Cleavages and the Two-Party System of Modern Greece

This study begins in 1974 for several reasons. First this year marks the fall of the seven year Junta dictatorship, and the transition to a parliamentary democracy that survives unchallenged to this day. Second, the period of democratic consolidation that ensued saw the rise of a political spectrum much different from the one that preceded the Dictatorship of the Colonels. Third, today’s two leading political parties, PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) and New Democracy, both emerged into political reality during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and have dominated power ever since. Finally 1974, also marks the birthday of the invasion of Northern Cyprus by Turkey, an issue of political tension that would foreshadow two decades of tense external relations, not only with Greece’s Anatolian neighbor, but also with other Balkan nations.

In this paper I use theory of political cleavages as applied to the particular Greek political reality to trace the development of modern political parties, and to try to elucidate Greece’s drift towards an increasingly two-party dominated system. I focus primarily on the model of Lipset and Rokkan, but also have resource to the ideas set forth by other cleavage theorists to explain
certain aspect of Greek political consolidation. In the second part of my analysis, I mention some of the overarching democratic challenges that political concentration of power creates in Greece and try to point out possible solutions to overcome them.

**Cleavage Theory:**

It is generally agreed that parties develop ideologies based on the electorate they wish to represent and which they fuel their ideological stance and administrative support. Cleavage theory argues that party families rise from similar social cleavages to which they give political voice and translate into political oppositions. In this sense, political cleavages are therefore the partisan expression of an underlying division among the members of a given society.

The concept of cleavages was popularized by the milestone study of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967). Lipset and Rokkan tried to explain the reason behind what they identified as the persistence of party systems in Europe. In their analysis, they maintained that specific political cleavages gave rise to the modern political system. Political cleavages were seen as being the result of two great historical processes: the movement towards the creation of the nation-state, or state revolution, and the industrial revolution. National revolution created two structural divisions: between the center and the periphery, and between lay state and church. The industrial revolution added two other cleavages: those between agriculture and industry, and between capitol and labor. Because cleavages were identified as the underlying propellant of party formation, this, in their view, explained why continuity rather than change was the distinguishing feature of partisan politics in Europe; party systems had, in their words, become “frozen”.
However, many authors since have argued that this causal effect is not perfect. Other factors, such as type of party system, and electoral rules, as well as the maturity of the national democratic institution may influence the type of issues that are brought to political attention. Institutional design can greatly affect the strength of political cleavages. Institutionalists stress the importance of the electoral system. Electoral rules, such as the mapping out of electoral districts, may influence the ultimate determination of the political system, therefore curbing the capabilities of more minor cleavages to be expressed.

Sartori (1969) was the first to turn the argument of Lipset and Rokkan around. For Sartori it was the political parties that gave visibility and identity to a particular structure of social divisions. Political parties, in their quest for office can become less and less reliant on political cleavages. Kirchheimer (1966) investigated the transition from the ‘party of social integration’ to the ‘catch-all party’, that is, a party able to represent diverse classes and social groups electorally. With this approach Kircheimer was able to demonstrate the declining relationship between cleavages and political parties. Mainstream parties may attempt to protect the status quo by suppressing the salience of a new issue that cuts across existing dimensions of party competition (Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989).

Additional factors may influence the type of political stratification in a pluralist democracy. Daalder (1969) pointed out the existence of political divisions due to the nature of political regime and concept of nationality. Lijphart (1999) showed that ethnic divisions performed the same function in structuring identity and behavior, as did the other social divisions of Lipset ad Rokkan. As regards to the maturity of democracy, many argue that older democracies are more prone to keep certain social cleavages dormant. That is because in established democracies with ‘frozen’, or at least more rigid political systems, politicization of a
new social cleavage is difficult. Mair and Bartolini (1990) examined three different hypotheses with regard to freezing process, and concluded that the stabilization of the party system of interactions among the main political actors was the most plausible explanation.

Others have argued that in the stage of emerging democracy, political actors play a vital role in determining which social groups will receive political voice. Finally, some cleavages are particular to certain countries. For example, Bensel (1987) showed that the situation in the United State was influenced by sectional rather than social or cultural. This is a political cleavage among States and the Central Government, which is epitomized by the bloody Civil War of 1861-1865.

The main conclusion to be drawn from a survey of cleavage theory appears to be that because of a variety of internal (social cleavages, historic legacy) and external factors (strategizing of political parties, electoral law) there is a high probably that significant cleavages, particularly new ones, can remain dormant. Zielinski (2001) has demonstrated for example, that in the United State, where class conflict clearly exists, its political salience remains decisively muted. With this consideration in mind, the underlying question in this paper will therefore be two fold: to understand the consolidation of Greek democracy during the Third Republic (1974 to present) but not to excuse it. In other words, the effort is both to explain the phenomenon but also to identify any societal groups which suffer from underrepresentation.

Finally cleavages are also categorized according their historic relevance. Predominantly, this means that they are grouped into two sets: those belonging to ‘old cleavages,’ identified as those analyzed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), and those of ‘post-industrial cleavages’ or ‘new’ cleavages. The latter represent a shift in values among the populations, where issues such as
gender, race, ethnicity, public versus private sector, environmentalism, even European integration (Marks, 2000), gain political prominence. These cleavages are in a sense cultural cleavages, because parties represent the divergences in conception of lifestyle. Another significant classification is that of ‘strong’ or ‘weak’. Strong version of social cleavage maintained that all social cleavages are politicized and the “weak” version, which allows for the possibility of non-politicization (Zielinski, 2001:5).

The present paper will use a combined approach of old and new cleavages. Drawing from Lipset and Rokkan, I will examine the Rural-Urban and Church-State cleavages of the National Revolution cluster, primarily because Greece was not impacted by the Industrial Revolution in a manner comparable to other Western countries. In Greece, the industry received a boost when more than 1 million refugees from Anatolia poured into the Greek territory providing cheap labor near main urban centers. Combined with a massive injection of foreign funds in the form of international aid for refugees and private investments in public works, helped give a strong impetus to Greek industry (Mouzelis 1986: 51-52). Indeed, during the first post-depression decade, Greece’s increase in industrial production was one of the highest in the world and towards the end of the 1930s 21% of GDP was represented by the industrial sector (Mouzelis 1986: 54). Yet despite Greece’s industrialization in 1920-1930s, the industrial labor force always remained relatively low (Mouzelis 1986: 55). This is probably due to the fact that industrialization occurred late in Greece and never reaches the scale of British or French counterparts.¹

Additionally the “new cleavages” of ethnic minorities will be examined due to the increasing flux of migrants that Greece has hosted and incorporated into its society since the late

¹ Income disparity is also relatively low in Greece, on average from 1989-2007, Greece’s Gini index has been 34.3 (World Resource Institute)
Finally, I will argue that external relations were also decisive in the emergence and consolidation of the two-party system.

