities built in the first wave of land squatting some 25 years ago, the term novostroika has really become a misnomer, but it is still used broadly to refer to residents of informal communities in Bishkek.

6 Novostroika area population estimates vary drastically depending upon sources. The 2007 survey used here puts the total resident population at around 125 thousand people. Bishkek’s estimated population is about 1 million with the country’s population being about 5 million (National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2013).
The city landscape has changed drastically with slum-looking, poverty stricken illegal settlements being the city’s most recognizable feature. Figure 1.4 tracks expansion of informal settlements between 1989 and 2012 as measured by the total hectares of occupied lands. Furthermore, Table 1.1 provides a summary of all informal settlements as of 2007; original boundaries of lands earmarked for squatter settlements remained largely unchanged over the following few years while the build-up rate increased significantly within those boundaries.

Informal Settlements of Bishkek: What Does Life Look Like?

Access to housing. A novostroika settlement may be compared to a village segment inserted into the fabric of a city: a majority of buildings are built on formerly agricultural fields and are self-constructed using predominantly traditional low-tech house construction methods and materials such as adobe bricks (a mix of clay and straw referred to as *saman*) and clay. Many of the prospective residents produce the adobe bricks on site by mixing the ingredients and drying the bricks in the sun. Thus, most of the construction takes place between May and September, and the whole house can be built very quickly within one construction season with most of the time spent on actual drying of the *saman* bricks. This building material is very cheap, if not free. However, for the poorest families house construction may take years to complete after walls are in place as the roof materials may still need to be procured. Overall, slightly less than a third (30 percent) of all houses reportedly have walls made out of solid material such as brick, cinder blocks or concrete; about 63 percent use *saman* or clay. More solid building structures are found in the oldest communities which emerged between 1989-1991: 33 percent of houses reportedly have brick or concrete walls as opposed to about 22 percent in other locations (see Table 1.2 for a summary of housing statistics). However, even for these older communities the

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7 All figures are based on statistics generated by the 2007 household survey of informal settlements unless otherwise noted.
figure is still not very high. Wealthier households are slightly more likely to be able to afford solid structures; households migrated from the north are somewhat less likely to use solid materials. Virtually all houses are roofed with asbestos shingles (96 percent). Houses usually sit on land plots of 400 to 600 square meters, and the majority of them have two or three small rooms inside (about a quarter of households report having just two rooms; one-third, three rooms; and about 28 percent, four rooms); the total size of the living area is quite small, as about half of all households inhabit a space of up to 50 square meters.\(^8\) In one out of five cases, a house is shared by two or more households.

To complete a formal registration, a house owner needs to go through a number of time consuming and costly steps to register both land and dwelling. In practice very few residents have their property rights formalized with the local cadastre agency. The World Bank (2007b) provides estimates based on the official 2003 data from the cadastre agency indicating that in the oldest communities only one in ten allocated plots was registered for land title purposes, and about 19 percent of all units erected in the informal settlements as of 2004 obtained mandated construction permits and clearances, which is a necessary step to obtain a building title. However, when asked directly, an overwhelming share of respondents states that they possess both types of registrations. The large gap between official information and survey data may

\(^8\) Or about 538 square feet. Median reported household size is four people; median household square footage per person would be around 135 square feet. For comparison purposes, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development estimates that in 2005 the median square footage per person in the US was 675 square feet per person; overcrowding is triggered at around 165 square feet per person (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2007). It is also fair to mention that there are a couple of informal settlements considered top of the market, or elite single-family homes, and such land plots have reportedly been acquired via squatting as well, allegedly by high ranking government officials and members of well connected business elites (Niyazova, 2013, December 6; Sultankulova & Kydyrtoktoyev, 2013, January 6). Such settlements are excluded from this analysis.
reflect of the respondents' desire to show that all papers are in order, as well as the lack of information about relevant registration steps.9

Access to drinking water. Lack of clean potable water is by far the top issue identified by slum residents universally, including in Bishkek. Here is a snapshot of the situation as reported by the slum residents residing in Bishkek's informal communities. I look at several dimensions of drinking water accessibility, including access to piped water for individual (non-communal) use, availability of 24-hour water supply in summer, availability of 24-hour water supply the previous winter,10 and the practice of storing drinking water for future use as a mechanism for coping with water shortages. Table 1.2 provides a summary of all water acquisition experiences, with breakdowns for old vs. newer communities, for migrant vs. non-migrant populations, and for migrants originating from the south of the country.

Ensuring access to water is a particular priority for the poorest households: it tops the list of three main development priorities as voiced by the residents in the lowest tercile: about 28 percent of those from the lowest tercile put potable water as the first priority compared to 19 percent of those in the second tercile and 13 percent of those in the third tercile.

Overall, residents are significantly less likely to have 24-hour water supply either in summer or in winter if they reside in newer communities, especially those built after 2000.11 For

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9 Similar levels of alleged registration progress emerged in the survey conducted by the World Bank in 2004 in nine of the oldest novostroikas (World Bank, 2007b).

10 Most households experience more severe water shortages during summer seasons, as residents start using potable water for watering subsistence vegetable gardens; water supply in winter tends to be more consistent.

11 Several settlements that emerged in 2005 in environmentally hazardous or remote zones in the north of the city have had no water and electricity supply at all. For example, in one of the settlements (Ak-Jar, founded in 2005, estimated population varying from 7,300 to 15 thousand people), the first water networks were installed in 2011 (Bishkek Mayor's Office, 2011). Another smaller settlement, Altyln Kazyk, with more than 500 residents inhabiting part of a city dump, was originally approved by the national government in 2005 on the wave of the revolution, only to be later declared unfit for legalization. As of 2012, the community still lacked water and electricity (Kovshova, 2012, March 27).
example, about 58 percent of households residing in settlements built between 1989 and 1991 report 24-hour water supply in summer compared to 34 percent of those residing the rest of the communities and 22 percent of those residing in novostros built after 2000; similarly, about 74 percent of residents in older communities report having had access to 24-hour water supply the previous winter compared to 44 percent otherwise. In addition, novostroika residents who migrated to Bishkek from regions other than Chui, where the capital is located, are significantly more likely to be at disadvantage: about 44 percent of migrant households report having stable water supply in summer compared to 65 percent of non-migrant households.

Access limitations for migrants are further exacerbated in newer settlements: for example, about 43 percent of non-migrant residents from settlements built after 2000 have uninterrupted supply in summer compared to mere 12 percent of migrants from other regions. Similar patterns are found in securing uninterrupted supply in winter. Those migrating from the southern regions are also more likely to experience limited water supply. Such inequities in access are consistent with the patterns of storing water for future use: for example, about 71 percent of residents in novostros built after 2000 store water as opposed to just 33 percent of residents in other communities. Similarly, residents from the southern regions are more likely to have water stored (55 percent) compared to the non-southerners (38 percent). In addition, water storage tends to be more prevalent in lower income households: slightly more than half of all residents do so in the poorest tercile compared to a third in the top tercile.

Bishkek municipality is currently expanding its water supply system to improve water access in five communities on the western side of the city; however, it is not clear how the issue will be resolved in other settlements that have emerged on the northern part of the city.
**Lack of access to improved sanitation.** Pit latrines are the main type of a sanitation facility used (90 percent residents report using pit latrines and about 6 percent report using public toilets). One of the main issues with such facilities is that not many of them are emptied or otherwise treated on a regular basis. Pit latrines usually represent a public health hazard due to the risk of ground water contamination, a particularly relevant issue for those who use ground water pumps (Parkinson & Talipova, 2005). Digging pit latrines in communities located in areas with very high ground water levels requires more sophisticated drainage methods than are not typically employed by settlers.

**Access to other infrastructure services.** As informal settlements develop over time, their development priorities shift. The most basic services are water and electricity. Next come roads, natural gas supply, sewer/sanitation and solid waste removal. Water shortages are common in the summer, and electricity supply becomes a bloodline for survival in winter. Bishkek in general has been suffering from severe power shortages during the past several winters.\(^\text{12}\) The situation in *novostroikas* is even more dire. Communities established in 2005 and later have suffered from a complete lack of electricity for a number of years.\(^\text{13}\) Overall, based on the survey data, 24-hour electricity supply during summer months was reportedly available for about 75 percent of all surveyed residents while only 43 percent reported steady supply in the previous winter. The share of settlers with uninterrupted supply in summer generally drops substantially if they come from a community established after 2000 (49 percent compared to 81 percent for those residing in older communities), and if they come from the south regions (63 percent as opposed to 77 percent).\(^\text{12}\)

\(^\text{12}\) For example, the main power distribution company supplying Bishkek reported about 20 outages per day during the winter seasons and annually 15 outages a day between 2010 and 2012 (World Bank, 2014).

\(^\text{13}\) At different times, residents of at least three settlements blocked the main beltway highway with demands for water and electricity in 2010-2012.
percent of those migrating from other regions). Poorer households (first tercile) are less likely to have uninterrupted supply (67 percent) compared to those from the second and third terciles (78 percent and 79 percent correspondingly). For a complete comparison, see Table 1.2.

Availability of access roads and roads inside settlements is an issue of particular concern. There are multiple social and economic costs associated with the lack of roads, and as a result, limited availability and regularity of transportation services in squatter areas. High transportation costs increase cost of commuting to jobs and schooling. Many residents note that the biggest hardship related to the lack of roads is related to sending children to schools, as they are typically located outside of the novostroika boundaries. The situation is somewhat better in older settlements: in many cases there are access roads, and there may be several predominantly gravel roads running within a community itself. Much road rehabilitation and construction is done by the residents themselves with some limited help from the municipality. As an indication of accessibility, about 72 percent of residents living in communities dating back to 1989-1991 report having a bus stop within 10 minutes or less as opposed to about 50 percent of residents in the rest of the settlements (the percentage drops to about 40 percent for residents from communities dating back to 2005).

Access to social services. Access to schools and basic health services is extremely limited for all residents of informal settlements. There are not enough schools even in the oldest communities; residents of novostroikas have to send their children to the nearest public schools in accepting city districts and such schools are frequently overcrowded exceeding their planned capacity on average by a factor of two (World Bank, 2007b). There is also an extremely high
demand for kindergartens and health facilities. Nevertheless, given tight budget constraints the municipality tends to prioritize over these needs to focus on more basic infrastructure such as extending water networks (Aksenenko & Kojoev, 2014, April 29).

Access to existing schools and health facilities of the city is further severely constrained by the permanent residency registration requirements or the system of propiska. The institution goes back to Soviet times when it was used to control internal population movements and to gather other population statistics. Similar residency permit systems still exist in all countries of Central Asia, in Russia, in China, where the equivalent institution is called hukou, and in Vietnam (Craig Hatcher, 2011; Minnery et al., 2013; The Economist, 2014, April 19-25). In all these countries, without exclusion, the residency permit functions as an anachronistic but extremely effective mechanism for discrimination against and social exclusion of rural to urban migrants. Without propiska, a resident of an informal settlement in Bishkek cannot vote unless willing to travel back to the place of registration; cannot take advantage of free access to public health and education services (including schools); cannot be formally employed; cannot receive social benefits such as pension, social assistance or unemployment benefits; cannot register to obtain personal identification documents and national passports. These are simply the key basic civic and human rights restrictions that in essence create an army of "invisible people," as is aptly described by one of the non-government organizations working on legal protection of slum residents in Bishkek (Arysh NGO, 2013, 2013, September 16).

There are several reasons why a resident cannot obtain a permanent residency permit. First, an informal settlement may not be recognized as a residential zone under effective land use regulations. This situation represents the most severe case of deprivation. As of 2012, there were

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14 According to the Mayor's Office, there are only about 22 basic health service units (usually staffed with one physician and a nurse) in 48 novostroikas (Aksenenko & Kojoev, 2014, April 29).
up to 5 settlements, with a total population estimated at about 18 thousand people, considered irregular in this regard (Sanghera et al., 2012). Three of these were located immediately bordering the city open dump site. In such settlements, residents are not able to legalize their property rights for land and structures and get permanent residency permits even if they possess resources to do so. In some cases where a settlement has a legal residential land use status, selected segments of it are considered not suitable for habitation and hence are declared illegal.

According to the Mayor's Office, there are currently 6,382 land plots with illegally built structures (Aksenenko & Kojoev, 2014, April 29). This may bring the total population with no legal basis for registration to about 26 thousand people, at the lowest margin.

Second, in legalized areas, households not able to establish a legal claim to their lot regardless of the conditions of their housing are not able to be legally registered (World Bank, 2007b). There is anecdotal evidence that many of the original land grabbers sold their plots soon after they had obtained it; many of such sales were made without proper land titles (Parkinson & Talipova, 2005). This process of selling illegally acquired and untitled lands is still ongoing (Sanghera et al., 2012). Other major difficulties with obtaining a propiska include having a tenant status as property owners do not typically allow residency registration for their tenants; not being able to afford propiska; and failing to overcome excessive bureaucratic red tape (Sanghera et al., 2012). As an example of the latter, prior to new registration, a person needs to travel to the place of prior residency registration to "unregister" in person and may need to collect as many as 12 different certificates to accomplish a residency registration (C. Hatcher & Balybaeva, 2013).

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15 There are numerous cases when people bought plots from original squatters or their intermediaries under fraudulent land titles and eventually got entangled in protracted legal suits to fight forced evictions and house demolitions (Sanghera et al., 2012).
To circumvent the system, those who do not have *propiska*, try to obtain a temporary registration with local administrative bodies, a practice technically allowed by the law but not usually agreed to by local government officials. Residents also attempt to register at their friends' or family's locations; many seek buying a temporary *propiska* through intermediaries at a cost of about a month's salary (Arysh NGO, 2013, September 16). As a result, the *propiska* system is frequently viewed as a vehicle for administrative corruption: undocumented residents have to pay bribes to obtain permits or government services, and cases of extortion by local police and other law enforcement authorities are frequent (Sanghera et al., 2012). Some who acknowledge the severe limitations imposed on the daily activities of settlement dwellers lacking residency registration and property rights, also argue that lifting the legal and administrative constraints will go only so far unless the underlying structural issues of urban and rural poverty, equitable access to education and availability of economic opportunities are tackled as well (Sanghera et al., 2012; Yessenova, 2010). Nevertheless, reforming the *propiska* system seems a very good place to start the integration of internal migrants into the city.

**Environmental hazards.** Several of the settlements including the five illegal ones mentioned above, are located in environmentally hazardous areas. The open pit city dump site is encircled by about eight *novostroikas*, three of which sit right on the dump edges; another settlement is located within the zone polluted by fly ash from the Bishkek Thermal Energy Station; yet another populous settlement is positioned partially on the burial site of anthrax-affected cattle installed decades ago (World Bank, 2007b). In short, many of these settlements came to places never designed to be residential areas due to industrial or bio-hazardous pollution; such places were also considered, very much in error, to be far enough from the main city to pose no hazard. In addition, the city is crisscrossed by a number of water channels and rivers; several
parts of the city, predominantly in the south are prone to flooding during the winter-spring season, while northern areas are likely to have high ground water levels. In several informal communities, residents who ignored restrictions on building within the floodplain boundaries area are being flooded periodically (KTRK, 2014, January 8). Selected lowland settlements in the north were known to have malaria outbreaks between 2005 and 2010, although since 2011, following an aggressive anti-malaria campaign, no new domestic malaria cases have been reported (Miroshnik, 2014, April 25).

Chapter Summary

In Chapter 2, I examine theoretical approaches to the definitions of responsiveness and place it in the context of the post-Soviet administrative state. To provide theoretical underpinnings for the determinants of local government responsiveness, I review existing literature on collective action, formal and informal institutions, and urban service provision. Based on the review of applicable literature, I develop a theoretical framework that will address two objectives of this study: (a) to understand the factors that influence citizen perceptions of local government responsiveness at different levels of the Bishkek municipal governance system, and (b) to examine a potential effect of such perceptions on coproduction of public goods. I further derive six research hypotheses to test the proposed theoretical models.

Chapter 3 provides the details of the methodological approach, including sources of data and sample, and explicates two theoretical models, one of local government responsiveness and the other of coproduction. I operationalize dependent and independent variables and introduce theoretical equations to test proposed hypotheses.

Chapter 4 discusses the findings of the first theoretical framework. I provide background on the local governance structure of Bishkek and identify key institutional players in urban
service provision and city management. I closely examine how perceptions of responsiveness differ across three levels of the city governance structure and test the first five hypotheses. I examine the effects of informal settlement residents’ demands to achieve better living standards and of their participation in community initiatives to improve local infrastructure. I explore whether inequality in access to basic urban services matters in shaping the perceptions of responsiveness. My third theoretical variable of interest is that of regional cleavage, or the effect of regional identity on perceived government responsiveness. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of important control variables and implications for further research.

Chapter 5 focuses on the model of coproduction of public services. Taking as an example the implementation of the participatory community grant program run by the municipality to upgrade small community-level infrastructure, I further examine whether perceptions of the city government responsiveness matter in achieving programmatic objectives. My outcome of interest is the duration of the social mobilization process undertaken in 33 Bishkek informal communities.

Finally, Chapter 6 assesses the overall findings of this research project and concludes with the research agenda to be undertaken by the author in the future.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Government Responsiveness in a Post-Soviet State

Focus on Government Responsiveness

The relationship between citizens and their government as manifested via citizens' views of their government is critically important for the study of democracy and democratic accountability. Government responsiveness appears to be one of the key dimensions in which to evaluate such a relationship. The notion of responsiveness constitutes an important concept in a broader study of political accountability and governance (Forbes, Hill, & Lynn, 2006; Kettl, 2002; Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill, 2001); trust and confidence in government (Bouckaert, Van de Walle, Maddens, & Kampen, 2002; Glaser & Denhardt, 2000; Glaser & Hildreth, 1999), political participation (Iyengar, 1980; Shaffer, 1981), and citizen participation in public administration (Bovaird, 2007; Bryer, 2009; Bryer & Cooper, 2012; Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2010; Frederickson, 1984; Fung, 2006).

The attitudinal dimension of government responsiveness is frequently framed as external political efficacy, the concept that examines citizens' perceptions of government institutions. Political efficacy is considered to be a two-dimensional concept: it can be internal and external. Internal political efficacy is generally defined as one’s ability to understand and influence political system or participate effectively in politics, while external efficacy reflects people's views on how responsive the government is to demand-making by citizens (Balch, 1974; Berry, Portney, & Thomson, 1993; Bowler & Donovan, 2002; Craig & Maggiotto, 1982; Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991). It reflects the subjective nature of assessing government performance from the
viewpoint of common citizens – as opposed to specific policy outputs or outcome generated by the government. This concept has been found valuable from a comparativist's perspective and applicable in the context of different countries, types of government institutions and service provision arrangements (Bratton, 2012; Radnitz et al., 2009).

Why do we need to know how citizens feel about their government? From the behavioral point of view, political attitudes including perceptions of government responsiveness are important, because they help to gauge political behavior (Anderson, Regan, & Ostergard, 2002; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Berry et al., 1993; Bowler & Donovan, 2002; Sharp, 1980, 1986). Political attitudes may translate into voting, civic engagement, and paying taxes, and can go as far as contributing to civil unrest (DeHoog, Lowery, & Lyons, 1990). According to Hirschman (1970), citizen voice has the intrinsic value of enhancing one's agency, and an instrumental value of strengthening the downward accountability of the state to align with the needs of the people. In the context of Central Asia, the act of asking citizens for their opinions of the government by itself may be regarded as a huge step towards building citizens predilection for more participation in government. When formal electoral politics appear to be a mere façade, is there a way for citizens to sanction corrupt officials via other channels rather than elections and street violence? Does it pay to have and informed and involved constituency in order to provide incentives for governments to open up and become more responsive? When the public is involved, how does that affect administrative behavior? These are some of the bigger questions I am looking at in the context of citizen perceptions of government responsiveness.

The need to provide an external pressure for governments to become more transparent is apparent and immediate in the post-Soviet Central Asia. There is a longstanding and seemingly perpetual crisis of legitimacy that characterizes government institutions in Kyrgyzstan (Gullette,
Much of the energy in public administration reform over the past two decades has centered on institutions of the national government, while initiatives to introduce accountability reforms at the sub-national and local level have been haphazard at best (Liebert & Tiulegenov, 2013). Kyrgyzstan made noticeably early attempts to liberalize political and administrative systems compared to other countries in Central Asia. Such reforms were intended to prepare the country for a fiscal decentralization. Thus, at the sub-national and local level attempts have been largely focused on the fiscal decentralization aspects of governance while issues related to human resource management, financial management, service delivery and municipal asset management remained largely out of the scope of consistent reformation.

Government responsiveness in the broadest possible terms may reflect a number of political phenomena, including simply paying attention to citizens’ request and complaints, transforming citizens’ demands into policies, and providing services in the amount and of the quality demanded by citizens (Bratton, 2012). For the purpose of this research project, perceptions of responsiveness are attributable to formal institutions of the municipal government of the city of Bishkek, which comprises the city administration or mayor’s office (its administrative branch together with its vertically integrated district level units and lower level subdivisions) and the city council (the representative branch together with its district level units). Traditionally, responsiveness is defined as the government’s ability to hear and acknowledge the needs of citizens and respond to them via both formal and informal channels (Bratton, 2012). I use this operationalization to reflect the issues of political accountability in a post-Soviet state's environment and in the citizens’ ability to assess government performance (external political efficacy) in the context of basic public service provision. I incorporate three dimensions into the
definition of responsiveness: the first one is the citizens' expectations of a positive outcome or adequate response from a government agency; the second one is the citizens' willingness to engage with local officials; and the third one is that such expectations and willingness are exercised in the context of resolving local community development issues.

