I. Introduction

One of the more compelling movements of the second half of the twentieth century was the rise of the African independence movements. The first fifty years after 1880 had seen a great scramble by the European colonial powers for territory in Africa, followed by readjustments in colonial possessions in the aftermath of both World War I and World War II. Through this period of colonialism and subjugation, only the countries of Liberia, founded with the support of the United States, and Ethiopia, which...
overcame a short period of subjugation by Mussolini’s Italy during the Second World War, remained independent. The entirety of the rest of the continent was subjected to colonization efforts by the likes of Great Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, and Belgium. After the First World War, many of Germany’s colonial possessions were entrusted to Allied countries as League of Nations mandates in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I. After World War II, the mandates became United Nations trusteeships.

One of, if not the, most influential colonial power during this time was Great Britain. During its peak, the country could claim that the “sun never set on the British Empire,” and the Empire’s colonial holdings in Africa were a large part of its possessions. At one point or another, the British Empire exerted control over the colonies of Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Southern Cameroon, Libya, Egypt, the Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia, Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Swaziland, and South Africa. The two colonies relevant to this research, the Gold Coast and Tanganyika, received their independence in 1957 and 1961, respectively. After independence, the Gold Coast took its present-day name, the Republic of Ghana. Although the colony of Tanganyika retained its name after independence, an act of union between Tanganyika and the island of Zanzibar in 1964 created the name Tanzania, by which the country is known today and will be referred to as throughout the paper.

Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana/Gold Coast, 1952-66) and Julius Nyerere (Tanganyika/Tanzania, 1961-85) were two of the most influential African statesmen of the 20th century. They had similar early lives, as both traveled abroad to continue their
studies and returned home as advocates for independence. Both men took existing political parties (TAA in Tanganyika and UGCC in the Gold Coast) and transformed them into strong parties striving towards independence. These parties, two of the most famous in African political history, were the Convention People’s Party (CPP) in Ghana and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). Nkrumah and Nyerere led largely bloodless and successful drives for independence, which resulted in the independence of Ghana in 1957 and Tanganyika in 1961. As leaders, both men implemented socialist economic policies, were leaders of the non-aligned movement, and enjoyed initial overwhelming support. In fact, both men passed legislation that made their respective countries one-party states.

Given these similarities, it is necessary to ask what led to such a divergence in how Nyerere and Nkrumah ended their political careers. In other words, what factors enabled Nyerere to remain a respected figure in Tanzanian politics until his retirement in 1985, and what factors prompted Nkrumah’s overthrow via coup in 1966? How did politicians that led similar independence movements and implemented many of the same policies during their initial years in office have such disparate holds on power?

II. Country Background

The earliest developments that relate to today’s Ghana occur around 1000 c.e., when the Akan people began to appear in the rainforests and the Shai Hills in the midwestern part of the territory. Near the end of the fifteenth century were the first instances of contact with the Europeans. The main interactions were initially with the Portuguese,
who established castles and fortifications on the coast. One of these castles, the Castle of Sao Jorge da Mina, was known as one the strongly constructed European castles on the entire continent. The Portuguese were also the colonial power most invested in spreading Christianity in Ghana, although the tropical diseases and weather wreaked havoc on the missionaries sent to the area. In fact, at this time Ghana was known as the place of “white man’s death” (Gocking, 2005: 28).

Although there was a strong Danish presence on the coast after sparring matches with the Portuguese, it was the English colonialists who had a larger influence on the development of the present-day nation. Under British control, the area was known as the Gold Coast Colony. This was mainly confined to the lands near the coast until the beginning of the twentieth century, when hostilities with the Asante people and the scramble for colonial possessions among the European powers led Britain to annex the lands that make up present-day Ghana (Gocking, 2005: 40). The next 50 years would see Ghanaians fighting for the UK in two world wars. One of the more successful governors of the Gold Coast during this time period was Sir Gordon Guggisberg. His governorship, which ran from 1919 until 1928, was a time that has been looked upon favorably by most historians. T. David Williams, in his essay “Sir Gordon Guggisberg and Educational Reform in the Gold Cost, 1919-1927,” states, “He [Guggisberg] worked energetically to develop the economic capacity of the country and to create an educational system which would produce Africans who would be able to take over the leadership of their country. Most commentators have held him to have been an admirable Governor” (Williams, 1964: 292). Another notable governorship was that of Sir Alan Burns, whose tenure of office as Governor of the Gold Coast ran from 1942
until 1947. In this position he integrated an increasing number of Ghanaians into the civil service (Gocking, 2005: 80). It was also during Burns’ rule that the seeds of independence grew. The independence movement, of course, would be Kwame Nkrumah’s finest hour.

The first European interaction with and influence of the population of current-day Tanzania was from the Portuguese. Vasco da Gama, the famous Portuguese navigator, was the first European to sail up the coast of East Africa, in 1497-1498 (Reade, 1898: 589). The Portuguese set up trading posts, some settlements, and actively participated in the slave trade. Over the succeeding centuries, the slave trade through this region came to be dominated by the small offshore island of Zanzibar. Unlike the West African slave trade, which was largely carried out by Europeans and African chieftains, the Tanganyikan/Zanzibari slave trade was run almost exclusively by Arab and Indian businessmen. It was using slaves from Zanzibar that Henry Stanley carried out his quest to find Dr. Livingstone. The British government, which crusaded around the globe during the 1800s for the abolition of slavery, eventually forced the sultans of Zanzibar to sign treaties in 1845 and 1873 that made everything involved in the slave trade illegal (Listowel, 1968: 19).

It was during the 1880s that the first real European attempt to colonize Tanzania began, courtesy of the Germans. A German official named Carl Peters traversed the area, encouraging chiefs to sign treaties handing over their lands in return for almost nothing. Besides the fact that the compensation was pathetic, the chiefs did not recognize the concept of personal land ownership. Land was thought to be utilized by tribes as a
The Treaty of Versailles divided the German African colonies between the victorious powers, to be administered under the auspices of the League of Nations. Although technically it was League of Nations mandate, in reality the British administered the operations of the colony. The first Governor of Tanganyika, as it was then called, was H.A. Byatt. Byatt did not run the colony terribly well, as he increased poll taxes and cut education spending, among other missteps. In 1925 Sir Donald Cameron, acknowledged as one of the most forward-thinking Tanzanian governors, took office. Cameron was a believer in indirect rule, what he called Native Administration. His Native Administration councils, and enlistment of tribal chiefs in his governing, laid the foundation for the future independence movement. Among his accomplishments were increased education spending, better agricultural development, more flexible labor laws, and the fact that Cameron put a halt on talks of Closer Union with Kenya and other British East Africa possessions. At this point in time,
it would have slowed down Tanzania’s development due to the power of the Kenyan settler interests (Listowel, 1968: 82).

The next momentous occasion in Tanzanian history was the outbreak of World War II. Thousands of Tanzanians volunteered to serve in the K.A.R. (King’s Army Rifles). This experience would prove valuable, as this generation of young men would use their greater worldliness to begin to believe in the necessity of independence. At the resolution of the war, Tanzania’s status changed from a mandate to a trusteeship, which placed the end goal as being an independent state. Of course, the timing of independence was by no means resolved. The independence movement, in which Julius Nyerere would play a momentous role, had not yet come to fruition.

