THE WEAPON OF RACE AND THE POWER OF SHAME:

SPEAKING OUT AGAINST THE

VIOLENCE IN SUDAN

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
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This piece is dedicated to all the Sudanese individuals—be they from the north, south, east or west—in Washington, D.C. who were kind and patient enough to discuss their lives and opinions with me. I also dedicate this work to those Sudanese individuals across the globe affected by the ongoing conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan.

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ABSTRACT

There are many explanations for the ongoing violence in Sudan. Racialized tensions, religion, colonialism, and oil are often cited as causing what are now several conflicts in the country. Drawing on qualitative research with the Washington, D.C. Sudanese diaspora, I explore the role that racial categorization and cultural identity struggles have played in the violence. Through interviews and group conversations, the notion of racialized identity emerged as an important political and economic concept that has been used by those within positions of privilege and power in the Khartoum government. The government of Sudan, headed by Omar al-Bashir, claims Sudan is an Arab nation, comprised of Arab-Islamic individuals. Many of those who reject the positions of the government—the privileging of the Arab-Islamic identity—do not place great importance on a racialized identity. However, these same individuals believe that claiming any other identity in Sudan, besides Arab-Islamic, subjects them to the program of violence and marginalization by the Sudanese government. Bashir's project of forced assimilation of those labeled as non-Arab Sudanese has resulted in widespread violence, rape and displacement. My interviewees from the Washington, D.C. Sudanese community discussed the dichotomies created within the conflicts of Sudan, the role of race and the experiences of violence and shame. From this information, along with knowledge from scholarly texts, I conclude race is not the main cause of the conflicts in Sudan, but is a weapon for the exclusionary access to power, wealth and resources within the country.

PREFACE

My research with the Sudanese diaspora population in Washington, D.C. took place over a period of great change. During this time, parts of southern Sudan participated in a referendum, South Sudan became an independent nation, the government of Sudan continued to bomb unarmed civilians in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and other areas containing populations suspected of dissent. Acts of war took place between the two independent nations of Sudan and South Sudan. At one point, I marched with concerned diaspora members outside the Sudanese embassy because of the lack of referendum in Abyei. On July 14th 2011, I watched a live feed of the induction of South Sudan into the United Nations. Soldiers clad in brown uniforms marched in the light sand, stepping in unison across my television. Smiling women extended their arms toward the parading men, twisting bright pieces of fabric in waves of appreciation. In April of 2012, I participated in a group draft for a press release regarding the violence between two independent nations, Sudan and South Sudan, over claims to the oil-rich Heglig region. As with any research project, circumstances change, which leads to changes in individual opinion. As this piece focuses on the voices of Sudanese refugees—their opinions, stories and beliefs—regarding the racialized projects of violence and marginalization by the central government of Sudan, their individual attitudes and positions sometimes varied depending on the circumstances and developments from their home state. What remained the same was their passion for peace, justice and stability in Sudan and, now, South Sudan.

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A DOUBLE LENS: RACIAL COMMENTARY ON SUDAN

AND LESSONS FROM SUDAN ON RACE

The discourses from the international media regarding the violence in Sudan, whether the

civil war between the North and South or the situation in Darfur, have often framed the

circumstances as a conflict of race, oversimplifying the matter. Discussions by some western

news media organizations, international political entities and scholars on Darfur and the North

vs. South conflict are framed as being a war between the black*[1] and Arab* population. The

conversation in the U.S. news media regarding Darfur and the other regions of Sudan

experiencing systematic violence generally present the problem as stemming from racialized

religious discord, a war between the Arab*-Islamic north, the black* Christian south and an

ethnic cleansing of the west. These tactics serve to leave the complexities and intersectionalities

within the reality of the situation unexplored. Of course, issues of race and racism exist within

the conflicts, but they do not comprise the overarching causes. The racialized subject positions

within Sudan exemplify in-group and out-group claims to resources, power and hegemonic

modes of accessibility. This is especially clear with the exploration of the conception of racial

groups within Sudan, including the 'Zurqa*,'[2] a term which is often used by individuals claiming

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[1] Exploring issues of race and racialization leads to the difficult challenge of deciding whether to use the actual derogatory terms. These words are culturally constructed in order to convey the negative aspects of social hierarchy inherent to most racial categories. Therefore, I have decided to use the actual words with the addition of the * symbol so the reader is always reminded of the lack of terminological impartiality as well as the biological fallacy of these culturally constructed categories. I hope the * helps to combat the process of naturalization of racial categories.

[2] The term 'Zurqa*' is reflective of emerging racism. I use the term, but wish to include the point that: "The widespread use of 'Zurqa*' in essays (of Darfur and the Crisis of governance in Sudan) is indicative of the process through which many words with derogatory connotations become normalized through their repetition; we hope that as readers encounter the term in quotes they will be reminded that in the context of Darfur it is not simply a neutral descriptor" (Hassan and Ray 2009:19). I choose to use 'Zurqa*' for its meaning as the non-Arabized population of Darfur, acknowledging its lack of terminological neutrality.

Arab* superiority within Darfur to group the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes together, and 'Ab'd*,' a derogatory racial term used in the south meaning 'slave.' The emergence and heightened use of racial epithets paired with the knowledge of race as a cultural construct leads me to the purpose of this paper.

Statement of Purpose

In this thesis, I will explore the racial categorization and cultural identity struggles discussed by Washington, D.C. members of the Sudanese diaspora regarding their experiences of violence in Darfur and greater Sudan during my ethnographic fieldwork. This exploration involves the ongoing discourse surrounding the situation in Sudan in various texts, interviews and participant observation. My research question asks how local Sudanese individuals interpret the violence in Sudan and the racialized discourses promulgated by the Khartoum central government that both construct and maintain privilege and marginalization. In seeking an answer to this question, I use the available literature on the topic coupled with ethnographic research with the Sudanese community in Washington, D.C. Race is used as an entry point to understand the violence in Sudan, and Sudan is used as an entry point in which to understand race. I hope to understand better how the construction of a racialized "other" by the Arabized* Sudanese center of power helps us to comprehend and question the ongoing violence and notions of race and ethnicity. By race, I mean "a cultural invention" that "bears no intrinsic relationship to actual human physical variations, but reflects social meanings imposed upon these variations" (Smedley 690:1999). I explore the ways in which race has influenced the violence in Darfur and altered the perspective of those in positions of hegemonic authority, those deemed racially aligned with those in hegemonic authority and those who find themselves within vulnerable positions. I will unravel the intricacies surrounding the violence within Sudan by using the social

construction of race to reveal deeper cultural, political and economic factors influencing the ongoing conflicts, such as postcolonial national identity formation, a countrywide program of acculturation and an exclusive public and private job sector. Through my ethnographic research, I found an unexpected trend. Washingtonian Sudanese individuals involved in this study use the same racial categorizations and terminology to explain their experiences in Sudan as those who impose strict racialized realities upon them—the oppressive Khartoum regime and the apathetic global community who is only minimally aware of the Sudanese struggle; however, they reject these notions of strict racialized realities.

I submit this work to the academic community as a contribution to the discourse on violence, marginalization and construction of race. Race is my entryway into issues of genocide, violence and tacit subjects. Through the use of race as a lens to view Darfur, and Darfur as a lens to view race, it will be shown that more solidified and hostile racial categorization is not a cause of the conflict but a weapon of the raising tensions and violence within Sudan. Scholars on the topic of the categorization of violence in the region clarify that:

> While there is no doubt that ethnic tensions, which have a long history in Darfur, have affected how the violence has unfolded, to characterize the violence as a "tribal" or "race" war neither speaks to the ethnic dimensions of the violence nor to other important factors, such as unequal access to political and economic power, that have coalesced to bring about this unprecedented wave of destruction at this particular moment. [Hassan and Ray 2009:18]

The classification of the violence as tribally or racially motivated, though widespread, is problematic. It fails to acknowledge "the leading role that violent conflicts play in concretizing previously fluid categories of ethnic identity and creating new forms of ethnic affiliation, which in turn can intensify existing conflicts or become fodder for future ones" (Hassan and Ray 2009:18). The escalated tensions and violence within Darfur and greater Sudan are sometimes explained by or blamed on colonialism (Hill 2009), global warming and the strained economic

relationships caused by drought (Faris 2007), religious discord between Muslims, Christians and indigenous groups (O'Keefe 1998) and the political and economic actions taken by China based on their incentives to protect their fifth largest oil supplier (Ward 2008; Feinstein 2007; Savitt 2007). These events and circumstances represent important facets of the conflicts. Coupled with the emergence and heightened use of racial epithets (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009:161-192), the framing of these events and their effect on identity and violence will be examined. This work will help bring about an understanding of the escalation of racialized violence. The tracing of this racialized violence in Sudan will help identify the cultural factors that led to widespread violence. Another possible value of this work may be its contribution to deracializing the situation and producing knowledge and information needed to come up with a sustainable, peaceful and plausible solution to end the violence. Once the causes and factors of conflicts are understood, more effective problem-solving methods can be applied. Presenting the opinions, stories and beliefs of Sudanese individuals will lead to a better understanding of the process of marginalization and securing of hegemonic modes of power within Sudan.

<u>Renegotiating National Identity</u>

An important process in the decolonialization period, or newly acquired independence period, of a nation is to embark on the negotiating, or renegotiating, of national identity. During occupation, programs of assimilation take place, permanently altering the culture of the colonized. After independence, or during the process of decolonialization, a new culture emerges. According to Fanon:

> The liberation struggle does not restore to national culture its former values and configurations. This struggle, which aims at a fundamental redistribution of relations between men, cannot leave intact either the form or substance of the people's culture. After the struggle is over, there is not only the demise of the colonialism, but also the demise of the colonized. [Fanon 2004:178]

A people can no longer fully embrace cultural identities from the pre-colonial era, nor can they adopt identities prescribed by colonizers. No culture is protected from change or alteration that occurs naturally over time. As independence would indicate, these forced identities were determined as flawed or inadequate by the nation. The unequal, subservient versus dominant nature of colonialism speaks to the negative attributes of colonial identities. Civilizations within Sudan were lumped together as British colonizers inflicted a single and unified identity upon them. This identity was meant to convey the otherness of the colonized as primitive or inferior. The identities of the Sudanese have been undertaking a process of intense negotiation since the time of independence (Willemse 2009). This is exemplified through the civil war that began in 1962, just four years after independence. As with many previously colonized areas, the borders of regions and identities in Sudan today reflect the parameters established by the colonizer.

Though pre-colonial identification within Sudan can be detected throughout the region, existing in continuing tribal groups and affiliations, markers on identity also remain from British colonial rule. An interesting dichotomy emerges from this history. Those given power by the colonizer, either in the economic, political or social realm, wish to hold onto this attribution of distinction while those suffering from the hegemonic structures of the past colonial system wish to abandon all divisions made by the British in favor of beginning anew. During occupation, the "colonial staff portrayed themselves as of superior standing" compared to the inferior natives (El-Tom 2009:88). This dominant position was monopolized after the fall of colonial rule by "members of the northern region of Sudan (the three northernmost provinces at the time)" who, after independence, "simply slotted themselves into the social relations vacuum left by their colonial masters" (El-Tom 2009:89). This differentiation in preference for a colonial-like form or an original national identity has contributed to the rise in tensions and ultimate eruption of

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violence within Sudan. Underlying these differences in national identity preference are issues of accessibility. Those who benefitted economically, socially and politically from superior cultural positioning within the colonial-like structure of Sudan opposed adopting an entirely new national identity. Constant interactions of those forcing elements of identification and submission onto those attempting to self-identify in a process of self-determination characterizes the constantly evolving mood in cross-cultural relations of Sudan.

Much literature exists today within the anthropological sphere on national identity and subject formation. When speaking of identity, I mean the "historically and culturally rooted self-image of a group of people" or an individual "that was predominantly sketched and sharpened in contact vis-à-vis other groups of peoples" (Van Meijl 2008:170). According to Hodges, "identity is itself an effect of culture and sociopolitical interaction undergirded by relations of power" (2011:83). The state often plays a critical role in identity formation. A state's power comes from regulatory practice of using ideology in the production of subjects (Althusser 1971:170-177). Citizens have different reactions to this regulatory function of the state, whether acceptance, resistance, talkback or disidentification. Other regulatory practices of the state involving identity include the formation of racial categories. Race itself "has emerged as the dominant form of identity in those societies where it functions to stratify the social system" (Smedley 1999:690). Therefore, race becomes a "mechanism for social stratification" and "a form of human identity" (Smedley 1999:690). Within circumstances of violence and genocide, the aggressor, often the state, utilizes its ideological power to impose identity onto the subjects or population under attack. As was the case in the break-up of Yugoslavia, both the "media war and ethnic war… aimed to make ethnicity the only mode of being, to obliterate and obscure everything that could

cast a shadow on its omnipotence" (Žarkov 2007:3). Tactics of human extermination affect

individual and group identity through practices of creating the racial or ethnic other.

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Anthropology of Structural Violence, Physical
Violence and Genocide

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One relatively new area of study involves the concept of structural violence. Structural

violence includes the "physical and psychological harm that results from exploitive and unjust

social, political and economic systems" (Gilman 1983:8). This type of violence is exclusively

experienced by those within the "bottom rungs of society" who experience "increased rates of

death and disability" in contrast to the "relatively lower death rates experienced by those who are

above them (Gilligan 1997:89). The concept of structural violence has become an important

topic in anthropology, particularly used by Philippe Bourgois, Paul Farmer and Nancy Scheper-

Hughes. Farmer frames structural violence as being "visited upon all those whose social status

denies them access to the fruits of scientific and social progress" (1999:79). This concept is an

insightful approach to studying the political, social and economic structures that result in the

violence or death of marginalized populations. Examining the structural violence of Sudan

requires an insight into Sudanese history and the current moment to illuminate the current

processes and forces contributing to this phenomenon. Consequences of structural violence often

include other forms of violence including class/race warfare and sometimes ethnocide or

genocide.