Party Systems:

There are five main categories of party systems: Dominant-party system, multi-party system, non-partisan democracy, single party system and two-party system. Two approaches are common in explaining two-party systems. One focuses on the electoral system. Two-party systems are generally thought to be more compatible with single-member constituencies than proportional representation because in single-member constituencies the “winner takes all.” Permanent minorities are not able to gain representation. Therefore, pressure builds to form permanent coalitions of “ins” and “outs.” These pressures do not operate systems with proportional representation.

A second approach explains party systems as the consequence of religious, class, or cultural cleavages. Overlapping cleavages produce multiparty systems. Unlike the approach focusing on electoral rules, this approach stresses the social basis of party formation. According to this view, multiple party systems may persist even where electoral rules might lead one to expect the emergence of a two-party system. This is the case for example in Australia, Ireland and the former West Germany where there was a two party-dominance in a multiparty system.

Generally there are two approaches: qualitative criteria (what kind of systemic competition) or quantitative data (how many parties in the system) to determining a two-party system. Without going further into this analysis, it will suffice to say that, for our purposes, we
define a two party system as a two-party format where the existence of third parties does not prevent the two major parties from governing alone (Sartori, 1969).

**GREECE**

Modern Greece has had a rather tormented history. After gaining its independence in 1822 from a four decade long Ottoman occupation, it was plagued by a series of wars and crises that prevented it from developing strong and stable democratic institutions. The leaders of the Greek state established in 1830 brought Western European constitutional institutions to Greece, but the monarchy established under the Bavarian prince Otto I in 1832, who brought German cabinet ministers and German soldiers with him. He was overthrown away by revolution in 1862 by a revolution, that brought a new Constitution and a new Danish Prince to the throne. That document placed political power squarely in the hands of the most democratic elements of Greek life: the senate was abolished in favor of a uni-cameral legislature elected by direct, secret manhood suffrage (Sowards, 1996).

Despite this progress, the transition to a more democratic system of governance did not continue in a smooth manner and the 20th century was marked by great instability. Eleutherios Venizelos dominated Greek politics from 1910 to 1935, a period of rivalry between republicans and royalists. The collapse and reorganization of the Greek government is indicative of the fact that Venizelos became Prime Minister seven times during that period, not once consecutively. In 1921-1922 the Asia Minor catastrophe Greece welcomed over 1,000,000 refugees in its territory with dire economic and social consequences. The war ended with the establishment of a republic in 1924, but the monarchy was soon restored in 1936, under the leadership of General Ioannis
Metaxas, who claiming the threat of Communism as justification, and taking advantage of the political impasse between royalists Venizelists and Communists in the elections of 1936\(^2\), ruled as a virtual ‘paternalist-authoritarian’ dictator (Clogg 1987: 182). Later, Greece was occupied by the invading Nazi forces from 1941 till the end of WWII. After the liberation, a bloody civil ensued from 1945-1949 between royalists and communists that ended with the intervention by the English and Americans on behalf of the royalists. The civil war deeply scared the nation, and the resentment between the political right and left survives to this day.\(^3\)

Continued instability during the 1960s led to a military coup in 1967. A group of military generals, led by Colonel Papadopoulos, brought the young democracy to its knees and established a rude military dictatorship for seven years. In the end, it was the fatuous aspirations of greatness that brought the regime to its own doom. The encouragement to set a Greek Cypriot coup brought Greece to the verge of war with Turkey. Demonstrations by students and their brutal suppression using tanks and other military arsenal fired up the Greek population and brought down the repressive regime. A civilian government of “National Unity” was restored, elections were held on November 1974, and a new republican constitution was adopted in 1975. My paper examines the rise of political parties from this point onwards, taking into consideration, when appropriate the legacies of history.

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\(^2\) The 1936 elections had resulted in the communist Popular Front holding 15 seats, and determining the balance between the royalists and Venizelists forces. Two attempted coups by the Venizelists in 1933 and 1935 had created an increasingly polarized political climate, which fatally inhibited the co-operation of the two major parataxeis in seeking a solution to the crisis. Metaxas with the acquiescence of the armed forces, established a dictatorship on 4 August 1974.

\(^3\) Explained with greater detail further on.
Background and major trends of Greek Political parties:

Greece has a 300-member parliament which is elected for four years by universal adult suffrage under a system of proportional representation. The threshold to enter parliament is 3%. The President, who is elected for a five-year term by Parliament, appoints a prime Minister (who commands a majority in Parliament) and other Ministers. In reality however, the President of the Hellenic Republic only confirms the elected (behind closed doors) party-leader and the pre-selected cabinet members.

After the fall of the Dictatorship of the Colonels, Kostas Karamanlis returned from exile to head the new government. To legitimize his rule, he quickly called for elections, that placed his party, New Democracy, essentially a reconstruction of the pre-coup National Union Party, won 54% of the votes and 219 seats (Clogg, 2006: 168). This election marks the beginning of the consolidation process into a two-party system. The trends leading to establishment of the dominant PASOK and New Democracy parties can be summarized into three simultaneous developments.

The first of these changes is the collapse of the traditional center. The political spectrum of post-coup Greece changed significantly from that of the 1950s and 1960s before the establishment of the Junta. Prior to the 1967 coup the center party had won the 1963 elections. During the first two elections of the Third Republic, Center Union (Enos Kentrou), the principal standard-bearer of the center, was able to retain certain electoral appeal, gaining 21% of the votes in 1974 and 12% in 1977. By 1981 however they represented only 1.6% of the vote. This is

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4 This had grown out of the Komma phileleutheron of Venizelos, a party identified with republicanism during the First World War. They remained opposed to a Monarchy throughout the Metaxas dictatorship but sided with the anti-communists during the civil war, regarding the Return of the King as the lesser of two evils (Clogg, 1987: 186).
due to the fact that their electorate was gradually absorbed by the rising Left and Right majority parties of PASOK and New Democracy respectively. Ultimately, the party disintegrated after the 1985 elections.