III. Early Life/Education

Kwame Nkrumah, born Francis Nwia Kofi Nkrumah, was born in approximately 1909 in the town of Nkroful, in the Nzima region of present-day Ghana. His father was a goldsmith by trade and kept many wives, although Kwame Nkrumah was his mother’s only child. His early education was conducted at local missionary schools, and his aptitude enabled him to attend the Government Training College in Accra in 1926. (This school would change its name to Achimota College in 1927). At the Government Training College, Nkrumah was trained to become a teacher (Adi, 2003: 144).

Nkrumah graduated from the Government Training College/Achimota College in 1930, and for five years worked as a teacher, although during this time period he also contemplated a move into the priesthood. In 1935, having shown great promise,
Nkrumah decided to take his studies abroad. After a shorter stint in the Gold Coast’s colonial overseer, Great Britain, Nkrumah traveled to the United States to further his education. He first completed undergraduate studies at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, whose alumni include such luminaries as poet Langston Hughes and Thurgood Marshall, former Supreme Court Justice. From there Nkrumah made his way to Philadelphia, where he conducted his post-graduate studies at the University of Pennsylvania. After graduating from that institution, Nkrumah returned to Lincoln University, where he joined the faculty as a teacher (Adi, 2003: 145).

Julius Kambarge Nyerere was born in 1922 at Butiama, a small village in northwestern Tanzania near Musoma. Nyerere’s father also had multiple wives (eighteen) and children (twenty-six), but Nyerere’s mother, Mugaya, had six children, unlike Nkrumah’s mother. Nyerere’s childhood, in the words of William Redman Duggan in his book Tanzania and Nyerere, was “much like that of other African children in a rural tribal environment. As a small boy he shepherded the family livestock. A precocious child, Nyerere pressed his family to permit him to attend school” (Duggan, 1976: 44). His family relented, and young Nyerere was sent to boarding school in Musoma, which was located on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria. After quickly rising to the top of his class at Musoma, Nyerere’s outstanding academic performance enabled him to secure a spot at the Tabora Government Secondary School in 1937 (Duggan, 1976: 44). It was during this time period that Nyerere became intensely interested in the Catholic faith, and he was officially baptized in the year 1943. That same year, Nyerere
began his studies at the prestigious Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda, where many of British East Africa’s elites were schooled (Adi, 2003: 147).

It was at Makerere that Nyerere made many of his future connections that would serve well in politics, including Abdulla Fundikira and Ibrahim Sapi, both sons of influential Tanganyikan chieftains who would later become Nyerere lieutenants. In Duggan’s words, “This group of young African aristocrats composed an intellectual nucleus for nationalistic though and discussion. In that atmosphere, Nyerere developed his debating techniques, his brilliant discursive talents, and his political idealism” (Duggan, 1976: 45). After completing two years at Makerere, Nyerere returned to Tabora and accepted a teaching position at the St. Mary’s Catholic Boys’ School. Teaching both at the school and at St. Mary’s College, also in Tabora, Nyerere came under the influence of Father Richard Walsh, who proved to be a guiding factor during this period of Nyerere’s life (Adi, 2003: 148). In fact, when Nyerere left Tabora in 1949 to obtain a master’s degree from Edinburgh University in Scotland, it was Father Walsh who assisted in helping Nyerere gain the financial backing necessary.

IV. Early Political Thought

It was while studying in the United States that Kwame Nkrumah began to flesh out his views on Pan-Africanism, economics, and African development. He attended meetings of a multitude of political organizations, including the Council on African Affairs, the Communist Party, and Marcus Garvey’s UNIA (United Negro Improvement Association). In his book Pan-African History, Hakim Adi describes Nkrumah’s time in
the United States as a time when he “became active in the African Students’ Association, which was formed in 1941 by West African students, the majority of whom were from Nigeria and the Gold Coast. Nkrumah was elected president of this organization, wrote for its publication *African Interpreter* and spoke at numerous meetings” (Adi, 2003: 143). In 1945, Nkrumah chose to attend London University.

It was at London University that Nkrumah fully threw himself into pan-African politics. In London, Nkrumah came face-to-face with the colonial question, and loved the symbolic aspect of fighting for colonial freedom in the heart of the world’s greatest colonial power (Nkrumah, 1962: 31). It was also in 1945 that Nkrumah wrote his famous pamphlet, “Towards Colonial Freedom.” In the essay he laid bare his issues with capitalism, colonialism, the hypocrisy of “mandates” and “trusteeship” colonies, and his solutions to the colonial oppression. In one passage, Nkrumah lays out his plan for a colonial liberation movement:

> The duty of any worthwhile colonial movement for national liberation, however, must be the organization of labour and of youth; and the abolition of political illiteracy. This should be accomplished through mass political education which keeps in constant contact with the masses of colonial peoples. This type of education should do away with that kind of intelligentsia who have become the very architects of colonial enslavement.

-Kwame Nkrumah, “Towards Colonial Freedom,” pg. 41

One of Nkrumah’s biggest accomplishments of this period was playing a large role in helping to organize the historic fifth and final Pan-African Congress. The event, held in 1945 in Manchester, England, was organized by Nkrumah and fellow Pan-Africanist George Padmore, and was attended by such luminaries as Kenyan...
independence activist Jomo Kenyatta and American intellectual W.E.B. Du Bois (Adi, 2003: 143). After the success of the conference, Nkrumah helped found the West African National Secretariat. He was also the general-secretary of the group, which was formed with a goal of united West African independence. During his remaining time in Britain, Nkrumah also became more and more closely associated with the British Communist Party, and became the leader of the “Circle,” a group dedicated to creating a Union of African Socialist Republics (Adi, 2003: 144). In 1947, with the intention of turning his plans for independence into reality, Nkrumah returned to the Gold Coast.

It was at Edinburgh University where a major impact on Julius Nyerere’s political, economic, and social views were recorded. As Duggan states, “He [Nyerere] claimed that he evolved most of his political philosophy while at Edinburgh” (Duggan, 1976: 45). In an unpublished manuscript from this time period, entitled “The Race Problems of East Africa,” Nyerere hoped for an end of racial problems via harmonizing between blacks and whites, condemned the domination of one group by another, and stated that true solutions to the problems facing East Africa could not be solved without redistribution of political and economic control, as well as an acceptance by everyone that social, economic, and political equality as necessary (Duggan, 1976: 45-46). While at Edinburgh, Nyerere became increasingly active with the Scottish Council for African Questions, a group that was formed in 1952 with the intent of coordinating efforts of various committees whose goal was the equitable distribution of economic and political power in the British African colonies. One of the group’s main concerns, and a large personal concern for Nyerere himself, as his future actions would show, was the
increasing White domination of the Central African Federation. The Central African Federation, also known as the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, was meant to provide a middle path between full independence and settler-dominated colonies (de Smith, 1953: 489). However, the increasing dominance of the white settler minority in Rhodesia soon put paid any of these plans. At Edinburgh, Nyerere also became influenced by Fabian socialism, a brand of socialism that advocates achieving the socialist agenda by gradual and reformist, rather than revolutionary, means (Cole, 1961: 7). Nyerere returned to Tanzania in 1953 with a wealth of new information, and policies and beliefs formulated much more fully.