Violence and the humans affected by violence represent a complex area of study.

Violence in and of itself is a challenge to define. The effect of violence on human populations is

sometimes extremely abstract in nature while other times quite obvious. Though traces of

violence can often be evident through the physical markers on living bodies, their origin can be

challenging to pinpoint. Violence does not always start with a simple physical motion to inflict

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pain or suffering on another being. Sometimes violence starts in the mental and emotional arena of a concept, belief or idea. The particularly violent domains of ethnocide and genocide require further exploration.

According to Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, "genocide and ethnocide constitute anthropology's primal scene" (2004:5). Although this connection exists alongside the fact that anthropologists often find themselves witnessing these atrocities, "the discipline, until quite recently, has been largely mute on the subject" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004:5). Historians, political scientists, criminologists and journalists have traditionally dominated the field. However, these fields of study often take a westernized approach to analysis and rely on quantitative data. The anthropologist, a researcher attempting qualitative research in the form of ethnography while attempting to maintain objectivity, is well suited for the exploration of conditions of conflict. This particular methodology of research can manifest as an avenue in which voices of the oppressed may be expressed and heard. This is not to comment on the lack of voices, for they are present and shouting, but critique the world for its general neglect and apathy. The voices of those suffering in Sudan continue to be ignored while the violence they are subjected to remains ongoing.

One of the most perplexing instances of human behavior is genocide. Genocide, or the large-scale systematic killing of a population of people unified under a particular group-identity, is one of the rare instances of human behavior that is almost universally unacceptable. Perpetrators of genocide often rationalize their behavior through public or national discourse, using tools of dehumanization or 'othering,' which often manifest as extreme racial or ethnic divisions. Examples of genocide can be seen cross-culturally, and within a diverse array of time. Genocide does not belong exclusively to one time period, geographic location or culture.

The fact that genocide continues today is interesting as so many different cultures and societies across the globe have come together in agreement upon the deviance of this type of behavior. International laws written against genocidal actions are in place, though often ignored. Perhaps this is because those not committing the crime label occurrences of violent behavior as genocide while those who take part in it characterize their acts as legal and justified deeds of war or deny the behavior and events completely. Many perpetrators of genocidal violence justify their actions through culturally constructed rationales. Such is the case in Darfur, Sudan. President Omar al-Bashir has denied the accusations of state involvement in the violence in Darfur and greater Sudan. In an interview with The Guardian, Bashir stated "What happened in Darfur, first of all, it was a traditional conflict taking place from the colonial days," and that the only involvement of the state involved fighting "the ones who were carrying arms against the state" (Tisdall 2011). However, the same article quotes John Prendergast who stated within his various trips to Darfur, "the overwhelming evidence demonstrates that a government-sponsored counter-insurgency targeted non-Arab* civilian populations by destroying their dwellings, their food stocks, their livestock, their water sources and anything else that would sustain life in Darfur" (Tisdall 2011). Bashir's framing of the situation as a traditional tribal conflict works to frame himself and his government as innocent of genocide while Prendergast's observations of a specifically targeted group, non-Arab* Sudanese, works to affirm the occurrence of genocide. Biases must be taken into account when examining individual takes on circumstances in Sudan.

As technology advances and the globe shrinks, scholars from around the world are contributing their thoughts and opinions to the public dialogue on conflicts and humanitarian crises such as the violence in Sudan. A major theme within this public dialogue is the debate over whether the occurrences in Sudan classify genocide. Many of those arguing for the

classification of genocide in Sudan do so in order to invoke a response from the global

community through international law. Others remain unconvinced that the violence is directed at

a specific population of individuals. These individuals remain perplexed as to the racial

constructions within the Sudanese community. Since race is a social construct, it is often difficult

for people from an etic, or outsider, perspective to understand racial categories different from

their own. Many people believe quite vehemently in the biological categories of race. Individuals

who believe race to be a universal truth take their own culture's racial categories as such.

Because of the naturalization of race and the ethnocentrism approach to racial categories that

results, it becomes challenging to explain the race and racism existing in a foreign culture whose

racial categories are different. For example, one journalist attempts to de-racialize the violence in

Darfur, but claims race is not a factor because everyone in Sudan is black* (Wax 2006:B03).

This claim is particularly interesting as Wax is imposing her own ideological beliefs about race

onto the people, situation and region of Sudan. She uses her understanding of race as a universal

concept, solid in its categorical boundaries. Wax does not understand race as a socially created

concept, meaning racial categorization is dependent on the culture individuals find themselves in.

Since racial categorization comes from cultural constructions, it is impossible to assume the

racial groupings within one society can be applied to another. To make any sort of claim

regarding race requires extensive knowledge of a particular cultures use, or lack of use, of race

and its historical background/application. It is important to bring the focus back to those with an

emic, or insider, perspective, highlighting the human element, intersectionalities and

complexities that exist within culture.

The confusion within Wax's work is important to note. Issues of race are complex. The

presence of race, racial categories and racism within Darfur and greater Sudan is evident but

widely misunderstood. This misunderstanding has largely to do with little physical distinctions between the 'black* Sudanese' or non-Arabized* Sudanese and the Arabized* Sudanese and with the fact that these categories have emerged within the last century (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009:xxii). The timing of the conception of these racial distinctions is significant. Racial meanings and epithets increased in usage and acquired derogatory meaning as the economic lives of many Sudanese were strained. I show, through a presentation of academic sources on the topic of emerging racism in Sudan as well as first person narratives of Sudanese, race in Sudan is a construction and manifestation of increasing tensions related to economic strain and an unstable political regime. In Darfur, and other regional areas of Sudan, these tensions have culminated in a response to drought, according to many scholars, leaving once fertile lands to undergo the process of desertification (Ali-Dinar 2009:104). Sedentary farmers that once were historically willing to share the fertile lands with nomadic hunters and gatherers claimed sole ownership with the drought and refused to surrender their means of sustenance. The nomadic groups attempted to access the land and resources at a greater rate, depleting water resources and destroying "not-yet-harvested crops" (Willemse 2009:216). Violence resulted as these once fluid groups of people began to polarize in response to land disputes.

While the violence has escalated notions of race and ethnicity, there is danger in oversimplifying the conflict. Sudan is home to a diverse array of cultures. Over 300 languages are spoken in the region while nearly 400 ethnic groups are represented (Khalid 2009:40). Because of this profound diversity, it is nearly impossible for any fair commentator to find a "common thread that binds all those groups together, be it in Darfur or Sudan at large, that thread is neither Arabism* (racially defined), Africanity (culturally defined), nor religion, be it Islam or

Christianity" (Khalid 2009:40). These binary groups are often used falsely to describe the situation, corrupting a level of true comprehension.

Ethnographic Research

There are many non-profit advocacy organizations within the international city of Washington, D.C. A few advocacy groups make issues within Sudan their primary focus. Members of these groups include human rights activists, individuals with anti-genocide or anti-violence messages and individuals from Sudan who make it their life's mission to advocate for those they left back home. Although some members of these advocacy groups make a living off of their human rights work, most volunteer.

Members active in social advocacy, particularly those from Sudan fighting for the rights of those still living in their country of origin, represent my target research population. This includes male and female Sudanese adults who have acquired citizenship within the United States. Many have done so for asylum, seeking refuge and protection within the United States' borders from physical, economic and religious persecution. Though they have distanced themselves, or been distanced from, the region of conflict, they continue to connect themselves to the ongoing plight of the Sudanese through advocacy work. This continued connection between the Sudanese diaspora and the issues of Sudan could not be over-stated. As one research participant, Tapari, shared with me during an informal discussion, the work is more than just an attempt to help.

"They want to be involved. If they're not involved in this, they get sick. For me, it's like therapy. It's a good feeling. Very fulfilling," he explained. The involvement with Sudanese advocacy work functions as a method to handle and cope with their traumatic experiences.

According to Tapari, without some involvement with this work, member of the Sudanese

diaspora feel physically ill.

This population's perspectives provide an often-ignored insight to an international

network of support. Their efforts have led to changes in legislation, significant humanitarian

efforts, heightened media coverage and awareness. Therefore, these interviews provide valuable

perspectives from not only individuals with first-hand accounts of the events in Sudan, but also

members of an important, ever-flowing system of assistance. Individuals have and will continue

to be approached regarding interviews on the topic of ongoing violence in Sudan and the role of

race. As a fellow member of anti-genocide and Sudanese social advocacy organizations in

Washington, D.C., I have and will continue to interact with this population in order to hear

various perspectives, stories and opinions. I employed the snowball sampling technique to

acquire interviewees. I used my established connections with individual members of my target

population to meet other interested research participants.

Transcriptions of interviews with local Sudanese individuals about life, violence and race

in Sudan, explorations within available literature on Sudan, news clippings and participant

observation at rallies, meetings and panel events represent my data. My data set includes ten

interviews with nine male and one female[3] members of the Sudanese Diaspora living in or near

Washington, D.C., a public video featuring three of my interviewees, an asylum seeking

application for the United States, and a public panel on the experience of women within the

violence of Darfur. The names of the individuals involved within my ethnographic fieldwork

have been changed to protect their identities. Most interviews took place within Tapari's

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[3] The disproportionate amount of male to female interviewees was not an intentional choice. I was unable to conduct the desired amount of female interviewees for this project. I hope to be able to interview more female members of the Sudanese diaspora in the future.

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nonprofit organization's office. The interviews ranged from thirty minutes to two hours. I interacted with these individuals on numerous occasions through social or advocacy events or group dialogues. Other recorded sessions include a panel from the Female Darfuri Group (FDG) on "The Silent Plight and Vulnerability of Women in Darfur; What Can Policy Makers Do?" and multiple member meetings from Tapari's nonprofit organization. This form of research was valuable because of the group familiarity between the participants of the Sudanese diaspora. Individuals did not seem as comfortable in one-on-one interview sessions as they were during these free-talking group meetings. Though my added presence impacted every environment I found myself in, the group and panel discussions would have taken place regardless of my attendance. I observed a wider variety of actions during my participant observation research in a number of settings with the diaspora community. These various forms of qualitative research are valuable in determining the cultural climate of Sudan during the violent moment in time. Although my interviews may represent short-term data collection from afar (as opposed to long-term emersion within Sudan) the voices captured and represented belong to individuals deeply connected to the region, culture and atmosphere. Opening the door to this type of research, glimpsing a fraction of the advocacy work being done by the Sudanese for the Sudanese in Washington, DC, gives me access to an important piece of the larger picture.

An acknowledgement of these individual's privileged position is necessary. Most have full-time jobs, many within the social advocacy realm of DC, but some beyond such as working for an airport or as a night shift engineer. Support was also available to the research participants through donations from religious organizations and other non-profit groups as well as a network of Sudanese across the globe.

Though I only spoke with ten individuals, they all provided their own personal experiences, beliefs and ideas. Their position as individuals who lived within Sudan during the time of widespread violence makes their contributions to the discussion invaluable. Of course, the small number has downfalls. Having a population of individuals all living in Washington, D.C. may have impacted their responses and beliefs. I plan to conduct future research with a larger number of participants from a multitude of locals. As finances and my academic career bound me, I chose research participants within the immediate vicinity. Though the number of interviews is small, representing a miniscule fraction of those who experienced, and experience, the violence in Sudan, they are no less valuable.

The position of these individuals as being outside the space and place of Sudan at the time of the interviews is only so because of their turmoil, marginalization, oppression and/or dissatisfaction within the space and place they occupied at an earlier time. It may be argued that the voices of those from various emic, or insider, perspectives belong to those living within Sudan at the time of interviews and interactions, but I maintain profound value can be found in listening to the voices of those from Sudan within D.C. Their political involvement further exemplifies their continued ties with and pledge to Sudan and the country's future. It is to those people who have the time, patience and kindness to share with me their stories that I am eternally grateful. The struggle for peace and prosperity in Sudan is great and I hope my actions and writings represent a contribution to this effort.

Beyond the ten interviews, I interacted with many members of the Sudanese diaspora community in the Washington, D.C. metro area. These individuals often knew about my research project and would give their brief inputs on the topic itself as well as suggestions for future methods and research projects. These suggestions included a focus on specific regions, forms of

violence—such as the widespread rape of women—and visiting the conflict zones. Much of what I focus on in this piece was impacted not only by the interviews but also the broader Sudanese diaspora community that spoke with me. Most criticisms received within this step of the project came from non-Sudanese individuals and encompassed a questioning of knowledge, motivations and qualitative methods.

My ethnographic research began over the Internet. My academic advisor knew of my research topic of violence and genocide and my interest in the situation in Darfur. He was kind enough to put me in contact with a woman from Darfur, Nafy. After an exchange of emails, Nafy and I finally met face-to-face at a protest rally in front of the Sudan embassy in Washington, D.C. After this initial interaction, she agreed to meet with me over coffee one afternoon at a café near her Darfuri nonprofit organization's office. When she was not working, she volunteered for the Female Darfuri Group, or FDG. Beyond this caffeinated one-on-one interview, Nafy invited me to multiple information sessions and fundraising events focused on the issues faced by women in Darfur. Through these advocacy events as well as social gatherings I met Nafy's niece, Sondra, also from Darfur, and a slew of other Sudanese individuals. Sondra was working on school and attended Nafy's events. Not only did the FDG sessions reaffirm the problematic occurrences of widespread rape throughout Darfur, but also addressed female issues that do not appear in scholarly journals or news stories; such as the need for humanitarian aid or donations for refugee camps to include feminine hygiene products as there was no access to these monthly necessities.