A second major change is the transformation of the Left and the appearance of a social party for the first time in Greece. Since the failed coup of 1936, the Communists retained a strong communist presence, particularly under the umbrella of E.L.A.S (National Popular Liberative Forces) a resistance group during the Nazi occupation. At the end of World War II, these active and largely successful operations of the extreme left, sought to gain power in freed Greece and impose a communist rule. They were met however by resistance of the royalists and republicans who had also fought for independence. During the civil war, the Western backed Right forces outlawed the communist political party in 194. A communist presence was however able to survive in exile or underground, while hiding behind the façade of the United Democratic Left (EDA) (Pappas 2003: 94). This party remained present until 1968, at which point disagreement within the Central Committee of the Communist Party let to split between the Orthodox Communist Party (KKE) and the more moderate and revisionist Communists of the Interior (KKEs). In 1977 Communists secured 9% and the Communists of the Interior, 3%, in alliance with other parties (Clogg, 2006: 176).

Until the 1970s the Left was mostly represented by communist forces. Socialist movements in Greece remained latent throughout much its history due to Ottoman rule, internal conflicts and slow economic growth, which had isolated and hindered Greece from great historical movements such as the Renaissance, the Reformation, the seventeenth-century scientific revolution, the Enlightenment. Consequently, the nation was not able and ready to hop on the trains of the late 19th century the Industrial Revolutions. Mouzelis (1996) argues that Greece
entered the development race a century or so later than the nations of Western Europe because of
the persistence of a plethora of artisanal units with very low productivity; and the inability to use
“nineteenth-century export trade in order to modernize its agriculture and link it effectively with
a competitive industrial sector” (Mouzelis, 1996: 221-222). According to his view, this is to be
blamed on the clientalist and populist nature of the Greek State that made it impossible for
rational and intelligent reactions within a new international environment. The end result was the
creation of a society where, lacking the large industrial and worker strata, socialism could not
anchor. Trade-union movements there fore did not attract a mass following in the inter-war
period. Although socialist intellectuals were present since the early twentieth century, they were
never able to organize in cohesive political groups (Mouzelis 1986: 56). The salience of
communism on the other hand, had to do with the geographical proximity, and ethnic/cultural
affinities of the neighboring Slav-speaking populations of the Balkan (Mouzelis 1986:57).

PASOK, or Panhellenic Socialist Movement marks the debut of socialist Greece. It was
comprised of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement, which had been directed by Andreas
Papandreou from the United States during the dictatorship, and of the Democratic Defense.
PASOK gained a baffling 14% of the votes on its first showing. In 1977, PASOK doubled its
votes, collecting almost 25%. That same year also marked the year that PASOK became the
official opposition, with 60 seats in opposition (Clogg, 2006: 175). In 1981, Pasok won 48% of
the votes and became the ruling government. In a mere 8 years, socialism had developed
won the
general elections in Greece.

5 In Western Europe, the cleavage between capital and labor emerged before democracy. In fact, the contention
between owners and laborers in the secondary economy lead to the creation of powerful socialist parties and so
turned economic class into a fundamental basis of political contestation (second link, Cleavages AU,4) In contrast,
in Eastern Europe we have the rise of the cleavage after the parties freeze.
Other socialist movements include the Democratic Social Movement (Dikki), which was formed in 1996 by a faction of PASOK claiming to be the true representative of the socialists heritage but which quickly dismantled. It won 4.4% of the vote that year, but has not managed to enter Parliament since. The 1977 also marked the complete dominance of KKE over KKEs and “brought to an end the dispute over the inheritance of the communist electoral tradition” (Nicolacopoulos, 2005: 262). Coalition of the Left and Progress, on the other hand, was born out of the legacy of the disintegrated KKEs, and entered Parliament in 1989 (Pappas, 2003).

Thirdly, while the forces of the left broadened and tilted towards a new, more socialist and center-left balance, the forces on the Extreme Right twiddled away. Old royalists were absorbed by New Democracy, and until 2000, fate of the formation of the Populist Orthodox Rally (Laikos Orthodoxos Synargeremos-LAOS), Greece lacked a strong Extreme-Right Party. After the fall of the dictatorship only National Front, Ethniki Parataxi in 1977 had been able to secure 7% of the popular vote, and later absorbed itself into New Democracy in the 1981 elections. Populist Orthodox Rally, led by George Karatzaferis, has never reached the 3% necessary to enter parliament during the national elections, but attracts more voted during the European parliamentary elections.\footnote{In 2004, the party won 4.1% of the votes securing one seat in the European Parliament. This follows a pattern of Greek Far-Right presence set by the president of Komma prodeutikon (1981) and Ethniki Politiki Enosi (1984) who had secured some seats at the European Election. See Clogg 1987: 183-185 for more details on these parties.}

The Greek Rally, of which New Democracy is an outgrowth, had been established in 1951 by Field Marshal Alexandros Papagos, the military victor of the civil war against the communists, had a clear anti-communist and strongly conservative agenda (Pappas, 2003:92).\footnote{The National Radical Union established by Kostas Karamanlis in 1955 after Papago’s death, is an outgrowth of the Greek Rally} In the end, it becomes obvious that part of the great success of the young New Democracy under Kostas Karamanlis was the disassociation of this new party with the
legacy of an authoritarian Right presence in Greece, and the reorganization of the Right to a more central position.
Greece’s changing political system:

Several scholars have dwelt on the mutating nature of the Greek political system. Pappas (2003) divides Greek party-system in two phases. The first is identified with Poly-Partyism from 1951 to 1981. Within this time period he further subdivides the first type into two classes: ‘predominant-party system’ (1952-1963) and ‘polarised pluralism’ (1963-1981). The period of 1981 onwards is identified as ‘two-partyism.’

Indeed it is not difficult to see that Greece has moved to a de facto two-party system since 1981. Using qualitative data, we can see that alternatively, the governing PASOK or New Democracy have been able to secure absolute majority of Parliamentary seats\(^8\).

Alan Siaroff (2003) identified the existence of what he termed “two-and a half” party systems in several countries. This system occurs when the two main parties get at least 80% of the seats but more not more than 95% and where the no one party exceeds 51% of the seats whilst also maintaining a seat ratio vis-à-vis the second party of 1.8% or higher. The significant of two-and-a-half party system is that the third “half” party can act as a wing or hinge party and potentially play a deciding role in government formation. Although Siaroff identifies Greece as a two-and-half party system\(^9\), he recognizes that the Communist party is a wing party of minor relevance because “most elections have yielded a majority of seats for either socialist PASOK or

\(^8\) See Appendix. The June 1989 elections constitute the exception.
\(^9\) Along with Austria, Germany, Australia, Canada and Spain
the conservative New Democracy.” Greece it seems has “been functioning effectively as a two-party system” (Siaroff 2005: 276). Indeed the only election in which a one-party parliamentary majority was contested was in 1989 when a conservative/communist coalition had to be formed to ensure victory, “a sight that astonished even this (Greek) land of cantankerous politics” (Simons 1989, A7).