V. Independence Movements

Nkrumah’s return to the Gold Coast from London in 1947 was precipitated by an offer to become the general-secretary of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), an anti-colonial organization. On his journey back to the colony, Nkrumah arranged for several meetings with trade union leaders, political activists, and anti-colonial organization leaders in both the free nation of Liberia and in Sierra Leone, which was then also a British colony (Adi 2003: 144). In 1948, a series of riots, involving mainly workers and ex-servicemen, caused the British colonial government to declare a state of emergency in the Gold Coast. Although the UGCC had not organized the riots, they did nothing to stop them, and in fact attempted to capitalize on the riots and advance their cause. This in turn led to Nkrumah and six other leading UGCC members being arrested and detained (Adi, 2003: 144). The arrest served as both a blessing and a curse to
Nkrumah. His popularity and standing among the people widely increased, but the
incident led to a schism between Nkrumah and the more conservative wing of the UGCC.
To show their displeasure, the organization’s leadership demoted Nkrumah to treasurer
from general-secretary. Angry at this, Nkrumah decided to branch away from the UGCC,
first forming the Committee of Youth Organization, then the *Accra Evening News*
newspaper, and finally, and most importantly, a new party, the Convention People’s Party

The next test for the CPP would be their performance in an election for the new
state legislature, scheduled for early 1951. The election was contested by the CPP, the
UGCC, and the smaller National Democratic Party. By this time, the CPP had become
wildly popular; in Gocking’s words, “the party was masterful in adapting hymns, prayers,
and biblical phrases to popularize its message among people for whom Christianity had
deep appeal (…) There were rallies, picnics, dances, and skits, and loudspeaker cans
painted in the party’s colors” (Gocking, 2005: 96). The fervor of support, combined with
the high personal support for Nkrumah, almost assured the CPP of victory. When the
results came in, the party had won 29 of the 33 elected seats in the new legislature, and
swept all five municipal seats (Gocking, 2005: 97).

Being in government mandated a whole different approach to the actions of the
CPP. Previously they had been a protest movement—now they had to adjust to being
able to make decisions and policy. As Gocking described it, “For the CPP it meant
moving from Positive Action to what Nkrumah called Tactical Action. In essence this
meant compromise rather than confrontation with officials” (Gocking, 2005: 98). Many
hardliners in the CPP were angry at the new mood of compromise, as the British still
were in control of the colony, and the goal of independence had not been achieved. However, the burgeoning Gold Coast economy made it much easier for the CPP government and the British overseers to work together effectively. The first CPP government, from 1951 to 1954, saw extraordinary growth in the Gold Coast’s economy. A number of existing roads were paved, new roads built, a large expansion of the water supply was developed, and free compulsory primary education was instituted (Gocking, 2005: 100). However, this time period also saw the first instances of issues that would explode during the post-independence Nkrumah years, such as dissatisfaction with the CPP’s dominance and the widespread corruption among government officials that was becoming apparent.

The next general election, in 1954, was for control of a larger legislative assembly, as the British plan stipulated that as the Gold Coast moved closer to independence, the size of the legislative chamber would increase. Once again, the CPP was the heavy favorite. The party was opposed by the Ghana Congress Party (GCP), which consisted of remnants of the UGCC and was headed by K.A. Busia, but the most serious opposition came from the Northern People’s Party (NPP), which was a regional party based around the thought that southern and coastal politicians were coming to dominate the legislature (Gocking, 2005: 103). Gocking describes the vote result and its aftermath as such: “The CPP scored an overwhelming victory, winning 72 out of 104 constituencies. Independents won 16 seats and the NPP won 12, while the GCP was all but swept away, winning only one seat. Nkrumah was able to use this disarray on the part of his opponents as the rationale for denying them the status of an officially recognized opposition in the new government” (Gocking, 2005: 104). Although there
was no official opposition in the new government, the election of 1954 had revealed some fissures in the nationalist movement and dissatisfaction with the CPP.

The final election before independence was scheduled for 1956. The campaign was fiercer even than the previous two, with an escalation of violence, even including a bombing of Nkrumah’s home. The main opposition to the CPP this time was the National Liberation Movement (NLM), which mainly represented the interests of a large ethnic group, the Ashanti. The group was led by the GCP’s 1954 nominee, Kofi Busia. The CPP again won a strong victory, winning 71 of the 104 possible seats and 57% of the popular vote (Gocking, 2005: 109).

When Julius Nyerere returned to Tanganyika from Edinburgh University, he took up a position as a history professor at St. Francis’ College, near Dar-es-Salaam. It was not long before Nyerere began to meet intellectually stimulating people who would later become very important to the independence movement. Among these men were Amir Jamal and Fraser Murray, men who would have a positive influence on Nyerere’s burgeoning political activism. The Tanganyika Africa Association (T.A.A.) was at the time one of the most important organizations in Tanganyika. Although Nyerere was lukewarm about the group’s methods, he reluctantly decided to run for T.A.A. office, as it would be, he decided, the most efficient way to effect change (Listowel, 1968: 221). After his victory and appointment to the T.A.A.’s leadership, Nyerere and his group of friends and advisors determined that the only way to turn the T.A.A. into an effective agent for independence and change was to transform it into a political organization. Judith Listowel, in *The Making of Tanganyika*, describes Nyerere’s thought process. “In
Britain, he had talked to many Ghanaians and analyzed Kwame Nkrumah’s constitution. Every day he realized more clearly that the Government would pay no attention to nationalist demands, however reasonable, unless they had the organized power of the people behind them. Only a political party would enable him to fight it out with the British” (Listowel, 1968: 222). The process of transforming the organization also entailed a name change, and it was then that the famous name by which the Tanganyikan independence movement would go down in history was formed—the Tanganyikan African National Union (T.A.N.U.).

Nyerere based T.A.N.U. largely on that of Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party. The group focused on building up support in Dar-es-Salaam, as they knew the headquarters would need to be large and effective in order to have any sort of control over the eventual rural branches of the organization. Although T.A.N.U. was initially almost bankrupt, Nyerere and the other leaders, including treasurer Ally Sykes, scraped together enough funds to purchase membership cards (Listowel, 1968: 226). Appropriately enough, Nyerere received the first one. On July 7, 1954, the T.A.A. had its Annual General Meeting in Dar-es-Salaam, and Nyerere’s group took the opportunity to announce the official transformation of the organization into T.A.N.U.

The Governor, Sir Edward Twining, issued laws that no civil servant would be allowed to become a member of T.A.N.U., which hindered T.A.N.U. recruitment efforts. Nevertheless, membership drives began to show more success, and the organization registered seven branches in the year 1954. Nyerere began his rise in politics with an appointment to the Legislative Council, a government decision-making body, in 1954. He and T.A.N.U. spent the next years building up membership, increasing popular
support, and speaking out against injustices carried out by the British colonizers. As Judith Listowel saw it, “by the autumn of 1956 T.A.N.U. claimed a paid up membership of a hundred thousand and some thirty branches. Nyerere was recognized as its national leader (…) Followers of his ideas were coming forward in all parts of the country, particularly in the north and the center, where the best educated and most progressive tribes lived” (Listowel, 1968: 285). By the end of 1957, however, Nyerere had become increasingly frustrated with the lack of true progress. In a year that had seen Ghana become the first African colony to achieve independence, Nyerere and T.A.N.U.’s goals had been stifled at almost every turn by the governor, Sir Twining. Nyerere abruptly resigned from the Legislative Council.