Before Nafy and I finally met in person, I attended an American University panel discussion, "Birth of a New Country: Challenges for South Sudan After the Referendum," in search of Sudanese refugees to interview. Only one panel member, Tapari, was from Sudan. The

way he ended "er" words with the "ah" sound, and had a slight trill to his Rs (/r/) were just some of the indicators he was not from the United States. His homeland was South Sudan, the topic of discussion. At the close of the panel event, audience members either filed out of the Founder's room in the School of International Service, or crowded the panel's table. Tapari stood, erect calm and still. He smiled and answered one-on-one questions. His personal contact information was given freely with the scribble of a pen. Tapari laughed and said he regretted not bringing his business cards. I told him about my scholastic plans, asked if I could help his organization out in any way, and whether he would be willing to be interviewed. He agreed and was in contact with me the following week to establish an internship and to schedule an interview.

Tapari is the President and founder of Hear the Sudanese (HTS), a US-based coalition of Sudanese organizations working to resolve humanitarian issues in the region. It is the mission of HTS to facilitate unity and solidarity between the voices of the Sudanese people and their allies. His own voice during the panel discussion, HTS group member meetings, protests, congressional and embassy briefings represented not only his personal beliefs surrounding the issues faced by Sudan, but also the opinions of the members of HTS. He was, and remains, in constant contact with members of the Sudanese diaspora across the globe as well as Sudanese in Sudan. This network of communication ranges from in person meetings to conversations over the phone as well as group forums over email.

In an effort to aid me in my academic goals as well as bolster support and content for the HTS organization and website, Tapari put me in contact with multiple members of the Sudanese diaspora in Washington, D.C. His close friend and organizational ally, Tanutamon, was a very enthusiastic interviewee. I spoke with Tanutamon in recorded sessions multiple times. Our interview was by far the longest, going just over two hours, and only ended because of a FDG

event we both wanted to attend. Tanutamon would often be the last to leave in HTS group meetings, staying late to go into greater detail about his frustrations and the frustrations of his Nubian people with the Arabized-black* Khartoum regime. Tapari, with Tanutamon's permission, gave me a copy of his family member's application for asylum in the United States. The document, though written for the purpose of portraying the individual's need for protection and safety, contained descriptive instances of violence, both physical and verbal. Content from interviews contained discussions of violence, but never gave as personal or as detailed an account as the asylum application. It is difficult to open up and discuss such private instances of shame and humiliation to a foreign stranger. More personalized, detailed stories of this nature came up more often when my recording device was turned off, or when we were in a group setting.

I met Uncle at a social dinner after a FDG panel. Though his name was not Uncle, other Sudanese individuals present at our meeting called him that. According to the novel *What is the What*, it is "customary to call an older man *uncle*, as a term of familiarity and respect," as well as calling a man *father* if "the man is older than one's father" (Eggers 2006:58). Uncle was very soft spoken, but enthusiastic in our interactions. His accent was the most challenging for me to understand, and sometimes others would step in and restate what he said in an attempt to alleviate misunderstandings.

At HTS, I was introduced to Gamali, a young Sudanese individual from the Nuba Mountains, Ian, also from the Nuba Mountains, Abbas, from the Blue Nile region, and Adil, from South Sudan. Within our interview and group interactions, Gamali presented his take on the violence in Sudan through factual evidence and admitted personal opinions on the general, overarching themes and issues. It wasn't until my recording device was turned off that he delved

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into his personal story, which included watching his entire community encircled before him and executed as well as dealing with multiple relocations. Using his index finger, he traced his migration pattern on the large map of the world behind Tapari's desk, starting with the specific region in the Nuba Mountains where he was born and ending in Washington, D.C.

I met Ishak and Kinza during an internship-training day. Ishak is from Southern Sudan and acted as a leader within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Kinza worked as a senior contributor to a prestigious think-tank. He was also originally from Sudan. Both Ishak and Kinza made note of their attempt to get straight to the point in explaining their opinions and stories regarding the ongoing situations in Sudan. They believed many Sudanese participated in a cultural practice of starting any story at the *very* beginning and often ran out of time and attention spans as dictated by American standards. My own cultural perception of time—or perhaps the U.S. obsession with efficiency—became apparent when a Sudanese memorial service started four hours after the officially stated time and ended in the early hours of the next morning.

With all my interviews relating in some way to a connection to HTS, FDG, Save Darfur or some other non-profit organization advocating for the Sudanese, the interrelations of such organizational group dynamics came into play from time to time. While some individuals stuck with their region of Sudan as their main focus, others advocated for a holistic approach across all dividing lines. Alliances with heavily funded, notorious or celebrity-backed organizations were sought out and carefully nurtured by the smaller, less funded groups. Students helping organizations as unpaid interns were sometimes treated as unfair commodities through comments laden with envy or jealousy.

"I wish *we* had a Kelly," one advocate stated, winking at me after a congressional meeting. I not only felt uncomfortable being singled out, but also with being treated as an overvalued commodity.

Dealing with controversial issues often leads to unforeseeable consequences. In academia, the vilest interactions I've witnessed were heated debates gone rogue, or, rarely, the dreaded plagiarism of intellectual property. In advocacy work for the targeted Sudanese populations, the unforeseeable consequences were a bit more intense. Tanutamon was uncharacteristically quiet during one group meeting. Once the group disbanded, he and I were left packing up our things preparing to go home. He leaned in close and told me he did not trust one of the group members. The violence, distrust and suspicions explained to me pertaining to the government's assimilation project did not end at the borders of Sudan, but reached globally, impacting many people, groups and organizations. Tanutamon explained that the Khartoum regime tries to dissuade different group's important political work, targeting specific individuals deemed vulnerable and tempting them with various vices: money, travel and women. Tanutamon believed one member succumbed to such temptation and as such, had questionable motives. He had spoken to Tapari about this, but Tapari did not share Tanutamon's fear.

"Just be alert," Tanutamon warned. Having not yet experienced the broad reach of those who share the goals and ambitions set forth by the Sudan government, I did not yet share Tanutamon's paranoia. That changed when the website I helped augment was infiltrated. After being hacked, all the content of the HTS page was destroyed, replaced by a simple message— "Fuck all the lammer :)" and the hacker's signature. According to a public entry and public votes on UrbanDictionary.com, *lammer* refers to "a person who knows very little about computers/computing." Based on the rest of the signature, the individual was a well-known

Turkish hacker. The IT management website SecurityProNews.com reported that, "although many of the Turkish hackers have religious agendas" this individual "does not seem to share them" and their "reasons or inspirations" are still yet unknown (Caverly 2006:1). Though the attack might have just been an unfortunate coincidence, it felt very personal as many of us put forth much time, energy and effort into the site.

Ethnographic research is often valued based on a scale of quality, quantity and scope. Though this research was modest, the voices of the individuals are nevertheless insightful. Their first person narratives measure beyond the scholarly analyses produced by outside sources. The overall trends of the interviews point to a Khartoum-based regime exercising violence over populations that do not meet their proposed standards of what it means to be Sudanese. Research participants concurred that the government was carrying out this violence, both physically and culturally, in order to create an impossibly homogenous Sudan. All interviewees made the distinction between individuals who identify as Arab* and those who force Arabization onto others. Though this research points to a racialized approach to violence and acculturation by the Bashir government, participants refused to adhere to these strict racial boundaries, believing the best solution for Sudan is a non-violent government where all are individuals are free to identify with their own culture, heritage and language. Despite the fact that the perpetrators of violence were always identified as those who make claims to Arab-ness*, interviewees did not believe all Arabs* were part of this group. The racial division of Arab* and non-Arab* Sudanese represented a fraction of other tools of distinction such as region, religion, language and culture, impacting one's superior or marginalized position within Sudanese society. These distinctions were overridden by the interviewees' shared experience as members of the shamed subject position in Sudan.

Analysis of Data

Beyond the process of collecting data, various theories will be used in order to analyze

the texts. Broad, overarching theories of structural violence, as put forth by Scheper-Hughes and

Bourgois, will function as a reference point. The concept will be pushed in a new direction,

meaning structural violence will be expanded with the exploration of *tacit subjects*. Decena's

presentation of tacit subjects explains the occurrence of an unmarked subject that is

"understood… but neither silent nor secret" (Decena 2011:19). My use of tacit in this thesis

breaks from Decena's method because I'm looking at the violence and racialization in Sudan as a

tacit topic. Many subjects are kept tacit surrounding the structured violence within Sudan. The

use of tacit subjects is linked to the Sudanese violence within multiple interviews and

interactions. This is apparent through the framing of race, loyalty, disloyalty and other taboo

subjects linked to the violence occurring in Sudan. For example, while explaining violence in the

streets of Khartoum, Tapari claimed "if there is a kind of misunderstanding, any slight thing,

people start saying these words, and some of these words when they come out, then they fight."

Tapari keeps the subject, racial epithets, tacit. Tapari does not explicitly state the racial epithets,

but invokes their meaning intentionally through the use of "these words." He assumes I know the

various words or type of words he is talking about without explicitly naming them. Using

Decena's tacit subjects will help me and my audience understand deeper issues within the

discourse of violence in Sudan that remain unmarked but profoundly significant.

Another concept of Decena's, the *specular circuit*, will help me analyze the creation of a

produced self, as opposed to an authentic self (Decena 2011:119). The produced self of the

Sudanese is based off the standards of al-Bashir and his Khartoum regime. This feat is described

as impossible, by an interviewee, because forming an acceptable Sudanese self by al-Bashir's

standards involves denouncing one's heritage and tribal affiliation while pledging loyalty to a

national Arab* identity at the same time as being excluded from the center of power. The navigation of accepted self and authentic self is relatable to the formation of subjectivity. The various tools employed by my interviewees to navigate the terrain of the specular circuit involving the authentic self and produced self will be presented and interpreted.

Volosinov's concept of *multiaccentuality* —which was used later by Duranti under the term *heteroglossia*—will help me analyze the various meanings of the racial categories and epithets and the various ways in which individuals frame 'the problem' in Sudan. Duranti defines heteroglossia as "the simultaneous existence of multiple norms and forms" (Duranti 1994:6). Volosinov defines multiaccentuality as the use of one sign within different classes, resulting in "differently oriented accents in every ideological sign," making the sign an "arena of the class struggle" (Volosinov 1973:23). For example, the word 'Zurqa*' has multiple meanings when explained by an interviewee. 'Zurqa*' literally means a color, it is also a racial category of the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit tribes within the Darfur region, and it is also used to simply imply 'other' or not Arab*. 'Zurqa*' is very much a sign containing class struggle. This sign has emerged in response to the drought and land struggles that ensued. The term 'Ab'd*' is also heteroglossic in nature. It means slave in the literal sense but it can also mean slave in the derogatory sense as implied when used to describe someone who is from the south and is 'black*'. The name of the country itself, Sudan, contains multiaccentuality. From an interview, Tanutamon explains, "Sudan means, in Arabic, 'The Land of Blacks*.' Politically, Sudan means land of slave." This individual also used Sudan and Nubia interchangeably. This functioned to put ownership back in the hands of the indigenous 'black*' civilization. The reclaiming of the nation becomes an important facet of identity.

I will utilize an ethnopragmatic approach to analyzing the interviews. This approach is introduced by Duranti who defines ethnopragmatics as "a study of language use which relies on ethnography to illuminate the ways speech is both constituted by, and constitutive of, social interaction" (Duranti 1994:11). More recent uses of ethnopragmatics include updates to the study. For example, Cliff Goddard states ethnopragmatics is "intertwined with cross-linguistic semantics because the whole idea is to understand speech practices in terms which make sense to the people concerned, i.e., in terms of indigenous values, beliefs and attitudes, social categories, emotions, and so on" (2006:2). Through analysis of the linguistic expressions of Sudanese individuals from ethnographic research, I aim to uncover details about the situation of risk and violence over and above the word and phrase. This is accomplished through the charted inception and evolution of various signs of race and identification. I will question what this means in each individual case as one of the several responses to forms of regulating pressure.

In the wake of a new nation, South Sudan, and further exploration of issues of colonialism, revolutionary violence and independence, theorists will be used to interpret the issues of citizenship and national identity. Said's concept of Orientalism will aid me in looking into identity issues of the metropol and the subaltern and the long lasting effect this system has had on Sudan. Orientalism is "the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it," meaning Orientalism is "a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient" (Said 1979:3). The experience of Orientalism has impacted Sudan. Sudan's current state is reflective of traditional Sudanese culture along with the deep marks of the colonizer.

Beyond textual analysis of interviews, I plan to use Foucault's and Scheper-Hughes's arguments to interpret effects and views of the body. An important aspect of conflict zones is the exploration of how the body itself is being viewed. Scheper-Hughes claims there are three perspectives from which people view the body, including:

> The individual body; the sense of the embodied self as existing apart from other individual bodies, the social body; the representational uses of the body as a natural symbol with which to think about nature, society and culture, and the body politic; referring to the regulation, surveillance and control of bodies (individual and collective) in reproduction and sexuality, in work and leisure, in sickness and other forms of deviance and human difference. [Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987:7]

These various views of the body represent an analytic tool in determining the ways the violence is and was being carried out. Similarly, Foucault's concept of the creation of docile bodies, or viewing the "body as object and target of power" wherein the body is "manipulated, shaped, trained, which obeys, response, becomes skilful and increases its forces" (Foucault 1995:136). The view of the body by the state, the individual and the resistance groups illustrates deeper social, economic and political structures.

The various theorists used are meant to analyze the ethnographic research I conduct, not alter or change the meaning of the words of others. Anthropological theory is applied in order to delve beyond the exact words and phrases of the interviews and get at the deeper cultural meanings, beliefs and values existing in the Sudanese community. This is an exercise in interpreting qualitative data to illuminate the complexities existing in the ongoing violence of Sudan. The function of these analytic tools is to further illustrate the construction, solidification and fiction of the racial categories and their inception in Sudan.