At this point it is crucial to mention the presence of elements within the political system that seem to contradict the proposition of two-partyism in Greece. Synaspismos (Coalition of the Left and Progress) is a party of the left, created in 1989. It is the result of a KKE-EAR initiative, which wanted to forge a coalition of social forces to fight the bi-partyist and right-wing policies (Mihas 1998: 61). Despite ideological ties, it refused to cooperate with PASOK during the 90s because of the Papandreou’s financial and personal scandals. Political Spring on the other hand, was founded in 1993 in Athens as a center-right or centrist political formation (Marakis 1993:9) with a principled opposition to the clientalistic tradition of the two-party system. Its electorate was mostly “new members”, young people who had never voted before and individuals coming from the entire political spectrum, ranging from right-wing royalists to ex-communists (Mihas 1998: 63). The characteristic of their electorates support that their appeal was their moral stance against the abusive, rigid and corrupt two-party system. As the successive elections show however, their appeal did not survive, because they were mainly pitching in the feelings of repulsion towards the established parties which had been involved in series of corrupt practices. LAOS on the other hand, appeals to a much more stable electorate that is xenophobic, religiously conservative, eurosceptic and anti-system voters (www.laos.gr).

According to Pappas: “two-partyism tends to develop in countries with long democratic traditions, stable political institutions, and a small spread of public opinion” (Pappas, 2003:110).
Taking this statement as inspiration, we proceed to examine the social cleavages of religion, race, urbanization and foreign relations to elucidate the reasons behind the emergence of the Greek quasi-two party system and the shrinking of the political electorate towards an inflexible Center Left-Center Right formation.

This overall pattern could be explained by treating Greece as a new democracy. Studies conducted on Central-Eastern European countries, concluded that after the collapse of communism, political parties in the new democracies formed based on pre-communist political parties (Turner 1993:331). Greece in a sense followed this pattern, since as illustrated during the first two election rounds many of the candidate parties on the ballot were re-organization of old parties which had emerged in some cases before the coup of 1967. Taagepera & Shugart (1989:87) argue that it is normal for many parties to emerge in a pluralist electoral system during the initial phases of new democracies since “many parties… try their luck.” Over time however rational voters avoid voting for parties who are unable to meet the threshold and on who they would “waste” their vote, and compete only for presumed successful candidates (Duverger 1951). Although this type of analysis is useful and provides insights on the rationalization process of the voter, it does not however explain the degree of consolidation apparent in Greece. Poland in comparison, in 1997, had seven parties represented in parliament despite a 5% threshold (Stancllck, 1997).
Church-State Cleavage:

The ties of the Greek State and the Orthodox Church are multiple and deep. Historically, Europe’s longest lasting Empire, the Byzantine Empire, broke off from the Rome in 330 A.D and began its independent ascent as the Eastern Empire, when Constantine I declared Christianity, and in particular Orthodoxy, the State religion. During the 11 centuries of Byzantine rule, State and Church matters remained intertwined.

The fusing of the Orthodox Church with the Hellenic Identity survived and was perhaps even strengthened after the Great Sack of 1453. Under Ottoman rule, the” Orthodox Church became a civil as well as a religious institutions” because in Islam there is no distinction between religious and secular powers (Stavrakakis 2003:166). The Greek Nation was grouped within the Rum Millet, or the “Roman nation” of the Empire, and increasingly the Patriarch of Constantinople was recognized as the national leader, or millet-bashi, of the Orthodox populations in the Ottoman Empire (Divani 2001: 40). Furthermore the Ottomans did not have any provisions to educate their non-Muslim subjects (Lawrence 2005: 318). Churches and church-run night schools helped maintain a sense of Christian and Greek otherness as regards to the Muslim Turk master.

When Greece was established as an independent nation in 1821, the Church became an integral part of the New Greek Monarchy. In 1833, the Greek Orthodox Church became an autocephalous from the Patriarche and the Holy Synod, established to govern state affairs, soon feel under the domination of civil authority (Frazee, 1969). This is because Greek language and

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10 Legacies of Ottoman and religiously heterogeneous inhabitants are illustrated by the fact that Judaism and Islam are the only two religious to be recognized Religions in the Greek Constitution.
religion were the two fundamental pillars that fuelled Greek nationalism and ultimately lead to the creation of modern Greece; “Greekness” is tied with religious and ethnic identity.

The historic and cultural ties of State and Religion in Greece continue to be expressed today through formal recognition of the Church of Greece as the official Church of the State. This implies many privileges for the Greek Orthodox Church. Foremost, the Greek Constitution recognizes the Church as a legal entity of the state. Article 3 of the constitution in force states that “the prevailing religion of Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ” and that the Church is actually a legal entity incorporated under public law. Church official may issue administrative acts assisted by state organs, clergy are remunerated pensioned by the state and exempt from military service, Orthodox churches are exempt from taxes, which does not apply to all other religious affiliations. Similar clauses in other European Constitutions like in the Spanish one of 1978. At the same time, certain powers were established limiting the moralist-legalist power of the Church: in 1981, civil marriage was introduced against stark opposition by the Church, while adultery was removed from the list of criminal offenses (Clogg, 2006:181).

We should also be quick to point out that Greece is not the only European country with a long tradition of established state religions. The Church of England is formally established Church whose supreme governor is the Crown, whiles the Norwegian constitution for example, designates the Evangelical Lutheral Church as “official religion of the State.” However in Greece, 97% of the population is Greeks Orthodox making it the “most religiously homogeneous society of Europe” (Alivizatos 1999:24).

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11 Article 16.3: “public authorities shall take the religious beliefs of Spanish society into account and shall in consequence maintain appropriate cooperation with the Catholic Church and other confessions.”
On the counter side, relations between State and Church however have not always been without hick-ups and there were several instances of open politicization of the Greek Orthodox Church. During the civil War, the Church sided with the King George I against Venizelos and played an active role against the ideological struggle against communism. Later, during the rule of the Colonels, although not collaborative, it did not oppose the religious ideology introduced by the dictatorship (Stavrakakis 2003: 158).

The most notable contestation of the power of the Greek Orthodox Church over civil societal matters by political parties occurred after the accession of PASOK to power in 1993. PASOK instituted a law removing from the identification card (issued by police and required to be carried by every Greek) the designation of religious affiliation. New Democracy generally sided with Archibishop Christodoulos in wanting to maintain religion information on the card, but ultimately the motion was passed without much reaction from New Democracy Leadership\textsuperscript{12} (Stavrakakis 2003: 155). Yet despite instances of what could be best termed ‘political coincidence’ between the Church and the Right wing of the political spectrum, there has never been any substantive religious cleavage in Modern Greek democracy.