The next year, a momentous moment in Tanganyikan history was brought to pass largely through the efforts at Nyerere. T.A.N.U.’s Tabora Conference of 1958 would determine the tone of events in the independence movement for years to come. The colonial government had limited elections planned for 1958, and as with all protest movements, T.A.N.U.’s choice of whether to participate was an extremely difficult one. Listowel summed up the importance of the event perfectly: “T.A.N.U. had reached a crossroads: it could either participate in the first general elections and follow the path of constitutional development; or it could boycott the elections, stage a general strike and drift into violence. The future, in fact the existence of the movement (for T.A.N.U. was still a movement), depended on the answer to this issue” (Listowel, 1963: 303).

Although a large majority of the delegates to the conference were opposed to taking part in the elections and giving the British colonial government a sense of popular legitimacy, Nyerere argued passionately and eloquently the case for T.A.N.U. participation. Using
parables, logic, and reason, Nyerere spelled out what damage a boycott could bring to the movement, and what effect it might have on the colonial government’s view of T.A.N.U. In the end, Nyerere’s position carried the day, and the organization went ahead with plans to contest the election. A major crisis had been averted.

Another major turning point in the drive towards independence was the replacement of Sir Edward Twining as governor of Tanganyika with Sir Richard Turnbull in 1958. Although Nyerere was initially suspicious of Turnbull due to his prior service in Kenya, the new governor soon won the independence leader over with a series of gestures, including reciting his inaugural address in Swahili and inviting Nyerere to the governor’s mansion. By the end of 1959, the working relationship between the two, after overcoming some differences of opinion, was paying dividends. Turnbull announced in December 1959 that after the next general elections Tanganyika would have “responsible” government, the last step before independence.

VI. Turnover To Independent Rule

After the CPP’s resounding victory in the 1956 elections, Nkrumah felt emboldened enough to take the final step. As Gocking describes the events, “With the mandate that this victory gave him, on August 3rd Nkrumah introduced a motion in the legislative assembly calling for independence. The CPP had more than met the requirements that the British government had placed on them of winning ‘a reasonable majority in a newly elected legislature’” (Gocking, 2005: 110). The only obstacle left was drafting a constitution. The constitutional debates featured a major showdown
between the CPP and the NLM hard-liners, who favored either regional autonomy for the Ashanti region or full independence. In the end, the opposition compromised the most, and a constitution containing a powerful National Assembly, who would decide regional issues, was passed. On March 6, 1957, the new flag of an independent Ghana was first flown.

The 1959 elections having been won overwhelmingly by T.A.N.U., Nyerere formed his first responsible government in September 1960. In order to make this work, and to take the final step towards independence, Nyerere needed to contain the excesses of his followers. Although T.A.N.U. had started off as an elitist group based in Dar-es-Salaam, as it grew rapidly it became much more decentralized, and many branches in the more rural areas were attempting to abrogate responsibilities that were those of the colonial government and the police force. Nyerere and his Minister for Home Affairs, George Kaham, made brooking this insubordination a top priority of the government, as T.A.N.U. needed to prove to the British that it was capable of running the country’s government (Listowel, 1968: 380-81). During the next year, from October 1960 to February 1961, Nyerere conducted a handful of negotiations with Great Britain’s Colonial Secretary, Iain Macleod. Nyerere had three demands of Macleod: he wanted to become Prime Minister, avoiding the transition post of Premier, he wanted the conference for Tanganyika’s new constitution to be held in Dar-es-salaam and not London, and he wanted Tanganyika to be made fully independent by the end of 1961. Macleod conceded the first two points relatively quickly, as they were not crucial matters. However, the date of independence took months of careful negotiating until Macleod was convinced that the
country was ready for that all-important step (Listowel, 1968: 383). On March 29, 1961, Macleod gave his historic speech, in which he promised Tanganyikans full internal self-government in May of 1961, and full independence on December 28, 1961. The moment of triumph for T.A.N.U. had been achieved.

VII. Policies In Office (Economic & International)

Nkrumah

Many of Nkrumah’s important acts taken while he was leader of Ghana involved his vision of what the Ghanaian economy should look like. Nkrumah was interested in taking the economy into a more state-run direction. As Adi notes, “Nkrumah had stated in his autobiography the need for a socialist society for a newly independent nation” (Adi, 2003: 145). This influence can be traced back to Nkrumah’s time spent studying abroad and his interest in Communist parties in the United States and in Britain. For Ghana, the top issue with the economy was its dependence on one cash crop, cocoa. When world prices for the crop were high, the economy as a whole could be successful, but as soon as the price for this one crop dropped, the economy as a whole was put at risk. In an attempt to diversify the economy and decrease its over reliance on cocoa, Nkrumah’s Second Five-Year Plan, introduced in 1959, called for major government expenditures with the intent of expanding the country’s infrastructure. Projects included funding for the completion of the Volta River dam, hundreds of new factories, the Black Star Shipping Line, and a new harbor at Accra (Gocking, 2005: 121-22). In addition,
Nkrumah had shown a moderate socialism to the rest of the world in hopes of increasing foreign investment. This policy was instituted by West Indian economist and Professor Arthur Lewis, who was appointed economic advisor to the government in 1957. Lewis believed that Ghana needed to make itself attractive to foreign investment, and in this vein government policies included tax holidays for foreign investors, a cut in the company tax rate, and liberal provisions for the repatriation of profits (Gocking, 2005: 120). Between 1957-1960, Ghana’s economic policies relied on a balance between Nkrumah’s instinctive socialism and Lewis’ more moderate influence.

These economic policies, however, did not prove successful. At this point, Nkrumah had a choice to make: was the Second Five-Year Plan too socialist, or not socialist enough? In accordance with his background and philosophy, Nkrumah chose to lurch leftward in economic policy. The Second Five-Year Plan, set to run until 1964, was cancelled in 1961 and replaced by a new Seven-Year Development Plan. The goal of the Seven-Year Development Plan, in Douglas Rimmer’s words, was a “socialist transformation of the economy and a complete eradication of its colonial structure” (Rimmer, 1992: 87). The foreign-investment friendly policies of the early Ghanaian years were to be abandoned.

In their place was a huge expansion of the already large role of the state in the economy. Most of the gold and diamond mining operations in the country were nationalized, the banking and insurance industries were taken over by the state, industrial development was taken over by the state, and state farms were set up that operated on mechanized technology, mostly imported from Eastern bloc nations (Gocking, 2005: 134). Established in 1961, the Ghanaian National Trading Corporation became the most
important importer and distributor of goods in the nation. The state effectively forced out private entrepreneurial competition by absorbing businesses and restricting import licenses for those that did not comply. In fact, the only major economic structure that was not in the state’s sphere of influence was the Volta River Project, which was still financed by foreign capital (Gocking, 2005: 134). The Ghanaian state was now in almost complete control of the country’s economy.

The subsequent reaction of the economy was, by and large, disastrous. Three factors combined to force wholesale shortages of necessary goods in the country: the inefficiency of the Ghanaian National Trading Corporation, Nkrumah’s demands that goods be imported from Eastern bloc countries, and the widespread corruption and ineffectiveness of the import licensing distribution system (Gocking, 2005: 135). Prices skyrocketed as shortages increased, and the state farms where woefully incapable of supplying food to the country, as they were so inefficient that oftentimes the farmers could not even feed themselves. People where so desperate to secure even the essentials that they had to line up in the Sports Stadium in Accra just to purchase single packets of sugar (Boahen, 2000: 215). Since the government’s diversification plans had not been successful, the economy was still very dependent on the price of cocoa. By 1964-65 the price had dived, and as costs exceeded the price, the net revenue of Ghana’s main cash crop became negative (Rimmer, 1992: 77). After the relatively strong economic performance of the 1950s, Ghana’s disastrous beginning to the 1960s would compound dissatisfaction with the increasingly authoritarian Nkrumah.