Such operationalization does look cumbersome. There are two reasons for that. First, there is no word-for word equivalence for the term "responsiveness" in the Kyrgyz or Russian languages. Second, the citizens of Central Asian countries may not necessarily view responsiveness as one of the inherent administrative values. Historically, soliciting responsiveness from a bureaucratic agency entailed mobilization of all available sources of informal pressure for a task at hand. In a Soviet city, the level and quality of urban services depended largely on industrial and municipal state-run enterprises located within a city; they were the ones sponsoring public services like housing, consumer services, public transportation, water supply, electricity, construction, and, very importantly, social services; they were also the ones wielding the most economic and financial clout in a city (Morton & Stuart, 1984). There were two major ways for the population at large to enjoy good access to public services in a Soviet city. First, one had to be employed by a top-tier industrial enterprise, and secondly, one had to be embedded in local social networks. Again, Morton and Stuart (1984) provide a good illustration of the latter:

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16 The population at large does not, for obvious reasons, include the Communist Party leaders and members of the top political nomenklatura.
The Soviet Union is a "society of connections": who you know may well determine how well you are housed, what food you eat, what kind of clothing you wear, and what kinds of deficient goods (from quality tape recorders to refrigerators) you can obtain. It is not simply a question of money, although that may be essential at some point to "buy" an official; but more important are one's connections because there are many commodities and services that money alone cannot buy and that can only be obtained as favors, to be paid immediately or at some future date. The society of connections is composed of interacting networks of friends and acquaintances who, by virtue of their positions, have access to scarcest resources they trade for others. (p.12)

When the state economy collapsed in early 1990s, the locus of decision-making power shifted to the national and local governments; both became the primary sources of service provision. It was only natural that the same logic of connections applied when lobbying for services with the government officials and bureaucratic agencies. Thus, the concept of government responsiveness has a very large informal component to it, making my definition of responsiveness indirect.

As an end result, I intend to explore the instrumental value of perceptions of government responsiveness in the context of citizen-municipal government coproduction of public goods in Bishkek. I will start with building a framework for understanding the key factors defining attitudes towards the municipal government responsiveness and then proceed to testing its effect on community mobilization activities under a community grant program devised to upgrade communal infrastructure and implemented by the Bishkek government in informal settlements of the city.

The nature of the post-Soviet state and its implications for sources of government responsiveness

Are state institutions responsive to the needs of their constituencies in post-Soviet countries like Kyrgyzstan? In order to define potential sources of government responsiveness, it is important to understand what type of state is characteristic for post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. The essential strands of literature helpful to understand administrative behavior and government
performance in the post-Soviet space are the studies of the interactions between formal and informal institutions in transition and post-transition economies, studies exploring social structures and sources of political power such as kinship networks and regionalism, and studies dealing with the issues of clientelism and patronage networks.

The study of institutions within the post Soviet space commenced primarily with the focus on formal institutions and functions of the state such as electoral systems, constitutional designs, independent judicial systems, etc.; however, it was later widely recognized that informal institutions are as important as formal ones, and that the interplay between the two is an important predictor of political behavior. Building upon a systematic review of the literature, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) provide a broad definition of formal institutions as rules that are openly codified, established, and are communicated through official channels (including state institutions and state enforced rules); while informal institutions are "socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels" (p.727).

Much of the earlier discussion of the state-building and formal institutions of the state in Newly Independent States (NIS) after the collapse of the Soviet Union was done within the framework of transitology or the study of regime transition from planned economy to market economy and from authoritarianism to democracy. According to Engvall (2014), the so-called modernization bias of this approach was grounded in the assumption that the process of state reformation within the post-Soviet space was linear in nature and that the newly emerged states would over time progress to acquire political and economic institutions which are very much in line with those characteristic for modern democratic countries of Europe, the United States, or the West in general. The central pillars of such transition would be institutionalization of good
governance practices such as checks and balances in government, decentralization, sound regulatory systems, rule of law, and many other institutional features traditionally attributable to liberal democracies (Grindle, 2004).

When the transition paradigm was not borne out in practice — i.e., the states that emerged out of the last two decades of transition tended to present an array of political regimes, with some of them being more repressive and autocratic than they had been prior to independence (the case being particularly relevant for Central Asian countries) — such variations tended to be attributed to temporal changes and were perceived as hybrid systems or weak states. As Grzymala-Busse and Luong (2002) pointedly note, the analytical focus in the analysis of post-Soviet state transition should be retrofitted from the application of the ideal-type of the Western state framework to consideration of reconstruction of public authority and state building:

The widespread assumption was rather that these states were overendowed with state structures. The prevailing view of the communist state as a behemoth spurred appeals for reducing its size and scope—that is, for state-dismantling rather than state-building. (p.530)

The state building starting point for Kyrgyzstan, as for all other 14 republics of the former Soviet Union, was a highly centralized, extensive, and politicized Soviet state. In the early days of independence, the state was perceived more as a “grabbing hand” — an agglomeration of powerful Soviet elites attempting to privatize key public resources (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). Later, analytical focus shifted to the state capture dynamics, whereby the state becomes increasingly influenced by private firms and highly concentrated special interests (Hellman, Jones, & Kaufmann, 2000). Grzymala-Busse (2008) provides a useful representation of the different ideal-types of state capture based on the variation in distribution of rents extracted by powerful elites as a result of the state capture and degree of available competition
between elites. Although the framework is intended primarily for nation-state comparative analysis, it may be applied in the context of different phases that government institutions may go through in a particular country, both by sector and across levels of government.

I find two ideal-types specifically applicable in relation to the functioning of the government institutions in Kyrgyzstan: one is fusion of party and state characterized by limited or no competition between elites and sizable redistribution of rents extracted as a result of the state capture or appropriation of state resources; the other is predation, which is similar to the first type in that it has no elite competition but also lacks any significant redistribution of gains. In both cases, resources are extracted from the state. In the case of party and state fusion, bureaucratic institutions become highly politicized, with the whole hierarchy being upwardly accountable to the appointed or nominally elected bureau leader. While redistribution is present, it may be contingently applied to those individuals and communities who support the party line. At the same time, poverty may induce dependence on redistribution, thus effectively making the poor a more supportive and stable clientele (Grzymala-Busse, 2008).

With the relative absence of redistribution in the case of predation, there are limited incentives to enhance the capacity of government institutions and provide goods and services to constituencies; only those institutions that maximize extraction of state resources are strengthened. I would characterize the period between March 2005, commencing with the Tulip Revolution and Kurmanbek Bakiyev's presidency, and March 2010 till the ouster of Kurmanbek Bakiyev and transformation of the Kyrgyz Republic into a parliamentary republic as having many features of the predation regime (Cooley, 2012; Gullette, 2010b; International Crisis Group, 2010). The period since March 2010 exhibits extensive characteristics of the state and
party fusion type with the Presidential party having a strong grip on the administrative state at the national level.

In addition to the state capture dynamics, there emerged the notion of the centrality of the state as an active political agent in its own right. The state may not be just an object of desire for powerful elites; the state is turned from within into a market of goods and services with no distinction between public and private interests: essentially, public officials tend to transform de jure public assets into private sources of revenue in addition to adopting other potential mechanisms such as embezzlement of public funds, rent-seeking, and taking bribes (Engvall, 2007, 2014; Karklins, 2002; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006). One of the most salient features of a state as market is the "sale" of various level government positions to the highest or preferred bidder who is expected to maintain continuous rent sharing arrangements with a higher level patron(s). Thus, obtaining a government position represents a sort of investment with future dividends divided between the client and the patron. Engvall (2014) provides the most recent and well-documented account of such practice in Kyrgyzstan.

Overall, the state building project in the post-Soviet space has clearly been characterized by a rapid recombination of both formal and informal institutions, which resulted in a "bricolage" type of arrangement whereby the original legacy of Soviet formal and informal institutions has been modified and re-modified overtime by elite competition (Grzymala-Busse & Luong, 2002. p.535). Helmke and Levitsky (2004) argue that the interplay between the two may not necessarily be either good or bad (or enhancing vs. dysfunctional); rather, the picture is more complex and informal institutions may complement, accommodate, substitute for or conflict with formal institutions. Whereby formal institutional structures are weak, informal institutions pursuing compatible goals may be involved in a functional substitution as in, for
example, provision of public services (Breeding, 2008; Tsai, 2007); or be in direct conflict with the formal institutions if goals are at odds with those of formal institutions as in the case of predation on state resources (Ganev, 2007).

Accounting for different levels of the state becomes crucial not just in the context of national vs. sub-national vs. local government levels, but within a government level itself. As it will be seen below from a brief description of the Bishkek municipal structural arrangements, the municipal government is a complex structure of a multi-layered administrative apparatus embedded in a network of municipal service providers and municipal regulatory institutions. The state cannot be simply regarded as a unitary actor. As Grzymala-Busse and Luong (2002) explain:

No one single agent has uniform influence or authority across all state sectors, and state action is neither centralized nor coherent. The emerging states in the postcommunist world, therefore, are best characterized as having multiple centers of authority-building, each with different sectoral capabilities and degrees of influence. (p. 533)

Interaction of formal and informal institutions may be illustrated through the analysis of their social structures and sources of political power. There are two major perspectives on the social sources of political power in Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan that are particularly linked to the understanding of the state. The first perspective refers to the power of kinship networks or clans, and the second, – to the power of regional elites. Collins (2003) defines the informal and traditional institution of clans as

…informal social organizations in which kinship or "fictive" kinship is the core, unifying bond among group members. Clans are identity networks consisting of an extensive web of horizontal and vertical kin-based relations. Clans are rooted in a culture of kin-based norms and trust but also serve rational purposes. (pp.173-174)

Kinship networks are important not only as much as they serve as a power base for a particular political candidate, but also from the redistributive perspective, whereby state
resources and public assets can be diverted towards specific kinship networks. Collins (2004) makes a clear distinction between the informal networks of clans and other types of informal institutions. For example, clientelism, or patron-client relationships, involves "exchange of goods/services through an asymmetric, dyadic tie between patron and client, based not on ascription of affection but on need" (p.233). Such exchange is based on trading political support on behalf of those affected by political or economic inequality in order to obtain vital public goods. The key feature of clans is the ascription of a specific identity and kinship. Clans do not transcend ethnic boundaries – these are sub-ethnic groups; the closest concept to clans is a tribe, although the latter may denote a larger conglomeration of interrelated clans (Collins, 2004). Clan networks are viewed mostly as detrimental to state institutions, especially under condition of negative economic environment and weak formal institutions. This is primarily due the role of clan networks in stripping public assets, undermining the administrative state through patronage and giving out government jobs based on clan kinships, and competing with other clans for the capture of resources (Collins, 2003, 2004, 2006).

Some critics of the assumed pervasiveness of clan networks state that, in daily life, people do not tend to think in terms of clans, but rather in terms of extended families and friends (Gullette, 2010a, 2010c). Extended families, friends, neighbors, colleagues, and classmates continue to be a major source of support in time of economic need, socialization into a new environment, and need for everyday information (Kuehnast & Dudwick, 2004). While kinship connections continue to be important in providing access to public services, jobs and education opportunities, such connections may be based on personal exchange based on trust and kinship or blat (i.e., influence), or bribe which does not generally imply a kinship relationship. Interestingly, there is some indication that the non-poor in urban communities tend to substitute
relationships based on kinship with participation in interest-based networks (Kuehnast & Dudwick, 2004). In some sense, the social dynamics tend to show that the benefit of access to social networks increasingly becomes a function of one’s wealth. For example, Kuehnast and Dudwick (2004) find that since 1991 the size of social networks as well as the frequency of social encounters as decreased significantly among the poorest population strata. At the same time they find that the non-poor are less likely to give support to the poorer members of their families, especially in the rural areas.

Reliance on informal voluntary assistance, referred to as ashar, to help a neighbor with in-kind inputs such as physical labor or cooking or building materials, is still a salient feature of community life (Radnitz, 2010). It is more prevalent in rural areas, but some urban communities may engage in ashar as well. Such projects may include community beautification, drainage canal reconstruction, community clean-up, small scale infrastructure renovations or repairs (e.g., repair of a transformer). Self-help groups have also sprung up as an important vehicle for a more formal association of residents in community. Most of such activities are coordinated by local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Aksakal courts or courts of elders may play a significant role in mobilizing residents in more established and mostly rural communities (Radnitz, 2010). The presence of strong kinship, family, and neighborly connections and other internal support networks may emphasize the need for viewing distinct geographic aggregations as communities whereby residents are frequently bound by internal social and economic exchanges within the city fabric.

An important dimension to consider when analyzing the sources of social power in Kyrgyzstan is the prevalence of regionalism, or the identity that relates to the administrative-territorial division inherited from the Soviet Union. Jones Luong (2002) argues that
administrative division super-imposed by the USSR central command transcended the clan and inter-ethnic boundaries and established competition for economic resources horizontally between regions as well as vertically between the center and regions. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, the author maintains that there are two major regionalism-based cleavages: that between northern and southern regions, and that between the northern regions themselves (Jones Luong, 2002). In fact, regional cleavages played a critical role in the dynamics of the Tulip Revolution in 2005 and the subsequent popular revolt in 2010.

Other relationships that may be considered outside of the direct scope of the administrative state but may nevertheless interact and shape people's perceptions of government responsiveness are clientelistic exchanges. Clientelism in a broad sense refers to the provision of goods and services by elected representatives and political parties outside of the purview of formal legislative or bureaucratic institutions in order to gain political support of citizens (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). However, this exchange may be further extended to actors outside of the formal political institutions, for example, to prominent business figures or holders of large assets (such as livestock and arable land) in rural areas. Thus, clientelism can be understood as an "asymmetrical, vertical exchange of targeted benefits for support," and it may go beyond electoral support and extend to state capture (Radnitz, 2010).

Examples of such relationships abound. In their analysis of social networks at the micro level, Kuehnast and Dudwick (2004) note that the poor in Kyrgyzstan increasingly find themselves in patron-client relationships with the non-poor. The dynamics primarily stem from the need to borrow cash from more affluent relatives, friends, or neighbors. Failure to return the loan forces a person into a cycle of obligation and indebtedness that is hard to escape. Thus, patronage relationships tend to be with people from higher income groups. Such patronage
politics can strongly manifest itself in the national arena and at regional and local levels (Hale, 2006). Empirical evidence also suggests a practice of resorting to both state and non-state elites to obtain materialistic community benefits such as contributions to local development projects and small-scale infrastructure improvements. For example, in donor-financed projects requiring community contributions towards infrastructure upgrades, local residents frequently appeal to prominent local businessmen or wealthy council members to generate the bulk of such community contributions. Radnitz (2010) finds that in Kyrgyzstan elite forces not connected with the regime in place invested some of their resources in the needy communities in order to demonstrate some commitment to social justice and win the 2005 parliamentary elections. Clientelism as demonstrated above, thus, may not necessarily bear bad news; clientelistic linkages between citizens and local leaders outside of formal institutions such as legislative activity and public service provision may still promote changes beneficial for the most marginalized population groups. In fact, research from other developing countries provides empirical evidence of positive effects of clientelistic exchanges for the poor communities and individuals (Breeding, 2008; Helmke & Levitsky, 2006; Tsai, 2007).

Understanding the nature of the post-Soviet state in Kyrgyzstan has multiple implications for identifying the sources of government responsiveness. First, it is imperative to acknowledge the co-existence of formal and informal institutions that may affect both citizen perceptions of government responsiveness and actual local government responses. Phenomena such as state capture resulting in extraction of state resources has important implications for the relationships between citizens and their government: restoring bonds of trust in national and local government institutions takes a long time when people feel estranged from their government (Ganev, 2007). Second, pervasiveness of such phenomena as clientelism and patronage relationships may
directly indicate the extent to which the poorest populations may or may not be served within existing public service provision programs. Third, such country-specific social dynamics as ascription to kinship networks, regionalism, or extensive reliance on informal social networks of extended family, friends, and neighbors indicate that there may be a big gap between the perceptions of government responsiveness and perceptions of citizen or community needs on behalf of local governments. In turn, such perceptions may affect citizens' willingness to engage with local governments directly and formally when needed. Fourth, marketization of the state, whereby the state is turned into a market place for public goods and services, may work to exclude the poorest segments of urban squatters from urban services.

Informal Participation and Perceptions of Responsiveness

*The Logic of Governance in Service Provision*

When exploring government responsiveness within the realm of public service provision the logic of government quickly becomes the logic of governance; in other words public service provision regimes have grown so complex and employ such an extensive variety of actors that such regimes cannot be simply characterized as government acting alone. According to Hill and Lynn (2005), public sector governance can be defined as "regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goods and services through formal and informal relationship with agents in the public and private sectors" (p.175-176).

This very broad definition renders a comprehensive description of a governance regime, and not all parts of this definition may be fully applicable in the context of the Kyrgyz Republic (e.g., judicial decisions are not likely to be an important determinant in public sector governance due to the very weak judiciary compared to that of the US or other Western governance
systems). However, some components of the governance regime are particularly salient for the purpose of this discussion. Specifically, the governance paradigm places an emphasis on the role of external stakeholders such as citizens and their interaction with public institutions. A comprehensive discussion of the logic of governance can be found in Lynn et al. (2001), Hill and Lynn (2005), and Forbes et al. (2006). One of the key advantages of the logic is that it can serve as a tool for a systematic inquiry into the relationships between citizens and their governments both on the horizontal and vertical planes.

Based on a meta-analysis of more than 800 governance-related studies carried out from 1990 to 2001 across the full spectrum of social science disciplines and geographies, Hill and Lynn (2005) showed that an overwhelming majority of studies focus on government primary work and government outcomes/outputs — about 30 percent and 35 percent respectively. The meta-analysis identifies only 23 cases where stakeholder assessments of performance were the focus of investigation. For comparison, 298 and 232 of all cases were focused on outcomes/outputs and primary work. Within the available cases, stakeholder assessments tend to be explained mostly by citizen preferences (9 of 23 cases), structures of formal government authority (7 of 23 studies), and outcomes/outputs/results produced by government (7 of 23 cases). However, this study focuses on the relationships between citizens and local governments and examines the interactions between citizen assessments and the citizens’ own behavior, and between citizens’ assessments of performance and outcomes/outputs/results produced by the government. Each of the interactions is discussed in more detail below.

*Interaction between the Perceptions of Government Responsiveness and Citizen Behavior*

Participatory behavior may be operationalized in a number of ways. Scholars distinguish between electoral and non-electoral participation. The earlier literature on slums and their
residents finds that non-electoral political participation tends to have more weight. For example, Cornelius (1974) demonstrated clearly that petitioning of local government officials for land titles and basic urban services in Latin American cities is quite prevalent. Such political participation is commonly referred to as demand-making. It is different from electoral participation in that it does not typically aim at resource reallocation by replacing or retaining incumbent officials or restructuring of the political system. The purpose of participation in such political activity is always highly instrumental in nature: to get a construction permit, to connect to a power line, to get a new water line, etc. The objective is almost always to get better services.

As discussed earlier, in the context of developing countries, citizens tend to have fewer chances to voice their preferences for public services as voters due to the prevalence of patronage politics, elite capture, and other factors that limited ability to influence policy-making; therefore the emphasis is placed on citizens as consumers of public goods to exercise the short route to accountability, that is to demand better services from the public service providers via voice, participation, and information exchange (Amin, Das, & Goldstein, 2008; World Bank, 2003). From this perspective, the political structure of government institutions in post-Soviet Central Asia because of lack of elections for chief administrators such as mayors, weak political accountability of local councils, direct hierarchical subordination of local governments to central government, and lack of fiscal autonomy of local governments to name just a few features, is frequently not commensurate with that found where there is democratic electoral participation. These post-Soviet countries may not fit well with the traditional median voter theory that is supposed to match voter preferences with the amount and quality of local service provision (Bahl & Linn, 1992). Accountability relationships under such institutional conditions tend to be exercised through less formal channels, such as individual contact with government officials,
direct patronage ties with elected and non-elected officials and municipal service providers directly, the politics of regionalism, and informal kinship relations (Collins, 2003, 2004, 2006; Grzymala-Busse & Luong, 2002; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). Informal mechanisms to gain access to better services from local governments, such as demand-making, are particularly interesting.

A distinction is commonly made between individual demand-making referred to as "particularized contacting" and demand-making on behalf of a groups of people or community referred to as general referent contacting (Cornelius, 1974; Hirlinger, 1992; Sharp, 1984, 1986). Particularized contacting tends to be less frequent compared to general contacting: slum residents prefer to contact public officials as representatives of a community or a group of residents so that the nature of demand is articulated as beneficial for the whole group or community (Cornelius, 1974; Hirlinger, 1992). It is argued that the two types of demand-making derive from different driving forces. For example, particularized contacting tends to be more strongly related to perceived need and presence of political ties, and less strongly related to socio-economic status, whereas demand-making on behalf of community tends to be a function of socio-economic status, perceived efficacy, and some demographic characteristics such as age and education (Hirlinger, 1992).