Discussions of the violence in Darfur reference issues of assimilation, economic factors and a hegemonic centralized power force in Khartoum led by al-Bashir. When questioned regarding the role of race and racism within the conflict of Darfur, respondents framed race as a

tool or weapon used by the Bashir regime to justify not only physical violence, but also economic and social exclusions. The brunt of this analysis comes from interviewees' answers to questions of violence, race and marginalization. Their own words, opinions and elucidations of the conflict in Sudan led to my own understanding and interpretation present within this work.

<u>Chapters</u>

My objective is to show members of the Sudanese diaspora in Washington, DC do not believe race is the cause for the violence in Sudan, but a tool or weapon reflective of the true causes: a program of assimilation by the Sudanese government rejected by many Sudanese. The conflict becomes a very real battle of the *specular circuit*—between the authentic self (claims that authentic and acceptable Sudanese identity can be both Arab* and non-Arab*), and the produced self (propaganda that the acceptable Sudanese identity is Arab*). The interviewees by no means use racialized categories as strict, solidified markers of who an individual is or what they stand for. They believe each Sudanese individual has the right their own identity claims. The chapters that follow attempt to interweave ethnographic data, social science literature and theory with regards to the ongoing crises in Sudan. Chapter two, 'Support, Suffering and Sudan,' gives historical background and current information on the region. Within this chapter, the descriptions of ancient life, the effects of colonialism, and life post-colonialism are emphasized. This functions to map cultural, political and economic change over time based on multiple perspectives. Chapter three, 'Race: The Cultural Construction of the 'Zurqa*,' 'Ab'd*' and 'Black Other*' gives a brief description of the anthropology of race and the various studies that have deemed race to be biological fiction. This chapter also investigates the inception of these racial categories in Sudan, the rise of racial epithets and the effects this has had on the Sudanese. 'Race and the Genocide Debate,' chapter four, explores the reasons behind framing the violence

in Sudan as racial, or racially motivated. This chapter includes the international law and an exploration into the widespread systematic use of rape in Darfur and greater Sudan. Chapter five, 'Resistance, Agency and Identity,' details the resistance movements, advocacy tools and effects of the violence on individual and group identity focusing on the constructions of binary opposition. Chapter six, 'Racial Subjects as Shamed Subjects,' explores the concept of shaming as expressed within individual interviews as an external interpellation mechanism. My concept of the shamed subject position is introduced and explained here.

Conclusion

In summation, this thesis sets out to explore the relationship, as stated by Washington, D.C. Sudanese refugees, between racial identities and the project of violence by the Khartoum government. I argue that though the research participants acknowledge the racial boundaries in Sudan, as used by the centralized government's program of violence and forced assimilation, they view these distinctions as a fluid and varying method for power, wealth and control. The participants all portray the al-Bashir regime's use of Arab* versus other, but do not believe all self-identified Arabs* in Sudan represent a threat to their own identity as non-Arab*. The unification of those outside of the privileged position as dictated by the Sudanese government are unified not solely by the racial distinctions of the Khartoum regime, but also by their shared experience of victimization and shame within Sudan.

CHAPTER 2

SUPPORT, SUFFERING AND SUDAN[4]

<u>Protesters, Power and Progression</u>

"Stop the violence in Abyei!" the man with the megaphone chanted

"Stop the violence in Abyei!" his followers stated in unison, circling the sidewalk outside

the Sudan Embassy in Washington, D.C. White cardboard signs rhythmically thrust into the air.

Cars slowed with drivers straining to read the messages. Glass windows slowly rolled down to

hear the chanting group of 15 protesting the violence in Abyei.

Abyei is an oil rich region along the north-south border of Sudan. The area was supposed

to participate in the referendum, an opportunity for the people to declare whether they would like

to remain part of the north, or succeed and become a new country with the South (Clarke

2011:2). However, Abyei's referendum did not take place. Violence has broken out in the region

as forces from the North and South assembled to stake claim to Abyei (Clarke 2011:3). Those

marching out front of the Sudan Embassy in the United States Capital hoped to bring attention to

the eruption of violence within Abyei, and the ongoing violence within the larger Sudan.

"Why Libya and not Sudan?" came loudly through the megaphone.

"Why Libya and not Sudan?" the marchers echoed.

"NCP[5] to ICC[6]!" "NCP to ICC!"

"Al-Bashir to ICC!" "Al-Bashir to ICC!"

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[4] An early version of this chapter first appeared on the Voices for Sudan website and can still be accessed by visiting http://voicesforsudan.com/?page_id=58

[5] NCP is the acronym used for the National Congress Party, the governing political party of Sudan headed by President Omar al-Bashir.

[6] ICC, in this instance, stands for the International Criminal Court.

"Stop the killing in Darfur!" "Stop the killing in Darfur!" Harsh enunciations came snapping through the megaphone as each syllable was emphasized and repeated with the set tempo.

A short blond police officer looked on, arms crossed, sunglasses down shielding his eyes. Besides asking for a protester permit, facilitating a letter transfer from protesters to the Embassy (which was ultimately refused) and helping pedestrians navigate around the progression, he was a silent observer. The group chuckled in sarcasm as the officer brought back their letter. It contained their opinions and motivations for protesting Sudan. The group said the Embassy's refusal to read their letter was no surprise to them. The al-Bashir regime had not been accommodating to those who offered criticisms and dissent. Those working at the Embassy were known for being cohorts with the Khartoum government.

<u>Historical Background</u>

To understand the protester's anger and frustration requires understanding the ongoing violent situations in Sudan. Though at the time of the protest the violent battle over the oil-rich land of Abyei had been a recent occurrence, the tension and fighting in the regions of Sudan was quite a bit older. The history of the Sudanese people is riddled with imposing rulers—including the Ottoman Empire, the Turko-Egyptian administration and the British colonizers—as well as diverse cultures with rich heritage, tradition and language.

Archaeologists have found human remains in areas of Sudan suggesting human occupancy during the Paleolithic period, spanning more than 60,000 years of Sudanese history (Metz 1991:4). Beyond skeletal remains, early evidence of a more settled, cohesive community, or the Kush/Nubian Empire, is evident through Egyptian records (Metz 1991:5). Having close ties to the Egyptian empire, the Kushites went through a period of being conquered by Egypt as

well as conquering them. The Kush Empire came to its demise in 350 AD by the Axumite Empire of Ethiopia (Ali 1996:199).

In 1820, the Ottoman viceroy to Egypt, Muhammad Ali, held autonomous control over Egypt, and set sights on conquering Sudan (Natsios 2012:16-17). This successful conquering left Sudan under the control of the Turko-Egyptian administration until the revolt of 1881 (Hassan and Ray 2009:370). Concerned about the stability of the region following the 1881 revolt, the British entered Sudan to establish their rule in 1899, but largely ignored the southern region of Sudan until World War I ended (Metz 1991:xxiv). British colonizers attempted to "modernize Sudan by applying European technology" to its economy and "replacing its authoritarian institutions with… liberal English traditions," while continuing to ignore regions of southern Sudan, claiming, "the south was not ready for exposure to the modern world" (Metz 1991:27). This development policy of separation functioned to isolate the regions of the south, impeding economic expansion (Metz 1991:28). Tensions between the southerners and Arab* northerners began to rise. After achieving independence in 1956, the positions of authority and control in southern Sudan once filled by the British were then occupied by northern Sudanese, representing (to the southern Sudanese) a kind of "Arab* imperialism" (Metz 1991:33). A dichotomy of geographical region, power and control emerged and grew steadily over time.

After Sudan declared independence in 1956, the people of Sudan have endured "the wrath of the longest-running civil strife in Africa's postcolonial history" (Abusharaf 2009:200). The civil war between North Sudan and South Sudan is sometimes distinguished as two different eras of fighting. As the British Broadcasting Channel (BBC) notes, the first civil war started in 1962 led by the Anya Nya movement and the second civil war in 1983 led by John Garang and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) (Hassan and Ray 2009:370). The violence has

resulted in an estimated, as of 2009, 1.9 million southern Sudanese deaths, 350,000 displaced to border countries and 2.5 million affected by famine (Abusharaf 2009:200). The 1983 violence correlated with Sudan President Numeiri's declaration of Shari'a law (Hassan and Ray 2009:370). This decree was met with widespread civil unrest, leading Numeiri to be deposed. The Transitional Military Council took over leadership until the National Salvation Revolution acquired control with a military coup in 1989 (Hassan and Ray 2009:370). President Omar al-Bashir was then appointed in 1993 and remains in power today.

Conflict occurred beyond the civil war when, in 2004, the Sudan army, along with "pro-government Arab*" Janjaweed militias entered the western Darfur region of Sudan and began a "systematic killing of African villagers in Darfur" (Hassan and Ray 2009:370).[7] This violence inspired groups of targeted populations to band together in an organized fashion. The Fur people created the Darfur Liberation Army in 2003, which grew into the Sudan Liberation Army (SLM) when joined by the Zaghawa (El-Battahani 2009:64). The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) emerged as an armed rebel group in Darfur (El-Battahani 2009:64). These groups, the SLM and the JEM, along with the SPLM constitute the main rebel forces combating the violence perpetuated by the Sudanese government both in Darfur and the North-South war. Though the SLM and JEM emerged in response to violence in Darfur and the SPLM in response to the attacks on the south, John Garang, the leader of the SPLM, saw no distinctions. He claimed the "Southern problem" was simply a "facet of a wider problem: that of Sudan" (Khalid 2009:38). Garang was respected by all sides of the conflicts in Sudan through his call for "an end for historical injustices, a new Sudan based on justice for all, recognition of the country's multiple diversities, and empowerment of disadvantaged areas and groups" (Khalid 2009:38). Unfortunately, Garang was killed in a plane crash on August 1st of 2005, sparking continued

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[7]   The use of classifying the individuals as Africans leaves the identity of the perpetrators tacitly Arab.

violence between the southern Sudanese and northern Arabs* (Hassan and Ray 2009:372).

Tapari continued to believe this was catastrophic for peace efforts, saying everyone in Sudan trusted and believed in Garang's solution for a united Sudan. Calls for a unified Sudan were overturned with a referendum vote in which South Sudan became a new country. However, the government of Sudan did not allow all regions to participate in the referendum. Abyei was one such region.

Together in Alienation

An hour before the Abyei protest, Tapari sat in the Hear the Sudanese office behind a large wooden desk. He met with me in order to help me explore the efforts of the local Sudanese in the fight for peace and freedom in Sudan. Tapari explained multiple issues had arisen within the country, from the north-south conflict to the violence in Darfur, but that everyone needed to come together in solidarity and attempt a holistic approach.

"Each issue anywhere is a concern for everybody," he stated.

Tapari explains the root of the problems in Sudan began with British colonialism, "The British came and there was slavery," Tapari continued. "The northern Arabs* were closest to the British, so they received the education and wealth—this is the core element. Once the British left, the government was in the hands of Arabs* who did not embrace diversity." Instead, Tapari said, "Their major goal was to Arabize* and Islamize."

Colonialism had a profound impact on Sudan. All of the Sudanese people who talked to me brought up the colonialism experienced by Sudan as an important historical force shaping their country's reality today. Egypt, then the Ottoman Empire, and finally the British Empire colonized Sudan. Groups that had once been united were divided under colonial rule. Even after gaining independence, Sudan's government established a system based on the hegemonic modes

of power reminiscent of colonial structures in the past. The Sudanese "central government reinforced British policies of segregation of the north from the rest of the country and of neglect and vicious suppression of the east, west and south" (Hill 2009:27). Violence, whether from forces attempting to rule or from people revolting, became a constant characteristic of life in Sudan. Sudan has been engaged in an internal war since the country became self-governing in 1953 (Yongo-Bure 2009:68). The cause of widespread internal violence is attributed to "the marginalization of most Sudanese through exclusion from political participation and the neglect of the socioeconomic development and cultures of the majority of Sudanese" (Yongo-Bure 2009:68).

In the Hear the Sudanese office, Tapari explained his goal of trying to bring people from all regions of Sudan together.

"Before, we were acting individually or according to region," he explained, giving me background information to his organization, "but then we held meetings and there was a consensus to work together. We are able to lend a voice. We want to work together strategically."

Tapari's goal of unifying the voices of the oppressed stems from the already unified forces perpetuating the inequality in Sudan: the government and other elite who perpetuate the homogenous goal of establishing a national Arab* Sudanese identity.

Coffee and Communication

Nafy, a Darfuri activist, and I had been corresponding with through emails for weeks, so I was surprised when Tapari introduced us at the protest march in front of the Sudan Embassy.

"Oh, Nafy! It's nice to finally meet you in person!" I said, excited to put a face to the name. Nafy smiled and said she was happy to finally meet me as well. We made plans to meet at a café near her office in downtown D.C. later in the week.

The Tuesday of my meeting with Nafy was beautiful. The sky was robin's egg blue and the temperature was warming up. I took the opportunity to wait at one of the outdoor tables for Nafy. In no time, Nafy was walking up to me, smiling. I stood for a hug. She leaned in, touching her right cheek to my left, and then her left cheek to my right with pursed lips. I straightened up, expecting the greeting to be over. She said, "No, one more," and leaned in a third time. "We do three times in Sudan." I smiled and walked into the café after her. We both ordered coffee. Nafy insisted on paying for mine and I thanked her.

Settling down at a tall table with two high stools near the window, Nafy and I began our discussion on ways in which we could help each other with our educational and activist goals. Nafy's new organization, FDG, was established in order to develop strategies to help marginalized women in the conflict areas of Darfur.

"Women are victims," Nafy explained, "but their strength and resilience needs to be recognized."

Sexual violence is rampant within Darfur. The systematic rape of women is terrorizing "the black* African female population, shaming the women and making them pariahs, humiliating the black* African men, tearing apart the seams of the black* African community, and creating 'Arab* babies'" (Totten 2009:154). This gendered violence has become a widely used tactic against the Darfuri population. One report claims, "Rape is an integral part of the pattern of violence that the GOS (Government of Sudan) is inflicting upon the targeted ethnic groups in Darfur… The raping of Darfuri women is inexorably linked to the systematic

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destruction of their communities" (Refugees International 2007). This trend not only exemplifies the larger issue of rape as a weapon of war, but also the cultural value of women within Darfur society.