Like his economic policies, Kwame Nkrumah’s foreign policy would start out relatively moderate, and then turn increasingly leftward. However, from the start
Nkrumah was an ardent Pan-Africanist, and one of the most influential advocates of this ideology of his time. As Opoku Agyeman states, “Even at the historic moment of Ghana’s independence on March 6, 1957, Nkrumah, far from indulging any territorial preoccupation, reaffirmed his espousal of the ‘broader map of Africa that has always been his focus,’ saying that Ghana’s independence would become meaningful only in the context of Africa’s total liberation” (Agyeman, 1992: 38). Nkrumah quickly became the face of Pan-Africanism, making his London friend George Padmore his advisor on African affairs and hosting the All-African Peoples Conference in Accra, which brought together 200 delegates from 28 African countries and colonies. Nkrumah made it a policy to promote independence movements and Pan-African movements with Ghanaian money and materiel, as was borne out in the Congo, Niger, and Guinea (Agyeman, 1992: 39-40). Up until the very end of his reign Nkrumah’s vision for Ghanaian foreign policy was not necessarily meant to promote the interests of only Ghana, but for Pan-Africanism as a whole.

In terms of global relations, the dominant issue during the time of Nkrumah’s rule was the ongoing Cold War, in which the “Western” world (United States, Britain, other Western European nations) was locked in an ideological struggle with the Communist U.S.S.R. Officially, Ghana’s policy in this arena was one of non-alignment, in which the country would not fall into either of the great ideological blocks. In practice, during Nkrumah’s time Ghana would veer between the two in an effort to capitalize on foreign aid. In the first few years on Ghana’s independence, as Gocking puts it, “most of Ghana’s contact was with Western countries” (Gocking, 2005: 127). The economic plans put in place by Professor Lewis, with the emphasis on foreign investment and foreign
capital, necessarily led to closer contact with Western countries, as these were the nations most able to supply investment. In fact, the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc nations did not even have diplomatic ties with Ghana until 1959, a full two years after independence.

It was around this time, however, when Nkrumah’s “non-alignment” policy shifted strongly towards the left. Nkrumah’s displeasure with the small effects of foreign capital, his new economic plans, and his staunch anti-colonialism and Pan-Africanism led him to establish closer ties with the Soviet Union. In 1961 Nkrumah went on a large speaking tour in the Eastern bloc countries, and his speeches were more and more favorable to the Soviets’ position. Interestingly enough, it was American financing, in Gocking’s opinion, which allowed Nkrumah to lurch leftward. “Nkrumah had always been an avowed socialist, but his concern with obtaining Western financing for the Volta River Project had forced him to be ideologically circumspect. By 1961 he had secured American support for the project and could afford to be more open about his socialist convictions” (Gocking, 2005: 132). This leftward tilt, which would continue until Nkrumah’s overthrow, led to a swift decline in his popularity in the West. He was praising the Soviet Union, condemning the Western powers, and attempting to export his ideas across the continent. Nkrumah was one of the biggest supporters, both financially and ideologically, of Patrice Lumumba, an early Congo leaders who would be assassinated with CIA help.

Nyerere
The main tenant of Julius Nyerere’s economic policies in office was the development of the rural areas of Tanzania. “Mwalimu,” as Nyerere was commonly referred to, believed that the success of Tanzania rested not in rapid industrialization and growth of the cities, but development of the nation as a whole. As Donatus Komba put it, “This was to be achieved through rural development based on agricultural transformation, which Nyerere believed was the only policy that could galvanize the people as a nation once the main focus for national unity, the achievement of *Uhuru*, no longer applied. To develop towns and neglect rural areas, where over 80 per cent of the population lived. Would be tantamount to a betrayal of all who had fought hand in hand for independence in the hope that their living standards would improve” (Komba, 1995: 32). Nyerere’s broad plan for developing the villages was called “*ujamaa*” socialism. It reflected a Tanzanian government policy where, unlike Ghana, the emphasis would be on agricultural development before industrialization. *Ujamaa* socialism was not an imported philosophy: It was the adaptation of development to the traditional communal ties that Nyerere believed Tanzanians were most effective in using. In this sense, it bore little resemblance to either free-market capitalism or doctrinaire Marxism. The emphasis was not on material gains, but on uplifting the people. As Komba describes it, “Hard, intelligent and cooperative work was therefore the root of development. In other words, self-reliance meant an emphasis on the people, their land, and agriculture as organized and fused together under the guidance of the policies of *ujamaa*, self-reliance and good, democratic leadership” (Komba, 1995: 37-38). The *ujamaa* program ultimately did not produce the results that Nyerere and his advisors believed it would, and was critiqued by both sides of the ideological spectrum. For free-marketers, the communal aspects of the
plan were what doomed it. For orthodox or “scientific” socialists, the lack of implementation of Marxist doctrine was the reason for *ujamaa* socialism’s limited success, as it was not “pure” enough socialism.

Nyerere’s legacy is weakest when it comes to his managing of the Tanzanian economy. Gerry Helleneir, an economist himself, notes that “Mwalimu’s grasp of the traditional tenets of economic theory were probably weak and so was that of his closest advisors (…) Nationalizations and restrictions on competition (including price controls) in the trading, industrial, agricultural, and financial sectors were far beyond governmental management capacities and proved costly” (Helleiner, 2002: 54). The setbacks encountered by *ujamaa* socialism early in his rule were costly, but most of the serious disasters in the Tanzanian economy did not occur until much later, the early 1980s. Nyerere’s handling of the Tanzanian economy was problematic, to be sure, but to the people it was his intentions that often resonated most. Cranford Pratt, in an essay entitled “The Ethical Foundation to Julius Nyerere’s Legacy,” suggests “that while many of Nyerere’s policy initiatives failed, they rested on an ethical foundation and on an understanding of the challenges which Tanzania faced, which were vastly more insightful than anything offered by his critics. An increasing number of students in African development are belatedly coming to recognize this truth. Perhaps, in contrast to them, ordinary Tanzanians have always recognized it” (Pratt, 2002: 40). Nyerere’s economic policy, while largely ineffective, did not seem to radically affect his popularity among Tanzanians.

In terms of international relations, Nyerere’s Tanzania carried out policies both very similar to and very different from Nkrumah’s Ghana. Nyerere was determined that
Tanzania become a factor in aiding the development of independence movements throughout the rest of the African continent. As John Saul argues in his essay “Julius Nyerere and the Theory and Practice of (Un) Democratic Socialism in Africa,” “Let us also recall how seriously Nyerere took the ‘unfinished business’ of Southern Africa, placing Tanzania squarely in the middle of the thirty-years war for Southern African liberation, as an essential rear-base for many liberation movements and as the most active of protagonists of such essential Pan-African initiatives for liberation as PAFMECSA and, subsequently, the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee” (Saul, 2002: 16). Nyerere’s context for his support of liberation groups was based on the same *ujaama* mindset that guided his economic policies: he deeply believed in the essential human dignity, liberation, and self-reliance. One of Nyerere’s most important contributions to African liberation movements was his allowance for foreign nationalist/liberation groups to use Tanzania as a safe haven for their operations. Organizations that utilized this included the ANC (South Africa), PAC (South Africa), FRELIMO (Mozambique), MPLA (Angola), ZANU (Zimbabwe), ZAPU (Zimbabwe) and SWAPO (Namibia) (Msabaha, 1995: 164). These groups spanned the ideological spectrum, with the commonality of fighting for independence. Tanzania’s support was often invaluable in providing these groups with the rear-base needed to carry on.