The relationship between perceptions of government responsiveness and political/civic participation is a difficult one to establish while avoiding the issues of endogeneity; the relationship is circuitous and may run both ways. Predictably, there have been two lines of thought (Berry et al., 1993). The first one posits that political participation causes stronger perceptions of government responsiveness; the second one emphasizes participation being the effect rather than the cause of feeling more optimistic about government responsiveness to
citizen’s demands. Using a reciprocal causation model, Berry et al. (1993) demonstrates how to test the relationship: for example, the perception of government responsiveness is the effect of political participation if there is a significant relationship between participation measured at time \( t_1 \) and perception of government responsiveness at time \( t_2 \), but there should be no such relationship between perception of government responsiveness at time \( t_1 \) and political participation at time \( t_2 \). Methodologically, it may be best to have panel data which measure perceptions of government responsiveness before and after the factor of political participation is introduced (or have a sequence of such measurements). Two well known panel studies (Finkel, 1985, 1987) have shown that participation results in higher external political efficacy, i.e., improved perceptions of government responsiveness.

An important question is why participation is expected to affect perceptions of government responsiveness. As Berry et al. (1993) posits

- Participation does not ensure that governments will be responsive or will be seen to be so, but it does make it easier for confidence to be built between citizens and their government. (p.247)

Some studies have concluded that the institutional context of participation and its interaction with socio-economic status is important as well. For example, one cross-city study notes that low socio-economic status residents involved in face-to-face participation in cities with broad-based access to such participation that is considered more structured tend to have substantially more positive perceptions of government responsiveness, although the same finding does not apply to medium- and high-socio economic status residents (Berry et al., 1993). Thus, community participation tends to be associated with improved perceptions of local government responsiveness in cities with strong mechanisms for participation, at least in the US context. Studies also show that the outcome of participation is important: if participation is associated
with no or negative result, the citizens may have lower expectations about government responsiveness (Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Bowler & Donovan, 2002). These studies concern themselves mostly with electoral behavior and direct democracy (e.g., referendums), but the idea may be applicable to non-electoral participation as well.

Perceptions of Government Responsiveness in the Context of Public Service Provision

Service Satisfaction Paradigm

There an extensive literature in the public management and performance movement on citizen perceptions of government performance adopted from the private sector studies, whereby citizens are viewed primarily as clients or customers (Kelly, 2005; Miller & Miller, 1991a, 1991b; Poister & Henry, 1994; Ryzin, 2006). The paradigm tends to be oriented primarily towards the goals of efficiency and productivity (Boyne, 2002). Several critics of the performance movement’s narrow focus on efficiency emphasize that different values should also be involved in assessing government performance, including those of effectiveness, equity, participation, and responsiveness (Bouckaert et al., 2002; Boyne, Meier, O'Toole, & Walker, 2006; Radin, 2006). Citizens may choose to apply performance criteria different from those applied by the government; they may also perceive themselves not only as customers receiving goods and services, but political actors involved in policy and politics (Bouckaert et al., 2002).

In the context of public service provision, government responsiveness is frequently linked to the concept of citizens satisfaction with local governments (Balch, 1974; DeHoog et al., 1990; Lyons & Lowery, 1989; Lyons, Lowery, & DeHoog, 1992). Of the different approaches to gauge citizen satisfaction with urban services, the earlier models are more linear in nature. An example is a performance-only model (Miller & Miller, 1991a) that assessed overall citizen satisfaction as a function of a subjective perceptions of local government performance across a number of
service areas. Fitzgerald and Durant (1980) offered a more comprehensive explication of the relationship, which is expanded to include both citizen evaluation of services and the response process. There are three major components in the model: service exposure measured through subjective and objective aspects of actual delivery of service, citizen evaluations (i.e., satisfaction or dissatisfaction with services), and citizen action to influence service delivery. All three components are sequentially related: service exposure affects citizen evaluations, and citizen evaluations affect citizen response, while all three components are also influenced by certain individual, group, and community factors that affect perceptions (such as race, income, age, size of the city). Perceptions of municipal responsiveness and assessment of municipal cost and benefit are also included, but it is not clarified how and why they are conceptually related to service satisfaction and citizen response.

The expectancy-disconfirmation model of citizen assessment has been adopted from the business administration and market research studies and tested within the public service provision setting (Deichmann & Lall, 2007; Ryzin, 2004a; Ryzin & Immerwahr, 2004; Ryzin, Muzzio, Immerwahr, Gulick, & Martinez, 2004). According to this framework, satisfaction is not just a function of perceived performance, but is also related to one’s prior expectations of service and whether or not these expectations are qualified (essentially a gap between performance and prior expectations). The American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) is the most direct explication of this model. It consists of three items: a) level of satisfaction with services; b) whether services provided by local government fell short of or exceeded expectations of such services; and c) the extent to which current services measure up to some ideal of local government services (Ryzin, 2004b). There can also be additional factors that may influence expectation and satisfaction levels; for example, comparison of service levels received by
residents with those receive by their reference group may be important (Deichmann & Lall, 2007). One would expect there to be clear peer group effects: resident may find services more satisfactory if their own level of service exceeds that of their referents or peers, given that services are homogenous and prices are comparable. However, in the context of public goods provision, the assumption of service homogeneity and price stability does not always hold, thus making a service user potentially dissatisfied if he or she believes that residents in another community receive a higher level of service at the same tax price or the same level of service at a lower tax price (Kelly, 2005).

Another model of service satisfaction is based on a well-known Exit-Voice-Loyalty (EVL) framework suggested by Hirschman (1970) and applied extensively in political science (see for example, Cleary (2010). This framework posits that citizens have three options to respond to their local governments’ practice of service provision: citizens may exit to some other jurisdiction (E), i.e., vote with their feet if they are not satisfied with the services received; citizens may use their voices to complain or petition the local government (V); and citizens may stay loyal to their government, indicating high levels of trust (L). Ryzin (2004b) examines several measures of public service satisfaction, including ACSI and EVL models, and finds that the ACSI model is very successful in predicting perceptions of trust in local governments, while EVL may also be good for sensing the changes in confidence in local officials. Overall, this study concludes that the multi-item scales such as ACSI and EVL appear to be better measurements of citizen satisfaction compared to other multi- and single-item scales based on a number of dimensions of reliability and validity criteria.
Value and Objectivity of Citizen Surveys

Swindel & Kelly (2000) point to two sides of the debate when linking citizen perceptions of satisfaction, including perceptions of government responsiveness, to government performance. The disagreement appears to be about usability, applicability, and overall value of data generated by citizen surveys in policy decision-making; however, the discussion also extends to assumptions and values of performance measurement. The first line of argument is that government performance should only be measured objectively via outputs and outcomes generated by government agencies or service providers; these are the so-called internal measures of service delivery (Stipak, 1977, 1979, 1980). There are also well established concerns about citizens’ stated perceptions compared to true preference revelation in the context of public goods and valuation of public services: tax price matters, what neighbor gets matters, coercible nature of taxes matters, as do existing socio-economic cleavages (Kelly, 2005).

The opposing line of argument posits that citizen surveys gauging public perceptions are of equal importance. They may be regarded as less objective – in fact quite subjective and represent external performance measurement techniques. Proponents of this argument believe that citizens are able to evaluate service quality even without directly experiencing a particular service or coming into the direct contact with the service provider. More importantly, a citizen survey serves as a tool of democratic governance to give all people voice (Brudney & England, 1982; Miller & Miller, 1991a), assert their rights for particular services and expose an equity dimension of service provision (Radin, 2006). Yang and Holzer (2006) conclude in their review of the performance-trust in government link that performance measurement has to be a deliberative and participatory process where citizen-driven performance measurement practice is
institutionalized. And responsiveness has to be one dimension among others on which the new performance measurement is to focus.

Some scholars point out that this debate plays out forcefully on the global governance scene. Radin (2006) notes that there are two competing streams of thought and tools related to the performance movement within the World Bank, one of the leading international development agencies: the social accountability approach and public sector management reform. The former concerns itself with the bottom up governance, and includes giving voice to people, promoting civic engagement, and measuring government performance through instruments like citizen report cards and other types of citizen satisfaction surveys implemented by civil society groups. The latter is concerned with mostly central level government-wide strategies to improve financial management, auditing, civil service, procurement, evaluation and other standard government procedures. The two approaches tend to talk past each other; however, there are attempts to bring the two by using citizen report cards and consumer satisfaction surveys to evaluate government responsiveness in service provision – particularly at the local or municipal level.

There has also been an attempt to bridge the two sides of the debate and link both internal (typically referred to as "objective") and external (referred to as "subjective") performance measurement instruments (Andrews, Boyne, Moon, & Walker, 2010; Andrews, Boyne, & Walker, 2006; Kelly & Swindell, 2002; Kouzmin, Elke, Helmut, & Korac-Kakabadse, 1999; Swindell & Kelly, 2000). These studies suggest that citizens overall are well equipped to evaluate government performance. In fact, Andrews et al. (2006) point out that internal measurements may also suffer from the lack of validity and reliability (e.g., made-up or inconsistent data generated by public agencies); internal measurements may be subjective in nature when reflecting the perceptions of public service employees even though presented as
objective measurements. Both internal and external measurements should be subject to questions of validity and reliability. Both internal and external measurements could be considered subjective if they have perceptions components and objective if they have factual components.

When it comes to citizen surveys, there are two long-established issues related to their use: attribution error and assessment error (Lyons et al., 1992; Radin, 2006; Stipak, 1977; Swindell & Kelly, 2000). Attribution error arises when a citizen cannot link a particular public service to a specific local government unit that provides it; assessment error relates to the fact that citizens may not always have adequate or accurate information about the amount and quality of service provision and thus are unable to assess services in an objective manner (Stipak, 1977; Swindell & Kelly, 2000; Thompson, 1997). Ideally, both internal and external sources of service assessments should be verified against each other as pointed out above.

Studies of perception of government responsiveness in the context of service satisfaction point to the importance of a number of additional factors affecting such perceptions.

First, citizen perceptions whether in assessing government responsiveness or service satisfaction tend to be affected by an array of individual-level characteristics such as age, gender, education, socio-economic status, and length of residence (Bratton, 2012; Burns, Schlozman, & Verba, 2001; Cleary, 2007; Cotter, 1984; DeHoog et al., 1990; Deichmann & Lall, 2007; Fitzgerald & Durant, 1980; Hero & Tolbert, 2004; Kim, 2010; Lyons & Lowery, 1989; Lyons et al., 1992; Miller & Miller, 1991a; Sharp, 1980, 1986; Stipak, 1977, 1979). For example, age is found to be related to confidence in government, as younger citizens tend to be more cynical towards the government (Berry et al., 1993); higher education is associated with better skills and resources and as a result those with higher levels of education are more likely to score higher on perceptions of government responsiveness (Bowler & Donovan, 2002; Hayes & Bean, 1993).
Second, jurisdiction level effects and neighborhood specific characteristics are found to be critical in assessing perceptions of responsiveness (Lineberry, 1977; Lyons et al., 1992). Jurisdiction level impacts refer mainly to some aggregate indicators of societal and economic context (e.g., the proportion of migrant vs. non-migrant population), including levels of services, given they possess jurisdiction level variations. Another dimension is government structure; this feature may be of weaker relevance since the study is focused on only one jurisdiction, the city of Bishkek. Neighborhood-specific features may not always be directly observable, as they may include specific local historical events, local political dynamics, or quality of community leadership and thus may be hard to quantify.

Coproduction of Public Services

Defining Coproduction

Coproduction in public administration occurs when public services are designed and produced with direct participation or involvement of non-government entities and individuals or members of a specific targeted community. Bovaird (2007) developed a framework which defines coproduction as "the provision of services through regular, long-term relationships between professionalized service providers (in any sector) and service users or other members of the community, where all parties make substantial resource contribution" (p.847). There are also other more restrictive or broader definitions of this concept (Brudney & England, 1983; Ostrom, 1996), but the one most useful for present consideration must be broad enough to accommodate for different types of coproduction while also stressing the institutionalized aspect of the relationship between government institutions and service co-producers. In the framework proposed by Bovaird (2007), the degree of public/private institutions involvement in both planning and delivery is placed on two continua, thus generating a useful typology describing
combinations of public and non-public agents in service provision. The example of coproduction that I will review under this project corresponds to a case whereby service users and communities benefitting from an infrastructure project serve as co-planners in the process of public goods formation: members of the public are involved in planning and designing the development outcome, and contributing monetary resources, while professionals are primary deliverers.

Among potential benefits of coproduction, the most important noted are improved service quality and quantity (Bovaird, 2007; Ostrom, 1996; Pestoff, Brandsen, & Verschuere, 2012). Inequalities in access may arise since higher socio-economic groups are more likely to participate due to better access to information and availability of resources. In such a case, a greater focus on involving the more disadvantaged population groups may be necessary to achieve more equal service distribution (Jakobsen & Andersen, 2013). Such particular emphasis on involvement of the more disadvantaged strata of the population has received much attention and application in international development where coproduction methods have been implemented widely in rural and urban small (community level) infrastructure upgrade projects. In such literature, much of the discussion has focused on has on bottom-up community development initiatives involving full community involvement in both planning and delivery with subsequent community ownership of new or upgraded community infrastructure, with a minimum reliance on the government's institutional structures.

Lately, there has been a major shift to bringing local government institutions into the realm of participatory community development. Development lending facilities extended by international donors to national governments frequently require local governments to involve communities and private citizens in planning, implementing, and maintaining small-scale
community infrastructure upgrades. Thus, local governments in the Central Asia region now find themselves in the uncomfortable position of community mobilizers, a role they have rarely experienced before, either during the period of centrally planned economy or during the post-Soviet transition. An important time limitation is imposed by donor-funded projects: mobilization targets need to be reached on time, and the implementation period is typically quite short. There is a strong indication that participatory goals may quickly become replaced by the goals of disbursement efficiency to move an investment project ahead and reach consequent implementation phases (Mosse, 2005). Whether such short-term horizon participatory mechanisms are capable of bringing about a real change in accountability relationships between citizens and local governments remains a big question.

**Participatory Paradigm of Coproduction**

While theoretical benefits from coproduction may be numerous, both for the local governments and citizens (Thomas, 2013), implementation of participatory approaches is inescapably uneven and fraught with complex issues (Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Moynihan, 1969). As discussed above, two of the critical issues to consider here are elite capture and clientelism. The most recent literature overview of community development projects involving specifically designed pro-poor participatory mechanisms finds that the potential for elite capture of allocated resources is still quite high: elite groups are more likely to benefit from development projects in areas with higher income inequality and higher gender, ethnicity, or social class disparity. The methods of capture play themselves out in participatory dynamics characterized by higher participation of community members who are more advantaged socially — more educated, wealthier, better connected politically, and male (Mansuri & Rao, 2013). One may also argue, however, that individual capacity yields important advantages: in other words, it frequently takes
individuals with better connections to local political networks, better education, and higher general well-being to mobilize other groups in their communities effectively. The important question then becomes whether elite control over the mobilization process translates into elite capture of local resources and programmatic benefits. Selected empirical studies demonstrate that better alignment of priorities and needs as expressed by poorer and wealthier segments of communities are again more likely to happen in more egalitarian and less heterogeneous communities with transparent information flows to begin with (Mansuri & Rao, 2013).

Apart from the effects of inequality within and heterogeneity of communities, there are a number of other important factors that may affect the success of community mobilization efforts. The literature on common property resource management puts such factors into four groupings according to Agrawal (2002): (i) characteristics of resources such as types of resources under community management, resource boundaries, access to and mobility of a resource; (ii) characteristics of communities or groups of resource users that incorporate community and group size, intra-group wealth and inequality, heterogeneity, and the group's social capital based on past collective action experience and accepted norms; (iii) institutional arrangements defining accountability, mobilizations rules, clarity of rules; (iv) effects of external environment including third-party monitoring, role of the central government, etc. The last two types of factors, although important in a general sense, are of limited applicability to the project in question since the same rules and government arrangements existed for all communities under review here. Further, I focus on the most salient factors in the context of this research project discussed in more detail below.

The type of goods is important. The common pool literature postulates that a resource, or in this case, the type of community infrastructure provided, may inhibit or facilitate community
mobilization based on members' expectation of its utility. For pure public goods, whereby consumption of benefits is neither excludable nor rivalrous, mobilization is more likely to be successful in larger communities, as each new member will provide additional resources to be available for a larger group. Once exclusion becomes feasible, meaning that consumption benefits are sub-tractable, as in the case of common-pool resources, the problems of free-riding, over-exploitation, and crowding are more likely to take place (Ostrom, 2010). Thus, the type of goods should be viewed in tandem with group size.

On its own, group size is expected to have a negative effect on mobilization and participation to achieve a public good (Olson, 1965); however, there are other studies that posit that the likelihood of participation and contribution diminish similarly when a group is too large to mobilize and when a group is too small because the cost of participation is too high (Ostrom, 2010). A good deal of interaction is to be expected between group size, type of goods, and other structural factors. In addition, the number of groups within a community is likely to make the process of mobilization more difficult as such fragmentation reduces the chances of achieving consensus.

The generally negative effects of group heterogeneity may be overcome by positive collective action experiences in the past as long as such experiences generated trust and social cohesion in a community, though both take years to build. According to Ostrom (2010), "reputations for being trustworthy, levels of trust and reciprocity are positively reinforcing … a decrease in any one of these can generate a downward cascade leading to little or no cooperation" (p.163). Trust that each participant has in reciprocators is at the core of explaining success or failure of collective action (Fukuyama, 1995). Putting high normative value on collective action as it happens with regard to ashar activities, as described earlier, may also
propel better mobilization outcomes, especially, in communities dependant on horizontal interpersonal exchanges of goods and services.

Overall, the collective action framework is extensive and provides a number of important factors to consider, but testing all of the factors simultaneously appears to be unfeasible due to the large number of potential interactions and potentially recursive relationships.

*Bishkek’s Municipality Community Grant Program*

The community grant program in Bishkek is part of a larger national investment project targeted at the squatter settlements of Bishkek and Osh, the two most populous cities in Kyrgyzstan. However, for the purpose of this research project, only the Bishkek community grant component is relevant. Implementation of this component started in 2008, and the program became operational in January 2009. The program is still ongoing. The analysis presented here is limited to the first year of implementation for three reasons: the opinion survey of squatter residents was carried out one year prior to the project launch in 2008; implementation of community grants in 2009 was the first time the municipality had to engage directly with squatter residents in joint participatory activities, and lastly, the country descended into political turmoil in early 2010 and little progress was made in project implementation during that year.

The community grant program has targeted 37 of the *novostroika* communities. The program is managed by the municipality through its Project Management Office, which coordinates activities across all municipal territorial units engaged in the process. The scope of joint community-municipality cooperation reviewed here includes the following key components of social mobilization:

(1) Scoping of needs and identification of priority investments in participating communities, in the following step: first, a scoping exercise is carried out at self-
governance level by block committees through citizen surveys; a list of potential projects is then generated and reviewed by municipal territorial units; this broad list is further narrowed down, based on criteria of financial and technical feasibility.

(2) Community consultations are implemented within each community to prioritize the short list of community projects; citizen assemblies are held to approve one specific project; community leaders are identified to represent each community and prepare detailed project proposals.

(3) Community leaders, local self-governments, and municipal territorial units mobilize contributions from residents of the community to co-finance an identified investment project. Total community contribution is set at 5 percent of the total community project cost for each community and at 10 percent for the municipality.

(4) A Project Implementation Agreement is signed between the municipality and the community development agency responsible for the overall project implementation to start actual construction activities.

Construction activities begin when, and only when, these social mobilization goals are achieved. During the construction period, community leaders are expected to participate in joint performance monitoring and quality assurance activities. Upon completion, facilities are commissioned by the municipality and a broad-based community meeting is held to announce project completion.

In the first year of implementation, 2009, the community grant program covered 34 communities and funded 30 community projects, such as installing playgrounds and sports grounds, steles, and pedestrian walks and crossings; carrying out landscaping activities; building community information centers; procuring a solid waste removal truck; and constructing a
bridge. The community grant amount was set at USD 5,000 for the first year for each
community, regardless of population size. At the time such a strategy was perceived to be the
most pragmatic to demonstrate equal treatment of and neutrality towards the squatter
communities. In later years, the grant amount increased substantially; still the grant size
remained equal for all participating communities, regardless of their population size.

The start of the municipal grant program shortly after the comprehensive household
survey of squatter settlements in Bishkek was carried out in 2007 provides a fortuitous
opportunity to link the government responsiveness perceptions with the dynamics of the grant
program implementation. Given a relatively small size of community grants, it may be difficult
to claim large development impacts on improved access to social and infrastructure services in
participating communities; however, the program indeed represents a "foot in the door" type of
initiative in the context of citizen engagement in co-production of urban public services in
Bishkek.
Theoretical Framework of Government Responsiveness and Co-production of Public Goods

Understanding Perceptions of Government Responsiveness

As step one, I attempt to understand the key factors affecting citizen's perspectives of municipal government responsiveness. To do so, I rely on a governance framework in service provision, a service satisfaction paradigm, and the theory of formal and informal institutions in the post-Soviet space.