Furthermore separation of Church and State has never been a serious prospect. At its greatest slump, before Archibishop Christodoulos was elected in April 1998, 47.6% of the Greek population favored separation\textsuperscript{13}. Half a year later he was the most popular leader in Greece and opinion poll numbers were reversed. Neither the PASOK governments not New Democracy since 1975 have attempted pushing a measure to constitutional separation between Church and State (Petrou, 1999). Although one may be tempted to conclude that there appears to be a slight

\textsuperscript{12} Despite over one million signatures petitioned, the petition was dismissed because it was ruled unconstitutional. 

\textsuperscript{13} According to the same opinion poll, 52.4% of Pasok and 39.4% of New Democracy voters favored the separation of church and state. See Avghi, 5 April 1998 in Alivizatos (1999)
nudging of the right with the Church, there is no indication that the role of the Church in society is a prominent matter of electoral divide on either end of the left-right spectrum. In fact a statement by prominent New Democracy MEP, illustrates the overarching philosophy lucidly: “While the New Democracy leadership considers…the correct system to be the separation of Church and State…, in the present situation and in light of tradition, it is difficult to abandon the existing system at the present time” (Prodromou 2004:478).

The attachment of Greek citizens to the Greek Orthodox is also crystallized into the new generations by the National Educational curriculum, which comprises Religion. The grade for this subject does not count in the final Panhellenic Contest for entering Tertiary Education (except for the students applying to Philosophy, Law and Religious Studies), and albeit students whose parents submit an official letter declaring themselves non-believers can opt out of the lesson, the religious education curriculum “is not meant to be broader than Greek Orthodoxy” (Alivizatos 1999: 27). It should be understood as part of the education building civic identity and responsibility in the young generation.

*Religious minorities:*

Greece does not have a very clean record as regards to religious minorities. Indeed since 1985, more than 700 suits against Greece have had brought before the Court at Strasbourg pertinent to minorities’ religious freedoms (Stavros, 1999: 4). Article 10 of Constitution, allows followers other "known religions"\(^\text{14}\), to worship freely, have constitutional recognition. This covers most religious minorities such as Roman Catholics, most Protestant Denominations, and

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\(^{14}\) This status in determined by the supreme civil court of Greece, Arios Pagos. According to Court Ruling: “religion or a dogma whose doctrine is open and not secret, is taught publicly and its rites of worship are also open to the public, irrespective of whether its adherents have religious authorities; such a religion or dogma needs not to be recognized or approved by an act of the State or Church.”

In Greece, 97% of the population of Greeks is Orthodox, making it the “most religiously homogeneous society of Europe” (Alivizatos 1999:24). Only two religious minorities are officially recognized in Greece: Muslim\(^{15}\) population in Thrace, and the Jewish Minority. Both have seen their numbers diminish in the last decade: the former was victim of the exchange of population of the Asia Minor Catastrophe/War of Turkish Independence of 1922, while the later were exterminated during the Nazi occupation of WWII. Additionally, 500,000 Turks and Macedonian Slavs deported from Greece during the civil war (Sardon 2001: 53). Finally, the Schengen Agreement has also contributed, though not significantly, to the gradual religious pluralization of Greece’s labor force.

In the end perhaps the Archibishop Christodoulos summed it best: “they accuse us that we speak politically, that our discourse is political. We reply, yes our discourse is political, only in the ancient Greek sense of the term; it was never associated with party politics” (To Bima, 2001).

The increasing ambivalence of the State and Greek society towards the religious heterogeneity of Greece should be examined within the larger prism of ethnic diversification, a phenomenon that is gradually becoming more prominent in Greece.

\(^{15}\) Muslims amount to about 1% of the population: http://www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/musmingr.htm
Center-Periphery cleavage:

In the case of Greece, the periphery is mostly identified with the rural. This is because Greece has a highly fragmented physical and economic area, given its mountainous terrain and the existence of hundreds of scarcely inhabited islands. Its urban system is characterized by a high and intense concentration and a serious lack of medium sized cities. Increasingly, the rural areas are acquiring a greater political clout because by emerging as areas of both agricultural and tertiary activities and play a key role in the consumerist state. Particularly the agricultural sector is very important (Ray, 1998). In 1997, the agricultural sector represented 15% of GDP and 18.7% of employment. Because of the high external demands for Greek agricultural products (they represent 30% of exports), often, agricultural industry remains the most attractive means for the development of peripheral area. Traditionally these agricultural peripheries have tended to vote for left parties. Furthermore there is a remarkable lack of strategic development plans in the peripheral cities. On the political level the central state did penetrate the periphery, primarily because the state "failed to marginalize the prevailing particularistic, clientelistic elements" (Mouzelis 1996, 219). This means that the expansion of political rights downwards was much more limited.

In its early years there had been a tendency to regard PASOK as the voice of rural protest, but yet the distribution of its vote in 1981, when it won the elections for the first time, was remarkably even between urban and rural areas and between men and women (Clogg, 2006: 179). Certain ameliorations during the first term of PASOK continued to help it hold a strong hold on the rural and periphery areas. The creation of a national health system, despite protests

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18 For more information see Antoniou, 2005.
from the health professionals, helped bring hospital and clinics to secluded areas. The efforts of
de-centralization in the administration however were not successful on a significant scale (Clogg,

In 1991, 58.8% of the populations lived in urban areas, while 12.8% lived in semi-urban
areas and 28.4% in rural areas (1991 census). The greatest centers of populations are Athens,
Thessaloniki, Patra, Volos, Larissa and Irakleio (what do they represent?). Together they represent more
than 60% of the population, while Athens alone encompasses around 50% of the country's urban
population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or Area</th>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>ATHINAI</td>
<td>3,072,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Calithaia</td>
<td>114,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Iraclion</td>
<td>132,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Larissa</td>
<td>113,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Patrai</td>
<td>170,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Piraias</td>
<td>182,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Salonika</td>
<td>749,048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The aforementioned cities will be considered constituting the ‘center’ while all other
prefectures will be regarded as the ‘periphery.’ From electoral maps of 1996-2007, we see that
the strongholds of the left are primarily in the periphery. If we take for example the legislative election of 2004, when New Democracy came back to power after 15 years, the strongholds of PASOK were primarily in Eastern Crete, which is the most rural and least populated area of the island. The North-West area of the Peloponnese also comprises a highly agricultural, and secluded area of Greece.