Rape is a particularly brutal attack. Sexual violence is often a part of the wide scale attack that is genocide. Scholars state, "rape survivors—especially those who were violated with genocidal or sadistic political intent during civil wars often become living-dead people, refusing to speak of the unspeakable, and are often shunned or outcasted by kin and community, and even comrades and lovers" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004:1). This type of violence brings the victim not only physical repercussions, but also very severe mental traumas. Many claim rape in and of itself can be a form of genocide.

Genocide is defined under international law from the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) within Article 2 as acts:

> Committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national ethnical or religious group; (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. [Pilch 2009:169]

According to Totten, the widespread sexual violence being committed against Darfuri women in Sudan constitutes genocide under this definition. He states, "both the threat and intent to impregnate black* African females by the Arab* soldiers and Janjaweed to create Arab* babies constitutes a genocidal act under Article 2b and 2c of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG)" (2009:137-138). Totten also claims, "the fact that the assailants know that any black* woman who is raped will be considered a pariah within her own family and larger community, thus cutting off, especially for young females, the possibility of having children in the future with a man of her own people, constitutes

genocidal intent under Article 2d of UNCG" (2009:137-138). The definition of genocide is aligned with the intent and actions of the individuals raping the "black* African" women in Sudan.

"Do you like it here?" I asked Nafy before we left the café, referring to the United States.

"Yes," Nafy answered, "but I would rather be back in a peaceful Darfur."

<p align="center">Tanutamon: Glorious is the Soul of Re</p>

Tapari emailed me one day, saying he found someone from Sudan willing to talk to me. His name was Tanutamon. We met at the Hear the Sudanese office. Talking over a large circular table in the conference room, Tanutamon agreed to allow me to record our conversation. Tanutamon, a smiling man from the northern region, described life in Sudan. Tanutamon recited stories of the ancient Nubian civilization, describing it as the "peak of black* civilization." According to Tanutamon, the Nubian civilization represents traditional Sudanese culture.

"Nubians have a very old history and a very old language. In Nubian language, for example, we don't differentiate between male and female. We don't have he and she. We have only one for both." Tanutamon's hands circled through the air as he explained how proud he was to have a matriarchal history within his culture.

"Women in Nubian culture… they play the biggest role. Nubian culture is a matriarchal culture. Women are actually the central player of the family, the society and the kingdom itself. They were the leaders and the queens ruling the kingdom of Kush and they were the goddesses," he explained.

Tanutamon dove into an epic tale of Amani Shando, a widely celebrated Nubian queen. He spread his arms widely to the side, describing the two elephants Amani Shando road to greet the troops attempting to conquer her land and her people. Amani, on top of the elephants poised

like tanks, led the Nubian army to battle. Tanutamon described her furious firing of arrows like

missiles shooting through air. Unfortunately, Amani lost the battle along with her right eye.

"Her statues are always drawn from one side, the left side," he concluded.

Tanutamon's story highlights two very important aspect of indigenous Sudanese culture:

the role of women and colonialism. These two themes play a major part in the ongoing violence

of Darfur. One scholar, Khalid, describes the root causes of the violence in Darfur succinctly:

> The root causes of the Darfur conflict can be summarized in two parts: first, hegemony
> by an omnipotent and omniscient Khartoum-based central government over the rest of
> Sudan; and second, the perpetuation of the economic development paradigm established
> by British rules to serve their colonial interests. [Khalid 2009:35]

The hegemony established by the British colonizer plague the establishment in Darfur. The

acknowledgment of this root cause of violence is necessary in order to take the next step of

dismantling the hierarchical and unequal structure within the Sudan government. Once the

inherently unequal structures of power that began with colonialism are dismantled, more equal

forms of organization and statehood can be realized and cohesion among the Sudanese can

occur.

Tanutamon glanced over some of the questions I had printed out. They were meant to

facilitate the discussion, not dictate the course of the interview. Tanutamon described life in

Sudan as a child and his experiences with forced assimilation and acculturation.

"This is what we call in Sudan Arabization and Islamization... Forcible Arabization and

Islamization of black Kushites*," he explained. Here, Tanutamon utilized "black Kushites*" as a

unifying term to mean the non-Arabized* population of Sudan. This terminological framework

also invokes a group sense of historical importance as it links the current population to the

ancient kingdom of Kush: a civilization of the region from 1070 B.C. to 350 A.D. Reminiscing,

he continued, "I remember when I was in elementary school. I was only speaking Nubian

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language. I didn't speak Arabic. I didn't speak English. I didn't speak any other language. They did not allow us to speak the Nubian language, they forced us to speak Arabic to Arabize the Nubians. They wanted to say the north of Sudan was all Arab*." While in school, Tanutamon encountered a structured policy of punishment for speaking his Nubian language. He described situations where he and fellow students received red cards for not speaking Arabic. These red cards led to public shaming and physical violence.

"The next assembly, when we were all in the square to sing the anthem and salute the flag before going to the classroom, in that assembly they would give us five lashes. Twenty to thirty students who had the red card would end up getting five lashes each. It's humiliation and penalty because we spoke our mother tongue. The teachers would do this but it was a policy of the state, the country. It came from the country," he clarified. This is an example of the methods used by the state to coerce individuals to assimilate to an Arab* identity.

Tanutamon explained the state's reasoning behind this policy by giving their position a voice, or speaking as the state: "You have to teach them Arabic quickly so we can build our empire, our dream empire," Tanutamon explained. "When I reached middle school, it was bothering me. It was scarring me. Why are these people doing this? Why my country? Why are my teachers doing this when they're Nubian? What's wrong with the Nubian language? Why don't we learn with our language? They said 'No, we are Muslims. We only speak Arabic. When you go to heaven, Allah only speaks Arabic, he doesn't understand other languages.' That was an excuse," Tanutamon concluded.

Policies of forced acculturation or assimilation have taken place, and continue, in Sudan. This attack on culture has manifested through a rewriting or reworking of history (El-Tom 2009:84-109). Abdullah Osman El-Tom calls this process "Arab*-Islamic monoculture" or the

"Arab*-Islamic project" (2009:88). Other scholars call this "Arabism" (Hassan and Ray) (Khalid) (Yongo-Bure) (Ali-Dinar) (de Waal) (Willemse) or "Arabization" (El-Tom) (Mamdami) (Abusharaf) (Hashim). The Sudanese national government in Khartoum, led by al-Bashir, has declared Sudan an Islamic state and joined the Arab League. Although a majority of the population of Sudan practices Islam they do not self identify as Arabs*. Much cultural heritage, such as language and tribal leadership, has been destroyed in an effort to Arabize Sudan. This attempt to create a uniform culture within a state containing a diverse array of cultural groups is problematic. Much contention and violence has emerged from this policy of forced acculturation or assimilation.

Tanutamon explained the differences between the Arabs* and non-Arabs* of Sudan: "We call them 'Arabized* blacks*' or 'Arabized* Nubians,'" he said. "They don't speak their native Nubian language and they claim they are Arabs*, descendants of prophet Muhammad. But they're black* like me with thick lips and Kushetic ring on their nose. But they're denying that they're black* so we call them 'black* Arabized*' or 'Arabized* Nubians.'"

Race and racial identity plays a role in the conflicts of Sudan. This role of racial, ethnic or tribal groupings is important to understand, but is not the root of the violence. The "Zurqa*" or "Zuruq*" is a Darfuri term used to describe the non-Arabized* population of Darfur, or the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes (Hassan and Ray 2009:19; El-Battahani 2009:43; de Waal 2009:139; Willemse 2009:217; Farred 2009:318). "Ab'd*" is a racialized term from southern Sudan meaning slave. This racial terminology has progressed from a simple indicator of one's status as slave to a more complex insult denoting not only race but also region. The antagonistic relationship between Arabs* and non-Arabs*, or the "Zurqa*," "Ab'd*" and Arabized* black* Sudanese, is perpetuated and made worse through the state's cultural war.

Although race and ethnicity play a role in the conflict of Darfur, many scholars wish to make it clear that the conflict is not solely about race or ethnicity. In fact, all the works within the "Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader," take the position that the ongoing violence in Sudan is "not a 'race war' and that the multiple parties involved are all indigenous Africans whose ethnic identities have increasingly become racialized as a result of the conflict" (Hassan and Ray 2009:18). The authors who contributed to the volume do not claim that race and ethnicity are not a part of the violent dynamics within the region. The compilation of works agree that:

> There is no doubt that ethnic tensions, which have a long history in Darfur, have affected how the violence has unfolded, to characterize the violence as a 'tribal' or 'race' war neither speaks to the ethnic dimensions of the violence nor to other important factors, such as unequal access to political and economic power, that have coalesced to bring about this unprecedented wave of destruction at this particular moment. [Hassan and Ray 2009:18]

Hassan and Ray claim the tensions previously existing in the area are often exacerbated by the intensification of ethnic affiliation that has occurred because of the violent conflict. Differences in access to political and economic power have helped lead to violence which then led to strengthened racial boundaries. In other words, the conflict and violence has led to more solid forms of ethnic identity that were previously conceived of as fluid.

Community Dining Debriefing

Nafy was adorned in two sheets of thin fabric, flowing around her shoulders, up over her head, tied at the waist and falling to her feet. The tan background was dull in comparison to the large blue flowers that were periodically placed all over. Her sandaled feet kept a slow pace while leading us up 18th Street in Adams Morgan, Washington, DC. A friend of hers, Kathy, followed close behind, laughing with Nafy's niece, Sondra. I walked next to Tapari and Tanutamon. Uncle, Ian and Adil brought up the rear.

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We all had just left a panel at the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) for the Female Darfuri Group (FDG) earlier that evening. The topic was "The Silent Plight and Vulnerability of Women in Darfur: What Policy Makers Can Do?" The group of four touched on the issues such as rape as a weapon of war, the appropriate responses to women's emergency needs and the ways to develop recommendations for women's protection.

"Rape in Darfur has been used as a weapon of war," Nafy explained. "It is not something that is happening because of chaos or uncontrollable troops in the fighting. It is very systematic. It is well planned and orchestrated by al-Bashir's regime to demonize women and destroy our society. They know that in Darfur, women are the center of our community. Women turn from the most protected in the society to the most vulnerable," Nafy concluded.

Exhausted from our day and feeling emotional from the panel, we all continued climbing the hill. Nafy had invited us all to dinner at Meskerem, an Ethiopian restaurant. I had never eaten Ethiopian, but she insisted I would like it. Kathy pulled me aside and explained the meal.

"The meal is made up of meats and sauces in a big pot in the middle. You tear little pieces of the thin sourdough bread and scoop up what you want to eat. Trust me, it's really good," Kathy said through a wide grin. Everyone insisted that I would like it.

The nine of us crowded around three low masobs: basket weaved tables. We all sat in low round stools, traditional not only to Ethiopia, but also to Sudan.

"We also sit on stools like this, but only for lunch. In dinner, we have chairs because it is a longer meal and our backs would hurt," Nafy explained. On cue, she and I both arched our backs, sitting up straighter.

The wait staff walked around our masobs in a hurry, taking drink orders and trying to take our food order. The same man who sat us took our food order.

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"I recommend the combination platter. It has two of every meat, one spicy and one not spicy, and vegetables," he explained.

Having already discussed what everyone wanted, the group all spoke at once, quickly interrupting him with the order. We all stopped, looked at each other, and began to laugh at the group outburst, and at the waiter's shocked look.

Nafy took over, stating, "Us three do not want spicy," motioning to herself, me and Uncle, "She wants vegetarian," pointing to Kathy, "and they want spicy," motioning to the rest of the group.

The waiter kept staring at our group.

"So… you all want the combination platter?"

This time, Tapari tried to convey our order, "Yes, the combination platter. We'll have spicy meat, she'll have vegetables, and they want not spicy meat."

The waiter's eyes followed Tapari's hands as they, too, pointed to the members of our group.

"So you want spicy, she wants not spicy, and they want vegetables?"

"No!" We all said in unison, causing the waiter to take a step back, and the group to erupt in laughter yet again.

Everyone was speaking English, but the various accents served as a barrier.

"We would like non-spicy… mild. She is a vegetarian and wants just vegetables. They like spicy, so they want their meat all spicy," I tried.

The waiter kept looking at our group, from one chunk to another. Finally he said "Ah!" and put his pencil in the air. He motioned for Sondra to switch places with Kathy, then he asked me to scoot my chair over to create more space between Adil and me. The rearrangement

resulted in a clear visual: Nafy, Uncle and I were clearly around one masob, Kathy had her own, and the rest were surrounding the third masob. Kathy laughed after making a frown face at the group. She had been ostracized.

After we all went to wash our hands, the food arrived. Everyone took turns grabbing warm rolled sourdough from the white plates. Beef, chicken, hard-boiled eggs and vegetables were sitting in various sauces. One was red, another green, and a third brown. The platter was lined with a large circle of the sourdough bread underneath the meats and sauces. Nafy caught my eye, then took her piece of bread and dug deeply into the chicken, pulling off pieces of the meat. She pinched the meat between her bread and dipped it in the brown sauce. Before putting it in her mouth, she made eye contact with me again. After swallowing, she said, "See?"

I looked to my left, and saw Uncle watching me, chewing on his own chosen mixture. The smells were new to me. My growling stomach was not the only thing begging me to dig in, my nostrils also joined in the convincing (not that I needed much). The brown beef broke easily into a smaller chunk with the pinch of my sourdough. The combination of meat, sauce and bread was a lot for my taste buds and tongue to explore.

Uncle ordered wine with the meal. His quiet voice was very difficult to hear over the roar of the restaurant.