I start with exploring whether and how perceptions of local government responsiveness differ at different levels of municipal authority (See Figure 1.1). I distinguishing between three levels of formal authority: city administration or mayor's office (first-tier executive authority); district administration, nested within the city administration (second-tier executive authority), and block committee (the self-government level within the district and municipal territorial unit). Given the varying degree of proximity to residents in squatter settlements, with block committees being the closest governing body and the city administration being the farthest, I expect variations in citizens' perceptions. The direction of the relationship is rooted in the subsidiarity principle postulating that each government function should be assigned to the lowest level of government which is defined as best suited to fulfill such function, serves the purpose of achieving greater efficiencies in delivering public services (Bahl & Linn, 1992). Under this principle, the lowest levels of government are more likely to respond to citizens' needs because they are closer to people and have better information about the types and amounts of urban services needed. This constitutes Hypothesis 1:

H1: Different levels of perceived responsiveness exist depending on the government level.

Higher levels of perceived responsiveness are associated with lower levels of government.
Next, I look at the role of informal institutions of participation and social mobilization. I explore the degree of reported participation in informal petitioning of local government authorities, and service agencies for better basic services and improved living conditions. Communal self-help measures taken to improve community services or small-scale communal infrastructure reflect a degree of local social mobilization. As noted earlier, informal demand-making for better services from local governments and service providers is a critical element in building stronger accountability links between local governments and citizens where formal democratic mechanisms such as municipal elections are of limited practical relevance. Based on the reciprocal causation model (Berry et al., 1993) and the studies of external political efficacy (Bratton, 2012; Finkel, 1985, 1987), I formulate Hypothesis 2 as follows:

**H2:** Participation in informal demand-making and self-help activities is positively associated with perceptions of government responsiveness; i.e., participation is likely to be associated with higher levels of perceived responsiveness.

Citizens' assessment of service delivery is closely linked to the amount and quality of urban services they get. I employ both perceptual and output related measures of service provision. First, I explore prioritization of services across urban communities to identify the most salient types of services. Second, I examine the effect of local service provision on perceptions of responsiveness with the following Hypothesis 3:

**H3:** Higher levels of access to prioritized urban services are associated with higher levels of perceived responsiveness.

In line with the service satisfaction paradigm, I expect that the evaluation of government responsiveness may be a product of both service exposure and a citizen's own action to remediate a situation. The levels of access reflect the actual reported amounts of various services received.
at the time of the survey. Thus, I am also interested in an interaction between access to prioritized service and participation activities in producing a combined effect on perceptions of responsiveness, but the direction of the effect is not specified as the overall effect may be dependent on the value of access to service. Thus, Hypothesis 4 postulates:

\textit{H4: The interaction between access to service and participation activities is likely to affect perceptions of local government responsiveness.}

Since many of the latest additions to the squatter communities appeared after the Tulip Revolution in 2005, I explore the role of potential regional cleavages in perceptions of government responsiveness; regional identities played a significant role in the dynamics of the 2005 revolution and onwards. The importance of strong kinship and neighborly connections and other internal support networks may indicate that when feasible new squatters may sort themselves out to settle down in communities with shared identities. Thus, parts of larger squatter agglomerations or whole smaller agglomerations may represent clusters of households originating from the same province or geographic region. My Hypothesis 5 is, thus, stated as follows:

\textit{H5: Regional identity and community heterogeneity are likely to affect perceptions of government responsiveness.}

\textit{Effect of Government Responsiveness Perceptions on Coproduction of Public Services.}

Once I determine the key factors affecting citizen perceptions of local government responsiveness, I examine whether such sentiments were instrumental in facilitating cooperation between citizens of informal settlements and the Bishkek city administration in a number of community infrastructure upgrade investments. My focus is on the municipal government's ability to carry out social mobilization activities, including using community consultations to
identify investment priorities and mobilizing the community co-financing required to implement investment projects in such communities.\textsuperscript{17} The duration of social mobilization activities served as the main indicator of difficulties faced by the municipality in working with communities.\textsuperscript{18} Large delays were symptomatic of significant hurdles to be overcome in registering community needs and priorities and mobilizing community co-financing contributions. Thus, more successful mobilization campaigns as defined by the municipality tended to be shorter on average.

I examine whether the role of perceptions of government responsiveness carries an instrumental value in determining the probable success of community-municipal government cooperation on development issues. As discussed earlier, citizen perceptions of responsiveness rely on the expectation of a positive outcome from engagement with local government officials and willingness to cooperate with authorities at different levels to resolve local community development. In this regard, I define Hypothesis 6 as follows:

\textit{H6: Citizen perceptions of government responsiveness are likely to affect the process of social mobilization in a community.}

\textsuperscript{17} More detailed information about the project is presented in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{18} I relied on project implementation reports identifying key issues related to social mobilization; however, the duration of a social mobilization phase is not the only dimension to characterize programmatic success. I intended to examine other important implementation factors, such as the share of the population in a community participating in the prioritization processes, the share of households voting for a type of community project that was later selected for implementation, and the share of community population agreeing to provide a co-financing contribution. However, the data were not available for all program participating communities.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Sources of Data and Sample

For this research project, I rely on a number of data sources. My main source is the quantitative and qualitative data generated by an extensive study of squatter settlements in Bishkek and Osh. The study was conducted in 2007 by a Bishkek-based research company and commissioned by the World Bank. The study includes two components, quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative component consists of a household survey of Bishkek slum residents. The objective of the survey was to identify key development issues persistent in the informal settlements of Bishkek. The qualitative component consists of about 45 transcripts of focus groups and key informants interviews. I also rely on an extensive media review of online publications about major event in informal settlements.

The household survey of squatter settlements in Bishkek: This is a sub-sample of a comprehensive household survey of slum residents in the Republic’s two largest cities, Bishkek and Osh. The sample size for Bishkek is 1,000 respondents. The original survey was one of the first most comprehensive surveys of the irregular squatter settlements covering all novostroika sites existent at the moment. The total number of distinct irregular settlements was determined to be 55 based on the information provided by the Bishkek municipality at the time. The sampling frame of the survey consists of 49 novostroika communities; six communities of the official count of 55 sites were not included into the survey due to the lack of development at the time of the study. Furthermore, out of 49 surveyed communities, I employ the data from 33 communities

19 I am thankful to the World Bank Kyrgyzstan Office and local municipal implementing partner for sharing the data.
that received a community development grant in 2009. The total sample size for the selected 33 communities is 914 respondents. The sampling methodology is simple random sample; average sample size per site is 27 respondents. Sampling interval varied per site and was calculated by dividing the total estimated number of households by the site's sample size. I construct non-expansionary sample selection weight factor (base weight) to account for unequal selection probability of respondents at a community level (Heeringa, West, & Berglund, 2010). Within each sampled household, a household head or the second most knowledgeable respondent was selected. Overall response rate for the survey was considered high at 88 percent; however, effective response rate varies per each variable in question. The interviews were conducted in the Russian and Kyrgyz languages based on respondent's predilection for either one.

Focus group transcripts of slums residents: The qualitative component of the larger study consists of about 45 de-identified transcripts of focus groups and key informant interviews. This set of transcripts represents the views of multiple stakeholders, including residents of selected irregular settlements, representatives of local self-governments and city administration, and active NGOs and local self-help groups. Local perspectives are presented on the issues of prioritizing development, participation in self-help activities and attitudes toward local governments.

Media publications: To construct a contextual background on development issues and political developments in informal settlements of Bishkek, I review a host of on-line media publications published by a vibrant online media corps between 2005 and 2014. The content covered is mostly related to political participation of slum residents, city’s response to the needs of people in irregular settlements, and perceptions of need by the residents themselves.
Administrative information on selection of particular communities for participation in community grant program: The information gathered from community grant program implementation reports establishes the timeline of key program's outputs such as the timing and duration of social mobilization, and types of public goods selected for investment.

The Model of Local Government Responsiveness

Based on the framework, my theoretical equation of assessing perceptions of local government responsiveness is as follows:

\[ Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Participation}_i + \beta_2 \text{Service}_i + \beta_3 \text{Regional Cleavage}_i + \beta_4 \text{Profile}_i + \epsilon_i \]  

(1)

Where \( Y_i \) indicates responsiveness score reported for a particular government level for an \( i \)-th respondent; \( \text{Participation} \) refers to a set of variables describing respondent's participation in informal demand-making and self-help activities; \( \text{Service} \) refers to a set of variables indicating respondent's access to key urban services such as potable water supply, electricity, sanitation, and roads, or a composite service index; \( \text{Regional Cleavage} \) denotes a set of variables indicating the respondent's place of a provincial origin and communal heterogeneity based on provincial identity; finally, \( \text{Profile} \) is a set of variables to control for socio-economic status and types of community one resided in. All variables are operationalized in more detail below; and Table 4.1. and Table 4.2. provide a summary of variables used in this analysis.

The unit of analysis at this stage is the individual; I apply probability weights and use clustered robust estimators of variance (I also examine standard errors under Taylor series linearization).

Dependent Variable: Perceptions of Local Government Responsiveness

My dependent variable is citizen perceptions of local government responsiveness at three different levels of municipal authority: city administration or mayor's office (first tier executive
authority), city district administrations nested within the city administration (second tier of executive authority), and block committee (the self-government level within a city district). I operationalize perceived responsiveness through the citizens’ stated expectation of a positive outcome and willingness to engage with executive branch institutions at various levels of authority in the context of community development on a forced-choice Likert-like scale (the middle point of "neither willing or unwilling" was removed from the scale). The statement is as follows: "When thinking about solving development issues in your community, which of the following government institutions do you agree to engage with directly while expecting a positive result/response from such collaboration? Please describe how willing or unwilling you are to engage, with "4" indicating highly willing, "3" – somewhat willing; "2" – somewhat unwilling; and "1" – highly unwilling, for each of the government institutions below". Each respondent was presented with a card with the list of local government institutions and response options. Respondents were also given the option of not answering the question. Importantly, this operationalization of responsiveness links the citizens' views to a specific set of needs in the community, whereas willingness to engage with a particular government institution is linked with an expectation of a positive result.

\[20\] Due to the difficulties of operationalizing responsiveness in the context of the post-Soviet bureaucratic culture compounded by the lack of direct linguistic equivalence for the term itself, operationalization as translated here from Russian may seem too complex and double-barreled. However, it was important to incorporate both the expectation of an adequate response from a local government agency and one's willingness to engage with it as the key ingredients of perceptions of responsiveness in a general sense. Better operationalization may be developed by measuring specific government responses to specific citizen requests; however, this was not feasible under this project. I also examined the data for a potential single source bias existing between perceptions of responsiveness and participation variables. I find that the only way to fully exclude the bias is to use the data for responsiveness and participation from two different sources, something this project was not designed to do. However, the bias may be somewhat mitigated by the use of different scales to measure responsiveness and participation, and different location of related questions in the questionnaire (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Furthermore, I use factor analysis to explore whether the two measurements generate a single factor accounting for majority of variance, implying that they are related to the same concept. The results for participation and city responsiveness indicate that there is no such single factor (the eigen value for factor 1 is .07; the eigen value for factor 2 is negative .06; both measurements are 96 percent unique). Improving upon the measure of responsiveness in the context of a post-Soviet state is clearly a task for my future research.
First, I examine variation in my dependent variable across the levels of government. To recall, H1 postulates that different levels of perceived responsiveness exist depending on the government level; higher levels of perceived responsiveness are associated with the lower levels of government due to its proximity and direct accessibility. I compare perceived responsiveness means between the three levels of government using descriptive statistics.

*Independent Variable: Participation*

To explore the effect of non-electoral participation on perceptions of responsiveness, I differentiate between informal demand-making for better services and self-help measures to improve local services. Informal demand-making is further defined as particularized (individual) and demand-making on behalf of a group of people or community. The following statements operationalize the particularized form of demand-making: "Within the past three years, have you resorted to writing a personal letter of complaint to the municipal government?" and "Within the past three years, have you requested your block committee to solve a development issue in your community?" The following statement operationalizes demand-making on behalf of community: "Within the past three years, have you resorted to writing a collective letter of complaint to the municipal government?" Self-help measures are defined by mobilization of community members and participation in community-wide activities to solve a common issue and are operationalized as follows: "Within the past three years, have you mobilized people in your community to solve a development issue?" "Within the past twelve months, did you participate in any unpaid communal activities in which people came together to do some work for the benefit of all?" All four independent variables are binary. I also create a count variable that is the total of all contacting events that the respondent reports having engaged in, varying from one to four. It is important to note that all questions referring to citizen participation refer to some time in the
past, and as such they temporally precede the measure of perceptions of responsiveness. This sequence allows to link prior actions to formation of perceptions; though a design accommodating a time-series approach in the absence of an experimental design would be much better to establish a causal claim.

This set of variables is linked to testing H2: Participation in informal demand-making and self-help activities is positively associated with perceptions of government responsiveness, that is higher levels of participation are likely to be associated with higher levels of perceived responsiveness.

**Independent Variable: Access to Services**

Based on the examination of key development priorities identified by the *novostroika* residents, I determine key types of urban services for which the demand seems most critical. I construct a service accessibility index using principal component analysis (PCA). This index is based on a number of critical services and also includes other infrastructure characteristics, such as size and quality of housing and presence of basic amenities. The index assigns higher weights to services and amenities that are more unequally distributed among households, whereas assets that everyone or no one owns are given zero or little weight. This index is also suitable for constructing a measure of inequality in access to basic services that is used in the next step in modeling coproduction of public goods. The index is used for testing Hypothesis 3: Higher levels of access to prioritized urban services are associated with higher levels of responsiveness.

I follow McKenzie (2005) in constructing the index. Table 4.2. provides the operationalization of all service- and amenity-related variables used as part of the service accessibility index. The quality of the index depends on diversity and multiplicity of indicators to be included to avoid clumping and truncation. I include a total of 19 indicators: those related
to water supply (4 indicators), electricity supply (3 indicators), public transport accessibility (1 indicator), accessibility of primary care health clinics (1 indicator), accessibility of grocery stores (1 indicator), solid waste removal (2 indicators), community safety (1 indicator), access to roads (1 indicator), housing quality (1 indicator), frequency of conflicts related to service availability (3 indicators), and ability to pay for utilities (1 indicator). Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.3. All indicators are amenable to reduction to a binary form, which makes the PCA score interpretation more straightforward.

Independent Variable: Regional Cleavage

To examine the effect of regional identity on perceptions, I employ three key variables. First, geographic area of migration is identified. Second, prevalence of a particular provincial origin is defined for each community. Third, an interaction variable is introduced to define whether or not an individual belongs to the majority group in their given community based on the area from which they have migrated.

These three variables are linked to testing H4: The interaction between access to service and participation activities is likely to affect perceptions of local government responsiveness.

Control Variables: Community and Individual Characteristics

This set of variable includes individual characteristics of respondents, such as age, gender, education, socio-economic status, and residency tenure; and aggregate-level community characteristics, such as year of establishment, proximity to city center and district attribution.

Individual level characteristics are considered level 1 variables; and community characteristics are considered level 2 variables. This distinction is important, as individuals are nested within communities, so one may reasonably expect a higher correlation between residents
of the same community with respect to outcome variables of interest. I estimate separate regressions for each level of government (refer to Table 4.4).

Given the limited variance in the distribution of responses under the dependent variable and the bipolar scaling method, I further convert the dependent variable into a binary response and estimate a logistic regression model using logit estimating the following equation:

\[
\text{Logit } \{ \Pr(Y_i=1) \} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Participation}_i + \beta_2 \text{Service}_i + \beta_3 \text{Regional Cleavage}_i + \beta_4 \text{Profile}_i
\] (2)

Whereby \( Y_i \) equals 1 if government is perceived as responsive and equals 0 otherwise. The rest of the variables are similar to their specification for the linear regression above. The estimated odds ratios are given for the overall or population-averaged probability and accounting for clustering effects within specific communities. I follow a design-based approach to address the intra-class correlation among observations within the same communities by using robust cluster-adjusted standard errors. Introduction of the cluster-adjusted standard errors rendered several independent and control variables insignificant. Several variables were otherwise found statistically significant when applying robust standard errors or Taylor series linearized standard errors.

The Model of Perceived Government Responsiveness and Coproduction of Public Services

This model aims to test H6 which states that citizen perceptions of government responsiveness are likely to affect the social mobilization process.

The basic equation is defined as follows:

\[ Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Responsive}_i + \beta_2 \text{Profile}_i + \varepsilon_i \] (3)

Whereby \( Y_i \) denotes the total number of days it took the Bishkek municipality to implement social mobilization for a community of respondent \( i \), as a function of perceived city government responsiveness and a set of community-level profile variables as control factors such
as year of community establishment, types of public good implemented under the community grant program, and community size (Table 5.1. provides operationalization of variables used).

The dependent variable is operationalized as the total number of days it took the municipality to conduct social mobilization, starting from community prioritization assessment and ending with signing of a project implementation agreement. Such a mobilization period includes shoring up community contributions to co-finance a development project as part of the community grant program. The independent variable is whether or not the municipal government is perceived as responsive. The same binary operationalization is used as in the model of perceptions of local government responsiveness above.

However, there are two important limitations of this approach. First, the dependent variable denotes time to event and requires an event-history analysis technique. Second, the model is essentially an attempt to assess a community-level outcome by an individual-level factor. I further elaborate on both issues and examine their implications for modeling purposes.

To address the first issue, I consider the implementation of the proportional hazards model using the semi-parametric Cox regression to estimate the likelihood of an event of interest occurring if it has not yet occurred. In the context of social mobilization completion as the status event, the Cox regression analyzes the probability of mobilization completion in any time period. The time variable (the number of days it took to complete mobilization) measures duration to the event that is defined by the status variable. Since all communities eventually completed mobilization, the status variable for all communities is equal to 1. The Cox regression assumes that the hazards rate of completion increases linearly for each increment of time (that is with the passage of each additional day). Predictors or covariates in a Cox regression can be time-fixed or
time-dependent. Perceptions of local government responsiveness is a binary predictor and time-fixed.

First, I look at the baseline survival function using Kaplan-Meier Survival estimate to plot the probability of an observation surviving through a certain date without experiencing the event, which is in this case – completion of mobilization. I also derive a covariate survival function to plot the survival probability given the dependent variable holding constant other covariates. Second, I estimate hazards rates as reverse of survival rates to exhibit the probability of an event occurring (i.e., completing the social mobilization in a given community) in that time period, if it has not occurred yet. Hazards ratios are the odds of an event occurring in one group as opposed to another (it is a ratio of hazards rate in one group to the hazard rate in another group). For example, hazards ratio of 1.0 indicates that there is no effect of a covariate on time to event; a hazards ratio above 1.0 indicates increased odds of the event occurring; while a hazards ratio below 1.0 indicates a decrease in odds of a time to event occurring.

Cox regression has a key assumption of proportional hazards that postulates that such hazards ratios for a particular covariate remain constant over time. Furthermore, most methods of continuous-time survival data assume that all survival times are unique and there are no tied failure times. However, this assumption is violated in the context of the community grant program, since all respondents residing within the same community have the same social mobilization completion duration. One way to deal with this is to use an exact partial likelihood method to break the ties. A different approach is to address this issue more broadly in the context of a micro-macro analysis.

As stated earlier, assessing a community-level outcome by an individual-level factor presents a specific methodological issue. Most frequently, the multilevel analysis reference texts
deal with the cases when the dependent variable is at the individual level as in, for example Snijders and Bosker (2012). When I examine perceptions of local government responsiveness, this dependent variable is defined at the lower level of an individual (the so called level-1, or micro level) whereas some of the covariates are defined at the community level (e.g., year of community establishment, community size, etc.). Such right side variables are macro or level-2 factors, and the relationship can be referred to as micro-macro model (Bennink, Croon, & Vermunt, 2013). Croon and van Veldhoven (2007) state that the traditional approach is to aggregate individual data to calculate group means and carry out analysis at group level. If this path is pursued, then the analysis reflects both within-group variation and between-group variation. Aggregation may also substantially reduce the power of the tests by cutting down the total number of observations and increase the probability of Type-II error or false negatives. In the case of the disaggregation approach, data are analyzed at individual level and group scores are assigned to all individuals within a particular group; however, this approach yields inefficient estimates of parameters and biased standard errors due to the violation of assumption of independent errors among individuals (Bennink et al., 2013; Croon & van Veldhoven, 2007).

The literature on the issue indicates that there are essentially three alternative approaches for analyzing such micro-macro relations without losing efficiency or sustaining biased standard errors: the first approach is the use of adjusted regression analysis that substitutes a mean group score by the best linear unbiased predictor (BLUP) of the latent group score, incorporating information on all observed individual-level and group-level explanatory variables included into a model (Croon & van Veldhoven, 2007). The second approach is to define the latent variable with individuals themselves acting as variables, the so called "people-as-variables" approach suggested by Mehta and Neale (2005) and Bauer (2003). However, the second approach is only
practical if the number of individual-level explanatory variables is limited and group sizes are small as each individual observation becomes a variable in itself to be multiplied by the number of predictors. The third approach is simultaneously estimating the micro-macro model as a two-level structural equation model specified at within- and between-level. Currently such estimation is feasible by using Mplus or LatentGold software as described in Ludtke et al. (2008).

I follow the first approach of estimating the BLUP of the latent group score of an individual-level explanatory variable and then plugging such predictor into a level-two regression model. Figure 1.2. presents the full model graphically. Croon and van Veldhoven (2007) provide guidance on analyzing micro-macro relations with continuous outcomes; while Bennink et al. (2013) demonstrate the application of the same latent variable approach for discrete data.