Nyerere’s Tanzania was a leading light for Third World countries. Nyerere did not see the world divided as much upon East-West lines, as was common during the Cold War, upon along the division of the rich “North” and the poor “South.” He was a strict adherent of the non-aligned philosophy, and refused to take sides in the Cold War. In Nyerere’s view, the assertion of true independence for African countries was a policy of
maintaining friendly relationship with all nations for the purpose of political and economic cooperation (Msabaha, 1995: 167). Nyerere was much more interested in building up institutions of African unity and development. Tanzania was instrumental in the formation and organization of the Frontline African States, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In keeping with Nyerere’s policies, Tanzania also played a prominent role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Msabaha, 1995: 167). Tanzania’s participation in these organizations during Nyerere’s time gave the nation prominence among poorer countries.

This mentality led Tanzania to advocate heavily on behalf of a world without the threat of nuclear weapons. The non-aligned principles led Tanzania to criticize superpower involvement in African affairs, criticize America’s Bay of Pigs operation, and support the Algerian war of independence, as well as advocate for a new world economic order in which wealth and prosperity was more equitably distributed (Msabaha, 1995: 167).

Nyerere’s Tanzania had a complex but ultimately effective and workable relationship with its previous colonial overseer, Great Britain. Even before Tanzania became independent, Nyerere was utilizing the forums available to British Commonwealth member countries to advocate for fair and non-racist regimes in Southern Africa. In 1961, the controversy over the racist policies in South Africa bubbled up before a meeting of the Commonwealth in London. According to Colin Legum, a reporter at the time, Kwame Nkrumah, who as head of Ghana was at the Commonwealth meeting as a member, was reluctant to take a stand on the issue. At the time Tanzania’s
independence was impending, and Nyerere wrote an article for publication stating that if racist South Africa remained a member, Tanzania would be unwilling to join the Commonwealth after independence. Nkrumah was inspired, and the Commonwealth passed a resolution that forced South Africa to change its policies if it wanted to continue to be a member (Legum, 1995: 188). In general, Nyerere and Tanzania were respectful and productive members of the extended British family. The same day that Sir Richard Turnbull announced Tanzania’s impending independence, Nyerere spoke to the crowd: “We can now look forward to our full independence—an independence within the Commonwealth—a Commonwealth which, in our feeling, has recently been renewed and refurbished. We have no doubt that we shall be happy members of that club, if that club is good enough to take us in” (Listowel, 1968: 388). Although the British had been T.A.N.U.’s adversary in the drive for independence, Nyerere did not let anything stand in the way of what he considered best for the Tanzanian people.

One of the major flare-ups in Tanzanian-British relations, and one instance in which Nyerere put principle above the interests of ordinary Tanzanians, was during the diplomatic crisis following Iain Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia in 1965. Nyerere and OAU states issued an ultimatum that Britain send troops to remove Smith’s racist regime, under threat of a boycott from all African nations. It was a bold move, and in the end only eight countries followed through with their promise to boycott Britain. Tanzania was by far the most adversely effected, as it was the only country with historical ties to Britain and the only one that received British aid. That aid was promptly revoked (Legum, 1995: 188).
As Kwame Nkrumah’s time as leader of Ghana grew longer, the independence hero became increasingly and increasingly authoritarian. The years 1957 and 1958 saw three controversial and heavy-handed bills passed with Nkrumah’s insistence and support. The Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Bill gave the minister of the interior the ability to determine who was or was not a Ghanaian citizen, with his decision not subject to the right of appeal by the courts. At the end of 1957, the government passed the Avoidance of Discrimination Act, which forbade the existence of parties on regional, tribal, or religious bases. Despite its Orwellian title, the act was in fact used by Nkrumah to outlaw opposition parties based off of their constituencies (Gocking, 2005: 123). The opposition quickly formed the United Party (UP) to get around these restrictions, but their success only prompted Nkrumah to respond more harshly. The 1958 Preventative Detention Act gave the Ghanaian government the power to hold someone in detention for up to five years, without the right of appeal, for conduct considered detrimental to the defense and security of the state. Gocking describes the bill’s aftermath: “By November of that year 39 people had been arrested under this law, all of whom were members of either the Ga Shifimo Kpee or the UP. Nine of the 12 arrested in 1959 were prominent members of the UP in the Ashanti Region” (Gocking, 2005: 123). Nkrumah utilized the power of his position to suppress opposition to his regime.

Nkrumah’s repression of the opposition only increased after he turned Ghana into a republic, with him as president, in 1961. In addition to his presidency, Nkrumah consolidated his power by, on May 1 of that year, taking over full executive direction of
the CPP and becoming its life chairman. A purge of the cabinet followed, as ministers not completely loyal to Nkrumah were swiftly replaced (Omari, 1970: 87). A devastating strike in the Sekondi-Takoradi region was put down by the government and used as cover for arresting fifty members of the opposition, including the opposition’s leader, Dr. J.B. Danquah. T. Peter Omari describes the political situation at this time: “Formal opposition had disappeared in Parliament where, on the introduction of the Republican Constitution, the expressions ‘government side’ and ‘opposition side’ were formally abolished (…) Members of Parliament who opposed Nkrumah were fast disappearing behind bars. Parliament was only rubber-stamping Nkrumah’s ‘decrees,’ and legitimate opposition to Nkrumah’s arbitrary measures had now ceased” (Omari, 1970: 91). Danquah, the hero of the opposition, would be arrested by the government again in 1964, and die in jail.

Julius Nyerere was also not a classical democrat in the Western mold. A one-party system in Tanzania came about partly because there was a lack of legitimate opposition, not due to government repression, but due to the immense popularity of T.A.N.U. The 1960 elections returned 58 out of 59 seats to T.A.N.U., with the remaining seat going to an independent candidate who was also a T.A.N.U. member. In this stage, the country was a *de facto* one-party state, with no opposition, but also no formal or legal restraints on the formation of one. Nyerere thought that a one-party state was necessary for the continued development of the nation. His views on the matter where that in “the future, it is possible that a second party will grow in [Tanzania], but in one sense such a growth would represent a failure by TANU. The existence of two or more stable political
parties implies a class structure of society, and we aim at avoiding the growth of different social and economic classes in our country” (Kweka, 1995: 65). Nyerere rationalized the need for one-party democracy as an “Africanization” of democracy, in which all views were manifest in one party.

Between 1960 and 1965 there were a handful of opposition groups in Tanzania, including the African National Congress, People’s Democratic Party, and the People’s Convention Party. One of the obstacles confronting the opposition was the immense popularity of T.A.N.U., the party of independence, which made it seem as if criticism of the party and Nyerere was unpatriotic or disloyal. However, the most serious anti-opposition measures were enacted with the Preventative Detention Act of 1962. Under this law, it was legal for the government to detain anyone thought to be a “danger to peace and good order,” with no right for the accused to defend himself before a court or to learn the identity of the accuser (Kweka, 1995: 69). This act was used to suppress the nation’s opposition parties.