"You cannot order alcohol in parts of Sudan," he explained. "Many of us drive down to the South, to regions where alcohol is not illegal, to celebrate and drink." This tidbit was one indication of the Islamic law within Sudan. He lifted his wine glass in the air towards me, wiggled his eyebrows and we both began laughing. He pulled the red treat to his lips and sipped.

Everyone was so engaged with one another, exchanging glances, teasing, laughing and eating from the communal trays. There was such cohesion, such togetherness, such love and

friendship. I felt honored to be a dinner guest within such a community. And yet, each individual held the scar of a nation immersed in turmoil and violence. Perhaps the friendship, peace, love and affection that was running rampant within the restaurant that evening would one day soon be defining characteristics of life in Sudan.

CHAPTER 3

RACE: THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE ZURQA*,

AB'D* AND BLACK* OTHER

Any piece tackling the complexities of race must include a discussion of what race is. My

goal in this chapter is to review the discussions of the meaning of race in order to establish a

clear understanding of race and its application to Sudan. Determining the general definition of

race is necessary before using the data acquired from qualitative research to explore the issues of

racialization in the violence of Sudan. Having a concrete understanding of the meaning and

history of race is vital to the subsequent chapters of this thesis. This chapter functions to provide

background to the emergence of the racial groups in Sudan. The brevity of this chapter's

discussion of the history of race is intentional, as many sources already exist on the topic. A

short presentation of the debates on race fit this project's needs. Although explaining race is a

cultural reality—but a biological fiction—I do not wish to give this categorization tool more

power than it has already.

As mentioned in chapter one, race is "a cultural invention" that "bears no intrinsic

relationship to actual human physical variations, but reflects social meanings imposed upon these

variations" (Smedley 690:1999). Race is a "mechanism for social stratification" and "a form of

human identity" (Smedley 1999:690). This chapter presents a brief description of the

anthropology of race and the various projects that have deemed race to be a biological fiction. It

also investigates the inception of the Zurqa*, Ab'd* and black* other racial categories in Sudan,

the rise of racial epithet usage and the effects this cultural phenomenon has had on the Sudanese.

The Anthropology of Race

As a science concerned with society and culture, anthropologists often explore the human element and socially constructed logic behind power, hierarchy and difference. Anthropology is charged with being a study with a history of occupying "a central place in the construction and reconstruction of race as both an intellectual device and a social reality" (Harrison 1995:47). As the study of anthropology is often called the handmaiden to colonialism, racial categories have been prominent within the field since its inception. Anthropology has its roots as a discipline aiding in Western conquest (Gable 2010:121). This connection is particularly important in the field of race as many scholars, Theodore Allen, for example, believe the invention of race occurred within the colonial era—the white race being formed after Bacon's Rebellion in 1676 (1997). This social construction was used as a "way to rationalize the conquest and brutal treatment of Native American populations, and especially the retention and perpetuation of slavery for imported Africans" (Smedley 1998:694). Race was born from the need to justify disparities between social classes.

The Importance of Race

Because race does not exist in the biological realm, race and racial categories are completely dependent on culture. Instead of adapting a "no-race" (Harrison 1995:47) or a "race avoidant" (Brodkin 1999:68) position within this manuscript, I believe including race, racism and racialization is of vital importance. The critique of approaching race as a biologically factual concept "led many anthropologists to adopt a 'no-race' position that was not adequately followed up by research designed to answer the simple question: Why does racism continue to exist if there are no races in the natural world?" (Harrison 1995:48). The truth is racism does continue to occur, even though biological race has been disproved. Every culture has a culturally specific

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concept of race or no concept of race. To accurately understand the role of race on a group or an individual, the culture in which the group or individual belongs to must always be included in the context of racial categorization.

Though race is a cultural construction and should never be treated as anything but a set of ever evolving social categories, the volatility or amiability between socially constructed differences speaks to larger societal trends. Racial and ethnic tensions, or any form of socially constructed difference, represent barometers for a nation or region's societal structures. As race and ethnicity are cultural constructions, existing only according to the parameters dictated by people, not by any scientific or biological standard, these groupings often reflect problematic societal structures and functions. The more fluid racial or ethnic groupings are (or are perceived to be) the less hierarchical and frigid the categorizations, leading to more positive social interactions, though other hierarchical and stagnant social groupings may exist. On the other hand, the more concrete and stratified the categorization racial and ethnic groupings are, the more unequal other areas of a culture are, leading to negative, or violent, social interactions. Race and ethnicity have deep and profound meaning to the cultures and societies of which they are a part.

<p style="text-align:center">Contemporary Anthropological Theory</p>

As race can never be divorced from its cultural context, the study of human culture— anthropology—is uniquely situated to tackle human issues involving race. The humanitarian crisis in Darfur represents an ongoing struggle of violence in which contemporary anthropological theory can be profusely applied. Too often issues of violence and war are analyzed through politics and policy, leaving out the human element. War is inherently human. The only way to truly understand and analyze violence is to comprehend issues of politics,

economics, culture and the human experience. Contemporary anthropologists take on the scholarly task of producing theoretical and ideological discourse regarding culture. I plan to use this application of anthropological theory not only as an academic exercise in exploring the situation in Darfur and greater Sudan, but also as a contribution toward the social justice component of public anthropology. This deeper analysis of humans and culture leads to a broader understanding of a conflict than simply looking through a policy or political lens.

Although current anthropological theory on race generally adapts a non-biological approach to race, there is no "theoretical, methodological, or political consensus shared across any of the subdisciplines on how to interpret and explicate the social realities that constitute race" (Harrison 1998:610). The cultural forces impacting and constructing the concept of race are broad and include aspects of political economy, power and history (Harrison 1998:610). Practices to legitimize race include the process of naturalization, or scientific racism, wherein this social phenomenon is explained as being a biological or natural truth. Legitimized racial categories reaffirm difference and inequality. Many social scientists and theorists are producing work to combat these historically perpetuated notions of biological race in order to unearth the cultural intersectionalities contributing to difference and inequality. This combating of the "racial worldview: the myth that biology has some intrinsic connection to culture" is done through unearthing and compiling evidence that "there is no relationship between one's culture or lifestyle and one's genes or biological features" (Smedley 1999:697). Various scientific projects have proven, at least to those accepting the scientific method as capable of revealing truth, that the genetic makeup of all humans disproves biological notions of race (Human Genome Project; U.S. Department of Energy Office of Science 2003). Therefore, anthropologists and other social scientists interested in projects involving race must focus on the social realities of race.

<u>Blackness in Sudan</u>

As previously explained, racial categories depend on the culture for which they are a part. Though a wide variety of racial categories and racism emerged from the West, impacting the rest of the globe (Harrison 1995), racial "systems are simultaneously national and international projects" (Mullings 2005:672). The Sudanese racial categories, while being impacted by notions of race at the global level, are reflective of local cultural beliefs, traditions and values. These categories are "constructed, in part, from tools and symbols already existing within local cultural repertoires as well as from new encounters and conflicts" (Mullings 2005:672). The racialization of previous constructions of identity and difference in Sudan, such as tribal affiliation, region, language and religion, has led to more static and harmful categorization.

Darfur is a western region within the country of Sudan that is relatively drought-prone. Sedentary farmers and nomadic herders traditionally populated the region, belonging to various tribal groups. The sedentary farmers within the region were traditionally members of the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit tribes, now commonly referred to as 'Zurqa*,' while the nomadic herders belonged to Arab* tribes. These tribal groups were not autonomous; there was fluidity between groups in the form of intermarriage and kinship patterns. Because of the shared resources, tribal leaders and elders generally settled any disputes over land. These disputes escalated in the mid-1980s after a prolonged dry-season led to desertification of the region (El-Battahani 2009:60). The conflict that has erupted over land in Darfur has escalated tribal tensions and antagonism. It is said the "Arab* tribes believe that the 'Zurqa*,' or non-Arab* tribes, mainly Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa, are harboring secessionist tendencies aimed at establishing an independent state to drive the Arabs out," while the 'Zurqa*' believe "Arab* tribes are using the Islamic central government to marginalize them and grab more of their land" (El-Battahani 2009:43). Beyond these social beliefs lies a deeper problem concerning power. There exists an unequal relationship

between the center of power, predominantly Arab*-Muslim, and the peripheral regions of Sudan (El-Battahani 2009:43). The complex dynamics of power within Sudan have expedited feelings of negativity and animosity, manifesting in violence and, arguably, class warfare.

What remains unclear in this climate related explanation of the emergence of the Zurqa* racial category is the claim of my research participants and others that this was not the true cause of conflict in the region. Two interview participants, Nafy and Tapari, members of different advocacy organizations, from different regions of Sudan, stated the fighting over land in Darfur did not occur because of the drought. They both stated, separately, that this was the Bashir regime's excuse to justify the violence committed by the government of Sudan and the government-backed militia forces.

From one-on-one interviews and participant observation with Sudanese individuals, there appears to be a general consensus that the violence within Sudan does involve the racial groupings and labeling of people, but does not constitute the main cause.

Kinza elaborated on the situation. "The root of the problems in Sudan is the concentration of wealth, power and resources. The manifestation of the problem is through identity, race and ethnicity. If we have a country that's inclusive with rights for all, then we wouldn't have these problems," he explained. This manifestation (through identity, race and ethnicity) of the problem (the concentration of wealth, power and resources) is complex and ever changing. Most believe this is done by the categorization of Arab* versus non-Arab* people. Others believe it has more to do with tribal affiliation. Some further still believe it to be a combination of the two. The Zurqa* or Zuruq* is a Darfuri term used to describe the non-Arabized* population of Darfur, or the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes (Hassan and Ray 2009:19; El-Battahani 2009:43; de Waal 2009:139; Willemse 2009:217; Farred 2009:318). The antagonistic relationship between Arabs*

and non-Arabs*, or the Zurqa* and Arabized* black* Sudanese, is perpetuated and made worse through the forced assimilation project, though it is not the root cause. This Arab* versus other ideological divide was mentioned in all of my interviews and was alluded to repeatedly during my participant observation research at the Sudanese diaspora events in Washington, DC. As other racial divisions, such as the white* versus black* distinction within the Bay City High School, the Arab* versus non-Arab* ideology perpetuated notions of separation and antagonism (Bucholtz 2011:257). A trend emerged from participant interviews: My research participants all explicitly stated, or hinted toward the notion, that the violence and conflict in Sudan would cease if the Government of Sudan would cease the assimilation project aimed at creating a homogenous Sudanese national identity of Arab*-Islamic individuals, and, instead, accept the diverse nature of the population of Sudan.

Tapari first mentioned the term Ab'd* to me when I asked about race in Sudan. Tapari explained that this was a "derogatory term for southern Sudanese" meaning slave and was often attached to skin color. However, this term does not have "purely legal and economic connotations," but instead "denotes a social category" (Clarence-Smith 1989:47). It can mean someone whose "identity was dependent on a master" (Clarence-Smith 1989:47). The use of the label Ab'd* is meant to reinforce social rules of racial hierarchy within the Arab* world. This "dreaded name" is used by Arabs* to recognize "those more black* than they are" (Prunier 2005:77). This ranking of blackness*, through the Ab'd* status, illustrates the broader social and political implications of race within Sudan.

My interviewees all explained the Government of Sudan's use of racial categorizations and epithets to establish a monopoly on power, wealth and resources.

"Either you're Arab* and with them, or not Arab* and against them," Ian explained to give insight into the Government of Sudan's general stance. However, Ishak believed the Arab* identity was an oversimplified indicator of personal alignment with or against the Government of Sudan.

"They have an interest in advancing certain types of culture or religion," explained Ishak, referencing the privileged Arab*-Islamic identity by the Government of Sudan, "But it is not clear-cut which ethnicity they are against. Their focus is on certain types of cultures versus the marginalized remote area cultures. Basically the government is against everybody who is against the government." Here, Ishak establishes the role of racialized or cultural identity as secondary to being either pro-government or anti-government in Sudan. These boundaries of alliance or rebellion to the government are marked by geographical space through the use of "remote areas" as well as cultural and religious affiliation. In essence, the explanation here is first, the Government of Sudan reinforced a racialized population of privilege through the concentration of power, wealth and resources. Second, the problems associated with the concentration of power, wealth and resources manifested through racialized, religious or ethnic identity formation, because of preferential treatment by those in power, giving a material and cultural reality to the escalating tensions between the marginalized and privileged populations. When the government did not provide survival necessities, many of the marginalized groups no longer trusted the government.

"They went back to tribal groups, clans or ethnicities for food and security," Ishak stated.

The marginalized populations began relying on "tribal groups, clans or ethnicities" for structural governance. This gave power to traditional societal structures, rendering the Government of Sudan obsolete. The Government of Sudan began aggressive strategies targeting

individuals or groups deemed to be against them—the marginalized, or non-Arabs*. Thus began the widespread program of violence.

Racism on the International Level

Any discussion of Sudanese specific racial categories must include an exploration of racism on the international level. Racism exists within an "international hierarchy in which wealth, power, and advanced development are associated largely with whiteness* or 'honorary whiteness*'" (Harrison 1995:50). Though Sudan is marked with low rates of income and power in relation to the global community, the government's association, or attempted association, with the Arab league may represent a claim to honorary "Arabness*" or whiteness*. The strict assimilation techniques of the state imposed on those not claiming an Arab* subject position may speak to this larger international racial hierarchy. The claims to being an Arab* nation[8], full of Arabs* speaking Arabic and practicing Islam may be representative of the ideologically superior positioning of the Arab* nations within the international racial hierarchy. This combative stance of the government of Sudan within the realm of race might have stemmed from not only an analysis of positionality within the global scale, but also recognition of a historical handicap stemming from Western colonialism. Perhaps the disadvantaged position Sudan occupies within the global racial hierarchy has contributed to the perpetuated ideological hierarchy of the Arab* and non-Arab* subject positions within Sudan. The large concepts and hierarchies of race globally have contributed to what is going on in Sudan and must be further explored.