In Comparison, the Communist Party, gained, most support in Kefallonia, and certain Island of the Cyclades, particularly the least touristic islands which are reliant on small-scale farming (as opposed the intensive industry of Northern Peloponnese and Central Greece. Overall, examination shows that the most secluded peripheral areas prefer Left wing parties. The Center
cities however, do not seem to have a pattern of preference other than for one of the centrist parties (PASOK, or New Democracy)\(^{19}\)

National Minorities:

In the first part we will identify and assess the condition of minorities in Greece in order to better understand the state of their political representation and participation in society.

Greece was deeply affected by the fall of communism. The successive wars\(^{20}\) following the break-up of Yugoslavia were the cause of constant migration by the afflicted populations

\(^{19}\) For further maps like this one see, [http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/g/greece/greece2004maps.shtml](http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/g/greece/greece2004maps.shtml) and ekloges. gr

towards more stable countries such as Greece, which was the only country of the Balkans to not have experienced a communist regime and the disastrous effects of a planned economy (Sardon 2001: 50). The huge numbers of immigrants seeking refuge in Greece since 1980s are slowly transforming Greece for the first time in its modern history into a multicultural society. Most of the minorities in Greece are therefore comprised migrants, most of which are undocumented immigrants, working in conditions of informality across the economy.

The latest national census (2001) shows that there are 797,091 foreigners living in the country (www.statistics.gr). It is also estimated that there are an additional 200,000 undocumented, making the total migrants to a total of a little over one million immigrants (Triandafyllidou 2005: 3) This represents roughly 10% of the 10,939,777 population and 11% of the labor force (2001 census).

The legal and naturalized migrants are comprised mainly of co-ethnic, usually Orthodox, returnees from former Soviet States, or immigrants of Greek descents. Immigration procedures for these persons (mainly Pontic Greek and Vorioepirotes, Greek Albanians) are hastened because of their cultural and cultural ties to the Greek nation. According to SOPEMI (1999) there were 74, 500 legal migrants in Greece, of whom 6% were Albanians, 8% Bulgarians and 17% Russians, 4% Romanians, 4% Ukrainians, 4% Egyptians and 5% of citizens from former Yugoslavia.

The largest minority in Greece are currently the Albanians. They compromise 54% (438,000) of documented workers while it is estimated that they also compromise the majority of the undocumented additional 200,000 migrants (www.statistics.gr). Most of these work in construction and agriculture.
Although regularization of illegal migrants on a mass scale has been mostly difficult in Greece, law 2910/2001\textsuperscript{21} has helped by creating a new system of labor permits and easier access to employers. The law provides for 33 different types of residence permits, and most importantly, redefines long term residents who have the right to apply to the naturalization process, as having lived continuous 6 years with a stable income (instead of 12). Simultaneously it enhanced border control and patrols.

There are severe constitution restrictions on the rights to migrants. Immigrants who are not legal residents do not have the right to rally (article 11), enter into associations (article 12). Voting and standing for elections are also restricted to Greek citizens. It follows that they cannot become official party members either (although an exemption is made for Cypriots). Unfortunately there are no studies to my knowledge, examining the numbers of naturalized citizens attaining significant electoral success.

“In Greece, immigrant participation in public life, even in its most trivial aspects such as going for a walk in a public place, enrolling one’s kids to school or visiting a doctor, has been seriously hampered by the longstanding undocumented or insecure status of most immigrants” (Triandafyllidou, 2005:16). Nonetheless informal and contentious forms of political expression periodically take place. In October 1999, following the murder of an Albanian by a racist young Greek, several thousands undocumented migrants rallied in the center of Athens in protest of xenophobia and abuse.\textsuperscript{22}

Migrant civil society organizations in support of their rights are growing in Greece, although they still remain weak. The most prominent of these are DIKTYO, the Forum of

\textsuperscript{21} http://www.imepo.gr/pdfs/LAW%202910%202001_English.pdf

\textsuperscript{22} For a list of migrant rallies and other contentious political actions see Athens News Agency website: “Chronology of Events” by Kathy Tzilivakis: http://www.athensnews.gr/Immigration/1immi3.htm
Albanian Workers and the internationally funded Greek Helsinki Monitor (www.greekhelsinki.gr). Other NGOs are more local, such as ‘Nostos’ that works in service of the Pontic populations. This organization has participated in EU funded programs and has developed academic and leisure activities to help integration of Pontic children (Triandafyllidou 2005: 23). Other examples include the Athens-based Filipino group KASAPI receives funding from the Philippines to provide nursery childcare and have set up two primary schools that offer the Filipino curriculum. Finally the Albanian federation named ‘Agios Kosmas’ is the most active Albanian organization.

Non-governmental associations run by the host community have also been formed to help support the immigrant populations, such as the Hellenic Commission of International Democratic Solidarity, SOS Racism, Greek Migrations FORUM and the Red Cross (Triandafyllidou, 2005:24). Regardless of these efforts however, there remains a very low number of participants: for example, only 250 of 37,230 Bulgarian immigrants are members of associations23. Overall Greek civil society remains weak compared to other countries and therefore does not provide a strong channel of politicization for minorities. Overall, authoritarianism on the part of the State concerning naturalization and the presence of the two-party dominated system in Greece allows very little outlet and incentive to minority groups for associations.
**Foreign Relations Cleavage:**

The international systems and foreign relation can also be seen as causes instead of consequences of domestic political developments (Gourevitch 1978, 881). In the international context, internal political transformations are shaped by war and trade.

In the case of Greece the international environment posed perceived threats and opportunities to the new, Greek state. These threats and opportunities were analyzed and exploited by domestic political parties who reinforced the political appeal of their new party by calling upon the nationalist sentiment of the population. The state of war, or threat thereof, induces states to organize themselves internally so as to meet these external challenges (Gourevitch 1978: 896). Gourevitch further shows how the degree of international threat can correlate with the degree of authoritarianism. According to his analysis, France developed absolutism as a way of preventing the constant impulse to exit. In contrast, England, enjoying the advantage of maritime defense, lacked this threat and was able to allow a greater voice through parliamentarism.

There are some similarities to draw with Greece. Greek Foreign Relations were particularly tense during the first decades of the Third Republic. More importantly, it appears that their salience in public opinion was amplified because the two main political parties, using imagery and sometimes populist discourse, began to tie their political performance with their ability to direct and define Greece’s regional and international position in the world.