I estimate the following Cox Proportional Hazards Model equation, which is presented here in a log-linear form (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012):

\[
\ln[h(t)] = \ln[h_0(t)] + \beta_1 \text{Responsive}_j + \beta_2 \text{Profile}_j \tag{4}
\]

Whereby \( h(t) \) is the expected hazard function for community \( j \), with the covariates of government responsiveness and a set of community profile variables. Government responsiveness is given as the best linear unbiased predictor (BLUP) of the latent community score \( \zeta_i \) expressed as the level-2 residuals instead of a mean group value for a specific community. The BLUP essentially represents the adjusted group mean for perceived responsiveness in community \( j \) while also taking into account all individual- and community-level variables (see figure 1.2). Next, \( h_0(t) \) is the baseline hazard function for time \( t \) when all covariates equal 0; it also absorbs the intercept parameter (Heeringa et al., 2010).
The BLUP of responsiveness is estimated via a generalized linear mixed model using xtmelogit and following the equation:

\[
\text{Logit} \left[ \Pr(\text{Responsive}_{ij}=1) \right] = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Profile}_{ij} + \zeta_j \quad (5)
\]

Whereby \( \text{Responsive}_{ij} \) denotes the probability of perceiving government as responsive by respondent \( i \) residing in community \( j \); and \( \zeta_j \) refers to the error component specific for a community and uncorrelated with \( \epsilon_{ij} \) or respondent-specific error component. This equation estimates fixed effects for the regression parameters (predictors) and variance of the random community-level effects. It is assumed that the community-level error component is independent across individual respondents and independent from the covariates. I follow Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012) and Heeringa et al. (2010) in estimating and evaluating this equation.

I also compare results with the Cox regression using a mean group value for perceived community responsiveness instead of the latent variable approach. The unit of analysis is a community. Importantly, the total of 33 communities represents the population of \textit{novostroika} participating in the community grant program; thus, the data at this point are no longer a sample, but the population of all program participating communities. The results for all models are presented in Table 5.2.

To summarize my methodology, I start with examining the determinants of local government responsiveness as perceived by the residents of all informal settlements in Bishkek. I examine whether perceived levels of responsiveness are different at different levels of city government. Next, I proceed with examining the relationship between citizen perceptions of responsiveness and their participation in informal demand-making and self-mobilization in the context of building better access to basic infrastructure services and improved standards of living. I am also interested in the potential effect of regional cleavages on perceived
responsiveness. After gaining a better understanding of perceived responsiveness, I examine whether such sentiments may play an important role in a joint production of public goods by the city administration and residents of recipient communities. Specifically, I look at the effect of the citizens' willingness to cooperate with government institutions in the context of solving development issues on the number of days it took the municipality to mobilize communities participating in the community grant program.
CHAPTER 4

PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS

City Governance

Most recently, in January 2014, the Bishkek City Kenesh (or City Council) adopted a new city development strategy, called "The City and its Denizens," identifying priorities for the next four years. The way the strategy was conceived merits an examination of its own, as it was verifiably the first strategic city management document in Bishkek's history formulated based on inclusive broad-based participation involving direct citizen input. However, for this discussion it is important to register that one of the cornerstone objectives proclaimed by the strategy is developing and expanding partnerships between city management and citizens. In fact, among the nine key issues identified in the analysis of city problems, the lack of the citizens' trust of the municipality, the city council, and other government institutions involved in city management was put squarely as the number one issue.

The position aired by the city residents appears unambiguous: there is no direct mechanism in existing governance structure to account for/respond to the residents' needs and interests. Not unexpectedly, the strategy calls for city management reform to develop a governance mechanism that makes space for the citizens' participation in decision-making via institutionalization of citizen-municipality partnership groups. The strategy identifies at least five possible intersections for citizens' input: (1) direct participation in prioritizing city development; (2) creation of policy-centered networks of citizens; (3) direct citizen participation in policy implementation processes; (4) involvement in policy evaluation and identification of policy impacts in open forums such as public hearings; (5) participation in re-assessment of policies and
policy change. It remains to be seen how these objectives will be met given that many suggested instruments are already included in the legal framework of local governance but remain formal and have not been consistently implemented over the years.

Beyond the issues of clientelism and corruption endemic in post-Soviet administrative states in a general sense as described earlier, the mere complexity of government institutions and the strong desire expressed by the higher-level executive authority (such as the city administration in this context) to build hierarchical systems of accountability, represent a serious impediment to achieving participatory goals. The structure of the formal government institutions in Bishkek is a good example of the point. As many as five levels of hierarchy can be found in the governance structure the Bishkek municipality: the mayor's office or city administration proper, city district administration, municipal territorial units, territorial community councils (in some locations), and block committees. The latter two levels are formally considered a part of the city's self-government apparatus; however, the block committee level mostly functions as the primary cell of the city's administrative authority, being vertically integrated and subordinated to municipal territorial units and district administrations. Below I provide a brief summary of the roles of each level of governance in relation to setting up policies towards city development and, specifically, towards the informal settlements. I also provide a justification on the selection of specific levels of administrative authority for inclusion or exclusion from this analysis.

The mayor's office or city administration is the first level of municipal executive authority charged with overall development policy implementation. The mayor is elected by the city council for a four-year term; candidates may be fielded by each political party represented in the council; the prime minister may also field one candidate to be voted upon. The Public–State Capital Construction Department (referred to as OGUKS) and the City's Agency for
Development, both under the auspices of the Mayor's Office, are the primary institutions within the city administration responsible for development policy in informal settlements. OGUKS was established in 1991 as an institution streamlining a cross-sectoral policy response to development issues in informal settlements; the "public" part of the name stands for direct participation of community members from informal settlements in prioritization of such development priorities. It is generally understood that OGUKS represented a compromise decision to deflate political pressure from informal settlement residents on the national and city governments by inclusion of the civil society into decision-making at the start of citizen rallies and land squatting back in 1989 (World Bank, 2007a). However, the agency is considered to have lost its "community spirit" over the past decade. Fast forward to the present day, and this institution is found to be under a great amount of pressure to justify its developmental choices and financial management practices. Currently, the agency is mired in corruption scandals of menacing proportions related to inflated project costs and poor quality of delivered communal infrastructure. The City's Agency for Development is more tangential to the development issues of informal settlements; it is primarily charged with preparation of an overall city development strategy and mainstreaming donor funds; this is a relatively new agency that emerged in 2009.

The city is divided into four districts, each managed by a district administration. Heads of district administrations are appointed by the mayor; however the prime minister may have a final say over a particular candidate. Formally, district administrations share a broad range of responsibilities with the city administration related to implementation of social and economic development programs in informal settlements; each district administration has a committed staff of up to four people. However, many of the responsibilities involving direct collaboration with the residents of informal settlements are delegated to municipal territorial units and block
committees, as described below. It appears that the main policy domain that district administrations are actively engaged in is the allocation of land plots for private housing and land development related to formalization of illegal settlements (World Bank, 2007a). This is the critical agency for the residents of informal settlements who seek (i) an allocation of a new land plot, and (ii) formalization of illegally occupied land plots/those services.

Municipal territorial units (MTUs) are administrative sub-divisions nested within each city district. These are newer entities that came into being in 2008 to replace formally or aggregate territorial community councils described below. Officially, MTUs are regarded as the primary cells of the city administrative apparatus, or the tertiary administrative level. Currently, those MTUs encompassing informal settlements of Bishkek are usually the primary points of contact to work with novostroika residents. The reported objective of creating this additional administrative level was to bring the executive authority closer to the resident population. However, there is a significant disagreement whether MTUs turned out to be effective: many believe that they contributed to a significant growth of the bureaucratic apparatus of the city, but have not brought tangible results in revitalization of city-residents partnerships. This level of administration is omitted from the analysis as MTUs did not exist at the time the novostroika resident survey was conducted in 2007. In any event, those units sustained low institutional capacity within the first two years of their establishment.

The territorial community councils are lower level self-governance institutions that are not formally considered an executive branch but used to be contracted out to perform many of the functions MTUs are currently charged with. In essence, MTUs were created to substitute for community councils. Some of the councils in the older informal settlements were independently registered as legal entities, which allowed them to apply for development assistance and grants.
However, prior to 2008 the overwhelming majority of councils were not fully formalized and served as mere informal extensions of the district administrations. The viability of community councils once the city administration's support is withdrawn is justifiably questioned: many councils had the narrow unifying operational purpose of mobilizing residents at the city administration's request and gathering population statistics (mostly related to residency permits and migration) within their geographic scope. Despite the apparent proximity to the city residents and electability of community councils, there was a perceived distance between the two sides; these institutions are frequently perceived as extensions of the city's executive authority rather than community-level organizations advocating for community needs (World Bank, 2007a).

Furthermore, at the time of the novostroika resident survey, many of the squatter areas that emerged after the 2005 Tulips Revolution did not have any established community councils. This prompted me to omit this level of organization from current analysis. The future of MTUs is unknown. There is an intermittent debate in the City Council about scrapping the MTU model and revitalizing community councils, but so far MTUs have prevailed.

Block committees are indeed the lowest level of continuously present self-organized institutions of city dwellers that formally step out of the purview of the city's executive authority. However, after the replacement of territorial community councils with larger size MTUs, block committees became the quasi-primary cells of the city government; heads of block committees are contracted out by MTUs to work on social mobilization issues, information dissemination, residential registration, and overall on propelling the city administration's policy messages all the way down to local constituencies. Block committees are paid a flat-rate fee by the city administration on per household basis for services provided. For municipal service providers, block committees may also be considered an important entry point into local communities of
residents, especially within informal settlements. Block committees frequently assist service providers with collecting payments for utility services while receiving an 8-10 percent commission from the total collections. Block committees are elected by city block residents for a two-year term. I include this level of governance into analysis as it represents the most consistently present and active level of self-organization in all urban communities, including informal settlements.

Apart from direct executive authorities and local self-governance institutions described above, there are also numerous municipal and state agencies providing municipal services to the residents of informal settlement and city dwellers in general. Like the majority of large post-Soviet cities, the Bishkek city administration owns a wide array of municipal enterprises providing utility services, such as water supply and sanitation, solid waste collection, centralized heating, housing maintenance, and transport. However, initiation and expansion of service for informal settlements is streamlined through the above mentioned OGUKS which are departments in the city administration. Thus, any formal service-related requests originated within informal settlements go through district administrations and this department first.

An important element of governance in informal settlements is represented by a number of active civil society organizations and non-profits. Several such organizations have their roots in the associations of squatters at the dawn of the squatter movement. Several organizations transformed into self-help groups aimed at implementation of small-scale community infrastructure projects as well as income generation activities for residents in their respective informal settlements. *Ashar* typically served as the main social mobilization method. Some note that the role of these organizations would frequently be limited in geographical scope and provide particularistic benefits to immediate members of a group, but not a community in
general; their organizational impact is perceived to be uneven and dependent upon the availability of funding from external donors (World Bank, 2007a). Furthermore, from a city technocrat's perspective, facilities built using *ashar* methods are considered low-tech, low quality, and unsustainable in the long term. Municipal utility companies frequently refuse to commission such communal facilities; in turn, facilities lack maintenance and become dilapidated soon after.

**Perceptions of Local Government Responsiveness**

"First, the municipal government should work closely with people. Second, their work should be transparent and honest. And third, they should simply perform their duty."

(male FG respondent)

**Does Perceived Responsiveness Differ between Levels of Governance?**

The complexity of city governance and multiplicity of institutional players with a potential to affect everyday lives of residents of irregular settlements make it difficult to single out specific levels of governance and institutions for analysis here. Before I proceed with analysis, I provide more details on the choice of specific levels of municipal authority.

I justify my choice of the city administration as the obvious major force behind the overall urban policy implementation; being the highest executive level within the municipal governance system, the mayor's office is the pinnacle of the decision-making authority when it comes to a programmatic response to development challenges in irregular settlements. In any case, if one asks a *novostroika* resident the perennial question of "Who is responsible for making your life better?" the finger will point unequivocally towards the city administration first, before allowing for other candidates to fill in the picture.

District administrations appear to be less important from the perspective of impact on improved well-being of *novostroika* dwellers; however, due to the importance of land allocation
practices as a major instrument of legalization of irregular land seizures, this level appears to be relevant for analysis since it carries an important political weight for the novostroika residents. I exclude both MTUs and territorial community councils from this analysis: MTUs were still a new institution during the time reviewed here; while territorial councils were not established in some of the newer informal settlements at the time of the survey. However, block committees representing the lowest level of self-governance and to some degree an extension of the executive authority, are included due to their institutional stability.

To recall, Hypothesis I posits that different levels of perceived responsiveness exist depending on the government level; higher levels of perceived responsiveness are associated with the lower levels of government, given the varying degree of proximity to residents in squatter settlements, with block committees being the closest governing body and the city administration – the farthest. Perceived responsiveness of local governments reflects residents' willingness to engage with local authorities to solve local development issues while expecting a positive result from such cooperation.

In the light of hypothesis one, respondents appear to assess block committees as more responsive: 70.8 percent of respondents report that they are willing or somewhat willing to engage with this level of self-government (scoring their willingness to engage at 3 and 4). The expectations from the district administrations are much lower: 37.5 percent of respondents appear to be willing to engage with this level of authority. Perceived responsiveness is somewhat higher for the city administration compared to the district administration level, but still very much lower compared to respondents' willingness to engage with block committees: 42.6 percent are reportedly willing to engage. The 95 percent confidence intervals slightly overlap for the mean responsiveness scores for the city and district administrations indicating that the means are
not statistically different, while both mean scores are significantly lower than the mean responsiveness score assigned to block committees. Table 4.1 provides confidence levels for the reported scores and proportions when the score is transformed into a binary variable.

Thus, a cross-sectional snapshot shows that a lower level of governance may be associated with the higher levels of perceived responsiveness. There is also a marginal difference of perceived responsiveness attributed to the city administration as opposed to district administration (significant for 90 percent confidence intervals). Overall, it is not surprising that the district administration tends to score lower than the city administration; with very limited resources, district administrations tend to function as mere extensions of the mayor's office; furthermore, the general perception is that district authorities tend to delegate much of their direct interaction with irregular communities to MTUs and block committees as opposed to having a direct communications channels with *novostroika* residents. Thus, district administrations appear less relevant in the eyes of the public.

Incidentally, focus group and key informant interviews with residents of irregular settlements point to a similar conclusion. Here is what respondents choose to say about their trust and responsiveness of district administrations: "How can I trust anyone there? They take their money, but don't get their job done." (male FG respondent); "We have not seen anyone from the district administration here." (male FG respondent); "District administration decides on just a single issue, land plots allocation." (female FG respondent); "When we go to the district administration for help, they promise, and then nothing happens…. We do everything ourselves…. Nobody helps, including the district administration." (female FG respondent); "Something needs to be done so that people actually learn about what they [administration] are doing. They need to talk to people. We don't know what they do and how they help." (male FG
respondent); "People have no idea about what they [administration] do. They don't see anything done. We, the residents of this novostroika, have not heard of anything they did for us." (female FG participant). Some opinions are quite strong: "They are completely useless. They don't do their job" (male FG participant).

Overwhelmingly, respondents tend to express much more favorable opinions about block committees. Here are some good examples: "We only go for help to territorial councils and block committees. We trust them, and deal directly with them. We have no time to go to the district administration" (female FG respondent); "I believe, only block committees try to achieve something. That's it. Nobody else" (female FG respondent); "They [block committees] are the single organization that does something. That's because they are close to people" (male FG respondent); "Well, I do trust the block committee head, but he has no resources. He cannot just work on his own. He does his job, but there should be help from the mayor's office" (male FG respondent); "We have good trust in block committees. Nobody ever cheats on us there. If they collect contributions, these moneys will not disappear in someone's pocket; they will be spent as designed. They report to people" (male FG participant), "They are close to people. They care about our problems. Because they are themselves — the people. They know about the tough life we have. When they do something, we see the results" (male FG respondent). Noticeably from the quotes above, respondents link responsiveness with transparency, proximity to common people, access to information, fairness, honesty, and tangibility of results.

**Does Participation Affect Responsiveness?**

First, I examine frequency of participation in demand-making and self-help activities. In line with the theory of particularized contacting discussed in Chapter 2, the residents of irregular settlements are more likely to report participation in general contacting, i.e. contacting public
officials as a group (15.8 percent of residents report contacting municipal authorities as part of a group) as opposed to individual or particularized contacting (9.4 percent of respondents report doing so individually). Attempts to resolve a development issue with a block committee on an individual basis tend to be much more frequent (34.3 percent of residents report doing so) compared to individual or collective contacting of the municipal authorities.

When it comes to participation in volunteer activities for the benefit of the whole community (such as ashar), only 16.6 percent of respondents recall participation within the past year; predictably, being an agent of social mobilization in one's community is even less anticipated – merely 7.7 percent have done so within the past three years. Overall, the total count of all participation activities (excluding self-help volunteer work) ranges from 0 to 4: now 59.9 percent of respondents report no participation in any of the activities, while 40.1 percent report participation in at least one activity. Participation in community work is excluded from the total count since reliability analysis shows that this item decreases the Kuder-Richardson-20 coefficient of internal consistency for binary variables.\(^{21}\)

As stated earlier, informal demand-making for better services from local governments and service providers is considered to be a critical element in building stronger accountability links between local governments and citizens, especially where formal democratic mechanisms such as municipal elections are of limited practical relevance. To recall, I examine the potential effect of demand-making and experience in self-help activities on perceptions of local government responsiveness by testing the following hypothesis: Participation in informal demand-making and self-help activities is positively associated with perceptions of government responsiveness. I test this hypothesis using both OLS regression and logistic regression model

\(^{21}\) The KD-20 coefficient for the four item scale of contacting and mobilization is .67.
for each of the three levels of governance; I use sampling weights and robust standard errors in both cases. The results are presented in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 correspondingly. Due to limited variability in the dependent variable when operationalized as a responsiveness score, I convert it into a binary variable. The two types of models show an overall stability of the statistical significance and sign of the coefficients for all independent variables and significant control covariates. Further, I report coefficients’ effect sizes in terms of odds ratios which appear to be a more intuitive way to describe the relationships examined here.

Overall, possessing some experience in appealing to local governments for help through means like individual contacting, contacting government officials as part of a group, and organizing other community members to solve a development issue tends to be associated with higher levels of perceived responsiveness of the city administration and block committees. The effect appears to be stronger for the block committees: each additional instance of engagement in such activity increases the odds of perceiving the block committee as responsive as opposed to non-responsive by a factor of 1.93 (p<.01 for one-tailed test) compared to the factor of 1.60 attributed to the increased odds of perceiving the city administration as being responsive as opposed to being non-responsive (p<.10 for one-tailed test), holding other variables constant. The same does not hold for perceptions of the district level administration: the effect of the participation variable is in the expected direction; however it is much smaller in size and not statistically significant. Furthermore, the perceptions of the district administration appear to be in most part the function of the perceptions of city administration and block committees: both of these variables are statistically significant and have the largest predictive power within the logit model based on the size of the value of their standardized coefficients, overall goodness of fit, and the lack of other major predictors beyond very few control variables. In general, the OLS
models explain 45 percent of total variance in city administration responsiveness score, 53 percent - in case of the districts administration score and 36 percent - in case of the block committee score. As per goodness of fit for the corresponding logistic models, the model for predicting the odds of finding a city government responsive as opposed to non-responsive explains 75 percent of cases and provides a 45 percent improvement in estimation compared to a naïve guess; the model for the district administration responsiveness explains 83 percent of cases and is 60 percent better that a naïve guess; finally, the model for estimating the responsiveness of the block committees explains 79 percent of cases and is 31 percent better than a naïve guess.

Participation in *ashar* or communal development activity for the benefit of the whole community is statistically significant (p<.01) and increases the odds of perceiving the city administration as responsive by a factor of 2.29, *ceteris paribus*. Such participation, however, does not appear to be a statistically significant factor affecting perceived responsiveness when it comes to the local self-governance units, i.e., block committees. Thus, there is some evidence to support the Hypothesis 2 that participation in informal demand-making and self-help activities is positively associated with perceptions of government responsiveness, especially when it comes to the perceptions of the city administration. It seems that even limited contacts with local government organizations targeted at resolving local development issues may foster a degree of connectedness between residents and local government officials. Informal demand-making for better services from local governments and service provider apparently has a role to play in building stronger accountability links between local governments and citizens. Building upon existing self-mobilization activities may be considered as an important entry strategy when engaging with the residents of the irregular settlements in order to capitalize upon community-derived institutional arrangements.
Does Access to Services Matter?

Residents in urban communities are expected to have a range of urban services available to them such as clean water, electricity, solid waste collection, and accessible roads. Other essentials may include access to decent housing conditions, access to social services infrastructure such as health clinics, schools, and grocery stores, and generally safe environment. However, in irregular settlements of Bishkek the situation tends to deviate significantly from a picture of happy urban living. One may assuredly argue that securing access to an extra hour of electricity in winter and an extra gallon of clean water in summer or getting largely inaccessibly emergency medical service, or simply navigating dirt roads in a morning commute to work and schooling constitutes a seemingly perpetual daily survival battle for the majority of novostroika residents. While the situation may be quite different from community to community reflecting drastic inequities in availability of services mostly between older and newer neighborhoods, the overall picture is that of daily struggle and lack of the most basic amenities.