Conclusion

Race is a tool for constructing naturalized distinction between human groups. Although race has been proven to be purely cultural—that is to say biologically false—it is often still given

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[8] This is based on what it means to be Arab* by the Bashir and Khartoum standards.

great power. Individuals who ascribe to the belief that race is a biological reality believe the subsequent characteristics attached to racial groups exist in a solidified manner. Because race is biologically false, all characteristics and meaning attached to racial categories are ever evolving cultural constructions as well. Taking a "no-race" (Harrison 1995:47) or a "race avoidant" (Brodkin 1999:68) approach is inadequate as race and racism continue to exist in a cultural reality.

When violence is committed with racial intent, the victims—or victim—represent a culturally constructed group of "others". Racial or ethnically motivated violence is taken very seriously because it can lead to the attempt to eradicate a culture or group of individuals that are perceived of as different, or other. The practice of creating distinction between groups of people can be done using race or any other perceived forms of difference, such as religion, gender, sexual orientation, nationality, etc. The destruction of a group, or the intent to destroy a group—racial or otherwise—in whole or in part, constitutes an act of genocide. Framing the conflicts in Sudan as racially motivated or genocidal has been done in order to invoke international law and end international impunity. The role of race in the genocide debate is explored further in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 4

RACE AND THE GENOCIDE DEBATE

This chapter sets out to explore the reasons behind framing the violence in Sudan as

racial, or racially motivated. This includes an exploration of international law and the widespread

systematic rape in Darfur and greater Sudan. Also present here is a discussion of other influential

states in the Darfur conflict such as China, the United States and Chad.

The Darfur genocide,[9] as well as the violence in other regions of Sudan, went through a

period of popularity in the United States. College campuses were and are encouraged to organize

or join local STAND groups, "the student-led division of Genocide Intervention,"[10] which was

created in response to the Darfur violence. Today STAND's focus has shifted away from Sudan

and towards the broader problem of genocide. George Clooney's Satellite Sentinel Project, Don

Cheadle's Not On Our Watch and Mia Farrow's Humanitarian Action are just a few examples of

celebrity activists taking on the Darfur cause. Work put forth by academic scholars had also

increased as the world's eye turned to the popular topic of the Darfur genocide. Darfur became

somewhat of a political and pop culture talking point: a popular cause to take up. Although the

violence wages on, the genocide in Darfur is rarely broadcast on national news stations. Much of

the attention and concern over Sudan seems to have subsided, replaced by the revolutions of

Tunisia, Egypt and Libya as well as the global Occupy movements. Many individuals who took

up the cause, activists and social scientists, are still working for humanitarian efforts. However,

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[9] I choose to use the title genocide as defined under international law. The term, as it applies to Darfur, as well as other regions in Sudan, is still hotly contested.

[10] STAND used to be "Students Taking Action Now: Darfur," but was later changed to "the student-led division of the Genocide Intervention Network" and is now "the student-led division of United to End Genocide" in order to convey the larger mission of prevention and elimination of all genocides.

the literature available on Darfur, and broader Sudan, has waned: not as a result of decreased violence but because of the changed focus.

Rates of violence and devastation in Sudan, particularly border regions between South Sudan and Sudan, as well as the Nuba Mountains, the Blue Nile and South Kordofan, have not subsided. In fact, violence in some Sudanese regions has increased. There does not seem to be a correlation between public attention or concern and the severity of the situation in Sudan. Experts have issued warnings for a possible famine in Sudan if conditions do not drastically improve (Migiro 2012:1). In a video on the violence in the Nuba Mountains, Nicholas Kristof dubbed the lack of international support or concern "Sudan Fatigue," stating the world "doesn't want to get involved" (2012). As civilians are bombed by the Khartoum regime throughout Sudan, regardless of internal rebel group forces fighting back, outside help is necessary to stop the indiscriminate violence and looming famine. Kristof ends his video filming a truck bed of women wounded by the bombings of a government Antonov plane. As the cries of one woman grow louder, he states, "I'm hoping that woman's screams will prod our consciences."

<div align="center">The Genocide Debate</div>

Genocide is defined under International Law within the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly 1948, or UNGC[11]. Article 1 states those states who have signed on are bound to prevent and punish genocide (UNGC 1948). As previously mentioned, Article 2 defines genocide as a list of "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" (UNGC 1948). This definition of genocide demonstrates the

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[11] I could not find consensus on the acronym for the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, so I am choosing to use UNGC.

dual nature of the action, being both a physical and mental act. Article 3 of the UNGC explains that multiple acts relating to genocide are punishable under international law. Article 3 states, "The following acts shall be punishable: (a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide" (UNGC 1948). An individual, group or state does not have to directly carry out genocide in order to be punished. Various acts relating to genocide are punishable by international law, further demonstrating the tremendous gravity of the crime. Actors involved in genocide extend beyond the victims and their killers. Utilizing this international law, advocates for the Sudanese people attempt to frame explanations of the situation in Sudan as genocide so those states bound by the document will be required to take action.

The issue with this debate is that it has forced focus "not on how to stop the crisis, but on whether or not it should be called a genocide under the terms of the Genocide Convention (a 1948 treaty that defines and prohibits genocide)" which would, in theory, "trigger an international response" (Straus 2005:123). Many who have argued for the use of the classifying Darfur as genocide have done so with the hopes that the international community would be forced to leap into action. However, this has not been the case. The UN Security Council had been slow moving, having "commissioned further studies and vaguely threatened economic sanctions against Sudan's growing oil industry if Khartoum did not stop the violence; one council deadline has already passed without incident" (Straus 2005:128). The slow response of the international community has led to further death and destruction in the region. The time and "energy spent fighting over whether to call the events there 'genocide' was misplaced, overshadowing difficult but more important questions about how to craft an effective response to mass violence against civilians in Sudan" (Straus 2005:128). The debate, according to multiple

scholars, was necessary for action, but according to others, also diverted attention from the real problem.

The global community often looks to the United States for answers regarding issues of international status. Many argue the violence in Darfur and other regions of Sudan constitute genocide because the U.S. Congress declared the situation genocide. The U.S. Congress approved the resolution, unanimously "declaring the human rights abuses in western Sudan's Darfur region as 'genocide'" (Humanitarian Affairs 2004:67). Although, as previously mentioned, some scholars believe the genocide debate has been superficial, many say "the debate does indeed matter, because of the implications for punishing the crime, as is called for in the convention" (Humanitarian Affairs 2004:67). The U.S. asserts the violence in Darfur is genocide, but the Sudanese reaffirms their position that they have committed genocide. The Sudanese government has "admitted backing the (Janjaweed) militias to fight a rebellion in Sudan, but has repeatedly denied any responsibility for the atrocities committed by them including ethnic cleansing and genocide" (Humanitarian Affairs 2004:67).

Then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell also believed the conditions in Darfur to be genocide. Powell presented data collected from interviews of various people affected by the violence, which "indicated 1) a consistent and widespread patter of atrocities (killings, rapes, burning of villages) committed by" Janjaweed and "government forces against non-Arab* villagers, 2) three-fourths of those interviewed reported that the Sudanese military forces were involved in the attacks" and finally "3) villages often experienced multiple attacks over a prolonged period before they were destroyed by burning, shelling or bombing, making it impossible for villagers to return" to their homes (Powel 2004). Although Powell asserted that the atrocities constitute genocide, he restated that this is not the ultimate problem. Whatever

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name we decide to call the situation, "the reality is the same: there are people in Darfur who desperately need our help" (Powell 2004).

Beyond the United States, international bodies have also declared the situation in Darfur to be genocide. The ICC, or International Criminal Court, has directly connected the events in Darfur to genocide. On July 14 2008, the "Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was charged at the ICC in The Hague with genocide and crimes against humanity" (CBC News 2008). The indictment alleged he "orchestrated the violence that has devastated his country's Darfur region and left hundreds of thousands dead" (CBC News 2008). The significance of this is profound. Al-Bashir is the "first sitting head of state to be charged at the International Criminal Court" (CBC News 2008). In theory, this meant that if al-Bashir left Sudan, he would be arrested. However, Bashir has left Sudan. The countries he has visited—after being charged with three counts of genocide, five counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes—failed to detain him. Lack of action from the countries bound by the UNSC effectively undermines the international body's authority.

The violence that continues in Sudan is difficult to categorize. Of course, describing the physical violence is a bit more straightforward, though descriptions of physical violence still contain traces of subjectivity. Amnesty International states "massive human rights violations committed in the region include: extra-judicial executions, unlawful killings of civilians, torture, rapes, abductions, destruction of villages and property, looting of cattle and property, destruction of the means of livelihood of the population attacked and forced displacement" (Amnesty International 2004:4). The ongoing violence in Darfur has been classified in a variety of ways; some claiming the crisis constitutes genocide, others a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions. The genocide debate continues on today, fueled by those wishing to use this title in order to force

the international community into action, and others who remain unconvinced as to whether the violence represents a systematic destruction of a people. The genocide debate gets even more complicated when an arguably unbiased party weighs in and claims Darfur is not genocide.

<u>Genocidal Denial</u>

"Whatever name is given to the violence in Darfur, since 2003 it has caused the deaths of more than 300,000 people and displaced over 2 million others." (Miller 2009:18)

The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council (ESPAC) published a manuscript regarding the genocide label dispute. The ESPAC piece cites the only organization they believe to be truly neutral—Médecins Sans Frontieres, or Doctors Without Borders (MSF). MSF was able to "form a particularly well-informed opinion with regard to claims that genocide was being carried out in Darfur" because of access into the battlegrounds, whereas the United States formed their opinion based "upon access to one thousand refugees living in refugee camps in Chad, with unanswered questions about feasibility of impartial translation, sensationalism, political bias and rebel pressure within refugee camps" (ESPAC 2004:82). MSF director Dr. Mercedes Taty believes the situation in Darfur is not genocide, claiming there is no systematic targeting of one racial or ethnic group (ESPAC 2004). MSF President Dr. Jean-Hervé Bradol claims that the "word genocide has been used, but it creates confusion" and that "the situation is severe enough to be described for what it is—a mass repression campaign against civilians." Even though they have received reports of massacres, they have not seen "attempts to specifically eliminate all the members of a group" (ESPAC 2004:83). His categorization of the situation as not genocide may stem from a cultural misunderstanding of the group identity of the targeted civilians. The multiple positions within this debate further distort the appropriate terminology to define the situation in Darfur. What is clear and widely agreed upon is that the violence, death and destruction is continuing and needs to be stopped.

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Multiple themes have arisen from the genocide debate. One is the relationship between legal frameworks and politics. Some claim, "the use of the word genocide is a political question now, not a legal one" (Bang-Jensen and Frease 2006:56). Many individuals believe that the qualifications for genocide have been met, hoping that the official definition of the situation would lead to the resolution of the situation through international law. Others are worried that this debate has been an "indication that insufficient political will existed to follow through on what the facts supported" (Bang-Jensen and Frease 2006:56). Even though the international community collectively frowns upon the atrocities in Darfur, the victims are still waiting for rights, protection and justice.

The Irrelevance of the Genocide Debate

As defined by the Genocide Convention, the application of the term genocide can be argued for or against quite easily. As a group's motivations for the crime come into question, the distinction between "the forced removal of an ethnic group" and the "deliberate extermination" of that group can be blurred (Straus 2005:130). Many instances of situations labeled as genocide can be argued as ethnic cleansing. There is too much disagreement and ambiguity over what constitutes genocide. The arbitration of the definition of genocide as well as the disagreement over the subsequent actions limits the effect and power of the term.

The theory that agreement on classifying a situation as genocide triggers international intervention has been disproven with the Darfur example. Therefore, the argument that this label is important for the sake of international response is invalid. Important groups have constituted Darfur as genocide, and yet international intervention to "prevent and punish" genocidal forces have not occurred. Even then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the use of the term genocide "would not change U.S. policy toward Sudan" (Straus 2005:130). As a piece of

international law, the Genocide Convention is "ambiguous on what 'undertaking to prevent' and 'suppressing' genocide actually mean and who is to carry out such measures" (Straus 2005:129). This lack of specificity has kept prevention, suppression and punishment from occurring.

In terms of the Darfur killings, the Genocide Convention has failed. Though past occurrences of genocide has led the international community to take the stance of 'Never Again,' those same lessons seem to have taught us little in the way of specific ways to handle genocide. In the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), the destruction of part of an ethnic group constituted genocide. By this definition, so should Darfur. In hindsight, many critiques highlighted the Clinton administration's refusal to use the term genocide to describe the Rwandan violence. Ann-Louise Colgan, an advocacy worker for The Nation, stated, "We should have learned from Rwanda that to stop genocide, Washington must first say the word" (Straus 2005:129). Colgan's statement emphasizes the importance of someone in visible authority using the term, but also hints at subsequent steps by the use of the word "first." Highlighted here is the idea that "states are obligated to do something in the face of genocide" (Straus 2005:129). Perhaps knowledge of this intense criticism of the international community and, specifically, the Clinton administration during Rwanda led the Bush administration to place too much importance on the term with Darfur and, subsequently, too little on implementing policies to curb the deaths.

Some scholars not only believe the Rwandan genocide effected the international response, or lack of, with Darfur, but that Darfur has actually become a reincarnation of Rwanda in the eyes of the international community. The ten-year anniversary of Rwanda coincided with emerging reports of violence in Darfur, blending the "memory of failure in Rwanda…seamlessly with the anticipation of genocide in Darfur" (Brunk 2008:32). This dialogue of memory and failure affected the discourse on Darfur. The "media stories and public discussions on Darfur"

were not focused on the actions within the region, but "became an occasion to vent recriminations for failing to act in genocides past, and expressed fear of failure in genocide present" (Brunk 2008:33). This fear of failure in response to an emerging genocidal present effectively stalled international response in favor of an extensive debate over the use of the term genocide. The use of the term "became an equally powerful symbolic expression of action within the international community" (Brunk 2008:35). Unfortunately, this symbolic expression of action did not translate into a literal expression of action.