There remained the step for T.A.N.U. and Nyerere to formalize and legalize the one-party state, taking it from de facto to de jure. In 1965, as part of a constitutional revision, Tanzania officially became a one-party state, with a requirement that all political activities in Tanzania were to conducted by or under the review of T.A.N.U. (Kweka, 1995: 67). In elections, voters would now have the choice between two T.A.N.U. sponsored local candidates.

IX. Nkrumah’s Overthrow/ Nyerere’s Fate
Nkrumah’s increasing radicalization, both economically and foreign-policy wise, as well as his suppression of opposition, led to a growing notion among the military and some of the Ghanaian elite that he would need to be overthrown. Nkrumah’s plan to intervene militarily in Rhodesia was draining his support in the Ghanaian military. His popularity among the armed forces was already low, as Nkrumah had set about phasing out the military and attempting to make his own militia, the President’s Own Guard Regiment (POGR), the dominant military force in the country (Gocking, 2005: 138). While Nkrumah was in China on a fruitless mission to help end the Vietnam War, he was overthrown by a joint military-police group led by Major A.A. Afrifa, on February 24, 1966. There was almost no notable opposition in Ghana to the coup, as Gocking describes it: “Only the Presidential Guard put up a brief resistance, and within 24 hours the coup was over (...) The bars were jammed with celebrants the night after the coup (...) The CPP, with its 2-million-strong membership and 500,000 militants, offered no resistance, and the party allowed itself to be disbanded by a single radio announcement” (Gocking, 2005: 138). The statue of Nkrumah in Accra was destroyed, and the reign of the man who led Ghana to independence was over.

Julius Nyerere, on the other hand, retained high popularity among Tanzanians up until his resignation from the presidency in 1985, as he transitioned Tanzania into a multi-party democracy. Scholars who looked back at his rule concentrated on his personal integrity and willingness to take principled stands in defense of the best interests of ordinary Tanzanians. Even Nyerere’s critics, of which he had his share, mostly were “those who see Mwalimu as an individual who meant well for Tanzania but whose ideals,
goals and targets could not be met because of inadequate resources, a lack of political will, ill-judged timing, or a failure to accept the myriad of external factors beyond his control,” as put by Geoffrey Mmari (Mmari, 1995: 183). Although many of his economic policies did not work, and he did utilize repressive tactics in regards to opposition, Nyerere retained his popular support and respect throughout his term as leader of Tanzania.

X. Factors in the Divergent Outcomes

Given the similarities between many of the policies of Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, it is interesting that one would be overthrown in a welcome coup while the other retired gracefully as a hugely popular figure. In my estimation, these are the possible factors that led to the divergent outcomes between the ends of the political careers of the two independence leaders.

a. Governmental Corruption and Ties to the Executive

During the times of Nkrumah and Nyerere, both Ghana and Tanzania had problems with corruption in their government. However, the difference in levels of corruption and how the corruption was associated with the country’s leader was evident in the two nations. Corruption had been associated with the CPP since the party’s earliest days, even before independence. A series of trials in the early 1950s led to allegations against the top of CPP leadership, even Nkrumah, who was accused of borrowing money from the CPP’s coffers in order to import a Cadillac automobile (Omari, 1970: 43). The
widespread inefficiency and manipulation of the import license system combined to prevent most Ghanaians from securing needed imported goods. Gocking describes the period leading up to Nkrumah’s overthrow: “In these difficult times, widespread corruption was rife and made the mismanagement of the economy even worse. It stretched all the way from the very top to the lowest echelons of the society” (Gocking, 2005: 135). The CPP’s, and by extension Nkrumah’s, association with governmental corruption would play a part in the ease by which Nkrumah was overthrown.

Nyerere, on the other hand, was not burdened with the blame for corruption in his country. His image as a morally impeachable and frugal man made it difficult for his opponents to tie mismanagement in T.A.N.U. to Nyerere himself. Nyerere conveyed a sense of dignity and humility that manifested itself in many arenas. He declined to take any honorific titles during his time in office, instead preferring to go by “Mwalimu,” which in ki-Swahili means simply “teacher.” Indeed, Nyerere even refused to allow members of parliament to be addressed by honorific titles that could be seen as a lack of solidarity with ordinary Tanzanians. When Nyerere returned from a state visit to Communist China in 1965, he was so impressed with Mao’s government frugality that, in the words of Cranford Pratt, “he said that frugality must also be the style of government in Tanzania. To this end he banned hard liquor at Government receptions and ruled that no car purchased from public funds should cost more than 900 pounds” (Pratt, 1995: 11). Nyerere also issued declarations that no T.A.N.U. member could receive other salaries or own outside businesses. In short, while low-level corruption remained in Tanzania, Nyerere’s personal morality and humility, combined with measures to combat corruption,
ensured that he was not blamed by the people for corruption that might be practiced by lower lever offices.

b. Implementation of Preventative Detention

Although both leaders fought for and enacted preventative detention acts, the difference between the two lie in how rigorously these were implemented. As previously mentioned, the preventative detention power in Ghana was often utilized by Nkrumah for purely political purposes. Throughout Nkrumah’s later period of rule, most of the opposition leadership was jailed for various infractions under the preventative detention act. In contrast, Nyerere’s goal in utilizing preventative detention were less political. He had an unorthodox view of human rights, in which he believed that the peripheral rights of troublemakers could be restricted if the exercise of these rights infringed on the practice of basic rights by the masses (Duggan, 1976: 225). The time when Nyerere most extensively used preventative detention was during the 1964 attempted coup, when he cracked down on the supposed coup-plotters.

c. Industrial vs. Rural Development

One of what I believe to be one of the largest differences between the Nkrumah and Nyerere regimes was their implementation of socialism and economic development. Nkrumah, as was his nature, was in favor of rapid industrial development for Ghana, as was evidenced by his initial economic policies which called for increased foreign capital into the country. This attitude can be seen in his desperate desire to fund the massively expensive Volta River Project (Gocking, 2005: 119). Even when Nkrumah’s economic
policies turned further leftward after 1961, this resulted in the nationalization of many industries, not their shutting down of operations. In this case, the state was the main driver of industrial advancement, not foreign finance. The cause, however, was the same: and emphasis on industrial development, which was not necessarily the development that would have benefited the ordinary Ghanaian the most.

Nyerere, in contrast, openly spurned industrialization. Opoku Agyeman describes the difference between the two men’s philosophies: “Nkrumah dreamt of developing a competence in nuclear technology effective enough to give Africa status in the world (…) In contrast to this kind of scientific ambitiousness, Nyerere was to preach a systematic graduation ‘from the hoe to the ox plough; from the ox plough to the tractor’” (Agyeman, 1992: 89). Nyerere’s *ujamaa* socialism placed a large emphasis on rural development, as Nyerere was determined that all of Tanzania should move forward, not just the more educated cities.

d. CIA Involvement

With the release of many declassified documents over recent years, it is now clear the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was at best complicit and tacitly supportive of Kwame Nkrumah’s overthrow and perhaps more heavily involved. In the year leading up to the coup, the U.S. Ambassador to Ghana, William Mahoney, and CIA agents in the country openly discussed and planned for an overthrow of Nkrumah. Paul Lee, in an article entitled “Documents Expose U.S. Role in Nkrumah Overthrow,” states that “Mahoney was satisfied that popular opinion was running strongly against Nkrumah and the economy of the country was in a precarious state” (Lee, 2001: 1). The CIA kept
in touch with and lent support to coup plotters. In addition, the U.S. declined to offer Nkrumah the financial aid necessary to keep his regime running, all but ensuring his downfall. After Nkrumah’s overthrow, a memo by Robert Komer, a National Security Council Staffer, wrote a memo to President Lyndon Johnson in which he called the coup a “fortuitous windfall” (Lee, 2001: 2).