As discussed earlier, availability of basic urban services has direct implications to forming residents' perceptions of government responsiveness. Citizens' assessment of service delivery is closely linked to the amount and quality of urban services they get. I look at a range of urban services when examining the effect of local service provision on perceptions of responsiveness. To recall Hypothesis 3, I expect to find higher levels of perceived responsiveness where services tend to be better.

In PCA, the first component captures the maximum discrimination between households. As seen from Table 4.3., the first component accounts for 27 percent of the total variation across all 19 indicators. This table also reports PCA score loadings or percentages of explained variation (column 1, Table 4.3.). The scoring coefficients are positive for all key infrastructure
services such as availability of piped potable water service, electricity and waste collection. This indicates that availability of these services is related to higher overall service index score. Declaring building road infrastructure as a primary development priority is also an indication of a more affluent community: the poorest neighborhoods tend to prioritize water and electricity first and foremost, and only then demand for roads and accessibility of social services (World Bank, 2007b). On the other hand, issues like frequent conflicts with neighbors about access to drinking water or solid waste removal, as well as conflict with utility service providers are more prevalent within less developed communities from the urban service accessibility perspective. This is reflected in the negative signs assigned to these indicators' coefficients. Another negative sign is attributed to availability of food kiosks; however, the overall contribution of this indicator is extremely small (PCA coefficient is negative .02). I further rescale coefficients by standard deviations of their source variables: thus, the coefficients will indicate a change from 0 to 1 for each of the service access dummy variable (column 2, Table 4.3.). It is clear that the biggest contribution to a higher PCA score is given by the water access indicators followed by access to electricity, while the largest negative effect is associated with the lack of ability to pay for services and conflicts with utility companies.

A helpful check of internal consistency of the index can be gained through examining means for each indicator across three terciles of the service index. Thus, for example, there are next to no households with 24-hour piped water supply for either summer or winter periods among the poorest tercile of households, compared to 86 percent and 96 percent of households in the richest tercile who report having such supply. Inequality of water accessibility is, perhaps, the most striking finding of this index analysis. As a different example, about 50 percent of the poorest households report having issues with paying their utility bills in full as opposed to about
15 percent of households within the richest tercile based on the service index. For multivariate analysis, I transform raw PCA scores into positive values and use weighted terciles of service index. I further use PCA scores for proxying service delivery accessibility at a community level for communities participating in the municipal grant program as described in the next chapter.

In addition to the general impact of service on perceived responsiveness of local governments, I expect interaction between service accessibility and citizen's own actions to remediate a situation. To see if there is an indication of such interaction, I examine means of participation variables across terciles of the service index. It appears that participation rates peak in the second tercile for individualized demand-making (e.g., writing an individual complaint to city authorities and requesting one's block committee to solve a development issue) and mobilizing people in one's community. However, there seems to be no differences among terciles in terms of collective demand-making activities. Finally, the relationship appears to be reversed for participation in communal activities for the benefit of the whole community: mean participation rates appear to be higher for the third tercile. This provides a further support for separating communal self-help into a separate category as proposed earlier. In multivariate analysis, I introduce relevant interaction terms in order to test Hypothesis 4, namely that the interactions between access to service and participation activities are likely to jointly affect perceptions of local government responsiveness.

When it comes to equity in urban service provision, those who belong to the most poorly served populations (assigned to the first service tercile) are significantly less likely to view the city government as responsive compared to those of the upper tercile which is designated as the third tercile and used as the reference group in the model: the odds of doing so decrease by about 73 percent (p<.01, one-tailed test) for the city administration and by about 44 percent for the
block committees (p<.10, one-tailed test). The results of the logistic regression are presented in Table 4.5. The residents of the second terciles are also less likely to view the city administration and local block committees as responsive compared to those of the upper terciles; however, the results are not statistically significant. These findings are in line with Hypothesis three which states that higher levels of access to urban services are associated with higher levels of perceived responsiveness or in this case, finding the local government responsive. Thus, access to basic urban services is an important predictor of perceived responsiveness – especially among those who are found at the bottom of the service access distribution. Furthermore, I find no support for the interaction terms between access to services and prior experience in demand-making and social self-mobilization; thus, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no interaction between access and different types of localized activities aimed at improving access to services. The interaction terms are omitted from Tables 4.4. and 4.5.

What is the Likely Effect of Regional Cleavages?

There is a strong perception that regional cleavages intensified in the social fabric of Bishkek after the Tulip Revolution of 2005, that is, roughly two years prior to the situation analyzed here. There are two primary factors driving this process: unbalancing of north-south power sharing in the central government and continued internal migration into Bishkek. The north-south power sharing arrangements since 1991 with deeper roots in the Soviet governance system, rested on the idea that the central government residing in the capital is naturally dominated by the representatives of the northern oblasts. At the same time, the regional leaders of the North (Chui Oblast) and the South (Osh Oblast) tend to enjoy exclusive bargaining advantages over the voice of all other regional leaders, and in particular cases, over that of the national government (Jones Luong, 2002). In the aftermath of the Tulip Revolution, the national
government in Bishkek became infused with pro-presidential cadres from the South; first to experience the change were the national legislature, the judicial system and courts, and law-enforcement and security apparatuses of the executive branch (International Crisis Group, 2010).

The population of Bishkek and neighboring northern regions frequently expressed overt and covert concerns of the new post-revolutionary government bringing about a destabilizing wave of corruption, predation on the state resources, and institutionalized criminality and lawlessness (International Crisis Group, 2008). At the interpersonal level, such perceptions frequently found their expression in distrust and elevated negativity towards migrants from the southern regions of the country (Kosmarskaya, 2011). The latter were frequently referred to as land-grabbers and abettors of the new regime; while the new settlements that emerged after the 2005 revolution were described as the breeding grounds for revolution. However, the situation appears to be much more complex. For example, with regard to the land-grabbing issue, there is a growing number of emerging reports that indicate that local municipal authorities and some central government bureaucracies may have been directly involved in land sell-off within and around Bishkek (Mitenko, 2011, March 11; Niyazova, 2013, December 6; Sultankulova & Kydyrtoktoyev, 2013, January 6; Temirova, 2010, April 21).

According to the latest population figures, Bishkek accounts for about 47 percent of all urbanized population of the country and about 16 percent of its total population of about 5.6 million people (National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2013). As for internal migration, the major sources of migrants to Bishkek in the 1990s and early 2000s were the districts around Bishkek and Chui Oblast where Bishkek is located, while there was still a sizable migration of people from the three southern oblasts to both the city of Bishkek and Chui Oblast (Schuler, 2007). This pattern is largely reflected in the distribution of novostroika residents by
regional source of migration to Bishkek based on the novostroika survey which shows an overwhelming majority of respondents (81.2 percent) reportedly migrated from the northern oblasts of Chui inclusive of Bishkek proper (38.2 percent)\textsuperscript{22}, Naryn (22.5 percent), Talas (10.7 percent), and Issyk-Kul (9.7 percent). The three southern oblasts together contribute to the remaining 18.8 percent or 7 percent from Jalal-Abad, 2.5 percent - from Batken, and 9.3 percent – from Osh.\textsuperscript{23}

Incidentally, there appears to be no statistically significant difference either in the mean number of years that a respondent's household has lived in their place of residence or in the mean number of years since the household's dwelling was built between migrants from the northern regions and the southern regions; although migrants from Batken do show slightly smaller mean years of residence.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, when examining the sub-sample of the novostroika population with incomplete dwellings at the time of the survey or dwellings built within the past two years (i.e., between 2005 and 2007), the residents are more likely to be from Bishkek proper (44 percent) as opposed to other towns (23 percent) or rural area (33 percent). This amounts to about 81 percent of all newly constructed or incomplete housing being occupied by migrants from the northern oblasts and Bishkek proper.

These patterns seem to be deeply at odds with the commonly invoked public sentiment of Bishkek irregular settlements being inundated with migrants from the south regions. Such sentiment is well documented, for example, in Kosmarskaya (2011). The review of online media forums presents a very similar picture. In the light of this project, the social cleavage between

\textsuperscript{22} About 84\% of those reporting migration from Chui Oblast are in fact from Bishkek proper.

\textsuperscript{23} One may reasonably suspect that some bias may exist in respondents' reporting of the region of origin due to political climate at that point in time; however, it seems unlikely to heavily skew the overall picture.

\textsuperscript{24} Using one-way ANOVA, p<.05.
those who migrated from the northern oblasts as opposed to those who came from the southern regions is expected to be an important factor in the perceptions of local government responsiveness. However, it is not immediately clear in what direction these potential associations may go: one may think that the relationship is likely to depend upon the level of governance.

To examine the effect of regional identity on perceptions, I employ two variables in analysis. First, the geographic region of migration is identified. Second, a binary variable is introduced to account for belonging to the southern group with substantial presence in a given community (whereby such migrant group constitutes 10 percent or more based on weighted survey results). These variables are linked to testing Hypothesis 5: The regional identity and the degree of community heterogeneity are likely to affect perceptions of government responsiveness. Table 4.2. provides descriptive statistics for regional identity and proportion of southern migrants in informal communities. The results of the OLS and logistic regression are given in Tables 4.4. and 4.5. correspondingly.

Overall, I find no statistically significant effect for irregular settlement residents migrating from the southern regions of the country on perceived responsiveness of the city and district administrations. On the other hand, the relationship is statistically significant and positive for the block committees: southern migrants are 2.19 times as likely as northerners to believe that block committees are responsive (p<.01). This finding is not surprising in itself, as many of those migrating from the south indicate that they come from rural areas where the institutions of participation in local community groups is a traditional approach to governance with deep historical roots. Given that at this level of governance, the block committee is an electable body closest to the residents of the informal communities, this outcome appears straightforward. It
also supports the hypothesis five postulating that regional identity matters when it comes to perceived responsiveness, but only in application to the local self-governance institutions.

This finding has at least two direct instrumental implications for social organization: first, reliance on block committees by city administration for grass-roots level organizing and facilitation of policy implementation is highly warranted (and this realization appears to be well internalized by the city and district administrations); second, engaging with those residents migrating from the south through locally representative block committees may increase the likelihood of successful collaboration between the city administration and residents of informal communities. On the other hand, it may be the case that the block committees are more inherently trusted exactly because they are viewed as somewhat autonomous from the formalistic bureaucratic machine of the city government. One may further argue that promoting autonomy and strength of these institutions is likely to further engender their legitimacy in the eyes of the people. However, this proposition may run counter to the predominant approach of administrative efficiency. As one district official put it: "We should eliminate elections of block committee heads altogether. They should be appointed by the district administrations. Only this way we can get something done" (male administration official, Sverdlovsky district).

Echoing the previous finding, respondents residing in communities with southern migrants exceeding 10 percent of the population are about 2.67 times more likely to perceive their block committees as responsive compared to residents where such population is 10 percent or less, controlling for other variables in the model (p<.10). However, the relationship is reversed with regard to the perceptions of the city administration: the odds of considering the city administration being responsive decrease by about 55 percent for respondents residing in more regionally heterogeneous communities with a substantial southern migrant population share as
opposed to those who live in communities with fewer migrants from the south, *ceteris paribus* (p<.10, one-tailed test). The latter result is marginally significant; however, the direction of the relationship is stable. Does this outcome reflect a disconnect between the city government dominated primarily by "native" northerners and residents from communities with a substantial southern migrant population? This question merits further exploration as access to urban services in such communities may also be an interactive factor: for example, a quick examination shows that the residents from communities with a substantial share of migrant population from the south are more likely to fall within the lowest first tercile of the service accessibility index as opposed to the second or third tercile.25

*Personal Characteristics and Location*

This set of variables includes individual characteristics of a respondent such as age, gender, education, ethnicity, employment, per capita monthly expenditures, urbanicity status (indicating whether respondent migrated to Bishkek from rural or non-rural area) and residency tenure. As described earlier in Chapter 2, there is a well established analytical tradition of using these types of demographic and individual-level characteristics in assessing service satisfaction and trust in government. In addition to these controls, I introduce a number of individual dimensions related to socio-economic status, such as the number of households residing under the same roof, which may serve as additional poverty related indicator (several cohabiting households is typically an indication of relatively worse economic conditions); perceptions of whether or not respondent's community of residence is poor; whether or not a respondent has relative in Bishkek to indicate the degree of local familial support structures available,

25 The proportion of southern migrants within the first, second, and third tercile are correspondingly 49 percent, 27 percent and 23 percent (95 percent confidence intervals are 41-58 percent for the first tercile, 18-35 percent for the second tercile, and 16-31 percent for the third tercile).
Characteristics of a respondent's community are important as well. I employ the following variables to control for community-level effects: the number of years since the community was established and community size (transformed into a natural log of the number of households residing in a given community at the time of the survey). Table 4.2 provides more detailed information on all control variables used in the models.

There are a number of control variables that are found to be significant. The results reported here for the logistic regression model are presented in Table 4.5. Among the individual demographic variables, age seems to have an inverse relationship with the perceptions of the city administration responsiveness: older residents are less likely to perceive the city administration as responsive to their needs. At the same time, with the age increase respondents tend to perceive local block committees as responsive. Male respondents are more likely to think of block committees as being responsive as opposed to district administrations, while there is no statistically significant result for the municipality. There is also a divergent result for respondents based on their employment status: the unemployed and those with no full-time employment tend to be more skeptical of the city administration responsiveness as opposed to those employed full time. On the other side, unemployed and partially employed respondents are more likely to believe that local self-government is responsive. Those who define their community as being poor are significantly less likely to be willing to engage with their respective district administrations; the relationship seems to be similar with regard to other levels of governance, but is not found to be statistically significant. Migrants from rural areas are significantly more likely to trust in responsiveness of block committees; for district administrations and the municipality this factor does not appear to be important, although the direction is reversed for the city administration. This finding seems to be consistent with the overall higher levels of
willingness to engage with block committees for those who come from the more traditional southern regions and older respondents. Those who have family networks in Bishkek are significantly less likely to consider city administration as responsive, which may reflect the internalization of the disparities in living conditions between Bishkek proper and irregular settlements. Finally, higher per capita monthly expenditures are positively associated with the residents' willingness to engage with the block committees whereas no such effect is found for district administrations and the municipality proper. The residency tenure appears to be inversely related to perceived responsiveness: each additional year is likely to reduce the odds of considering any of the local governance institutions responsive; however, the outcome is only statistically significant for the block committees.

Community level controls such as community size and the number of years since community was established are mostly not significant; however, respondents residing in newer communities emerging after 1999 are found to be more likely to rate their district administrations as responsive, while a small proportion of those who settled in the informal settlements in the wake of the 2005 revolution are also more likely to viewing the city administration as responsive and be willing to engage with it. Within the next several years following the establishment of new land squatter neighborhoods in 2005, these newer communities saw quite rapid expansion, and the residents there became perhaps the most outspoken demand-makers across the irregular settlement landscape. Then, yet another wave of squatting followed after the ouster of President Bakiev in April 2010. Within the past few years, there have been numerous reports of these informal community members blocking arterial roadways in Bishkek, coming out on pickets and strikes, and demanding visits of the mayor and city officials to their community to register people's deprivations and lack of basic living conditions. Some of the pressure put on the
municipality turned out to be quite successful: residents in several communities were able to get some progress on legitimization of their community and incorporation into the city limits, and provision of some services like electricity and water (Aksenenko & Kojoev, 2014, April 29; Bishkek Mayor's Office, 2011).

Discussion of Findings

In this chapter, I explore the significance of three sets of theoretical variables that may shape perceived local government responsiveness: participation, service provision and regional identity. It appears that all three factors are likely to be significant in shaping such perceptions; however, their effect may not necessarily be relevant for all levels of governance, and the size and direction of the effect may vary across levels. The comprehensible exception is the district administration, as none of the independent variables are found to be statistically significant; meanwhile, perceptions of responsiveness at this level are more likely to be a function of a resident's responsiveness perceptions of the city administration and block committees. Overall, the mere experience of prior engagement in demand-making activities such as requesting help individually or as part of group from the municipal government and local-self government is associated with perceiving both city administration and block committees as being more responsive. However, engagement in community mobilization activities, which typically require more substantial input on behalf of residents in terms of time and resource as opposed to contacting public officials, appears to be associated with a higher likelihood of perceived responsiveness with regard to municipal administration, but not local self-governments such as block committees. These findings are in line with the literature that posits that increased citizen participation is likely to encourage cooperative efforts within communities and build stronger trust in local government. Participation may also potentially reduce information asymmetries:
through participation, citizens are likely to learn about the constraints that their local government are facing and appreciate the steps that have already been taken. Prior research also indicates that community level engagement has a stronger effect on perceived responsiveness as opposed to other different types of involvement (Berry et al., 1993). This also appears to be the case in the context of Bishkek: the effect size for those who participated in *ashar* activities is significantly larger compared to other types of participation activities. Having more contextual information on the types of community development projects and outcomes of such mobilization activities would have shed more light on the reasons why such differences in perceptions exist.

With relation to access to urban services, it is apparent that sizable disparities exist in terms of quantity and quality of service; as a result, such disparities appear to influence the residents' perceptions of primarily city administration responsiveness in a strongly negative way. Those who tend to have an extremely limited amount of access to such key urban services as drinking water, electricity, local transportation, and some key social services are significantly less likely to perceive the city administration as responsive. On one side, such finding may seem like a practicality bordering on a "no brainer"; however, it does underscore the difficulty of achieving an equitable distribution of limited municipal resources among population groups within the city; it also points to significant service disparities existing among various informal communities as an important policy issue. I further use service access index to construct community level measure of service inequality as discussed in Chapter 5. An important finding of this exercise is that none of the community level inequality indices exceed the overall service inequality index, indicating that more homogeneity exists within communities as opposed to between communities when it comes to service inequality.
When regional identities are factored into the picture, the effect on perceptions of responsiveness becomes divergent for different levels of governance: respondents from communities with a higher population proportion of households migrating from the southern regions of the country are found to be more likely to consider the city administration non-responsive in dealing with developing issues afflicting these communities. Simultaneously, those same types of respondents are significantly more likely to recognize the lowest levels of governance institutions, block committees, as responsive to their needs. This finding is further corroborated by residents’ opinions expressed in focus groups and key informant interviews. At the individual level, southern migrants are significantly more likely compared to migrants from the north to believe that their block committees are responsive to development issues within their communities.
Armored with a better understanding of key factors potentially shaping the perceptions of the local government responsiveness in the informal communities of Bishkek, I examine whether such perceptions may in fact have an implication for the municipal government's ability to directly engage their constituencies in a collaborative community grant program. To recall, the program provided small community grants to the novostroika areas to resolve some of the infrastructure related issues. Most of these projects are really small in scale, but the program presents a rare opportunity to examine the municipality-community cooperation in the works. A big share of the grant program's success lies in the municipalities' ability to secure enough cooperation during the social mobilization phase of the program. During this stage the municipality is expected to (a) facilitate the prioritization of potential development issues; (b) secure agreement with participating communities on a specific project; and (c) mobilize community share of the project costs, which is set around 5 percent.

The municipality is generally constrained by the program implementation cycle, which lasts for about a year, meaning that community projects need to be identified, funded, and completed within the 12-months period for a new cycle to begin. The program allots about 90 days for completion of the social mobilization component at the start of the cycle. The review of the municipality's progress reports shows that the mobilization process varied across communities to a substantial degree: the fastest mobilization was completed within 59 days, and the longest mobilization took 232 days; only about 50 percent of all participating communities
were able to complete mobilization and sign project implementation agreements within about 90 days (median social mobilization duration come at 94 days).

There are several factors, community specific and investment-type specific, identified by the municipality as affecting the duration of the mobilization phase. The project- or investment-specific issues according to the municipality primarily originate in the preparations for obtaining regulatory clearances related to land use, building codes, zoning requirements, and technical engineering certifications. Depending on the complexity of a project, specific preparations may take a longer or shorter time to achieve. However, such variability may well be captured by the type of a project being implemented. The two key community-specific issues as identified by the municipal administration are extremely low participation rates by residents in any community gatherings and mobilization activities and difficulties with mobilizing the community’s co-financing share. These two community-specific issues are directly linked to the questions identified within the framework of this research project to understand the driving factors behind a community's willingness to engage in a collaborative manner with the municipality.

My key objective is to examine whether the role of perceptions of government responsiveness carries an instrumental value in determining the success of community-municipal government cooperation on development issues. The citizen perceptions of responsiveness as operationalized here reflects willingness of urban squatter residents to engage with local government officials at different levels of city government to resolve local community development issues based on the citizens’ expectation of a positive outcome from such engagement. To recall, I define my co-production hypothesis as follows: Citizen perceptions of government responsiveness are likely to affect social mobilization in a community. I intend to
test the hypothesis using a two-tailed test; however, I expect to find that higher levels of perceived responsiveness are associated with shorter mobilization periods.

In this regard, my dependent variable is the number of days it took the Bishkek municipality to mobilize a particular community. My independent variable is the perception of whether or not the city government is responsive. I estimate models at two levels as described under the Model of Coproduction in Chapter 3: the individual level and community level to account for methodological issues of aggregation of individual data at the community level and the history event nature of the data. Thus, the operationalization of the independent variable changes from a binary variable at individual level modeling to the aggregate percentages at the community level (as specified in further detail in Table 5.1.). The aggregate community-level percentages are further transformed into the Best Linear Unbiased Predictors (BLUPs) of the latent community-level group scores incorporating information on all observed individual level and group-level explanatory variables included into a community level model. The summary of the results are resented in Table 5.2.