**European Integration:**

Soon after his party’s election, Kostas Karamanlis became determined to accelerate Greece’s European integration. The 1961 Treaty of Associations had provided for the possibility
of accession in 1984. Deteriorating Turkish Relations and the loosening of the Alliance with the United States, which had traditionally been a close partner of the Right, since it had intervened in favor of the Royalists during the Greek Civil War, meant that Greece was now more isolated. Karamanlis’ leadership in the process was to be determinant. Though Greece’s economic performance was somewhat sketchy, Karamanlis skillfully exploited feelings of guilt at Europe’s inertia during the dictatorship to speed the accession process (Clogg 2006: 183); despite Greece’s many challenges, the country was admitted into the Union, a year earlier than the Treaty intended, in 1983. Throughout the first years of his leadership, Karamanlis enjoyed wide support, his emphasis on the primacy of foreign relations over domestic issues cost his party to loose the elections in 1981. In that year, New Democracy slumped from 42% to 36% and was unable to bridge the gap in the next legislative elections of 1985, obtaining only 41% (Clogg, 2002: 179). The foreign relations determination of Kostas Karamanlis eventually shadowed over the activities on the private front, and cost the party the 1981 elections.

Turkey:

Whereas European Integration seems to have been the champion cause of the Right under Kostas Karamanlis, Turkish relations, and to a certain extent, tensions of the name of FYROM were to turn out to be the stronghold of PASOK.

The process of democratic consolidation and European integration was played out against a background of continuing tension with Turkey. Once Greece gained its political independence in 1974, it was immediately confronted with the international challenge that had brought down the dictatorship: the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey. In a revival of the Megali Idea24 that had

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24 Megali Idea, or “Grand Idea” is the dream of a Great Greece where the lost territories of Constantinople and Smyrna (Izmir) are “re-conquered.” When implemented as a strategy, it has always proven disastrous. During WWI, Greece had entered the war hoping to gain land concessions in Turkey from the Triple Entente. After the end of the
dominated Greek Politics under Venizelos, Greece’s leadership planned to annex Cyprus. The move was anticipated by the Turkish authorities who responded by deploying their army in Northern Cyprus. This had adverse ripple effects. First, it created a rupture in Greek-American relations. Following the invasion of Turkey, anti-American sentiment rose drastically, primarily because the United States had not intervened with their ally to halt the Turkish move. Kostas Karamanlis responded and embraced this feeling by calling into question the future of U.S military bases in Greece threaten to withdraw Greece from NATO (Clogg, 2006:167).

Papandreou had called for the sinking of the ship Sismik I in 1976. During his years in opposition, PASOK leader Papandreou had been an avid critic of Karamanlis’ willingness to negotiate with Turkey, a stance which he maintained throughout the run to the 1981 elections (Clogg, 2006: 187). For PAOSK, Turkey’s conclusion of major agreements with Sofia, Skopje, and Tirana gave rise to exaggerated fears that Ankara was seeking to create and “Islamic arc” on Greece’s border in order to encircle and isolate Greece (Larrabee, 1999:332-333). Turkey’s quick recognition of FYROM in 1992, no wonder reinforced this view. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” which made relations worse. In 1984 an incident involving a Turkish ship firing salvoes in the direction of Greece, brought the two countries on the brink of war. This resulted in the reorientation of foreign policy whereby the main threat to the country’s territory came not from the Warsaw pact, but from Turkey (Clogg, 2006: 188).

Constant disagreements between the two countries over the delineation of the continental shelves of Greece and Turkey in the Aegean continued to poison the relations. In December

War, driven their nationalist aspirations, the Greek army advanced into neutral grounds in the village of Karaagwc and in the Western flank of the river Maritza. This enraged the Turkish Nationalist leader Attaturk and he attacked the forces of General Pangalos. Greece lost everything it had gained.
1986, and incident between Greek and Turkish border patrol on the Evros River resulted in the deaths of three soldiers, two Turkish and one Greek. Three months later, in March 1987, flare-up hinged on proposed Turkish exploration for oil on disputed Aegean waters. The armed forces of both countries were placed on alert and Papandreou declared that all necessary measures would be taken to safeguard the country’s territorial integrity (Clogg 2006:188). Holding NATO and particularly the United States to be responsible, Papandreou dispatched his foreign Minister to Sofia to discuss the crisis with Communist Leader, Todor Zhivkov and suspended communications with the American base at Nea Makri. The crisis was finally defused when the Prime Minister, Turgut Ozal, stated that only Turkish territorial waters would be explored. Overall however, after PASOK’s electoral victory in 1981, the party’s extreme rhetoric on issues concerning NATO, EU and other foreign policy gradually dissipated (Lyritzis 2005: 246). A turning point between Greece and Turkey was reached in 1988 when the two Prime Ministers signed the “No war Agreement.” Papandreou’s radicalism was exemplified when in the early 1990s, Mitsotakis (New Democracy leader) hinted that the return of PASOK would increase the likelihood of Greece becoming embroiled in a wider Balkan conflict, hinting at Papandreou’s past radicalism (Clogg 2006: 212).

Former Yugoslavic Republic Of Macedonia (FYROM):

By the end of 1991, the heated dispute over the name of the former Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) caused significant internal frictions within New Democracy, which led Andonis Samaras to be removed from the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs in April 1992 (Nicolacopoulos 2005: 272). With the dismantling of Yugoslavia in 1990, the formally ‘Federal Republic of Macedonia’, declared its independence in 1992 adopting the name ‘Republic of Macedonia.’ The adoption of the sixteen point Star of Vergina as its flag further confirmed the
aspirations of the nation to identify itself with the historic Macedonians of Philip and Alexander the Great.

To understand the salience of the issue for the Greek population, it is important to keep two issues into perspective. First, large numbers of refugees from Asia Minor and elsewhere had been re-settled in Greek Macedonia in the 1920s. There were many living in Northern Greece who had parents, grandparents or great-grandparents whose lives had been turned outside down in the process. This rendered them acutely sensitive to any suggestion of claims against Greece’s territorial integrity (Clogg 2006: 208). Secondly, during the World War II, western Thrace and part of Greek Macedonia had been subject to harsh Bulgarian occupation. Greeks had been massacred and ‘ethnically cleansed’.

The Left had traditionally been closer to the ethnic minorities of the Thrace. For example, during the Civil War the Communist party who enjoyed wide support among the Slav minorities of Northern Greece had called for self-determination of the Slav Greek Macedonians. PASOK, as a Left party and using the anti-Right strategies explained earlier, could capitalize on the legacy of minority protection and not “selling out” to the Western Powers for support. During his years in opposition, Papandreou in particular, spoke to the conditions of the migrants in the cities and “in blaming their problems, in populist fashion, on the sinister machinations of external and domestic reaction he had clearly struck a responsive chord” (Clogg, 2006: 179-180). Although both New Democracy and PASOK were opposed to the adoption of the star of Vergina and the name ‘Macedonia,’ there was a clear difference of approach. While New Democracy under Mitsotakis made it clear that a state under the name of Macedonia would never be accepted, Papandreou, while in opposition and throughout his Prime Ministry, claimed that even to talk with the Macedonian officials was tautonomous to recognition (Larrabee 1999: 323).
Papandreou and PASOK formed for themselves an image of the idealist, nationalist Left that opposed the ‘selling-out’ or ‘softness’ of the Right. This was clearly part of their electoral appeal and enhanced the perception that they were a new element in Greek politics that could defend the country’s interests, both within and without.