Nyerere, on the other hand, managed to steer clear of the third world’s most feared agency. This is interesting, as both Nyerere and Nkrumah were left-leaning, charismatic leaders with an aversion to Western institutions. However, research by Godfrey Mwakikagile indicates why the CIA did not actively attempt to overthrow Tanzania’s government. His research pointed out that Nyerere’s immense popularity, high international stature, and incorruptible nature made it highly unlikely that his ouster would be accepted either domestically or abroad: “When Oscar Kambona of Tanzania requested the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) help to overthrow [his] former friend, [he] was plainly told that [Nyerere] was impregnable because [he] was incorruptible and had no loot stashed in foreign vaults” (Mwakikagile, 2006: 359). Although Nyerere’s ideology was not clearly in line with U.S. policy, government officials had determined that a coup would never work in Tanzania due to the Mwalimu’s popularity and moral incorruptibility.

e. Ethnic Harmony of Respective Nations

One of the main structural differences, and an important one, is the matter of ethnic harmony in Ghana and Tanzania. Ghana is divided largely among the Asante people, the Ga, the Ewe, and the Mole-Dagbani (Gocking, 2005: 9). Tanzania contains
more than 120 peoples, with a large number being of Bantu origin. The main difference between the countries during Nkrumah’s and Nyerere’s time was that ethnicity made its way into politics in Ghana, while it largely did not in Tanzania. During his rule, Nkrumah’s main opposition came from the Ashanti people, under the yoke of various political parties. In Tanzania, however, T.A.N.U. dominated across all ethnic divisions. The entrance of ethnicity into the political arena can radicalize political movements and increase tensions already present.

XI. Conclusions

At first glance, the lives of Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah seem remarkably similar. Both had their outstanding performance in local schools give them the opportunity to study abroad, and both took advantage of this opportunity to study abroad in the U.K. It was abroad that Nyerere and Nkrumah developed their future political philosophies, getting heavily involved with African liberation movements and with socialist thought. On return to Africa, first Nkrumah and later Nyerere led successful and peaceful independence movements in their respective countries, Ghana and Tanzania. Their parties, the CPP and T.A.N.U., both achieved singular dominance during these post-independence years. In fact, much of T.A.N.U.’s constitution was based off of Nkrumah’s model for the CPP. To ensure the dominance of their parties, both leaders legislated their nations into one-party states. Nyerere and especially Nkrumah were extremely active in African affairs, aiding independence movements elsewhere and searching for ways to liberate the continent as a whole.
Why, then, did things turn out so differently for Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere? Nkrumah was overthrown in a coup welcomed by many Ghanaians and died in exile, while Nyerere presided over 20 years of Tanzanian politics before gracefully retiring in 1985. The differences between the two leaders’ actions, detailed above, help to explain the divergent ends to their political careers.

The most important factor, I believe, was the earnestness and perception of the men themselves. This manifested itself in the economic emphases of the two leaders, as well as the burden that each bore for corruption or mismanagement in either nation. While Nkrumah’s guidance of the Ghanaian economy was largely disastrous in the later period of his reign, Nyerere’s handling of the Tanzanian economy was only marginally better, if at all. The difference, however, was in the approach. Nkrumah’s many “white elephant” projects and attempts to rapidly industrialize the nation, along with fanciful ideas such as building nuclear reactors, appeared to be done in the interests of the pride and gratification of the nation as a whole and of Ghana itself. Nyerere’s emphasis on rural development, however, was an attempt to lift up all Tanzanians. However misguided or ineffective programs like ujamaa socialism were, the earnestness of Mwalimu in trying to improve his people’s day to day lives was what maintained his popularity. In this vein, the corruption issues impacted each man differently. Although Ghana’s corruption issue was much larger, Nyerere did have to deal with frequent abuse of power by the lower-level T.A.N.U. branches, especially in the rural areas. However, the popular perception of Nyerere, as a humble man who wore simple clothes, shunned honorific titles, and collected little material benefit from his position, was in stark contrast to the perception of Nkrumah, who was accused of borrowing money from his
party to import foreign luxury cars and went by the honorific title of “Osagyefo,” or “the crusader” (Agyeman, 1992: 93). The popular perceptions of each leader also enabled to Nyerere to receive far less effective criticism for his implementation of preventative detention that Nkrumah did. Nkrumah’s use of preventative detention was seen as almost strictly political as he detained leaders of the opposition, including J.B. Danquah.

It is my opinion that the popular perception of Nyerere as a morally impeachable leader with an earnest desire to help Tanzania, as opposed to the perception, at least later in his presidency, that Nkrumah was an egotist who abused the political system, was the main ingredient in what separated the two men’s careers. There are two other factors that contributed to their divergent ends, that, while not playing a huge role, were certainly important.

For one, Nyerere almost certainly had a less difficult time in uniting his nation than Nkrumah did. While Tanzania is very diverse, there is not the ethnic tension present in so many other African nations. For that matter, ethnic tension is not extremely high in Ghana, either, as the country has never had a civil war, but Nkrumah faced more political challenges based off ethnicity than Nyerere ever did. From the beginning of Nkrumah’s rule, the Ashanti people were, by and large, in opposition. The region even appealed to the British near independence to become a separate country from the Gold Coast/Ghana, but this never came to fruition. Ashanti opposition manifested itself in various political parties over Nkrumah’s time, from the NLM to the UP. Dealing with this ethnic political problem certainly did not make Nkrumah’s job any easier.

An important, but conditional, factor was the support of the American CIA. In short, the CIA actively worked to support plots to overthrow Nkrumah, while they
considered Nyerere to be “untouchable.” However, this is not, by and large, because they considered Nyerere’s policies to be more favorable than Nkrumah’s. In taking a strictly pragmatic view, the CIA believed public opinion in Ghana was amenable to a coup, while at no time during Nyerere’s presidency did the agency ever believe his popularity had sunken low enough for the public to accept his overthrow. While the CIA certainly played a large role in Nkrumah’s removal by coup, there needed to be a previously existing political environment in which his overthrow was accepted by the people (which it was). This, according to CIA operatives, could not have happened in Tanzania.

The various factors in determining success and failure in leaders are not scientific. In fact, neither are the terms “success” and “failure.” Although Nkrumah’s career ended in failure, his early years were undoubtedly a success, and he will go down as one of the most important African leaders of the century. Nyerere’s personal integrity and appeal masked the failures of many of his policies, especially economic. While Africa moves into, by and large, its second 50 years of independence, the issue of leadership remains a problematic one. With any luck, present-day African leaders can take from the good, and learn from the mistakes, of two of the most influential statesmen the continent has known, Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere.
Works Cited


Msabaha, Ibrahim. “Contribution to International Relations.” Mwalimu: The Influence