I include several important covariates based on a broader discussion of the coproduction theory and collective action theory. However, it should be noted that when estimating any models at the community level, I have only 33 communities. All of them represent the total population of communities participating in the municipal community grant program; however, from the analytical viewpoint, I do not have too many degrees of freedom to run a non-parsimonious model. Thus, I identify the most salient factors, which in this case include the type of public goods delivered through the program, the service access inequity index, community size, community tenure or number of years a community has existed since it was first established, and perceptions of block committee responsiveness.
The types of public goods provided are important for several reasons. First, as found in administrative records, preparation for some types of more complex investments may require a longer time due to a number of special regulatory clearances involved. The second and more important reason is theoretical: different types of public goods may provide different incentives for which residents may mobilize. I differentiate between three types of goods: common pool type of projects such as playgrounds and landscaped park areas, which are rivalrous in consumption but not excludable (I refer to them as social infrastructure); publicly provided private or club goods delivered at the community level, such as solid waste removal and roads and/or sidewalks, which are found to be both rivalrous and excludable (referred to as basic infrastructure); and pure public goods, the only example of which in the context of this project is the installation of community steles with community information maps (this type of goods is both non-rivalrous and non-excludable and is referred to as landmark in the model). The base category for comparison purposes is the pure public good: as noted in the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2, social mobilization for this type of goods is more likely to be fraught with delays and a general lack of the residents' willingness to contribute to project costs. It may also possess more symbolic value rather than provide a tangible benefit for residents in communities. As seen from the descriptive statistics, about half of all communities chose to invest in social infrastructure such as playgrounds and communal outdoor sports facilities; about a third of communities invested in basic services like solid waste collection, bridge repairs, and roads; and the remaining fifth invested in steles. The last choice is particularly hard to explain by anything other than suspecting that the small size of the community grant played a role and that there was a degree of predisposition among program implementers to navigate communities towards such options.
Community size is another critical factor to consider: it is expected that as community size increases it will be more difficult to conduct social mobilization activities. Community size varies significantly across the 33 participating communities. The latest additions to the ranks of irregular settlement were typically very small at the time of the survey, while older communities tend to be quite large in size. I track the number of households in each community; the range is between as few as 20 households in one of the 2005 squatter settlement and 5,220 households in the largest and one of the earliest settlements, established in 1991. However, the newest settlements were the ones that saw an exponential growth from 2005 and onwards. To minimize the effect of the extreme values, I use a natural log of the community size (Table 5.1).

Furthermore, I account for the age of communities which ranges from four to 20 years with the mean of about 13 years.

Inequality within and across communities is frequently identified as an important driving factor of collective action. The household survey I rely on is limited in the extent to which it has fully reliable data on household itemized incomes and expenditures. However, I continue to use the service access inequality index. I further modify the individual-level index derived from the principal component analysis to reflect a relative measure of service access inequality, following McKenzie (2005). To recall, the index represents a score that reflects how equally particular services are distributed across households, giving higher weight to assets that are more unequally distributed across the sample. The eigenvalue generated by the first principal component is equal to the total sample variance of the index. As the overall index is a standardized score, it has a mean of zero and its values are distributed on both positive and negative sides. The community level scores of service access inequality are then calculated by dividing the standard deviation for a sample of households within a specific community by the square root of the eigenvalue (or in
other words, the standard deviation of the whole sample). The sample's variance $\lambda$ is reported in the end of the Table 4.3. as eigenvalue. Higher community-level scores indicate higher levels of inequality; scores above 1 indicate that the inequality within a given community is higher than the inequality within the total population sample. I find that none of the community level inequality scores are greater than 1, indicating that the inequality across the whole sample of households is much greater than inequality within any of the 33 communities discussed here.

Finally, to account for the program's design feature indicating that the bulk of community mobilization activities are coordinated with and assisted by the local block committees, I include perceived responsiveness of this level of governance into the model. Similarly to the perceived responsiveness of the city administration, the scores at the individual level are binary. These scores are then transformed into aggregate weighted means indicating the percentages of respondents in a particular community believing their block committees are responsive, and are also presented as the Best Linear Unbiased Predictors (BLUPs) of the latent community-level group scores incorporating information on all observed individual level and group-level explanatory variables explicitly included into a community level model. Inclusion of this variable is further justified by the results presented in the previous chapter indicating that perceived responsiveness of the block committee has different underlying perception formation factors compared to the perceptions of the city administration responsiveness.

*Do Citizens Perceptions Matter when It Comes to Joint Production of Public Services?*

To examine the potential effect of perceived city administration responsiveness on the duration of the mobilization process, I start with the individual level model incorporating all respondents participating in the household survey within the population of 33 communities participating in the community grant program. I consider the implementation of the proportional
hazards model using the semi-parametric Cox regression which estimates the likelihood of an event of interest occurring if it has not yet occurred. In this model, perceptions of city administration and block committee responsiveness are binary predictors and are time-fixed. To account for dependency of observations within communities, I use clustered robust standard errors and report hazards ratios together with 95 percent confidence intervals as opposed to standard errors as confidence intervals are asymmetric in non-linear transformation of corresponding coefficients.

Before moving to the discussion of models, I would like to examine the baseline survival function using Kaplan-Meier Survival estimate, which plots the probability of an observation surviving through a certain date without experiencing the event, which is in this case – completion of mobilization. The survival function is presented in Figure 5.1. The graph indicates that the probability of failing to complete social mobilization (or "survive" the event) drops by about half around 80 days into implementation; and at around 90 days, which is the median social mobilization duration observed, the likelihood of not meeting the program target of three months is still around 28 percent. I further examine how the survival function varies for those who perceive the city-administration as responsive as opposed to those who think otherwise. Figure 5.2. graphs the results. This is a somewhat crude examination as the survival function is not yet adjusted for the theoretically important covariates. However, what is immediately clear from this graph without getting precise probability estimates is that the likelihood of failure to complete social mobilization by the programmatically established deadline of 90 days is much higher for respondents who think that the city government is responsive. Or if flipped, the odds of completing social mobilization are higher for those respondents who believe that the municipality is not responsive. This preliminary finding runs counter to the expected direction of
the relationship between perceived responsiveness and duration of mobilization activities; but I need to examine further to see if the relationship is statistically significant at the individual level of analysis.

The results of the full estimated Cox proportional hazards model are given in column 1 of Table 5.1. Given the covariates, the effect of perceived responsiveness of the city administration is statistically significant (p<.01) and appears to be inversely related to the duration of mobilization activities; based on this model, the hazard of completing social mobilization (counter-intuitively defined as "failure" in the model) decreases by about 40 percent for those who believe that the city government is responsive. The covariate adjusted Kaplan-Meier Survival estimate is presented in Figure 5.3. The lines now appear smoother and more symmetrical.

The Cox regression is non-parametric, but there is an important assumption of proportional hazards that needs to hold for the model to produce reliable point estimates. To test the assumption, I estimate the Schoenfeld and scaled Schoenfeld residuals to test the proportionality of the model as a whole and for each factor individually. I reject the hypothesis that the proportional hazards do not change over time using the global test for the total model (significant at p<.01), which indicates that the power of significance tests is reduced and the chance of obtaining false negatives is higher. In the case of the hazards ratio decreasing over time for the perceived responsiveness, the violation of the proportional hazards assumption means that the relative risk (that is the size of the hazards ratio) may be underestimated (Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, 2001). Thus, to summarize the utility of this model, it shows that there is a statistically significant negative relationship between the perceived responsive of the city municipality and duration of social mobilization activities despite the double effect of using
clustered robust standard errors and reduced power due to the violation of the proportional hazards assumption. The latter also indicates that the size of the effect may be underestimated.

To remediate the potential issue of using individual level data to predict community-level outcomes, as discussed in Chapter 3, I proceed with testing the effect of perceived responsiveness using the aggregate data approach and the BLUP approach. The aggregate approach is more straightforward. I use weighted aggregate means for each community for the perceptions of responsiveness for both city and block committee levels (refer to Column 2 of Table 5.2.). The model points to a similar inverse relationship (significant at p<.01); it predicts that the odds of completing social mobilization decreases by about 3 percent for each percentage point increase in the share of respondents within a community who believe that the city government is responsive and are willing to engage. The important finding based on the comparison with the individual-level model discussed above is that the relationship is still found to be significant and consistent in terms of its direction. The model does not violate the proportional hazards assumption: none of the covariates have significant chi-square test of proportionality, and neither does the global test for the whole model.

Finally, to address the issue of micro-macro relations I use the best linear unbiased predictor (BLUP) of the latent group score incorporating information on all observed individual level and group-level explanatory variables included into a model (Croon & van Veldhoven, 2007). The model to obtain BLUPs is discussed in Chapter 3. The scores generated by the multilevel analysis with community level random effects are group-level residuals (or level-2

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The model is multiplicative instead of linear, implying that positive effects are greater than 1 and negative effects are between 0 and 1; while a constant factor change in the odds does not correspond to a constant change in the probability (Long & Freese, 2006).
residuals) with zero means\textsuperscript{27} and estimated standard deviations and can be interpreted as the conditional likelihood of perceiving the city administration as responsive. As seen from column 3 of the Table 5.2., increased conditional likelihood of considering the Bishkek municipality as responsive is associated with a decrease in the odds of completing social mobilization, which is consistent with the previous findings. However, this model does violate the proportional hazards assumption for three covariates of block committee responsiveness, service inequality, and social infrastructure.\textsuperscript{28}

After testing these models, I come to the provisional conclusion that there is a statistically significant effect of perceived responsiveness on duration of the social mobilization activities; however, the relationship appears to be in the opposite direction to what was expected. The interpretation of this relationship requires further research and replication of the framework under more rigorous conditions. It appears that willingness to engage with the city administration may lead to exercising some degree of due diligence on behalf of informal community residents in their cooperation with the city officials, or residents may act on their higher expectations by contributing more to the participatory process and thus lengthening it. It may also indicate that respondents with higher expectations of the city administration may be interested in improving the quality of citizen participation, which may also contribute to more lengthy processes. On the flip side, efficiency and citizen participation may not necessarily go in tandem if one expects to receive a meaningful contribution from the citizenry.

\textsuperscript{27} The means are equal to 0 in the original sample of individual respondents but not at the community level.

\textsuperscript{28} I also run a parametric Weibull model which generates a similar result for the effect of perceived responsiveness – as reported in column 4 of the same table.
Effect of Covariates

As seen from the summary of models presented in Table 5.2., there are very few covariates that are found to be statistically significant. Under the individual-level model, the choice of basic infrastructure projects as opposed to the public goods category is associated with a higher probability of completion of the social mobilization process. This finding is in line with the literature on collective action and is likely to reflect the stimulating effect of deriving immediate private benefits from such community-level club goods. The direction of this relationship is consistent across all models. Another significant factor is service inequality; higher inequality levels are associated with higher odds of mobilization completion. The direction of the relationship is consistent across all models; however, it is only significant in the aggregate community-level model. This finding echoes the elite capture argument of the collective action theory: barriers for participation are weaker for people with higher endowments such as incomes, education, political connections, etc., which may or may not have an implication for social mobilization processes. In this case, inequality as expressed by service inequality is likely to be positively related with expediency of mobilization. Finally, the last significant factor appears to be the perceptions of block committees as being responsive. In a similar way as perceived city administration responsiveness, higher perceptions of block committee responsiveness are likely to decrease the odds of social mobilization completion at a particular point in time, given that mobilization has not yet been completed. The direction of the relationship is consistent across all models, but is found to be significant only when using the aggregate community-level model.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

On January 15, 2014, the capital city of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, welcomed a new mayor. He was elected by the city council in line with the mayoral election law written specifically for Bishkek as the country's economic powerhouse and a city with a regional status. According to the law, the mayor of Bishkek is elected by the city council members from a list of candidates introduced by each political party holding seats in the city parliament. It also happens that an acting prime minister may introduce his own candidate. The new mayoral candidate did not face any competition, however. In fact, the vote that the city council took involved just a single candidate, the one introduced by the pro-presidential Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan, which held 21 seats out of the total 45 seats in the council. According to the official announcements, 43 council members cast votes, two ballot forms were discarded on procedural grounds; and the remaining 41 members voted unanimously for the single fielded candidate.

One might reasonably ask: Would not there be many more candidates willing to take the chance and try to turn the city around? Or, would not city council members be more divergent in their support for that single fielded candidate? This situation is all too common in the post-Soviet space, however. Broadly speaking, it is not elections that matter. The head of the Bishkek municipal administrative branch is too powerful a figure in the national politics arena to leave the matter to resolve itself within the existing legal framework. Thus, formally adopted election mechanisms remain a mere instrument to legitimize decisions already made. There had been a lot of speculation on potential candidates in the media reports prior to the council members' casting of their votes. But the key message of these reports was that the candidate had already been
decided upon and vetted by the president a long time before elections ever took place (Timofeenko, 2014).

The point is not limited to mayoral elections, as an elaborate system of informal decision-making permeates the entire governance system, including the administrative functions. In comparative political science, this phenomenon is not new and is well documented and broadly researched under the rubrics of informal institutions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, 2006; North, 1990), Potemkin or façade institutions (Bunce, 1999; Fisun, 2012; Lahusen & Solomon, 2008), clientelism and elite capture (Grzymala-Busse & Luong, 2002; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Radnitz, 2010), and the on-going process of the post-Soviet administrative state metamorphosis (Engvall, 2013; Ganev, 2007; Gel'man, 2012; Hellman et al., 2000). Given that there are a limited number of ways to influence the nomination of key political players through formal elections channels, the politically-minded dwellers of Bishkek switch their attention to what the new mayor has to deal with in the first place, the entrenched municipal administrative apparatus.

A review of media publications and online civic forums reflects a mixture of cynicism and rejuvenated expectations of the new mayor. However, there is a common thread in attitudes toward the administrative apparatus of the municipal executive authority: the city administration cannot be trusted; it should be entirely "lustrated" to get rid of the most corrupt officials; there will be no change unless there is a change in the way city bureaucrats go about their business. Here is a good example of such views from one of the online contributors:

…They enrich themselves when they make new appointments; they steal when they assign land plots, and also when they build roads and procure meals for schools and kindergartens. The new Mayor should bring along a new team of energetic professionals who will bear responsibility for their actions. They will develop a new development program to be clear and comprehensible for the citizens of Bishkek (Online comment on the new mayoral appointment discussed in Timofeenko (2014)).
The grievances expressed in this statement are wide-spread among the residents of Bishkek, but the proposed lustration of the city governance system may hardly be seen as realistic. Existing accountability mechanisms make city bureaucrats either subservient to their own private interests, as described in Engvall (2014) and much of the discussion on the evolution of the post-Soviet administrative state in (Liebert, Condrey, & Goncharov, 2013), or captured by larger political forces from both public and private sectors (Gel'man, 2012; Grzymala-Busse, 2008; Hellman et al., 2000; Radnitz, 2010; Yakovlev, 2006), or a combination of both.

Based on the findings of this project, there are a number of ways to pursue changes in how the administrative system operates in the Bishkek municipality. The central argument is that by fostering citizen participation and by expanding contacts and improving communication with constituencies in the informal settlements of Bishkek, the municipal government may contribute to improved perceptions of local government responsiveness and thus build a stronger foundation for trust in government.

I examined perceptions of local government responsiveness from the point of view of the arguably most vulnerable urban dwellers of Bishkek, the residents of informal settlements that constitute pockets of the most severe urban poverty (World Bank, 2007b). Such communities are likely to present particular challenges when it comes to social mobilization and collective action (Mansuri & Rao, 2013). As is frequently found in the development literature, such urban populations are likely to be less willing than other populations to respond to participatory initiatives due to a number of factors, but most significantly due to their lower socio-economic status, the dominance of economic imperatives over those of societal or political engagement, and structural impediments to participation such as social exclusion. However, as this research
shows, there are a number of avenues for building reciprocity between local governments and their urban constituencies in the absence of direct political accountability, avenues beyond the scope of formal institutions and voting.

One of the fundamental questions posed in the beginning of this paper was "Why do we need to know how citizens feel about their government?" This project's findings indicate that calls for increased citizen participation in public administration are not purely normative; they may also have practical implications for gauging the citizens' behavior when the local government attempts to secure public cooperation. The case considered here, limited to a small-scale project involving co-production of community-level public services, shows that more positive perceptions of the responsiveness of the local government are potentially associated with more thorough scrutiny of potential projects by members of the communities involved. It appears from this research that in the informal communities with higher levels of perceived responsiveness of the municipal officials and of the block committees representing local self-governments, it took the Bishkek municipality substantially longer to complete the tasks of consulting with the community, prioritizing needs, and mobilizing community co-financing contribution. If we recall that perceptions of responsiveness are likely to be partially driven by the citizens' prior experience in civic engagement, such as contacting officials, collectively or individually, and engaging in communal efforts to improve living conditions within novostroika, then such a result may not be surprising. It may indicate that citizens with high expectations of the local government may prioritize due process over programmatic efficiency. Still, as I indicate in the discussion of these findings, a better study design and more data are needed to further examine such connections between people's perceptions and co-production outcomes.
Understanding citizen's perceptions toward their governments is not an easy task, but an important one. The suggested urgency of examining citizens' opinions about their city management appears to be more than validated by the recently adopted Bishkek city development strategy. The strategy identifies the lack of the citizens' trust towards the city government as the number one reason why the relationship between the residents and the municipality is dysfunctional (Bishkek City Council, 2014). The strategy statement defines a number of issues that contributed to such lack of trust, including the lack of political accountability of the municipal leadership to city residents and the self-serving nature of the city bureaucracy (Bishkek City Council, 2014):

The current municipal management system is servicing primarily its own functions and those of municipal enterprises and city services; the system is effectively detached from the needs of the city dwellers. The key issue is the lack of mechanisms to account for the citizens' interests. Lack of accountability on behalf of the authorities to the city community makes it difficult to assess how well or poorly local governments are performing. The tensions [between the city authorities and citizens] stem from the lack of understanding between the two sides, the circumstance that further increases the amount of criticism towards the city management (p.7)

What can be done to improve perceptions of the responsiveness of the local government? There may be a number of possible direct actions based on the results of this project. First, perceptions of responsiveness appear to be associated with the types and number of contacts that residents have with the city authority. As discussed earlier, the most prevalent types of demand-making behavior are collective petitioning of the city authorities and direct contacting of local self-government representatives. The city may need to design, test, and institutionalize broad-based participatory platforms to account for and respond to such petitioning. Hearing and acknowledging citizens' concerns may be an initial, but nonetheless big step, especially for those who are marginalized politically, socially, and economically. The use of low-cost information technology — for ranking local development priorities, reporting service-related issues and
corruption via mobile applications, or taking stock of community assets through interactive community mapping — is a very promising approach to bringing citizens on board and making their voices heard (Graesholm, 2012; Shkabatur, 2014). What is critical though is that citizen participation initiatives incorporate the ideas of social justice and inclusion when targeting the residents of informal settlements of Bishkek.

Next, the residents' ability to petition informally local self-government agencies such as block committees appears to be an important avenue for reaching out to the city authorities. It follows that the city may need to cultivate this channel of exchange more assiduously. In this regard, it may be counterproductive to incorporate local self-governments formally into the vertical subordination system that is already heavily centralized and extensive. The local self-governments appear to enjoy higher rankings on responsiveness and greater legitimacy exactly because residents in informal settlements consider them somewhat independent and autonomous from the city's vast executive apparatus. Improving responsiveness to community needs may thus be achieved via cultivation of such bottom-up citizen interaction with local self-governments. Local self-governments also appear better positioned to monitor changes in the living conditions among the novostroika residents resulting from municipal investments in providing urban services.

The novostroika residents' inherent capacity to self-mobilize for the benefit of their communities via ashar or other traditional forms of self-help is an asset that may be leveraged by the city. Over the years, the Bishkek municipality has lacked the funds to be able to address adequately development issues in novostroikas. Traditional forms of communal self-help could perhaps be re-evaluated and integrated into the city's strategy of forging partnerships with the non-governmental actors. These research findings show that the residents' experience with ashar
is likely to be associated with their perceptions of higher levels of responsiveness on the part of the municipality. There may be several reasons for this to happen: first, resolution of any development issue requires consultations with the city and its municipal service providers; second, such consultations may reduce information asymmetries between the parties concerning the partners' contributions and the plans of action. The *ashar* traditions clearly represent one of the informal communities' greatest assets for the municipality. The municipal government could rely on traditional forms of self-help to achieve deeper engagement with the residents of informal communities, many of whom are migrants from rural areas where such traditions are still very strong. Some ways to incorporate traditional forms of self-help are to make them more structured, with a better understanding of roles and responsibilities of the parties involved, and to adhere to some agreed-upon technical standards.

It should come as no surprise that service inequality may potentially have a strong connection with the residents' perceptions of government responsiveness. Those at the bottom of the service access distribution ladder are found to be significantly less likely to perceive the city government as responsive. At the same time, communities with higher levels of inequality are more likely to be mobilized for project involving coproduction of public services within shorter periods of time, which may be a strong indication of elite capture in *novostroika* communities and exclusion of the service-poor from deciding on local priorities.