**Conclusion:**

In this analysis, I have tried to explain the reason behind the emergence of the quasi-two party system in Greece. Generally, two-party systems are generally thought to be more compatible with single-member constituencies than proportional representation because in single-member constituencies the “winner takes all.” Indeed, Greece, especially compared to its Balkans neighbors, appears strikingly homogenous. Furthermore, other cleavages such as those of center-periphery and Church-State remain weak because of economic, developmental and historical reasons. Indeed it could be argued that the two-party system would be a natural outcome of this type of society.

Nonetheless this study has some important insight to bring in understanding the electorate of Greece. In my opinion, there are two predominant cleavages in Greece:

Foremost the most significant cleavage in Greek politics remains the left-right cleavage, a legacy of the Civil War (Lyrintzis 2005: 244). During the civil war, forces were labeled as communist, and anti-communists. This is exemplified by the alignment of centrist Venizelists with the forces of the Greek Rally in order to group against the Communists. Later this was replaced with a Left and anti-Right rhetoric, as PASOK employed an interpretation of history
that favored picturing the right as selling out to the foreign powers (they had been aided during the Cold War) and associating the new center-Right with the Dictatorship and Metaxas (QUOTE). In an accusing tone, PASOK called into remembrance an old Right that had monopolized power from 1949-1967, and had brutally suppressed the Left (largely identified with Communism); PASOK developed this radical discourse in an attempt to contrast itself to the Right and establish itself as a party of the Left (Lyriztis 2005: 244). This ‘new version of an old cleavage” (Lyrintzis 2005: 246) breed mistrust for the Right and helped anchor socialism, and with it, PASOK into the modern Greek political scene. The Left-Right tactic continued to be used successfully in the 1981, 1985, and 1993 elections. With the accession of Costas Simitis to PASOK leadership, the party’s central axis shifted to “modernization” (Moschonas, 1997). This legacy of Left-anti-Right divides further strengthens the polarity towards a two-party centrist government since it calls for large, cartel-like confluence of a wide range of people on one side of the political spectrum. The playing on nationalist sentiments was also used by PASOK under Simities in the real of foreign relations to inspire confidence and loyalty into the emerging socialist party. This combination led to the creation of a large and moderate party of the Left.

The second cleavage is a “new” cleavage that will increasingly dominate political reality: minorities. As I have shown, religious and ethnic minorities in Greece still face a variety of legal restrictions that do not enable them to gain significant political power. Minority rights will certainly be one of the salient issues in the next decade. It is no coincidence that the far right party L.A.O.S has been gaining more and more support since its creation in 2000 (see appendix). It captures the xenophobia and fear of those that feel threatened by the immigrants. The fertility rate in Greece is one of the lowest in Europe, 1.35, while its minorities typically have a higher
rate (i.e: 2.37 for the Albanian minority). These children, when born in Greece, automatically become Greek citizens and may seek a voice of their own.

Like their Spanish and Portuguese counterparts, Greek parties— particularly PASOK and ND—suffer from a lack of internal democracy. Despite the fact that most deputies deem their party to be democratic, Greek parties still remain leader-centered and allow little space for diverging views, let alone initiatives for intra-party democratic reforms that could possibly challenge the leader’s dominant position (Mihas, 1998: 54). In my opinion, the two-party-system will not change, for the reasons illustrated throughout this paper, instead, reforms should be implemented to accommodate a greater transparency within the existing system.

First, intra-party dealings should become more democratic by opening up the process of leadership selection. Currently, the candidate for Prime Minister is selected behind closed party doors, and then confirmed by the President of the Republic. It would greatly benefit Greece if this were conducted in a manner similar the American primaries, so that the electorate could have more choice of substance.

Second, the Greek Nationals abroad should be given the opportunity to vote in legislative elections. Clientalism in Greece remains a significant problem (Dobratz, 1992) and greatly contributes to the ‘closed-door’ policies of the inter-party dealings. Opening votes to the approximately 1 million Greeks abroad (without requiring them to fly back to Greece) would alleviate these pressures because it represents an electorate less reliant on immediate paternalistic relations.

Third, the constitution should be amended so that legal residents of Greece, but who are not citizens, can become party members. Although they would still not be able to vote, this

http://www.newspressrelease.eu/node/1161
would enable minorities to gain a greater political clout by participating more directly in the formulation of policy and exchange of ideas. Another amendment should be made so that migrants gain the right to rally, unless the actions severely disrupt the daily movements of the city.

There is no real political space for new parties, in as much as there are no deep enough cleavages to enter a highly dominated system and the legacies of civil war. The system is not frozen, but rather expresses the particular electoral identity of Greece. On the other hand, Greece has many more societal dynamics than initially apparent, particularly within its migrant populations. In the end, instead of focusing on the phenomenon of two-partyism as constraining political choice, it is better to focus on the issues of transparency and participation within this formation.
APPENDIX: ELECTION RESULTS BY YEAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>Seats / 300</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Rally</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>Marshal Alexandros Papagos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of the Parties (Center coalition)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Left (far Right)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Radical Union (right)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>Konstantinos Karamanlis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Union (center/far left coalition)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>132</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Radical Union (right)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>Kostantinos Karamanlis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Left (far right)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party (center)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Radical Union (right)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>176</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center Union (center)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Left (far left)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center Union (center)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>Georgios Papandreou</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Radical Union (right)</td>
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<td>132</td>
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<td>United Democratic Left (far left)</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Center Union (center)</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>Georgios Papandreou</td>
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<td>National Radical Union (right)</td>
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<td>107</td>
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<td>United Democratic Left (far left)</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964-1974: Military Dictatorship</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Democracy (right)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>Kostantinos Karamanlis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center Union (center)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panhellenic Socialist Movement-PASOK (left)</td>
<td>14</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Left (far left)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>%</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>New Democracy (right)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>171</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Panhellenic Socialist Movement (center-left)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>93</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Union of the Democratic Center (center)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communist Party of Greece (far left)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td></td>
<td>National Camp (far right)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Alliance of the Progressive and Left-Wing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forces (far left)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>PASOK (center-left)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Democracy (center-right)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communist Party of Greece-KKE</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>161</td>
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<tr>
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<td>New Democracy</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>KKE</td>
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