Severe disparities in access to water, electricity, solid waste removal, and decent housing conditions are supported by the service inequality analysis (in Chapter 4). Disparities appear to deepen for those who are rural-to-urban migrants, and particularly those who come from the southern regions of the country. These types of inequities are present at a *novostroika* level. There are also expected disparities in service provision between informal settlements, as access
to all public services is considerably worse in settlements that emerged after 2000, and such access tends to be at its worst in novostroikas that have developed since 2005. Existing inequalities between and within novostroikas in access to the most essential public services, such as water supply, electricity, and solid waste management, call for much deeper integration of social justice- and social inclusion-oriented policies when infrastructure upgrade activities are designed and implemented. Overcoming social exclusion tendencies such as those related to treatment of the migrant populations from the south, or rural-to-urban migrants in general, may be particularly challenging.

This brings me to a related issue that residents who live in settlements with a substantial share of the migrant population from the southern regions of the country appear to be less likely to view municipal administration as responsive; at the same time, residents in such communities are found to exhibit higher levels of trust towards local self-governments. This finding supports the idea that the municipality may need to put a greater emphasis on block committees and more traditional forms of civic networks (such as local askakal leaders or elders) when engaging with rural-to-urban migrants from the southern regions. If the municipality were to introduce an inclusive strategy of novostroika upgrade and development, that strategy would clearly need to incorporate improved targeting of public investments to the poorest of the novostroikas, based on the population estimates of wealth and identification of communities with the highest needs for basic service improvement. It should be expected that generating momentum for such distributive policies to take place may be particularly challenging. Only the older novostroikas, those built in the early years of the informal settlement growth between 1989 and 1991, have accumulated significant clout over decisions made at the municipal level with regard to prioritization of public investments (World Bank, 2007b).
The adoption of these several avenues for expanding contacts, fostering citizen participation, and improving communication with constituencies in the informal settlements of Bishkek potentially can result in more reciprocity between municipal governments and their urban constituencies in the absence of direct political accountability. Participation by citizens in local government initiatives guided by social justice- and social inclusion-oriented policies potentially can result in the provision of social services more adequate to the needs of these marginalized Bishkek citizens.

*Future Research*

As noted above, this study has a number of limitations. In my future work, I will improve on the study design to incorporate more robust methodological approaches to assess the links between citizen responsiveness and coproduction of public services. I intend to expand my data collection to cover Bishkek municipal grant program implementation into later years. I also intend to examine similar links between the co-production of public services and citizen attitudes in a context of a different country, the Philippines. In the future studies, I will be able to better incorporate the influences exerted by informal institutions of patronage on citizen-government interactions. I will also improve on the operationalization of the central concept of responsiveness in the context of post-Soviet administrative state.
## APPENDIX 1

### TABLES

**Table 1.1. Bishkek Novstroikas as of 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year established</th>
<th>Number of households (source: Bishkek municipality)</th>
<th>Number of households (2007 survey)</th>
<th>Area, in hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Kolmo</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1,292</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>118.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Altyn Beshik</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>32.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Madaniyat</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Aska-Tash</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>14.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Burdinski</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Kasym</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>22.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Ak-Orgo (inc. Alykulov st.)</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>3,555</td>
<td>3,379</td>
<td>362.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Ala-Too</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1,953</td>
<td>1,993</td>
<td>208.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Orok</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Bakai Ata</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>87.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Enesay</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>43.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Kelechek</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>64.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Ak Bosogo</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2,408</td>
<td>2,359</td>
<td>307.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Salam-Alik</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Ak Tilek</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>22.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Uchkun</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>46.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Kok Zhar</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2,366</td>
<td>2,231</td>
<td>260.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Archaa-Beshik</td>
<td>1991/2000</td>
<td>48,00</td>
<td>5,220</td>
<td>795.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Dostuk</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Keremet</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>7.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Yntymak</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>250.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Dordoi</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>134.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Kara Zhigach</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,557</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>112.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Kalys Ordo</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>135.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Fuchik</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>3.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Profsoyuz/Mesarosh</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Profsoyuz/Lumumba</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Lumumba</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 ul. Frunze/ Ahunbaeva</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>3.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 Ak-Bata</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>33.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 Tendik</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>26.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 Sovetskaya/Kollektivnaya</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 North Karagachevaya Roscha</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 Karalaeva/Alamedin river</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 Zhakshylk</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 Ala-Archa</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>63.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 Ak-Tilek2</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 Ak Ordo</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2,998</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>260.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 Rukhi Muras</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Year established</td>
<td>Number of households (source: Bishkek municipality)</td>
<td>Number of households (2007 survey)</td>
<td>Area, in hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altyr Ordo</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>75.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prigorodnoye</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>30.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muras ordo</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1,870</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>145.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-Antonov/Tynchtyk</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ak Tilek-3/Park Zelenstroi/Saadaeva</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>5.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scherbakova</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plot in Ak Bosogo</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulitsa Uluk Too in Ala-Too</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b/w Ak-Orgo and rail road</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keramicheskaya</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karagachevaya Roscha-1</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>6.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gagarina/Novaya Pavlovka AO</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uchkun-2</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>9.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thermal plant</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugu Ene Bagysh</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altyn Kazyk</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4055.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bishkek Municipality. Some population data are missing.
Table 1.2 Access to Selected Public Services in Bishkek, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solid wall materials, mean</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Established 1989-1991</th>
<th>Established after 2000</th>
<th>Migrant Status</th>
<th>Migrated from South</th>
<th>Household Expenditures, per capita, terciles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid wall materials, mean</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-hour water supply in summer, mean</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-hour water supply in winter, mean</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piped water available, mean</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household stores water, mean</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-hour electricity in summer, mean</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-hour electricity in winter, mean</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus stop within 10 minutes or less, mean</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health clinic within 30 minutes or less, mean</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1. Perceptions of Government Responsiveness across Three Levels of Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Confidence Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage with city administration on a scale from 1 to 4, with 4 equal to highly willing expecting a good response, and 1 equal to highly unwilling and expecting no response</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>2.10 – 2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage with city administration, binary, 1= willing; 0= not willing</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.39 -.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage with district administration on a scale from 1 to 4, with 4 equal to highly willing expecting a good response, and 1 equal to highly unwilling and expecting no response</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.99 - 2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage with district administration, binary, 1= willing; 0= not willing</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.34 -.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage with block committee on a scale from 1 to 4, with 4 equal to highly willing expecting a good response, and 1 equal to highly unwilling and expecting no response</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>2.65 - 2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage with block committee, binary, 1= willing; 0= not willing</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.68 -.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 815 (city administration), =811(district administration), =917 (block committees).
Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Individual Level Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable: Perceptions of Local Government Responsiveness</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage with city administration (score), with 4 equal to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>highly willing expecting a good response, and 1 equal to highly</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unwilling and expecting no response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage with city administration, 1=willing; 0=not willing</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage with district administration (score), with 4 equal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to highly willing expecting a good response, and 1 equal to highly</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unwilling and expecting no response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage with district administration, 1=willing; 0=not</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>willing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage with block committee (score), with 4 equal to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>highly willing expecting a good response, and 1 equal to highly</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unwilling and expecting no response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage with block committee, 1=willing; 0=not willing</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variable 1: Set of Participation and Self-Help Measures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrote a personal letter of complaint, 1=yes, 0=no</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrote a collective letter of complaint, 1=yes, 0=no</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requested block committee to solve a development issue in community,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1=yes, 0=no</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilized people in community, 1=yes, 0=no</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in unpaid communal activities to benefit whole community,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1=yes, 0=no</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation in at least one contacting/mobilization activity, 1=yes,</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>0=no</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variable 2: Access to Urban Services</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>24 hour water supply in summer</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 hour water supply previous winter</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to piped water for individual (not communal) access</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of water service agreement</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 hour electricity supply in summer</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 hour electricity supply previous winter</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of electricity service agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bus/shuttle stop within 10 minutes or less</td>
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<td>.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health clinic within 30 minutes or less</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.49</td>
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<td>Grocery store within 15 minutes or less</td>
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<td>Solid waste removal at least once a week</td>
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<td>.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safe after dark</td>
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<td>.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Road rehabilitation is primary development priority</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing quality: main wall material is brick</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicts about drinking water are common</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicts about solid waste collection are common</td>
<td>.22</td>
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<td>Variable</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict with utility companies are common</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household not able to pay utilities in full for services provided</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service index (unweighted)/service deciles</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>2.25</td>
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<td><strong>Independent Variable 3: Regional Identity and Community Homogeneity</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrated from Issyk-Kul Oblast</td>
<td>.10</td>
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<td>Migrated from Jalal-Abad Oblast</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.25</td>
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<td>Migrated from Naryn</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrated from Batken</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrated from Osh</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrated from Talas</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrated from Chui</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall share of southern migrants (migrated from Batken, Osh, and Jalal-Abad)</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of southern migrants &gt; 10% by settlement (heterogeneity)</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.48</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Characteristics and Location</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Respondent's age</td>
<td>37.98</td>
<td>.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Respondent is male</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Respondent's education (scale from 1 to 7 on an increasing scale)</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spoken language is Kyrgyz</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent is employed full time</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cohabiting households is one</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community is poor</td>
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<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated from a village</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have relatives in Bishkek</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of years lived at current location (residency)</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>4.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of years settlement exists</td>
<td>16.35</td>
<td>5.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly expenditures per capita (KG Som)</td>
<td>2,035.91</td>
<td>1,689.94</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monthly expenditures per capita (ln)</td>
<td>7.38</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement population size (# of households)</td>
<td>2,154.45</td>
<td>1,730.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement population size (ln)</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community established after 1999</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community established in 2005 (in the wake of March revolution)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Index</td>
<td>PSA scoring factor (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; component)</td>
<td>Adjusted PCA scoring factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 hour water supply in summer</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 hour water supply previous winter</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to piped water for individual (not communal) access</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of water service agreement</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 hour electricity supply in summer</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 hour electricity supply previous winter</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of electricity service agreement</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus/shuttle stop within 10 minutes or less</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health clinic within 30 minutes or less</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grocery store within 15 minutes or less</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid waste removal at least once a week</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe after dark</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road rehabilitation is primary development priority</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing quality: main wall material is brick</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicts about drinking water are common</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicts about solid waste collection are common</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict with utility companies are common</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household not able to pay utilities in full for services provided</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eigenvalue for the first component (λ)</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.07</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Share of variance associated with the first component</strong></td>
<td><strong>.27</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of variables</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
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</tr>
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</table>
Table 4.4. Effect of participation, services provision and region on perceived responsiveness of local government (OLS coefficients are reported)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>City Administration</th>
<th>District Administration</th>
<th>Block Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation/contacting</td>
<td>.13* (.07)</td>
<td>.06 (.06)</td>
<td>.21** (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation/communal</td>
<td>.20** (.10)</td>
<td>.04 (.09)</td>
<td>.15 (.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First service access index tercile</td>
<td>-2.5*** (.08)</td>
<td>.18** (.08)</td>
<td>-1.3 (.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second service access index tercile</td>
<td>- .06 (.09)</td>
<td>.02 (.08)</td>
<td>-1.1 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated from south</td>
<td>.06 (.09)</td>
<td>-.12 (.08)</td>
<td>.16* (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern minority &gt; 10%</td>
<td>-2.5*** (.08)</td>
<td>.007 (.08)</td>
<td>.32*** (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.01** (.003)</td>
<td>.002 (.003)</td>
<td>.007* (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-.01 (.06)</td>
<td>-.06 (.06)</td>
<td>.15* (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.04 (.02)</td>
<td>-.02 (.02)</td>
<td>.04 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz</td>
<td>-.09 (.06)</td>
<td>-.03 (.06)</td>
<td>-.07 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed full time</td>
<td>.17** (.07)</td>
<td>-.04 (.07)</td>
<td>-.17* (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One household</td>
<td>.12 (.07)</td>
<td>-.08 (.07)</td>
<td>.07 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community is poor</td>
<td>.02 (.07)</td>
<td>-.11 (.06)</td>
<td>.07 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated from a village</td>
<td>-.05 (.07)</td>
<td>.04 (.07)</td>
<td>.28*** (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have relatives in Bishkek</td>
<td>-.20*** (.06)</td>
<td>.15** (.06)</td>
<td>.05 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita monthly expenditure (log)</td>
<td>-.04 (.04)</td>
<td>-.02 (.04)</td>
<td>.13*** (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residency (years)</td>
<td>-.01 (.04)</td>
<td>.002 (.04)</td>
<td>-.006 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community size (log)</td>
<td>-.07* (.007)</td>
<td>-.02 (.007)</td>
<td>-.07* (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community established after 1999</td>
<td>-2.1* (.11)</td>
<td>.36 (.11)</td>
<td>-.03 (.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community established in 2005</td>
<td>.35** (.16)</td>
<td>-.15 (.15)</td>
<td>-.19 (.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness, district</td>
<td>.61*** (.03)</td>
<td>--- (.03)</td>
<td>.43*** (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness, block committee</td>
<td>.03 (.03)</td>
<td>.30*** (.03)</td>
<td>--- (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness, city</td>
<td>--- .50*** (.03)</td>
<td>.34 (.03)</td>
<td>.58 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.02*** (.51)</td>
<td>.34 (.44)</td>
<td>.58 (.56)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted R-squared | .45 | .53 | .36 |
N of observations | 746 | 746 | 366 |

***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1 for two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
Table 4.5. Effect of participation, services provision and region on perceived responsiveness of local government (LOGIT odds ratios are reported)\(^{29}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>City Administration</th>
<th>District Administration</th>
<th>Block Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation/contacting</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.93**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1.10-2.90]</td>
<td>[.39-2.72]</td>
<td>[1.11-3.35]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation/communal</td>
<td>2.29***</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.27-4.12]</td>
<td>[.55-4.70]</td>
<td>[.45-4.58]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First service access index tercile</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.14-5.1]</td>
<td>[.59-2.44]</td>
<td>[.25-1.21]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second service access index tercile</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.66</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[.46-1.18]</td>
<td>[.55-1.81]</td>
<td>[.38-1.12]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrated from south</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>2.19***</td>
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<td>[.61-2.31]</td>
<td>[.56-1.90]</td>
<td>[.24-3.85]</td>
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<td>Southern minority &gt; 10%</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>2.67*</td>
</tr>
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<td>[.15-1.29]</td>
<td>[.42-1.91]</td>
<td>[.03-8.86]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.97**</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.95-99]</td>
<td>[.99-1.03]</td>
<td>[.01-1.04]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.58**</td>
<td>1.75*</td>
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<td>[.64-1.52]</td>
<td>[.39-0.85]</td>
<td>[.01-3.12]</td>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>1.08</td>
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<td>[.95-1.24]</td>
<td>[.69-1.13]</td>
<td>[.85-1.36]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.26-1.61]</td>
<td>[.55-1.71]</td>
<td>[.40-1.65]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed full time</td>
<td>1.16*</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.52*</td>
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<td>[.15-2.43]</td>
<td>[.46-1.25]</td>
<td>[.27-0.98]</td>
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<tr>
<td>One household</td>
<td>1.6*</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.12</td>
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<td>[.10-2.44]</td>
<td>[.61-1.94]</td>
<td>[.57-2.19]</td>
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<td>Community is poor</td>
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<td>.46*</td>
<td>.78</td>
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<td>[.50-1.79]</td>
<td>[.21-0.99]</td>
<td>[.39-1.57]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrated from a village</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>3.07**</td>
</tr>
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<td>[.45-1.24]</td>
<td>[.72-1.83]</td>
<td>[.29-7.32]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have relatives in Bishkek</td>
<td>.47***</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>[.26-0.81]</td>
<td>[.79-2.65]</td>
<td>[.85-1.88]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Per capita monthly expenditure (log)</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.62***</td>
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<td>[.68-1.40]</td>
<td>[.58-1.83]</td>
<td>[.14-2.30]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Residency (years)</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>95**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>[.90-1.02]</td>
<td>[.95-1.04]</td>
<td>[.91-99]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community size (log)</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>.89</td>
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<td>[.62-]</td>
<td>[.70-1.53]</td>
<td>[.54-1.46]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community established after 1999</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>4.87**</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community established in 2005</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness, district</td>
<td>4.69***</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[2.60-8.47]</td>
<td>[1.05-3.16]</td>
<td>[0.9-3.39]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness, block committee</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>2.40***</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.64-1.46]</td>
<td>[1.54-]</td>
<td>[2.25-7.79]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness, city</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4.87***</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.73)</td>
<td>(.62-1.74)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log-likelihood: -336.57, -302.73, -305.00
Wald Chi-Square: 429.77***, 240.44***, 296.84***
Count R²: .75, .83, .79
Adjusted count R²: .45, .60, .31
N of observations: 746, 746, 746

\(^{29}\) The 95 percent confidence intervals are reported for odds ratios instead of standard errors as the confidence intervals are asymmetric in non-linear transformation of the logit coefficients (Long & Freese, 2006)
Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Community Level Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable: Duration of Social Mobilization</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of social mobilization, number of days</td>
<td>109.59</td>
<td>43.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual level variables: Participation and Self-Help Measures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City administration is responsive, % (aggregate weighted mean)</td>
<td>44.54</td>
<td>33.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City administration is responsive, likelihood (BLUP of the latent group scores, modal level 2-residuals)</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block committees are responsive, % (aggregate weighted mean)</td>
<td>75.63</td>
<td>28.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block committees are responsive, likelihood (BLUP of the latent group scores, modal level 2-residuals)</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to service index (defined as the standard deviation of the first principal component in a community relative to the standard deviation in PCA score of the sample as a whole)</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community age: number of years community exists</td>
<td>12.57</td>
<td>7.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community investment: social infrastructure, yes=1, no=0</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community investment: communal basic infrastructure, yes=1, no=0</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community investment: symbolic/landmark, yes=1, no=0</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community size, number of households</td>
<td>794.00</td>
<td>1,122.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community size, natural log</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 33 communities (equal to the population of communities participating in the municipal community grant program in 2009).
### Table 5.2. Effect of Perceived Responsiveness on Social Mobilization under Municipal Community Grant Program (Cox hazards ratios are reported)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cox Individual-level</th>
<th>Cox Community*</th>
<th>Cox Community^^</th>
<th>Weibull Community^^</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City administration responsive</td>
<td>.60***</td>
<td>.97***</td>
<td>.72**</td>
<td>.69**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.42-.85]</td>
<td>[.96-.99]</td>
<td>[.52-.99]</td>
<td>[.50-.96]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block committee responsive</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.97***</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.63-1.42]</td>
<td>[.96-.98]</td>
<td>[.66-1.16]</td>
<td>[.60-1.10]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service inequality</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>222.61***</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.02-10.34]</td>
<td>[5.58-887.64]</td>
<td>[1.35-103.11]</td>
<td>[.23-67.26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community age</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.96-1.11]</td>
<td>[.92-1.07]</td>
<td>[.93-1.09]</td>
<td>[.97-1.14]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment: social infrastructure (base category – landmark)</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.74-5.16]</td>
<td>[.58-4.35]</td>
<td>[.52-5.05]</td>
<td>[.24-2.25]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment: basic infrastructure (base category – landmark)</td>
<td>3.39***</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community population size (log)</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.78-1.62]</td>
<td>[.46-1.08]</td>
<td>[.65-1.52]</td>
<td>[.55-1.32]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-3965.17</td>
<td>-78.22</td>
<td>-84.01</td>
<td>-12.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald / LR Chi-Square</td>
<td>35.84***</td>
<td>19.21***</td>
<td>151.74***</td>
<td>9.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln_p</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of observations</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1 for two-tailed tests. Hazards ratios are given with 95 percent conf. intervals in parentheses using clustered robust standard errors for the individual level model and robust otherwise. *stands for aggregated model at community level, ^^stands for BLUP residual model at community level, and ^^^stands for Weibull parametric model at community level. M
APPENDIX 2

FIGURES

Figure 1.1. Perceived Local Government Responsiveness Framework: Individual Level

Participation:
- Particularized demand making
- General referent/community
- Self-help measures through traditional community mobilization

Inequity in service provision:
Index based on 19 indicators of available urban services

Regional Cleavage:
Community heterogeneity

Perceived Responsiveness of:
City Administration
District Administration
Block Committees
Figure 1.2. Framework of Coproduction of Public Services – Community Level

- **Z₁**: Size/year
- **Z₂**: Service inequality
- **Z₃**: Type of goods
- **ξ₁**: Latent of X₁
- **X₁**: Local Gov. Responsiveness
- **Y**: # of days to mobilize community

**Level 1: Micro**
- - Household

**Level 2: Macro**
- - Community
Figure 1.3. Kyrgyz Republic: Urbanization Trends as of 2014

Figure 1.4. Growth of Informal Settlements in Bishkek, 1989-2012

Source: Bishkek Municipality, Map of Informal Settlements
Figure 5.1. Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimate: the Probability of Surviving without Experiencing the Event (i.e., Completing Social Mobilization)
Figure 5.2. Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimate: the Probability of Surviving without Experiencing the Event by Perceived Responsiveness of City Administration (i.e., Completing Social Mobilization)
Figure 5.3. Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimate: the Probability of Surviving without Experiencing the Event (i.e., Completing Social Mobilization) by Perceived Responsiveness of City Administration, with Covariates


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