So what does the term genocide accomplish? It denotes severity and brings a situation to the forefront of international dialogues. Though it has failed as a technique to trigger international response, the genocide label is still valuable for advocates trying to bring attention to the atrocities. The use of genocide as a tool for awareness must be followed by structural policies and actions in order to effect change. Labeling a situation genocide does not and has not acted as an end for genocide in and of itself. The genocide label is simply a means to further courses of action.

<div align="center">Cultural Context of Genocide</div>

The cultural context in which violent acts are carried out is an important element to analyze. Relevant contemporary theoretical pieces that may not be explicitly about Sudan, but are still useful for analyses, are works on violence. One such piece is Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois' "Violence in War and Peace." Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois introduce their work through a discussion of violence. As violence is a central issue and concern for many Sudanese, it must not be divorced from a more specific discussion of genocide. The pair states that violence is not properly acknowledged within academia. Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois claim the "ideological approaches" of various fields within the intellectual community

"misrecognize the extent to which structural inequalities and power relations are naturalized by our categories and conceptions of what violence really is" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004:4). This neglect or misrecognition is often caused by the difficulty to define violence. The two claim violence defies easy categorization as "it can be everything and nothing; legitimate or illegitimate; visible or invisible; necessary or useless; senseless and gratuitous or utterly rational and strategic" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004:2). Although many violent acts are seen as forms of corruption, revolutionary violence is often celebrated as a form of liberation or a reclaiming of humanity (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004:2). However, revolutionary violence can also go awry, especially when combating a stronger, more ruthless force with more political and economic power.

The rebel forces within Darfur (the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, and the Sudan Liberation Movement, or SLM, for example) are participants of revolutionary violence. The Darfuri community and the mainstream media in the U.S celebrate the efforts of these groups. The fighting committed by these groups against the Janjaweed and the Khartoum, or al-Bashir, government is interpreted as a form of liberation and a reclaiming of humanity. The violence committed by Khartoum and the Janjaweed, however, is interpreted as acts of corruption.

While Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois acknowledge the real human experience of violence, stating "torturing and killing are as cultural as nursing the sick and wounded or burying and mourning the dead," they "reject the commonsense view of violence as an essential, universal, sociobiological or psychobiological entity, a residue of our primate and prehistoric evolutionary origins as species of hunter-killers" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004:2-3). This theoretical stance removes the possibility of writing off perpetrators of violent acts as being a

byproduct of human nature. Perpetrators of genocide cannot be excused as exercising their sociobiological instinct to kill or destroy. Indeed, with this theoretical framework, no violence is justifiable or explainable as being innate to human nature or instinct. Violence always has cultural meaning and relevance.

Without the ability to use the explanation of human nature, and abandoning the discriminatory and inaccurate practice of categorizing perpetrators of genocide as being primitive or simple, the cause of genocidal violence is still unclear. Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois claim, "Genocides are often preceded by social upheavals, a radical decline in economic conditions, political disorganization, or precipitous sociocultural changes leading to an undermining of traditional values and widespread anomie, or normlessness" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2009:14). The political and socioeconomic climate in Darfur was that of social upheaval and political disorganization. A radical decline in economic conditions took place in Darfur following the prolonged dry season of the 1980s, leading to desertification (El-Battahani 2009:60). Land that was normally used to provide sustenance for the people and their animals was transformed into desert. This led to rising tensions between the nomadic herders, the self-identified Arabs*, and the sedentary farmers, or Zurqa*. Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois state, "conflict between competing groups over material resources—land, and water—can sometimes also escalate into mass slaughters when combined with social sentiments that question or denigrate the basic humanity of the opposing group" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2009:14). Not only does the Darfur conflict represent competing groups over material resources, but also contains the use of tactics to dehumanize the opposing group.

Four-Phase Model of Genocide in Sudan

Othering

Drawing again from contemporary anthropological theory, Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois state, "extreme forms of 'us' versus 'them' can result in a social self-identity predicated on a stigmatized, devalued notion of the other as enemy" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2009:14). It is said, "the multiple parties involved (in the Darfur conflict) are all indigenous Africans whose ethnic identity have increasingly become racialized as a result of the conflict" (Hassan and Ray 2009:18). It is because of this phenomenon of 'othering' that ethnic affiliation has become more pronounced and finite, replacing past notions of fluidity.

The Janjaweed, along with the al-Bashir government, believe in the superiority of Arabism* and Islam. Although many Darfurians are Muslim, they do not self-identify as Arab* and are therefore deemed subhuman by the Janjaweed and members of the government of Sudan. It is through this distinction that Arab*-Sudanese, or Arab*-Darfurians, create notions of 'the other.'

Theorists have put forth a multitude of literature attempting to chart the processes leading to instances of mass violence and genocide. The "four-phase model of genocide" emphasizes the process of dichotomization, dehumanization, destruction of the other and denial (Moshman 2011:918). The first phase in this approach is dichotomization, or the strengthening of divisions between 'us' and 'them' (Moshman 2011:920). This process is captured in my ethnographic research with members of the Sudanese diaspora and is explained at length in Chapter Five of this piece. In summation, dichotomization has taken place in Sudan. My interviewees describe this dichotomization as being Arab* versus other—sometimes African, black*, Zurqa*, Ab'd* or Nubian—and proliferated by the Bashir regime.

Dehumanization

The process of dehumanization occurs after successful dichotomization. Dehumanization is not only meant to differentiate 'us' from 'them,' but to mark 'them' as less worthy than 'us' (Moshman 2011:922). The tactics of dehumanization are often "framed in terms of race, ethnicity, religion or nationhood" (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008:875). This processes purpose is to remove moral obligations to the targeted communities thereby preparing the perpetrators "psychologically to do things to others that we would never do to (those we see as) people" (Moshman 2011:922). Targets of genocidal violence are often called:

> Weeds, rats, vermin, dogs, wolves, cows, monkeys, viruses, maggots, microbes, parasites, plague, pests, snakes, spiders, lice, locusts, cockroaches, cancerous cells, or malignant tumors. Less biologically, they have been portrayed and seen as heretics, infidels, barbarians, savages, subversives, or terrorists. [Moshman 2011:922]

Proliferating the dehumanization of certain groups puts the perpetrators in the prime position to carry out horrendous acts without the distraction of guilt.

In Darfur specifically, examples of dehumanization have occurred. In the Darfur region, the process of "dehumanization involved racial epithets (e.g., 'you are slaves, kill the slaves' and 'this is the last day for blacks')" resulted in "violent victimization" (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008:876). It was through this dehumanizing racial framework that the "Sudanese government mobilized local Janjaweed militia toward much death and destruction" (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008:876). These racialized categories become a means of dehumanization when one racial group is seen as superior and the other as inferior, or not worth moral obligation.

In the war between the North and the South of Sudan, the South accused the North of practicing dehumanization. After South Sudan became its own independent country, members of their government came to Washington, D.C. for a briefing with local advocacy groups, which I attended. During this meeting, a ministry official claimed the government in the North saw the

people of the South as "sub-humans," calling them "infidels," "insects," in order to "demonize" them. The government official stated these dehumanization tactics were "a justification to kill our people—to wipe them out." Though dichotomization and, arguably, dehumanization occur in most societies, these actions do not always lead to violence, mass atrocities or genocide.

Destruction of the Other

Dichotomization and dehumanization may not always lead to genocide, but there have been "no cases where genocide was not preceded by radical forms of dichotomization and dehumanization" (Moshman 2011:923). Once the way has been paved for groups to exist in binary opposition and for morality to be obsolete because of a group's subhuman status, genocide can occur. Genocide, unlike mass killing, is the destruction of more than people; it is the destruction of social identity (Moshman 2011:925). In Darfur, not only have people been killed, but also the abstract social concept of non-Arab* identity has been targeted.

As mentioned in chapter one, Scheper-Hughes and Lock present three ways in which to view the body: the individual body, the social body and the body politic (1987:7). In war and genocide, the opponents, or the 'others,' are often seen through the lens of body politic. They are viewed as a simple cluster of individuals, or collective, who need to be terminated or dominated. Even if populations of 'others' are not terminated, practices of dominance often include the surveillance and regulation of bodies outside of war zones, such as processes of acculturation or assimilation, control of reproduction and the exclusion from positions of political or economic power. Perhaps this can explain why many women are then affected negatively by war. It is possible that the body politic perspective of the opponent carries over into the sexual lives of the soldiers, resulting in viewing women of the 'others' as bodies needing to be controlled or dominated. The individual women turn into embodiments of the collective

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opponent. By this logic, not only do all members of the Darfuri Zurqa* population need to be destroyed, but also the women who survive must be further dominated, terminating Zurqa* communities, bloodlines and the non-Arab* identity. The bodies of the 'other' are seen as being 'purified' through rape by the Arabs*, creating Arab* babies.

Genocide is the ultimate punishment of one group over another. Genocidal forces view being of another national, ethnical, racial or religious group as opposition to what it means to be a 'good' human. Genocide is the ultimate punishment for such a deviant infraction against cultural norms. The "right to punish…is an aspect of the sovereign's right to make war on his enemies: to punish belongs to that absolute power of life and death… a right by virtue of which the prince sees that his law is respected by ordering the punishment of" (Foucault 1995:48). Al-Bashir believes it is his right, and the right of his militia, to punish those he considers his enemy. His enemy, the enemy of the Janjaweed and the enemy to the Arab*-Islamic monoculture project, are thereby punished to the fullest extent: torture, rape and murder. Understanding the notions and rationality behind exercises of absolute power is necessary in comprehending the actions of those who deem themselves all-powerful.

Another form of creating docile bodies involves widespread sexual violence and rape. It is reported that, "rape is an integral part of the pattern of violence that the GOS[12] is inflicting upon the targeted ethnic groups in Darfur…The raping of Darfuri women is inexorably linked to the systematic destruction of their communities" (Refugees International 2007). This trend not only demonstrates the creation of docile bodies as they relate to the bodies being raped, but also the individuals being conceived out of the sexual violence and the men who are left powerless to cease the violence. The methodical rape of women is terrorizing "the black* African female

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[12] GOS is the popular acronym for Government of Sudan. It is widely used within the scholarly texts on Darfur and Sudan.

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population, shaming the women and making them pariahs, humiliating the black* African men, tearing apart the seams of the black* African community, and creating Arab* babies" (Totten 2009:154).

<center>Denial</center>

In the four-phase model of genocide, the fourth and final stage is denial. The denial of "what really happened" enables the perpetrator "to maintain their moral self-conceptions" (Moshman 2011:917). Though the process of denial constitutes the final phase of genocide, it takes place before destruction, during, and after, enabling the participants and their descendants to "avoid acknowledging what (they) have done" (Moshman 2011:923). Methods of denial appear in numerous forms. In Sudan, the government denies that genocide has occurred. President Bashir claims, "the request for his arrest was part of a neo-colonialist agenda to protect the interests of developed countries," and that there was no tie between the Sudan government and the Janjaweed forces (Herlinger and Joffrey 2009:5).

Another genocide theorist, Daube, discusses denial through the concept of purposeful silence and active obliteration as it applies to the Holocaust. The notions of purposeful silence and active obliteration stem from the wish to disacknowledge historical events, further distancing oneself from experiences of violence. This is not simply 'forgetting.' It is actively attempting to remove the tragic events of genocide from permanently shaping the discourse and history of a culture, society or region. Occasionally, "forms of violence and terrorism" are "kept apart and compartmentalized," while other times genocides are "easily transformed into 'public secrets' or normalized into invisibility" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004:9). Discussing the tragedies of genocide keeps the emotions alive and well. Purposeful silence and active obliteration act as tools of rejecting genocide as a defining factor of the individual's lives and cultural experience.

The next generation is kept safe from the horrific events experienced by the older generation because of lack of knowledge and/or discussion.

Purposeful silence and active obliteration are common forms of dealing with the emotional trauma associated with genocide. Many members of the Sudanese community affected by the ongoing atrocities remain outspoken. However, once the genocide, or violence, becomes a part of the past, the practice of purposeful silence and active obliteration may occur. This is often seen in the case of rape victims and rape survivors within the Darfur genocide. Scholars state, "rape survivors—especially those who were violated with genocidal or sadistic political intent during civil wars often become living-dead people, refusing to speak of the unspeakable, and are often shunned or outcasted by kin and community, and even comrades and lovers" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004:1). It is important to have an open dialogue regarding feelings and trauma for the survivors in order to adequately treat the psychological and emotional issues. Active obliteration and purposeful silence can be valuable in not allowing the genocide experienced by a culture to define them, but it can also be harmful as the truth within these scenarios is important to learn from.

Though some Sudanese may participate in purposeful silence, many are anything but silent in order to combat the denial of genocide by the Bashir regime. The denial aspect of the Bashir regime is combated by efforts such as the Satellite Sentinel Project. The project's purposes are to stream satellite imagery from "at risk" regions of the world and interpret the images. This type of hierarchized, anonymous surveillance exemplifies the power relations between the United States and the less powerful countries, such as Sudan.

Power issues arise out of the use of surveillance. Within Foucault's piece on discipline and punish, surveillance is a common topic. The concept of surveillance has evolved over time,

working from "domestic supervision of the master present beside his workers and apprentices" to being "larger and more complex, carried out by clerks, supervisors and foremen" (Foucault 1995:174). This reflected the use of surveillance as a tool for productivity. However, surveillance was also commonly used as a means to police: "a machinery of control that functioned like a microscope of conduct" (Foucault 1995:173). Surveillance is a tool currently being implemented to observe the activities of the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed. This new age project has taken Foucault's concept of surveillance as a pyramidal organization, a display of power laterally, from top down and bottom up, to an entirely new level. International power relations are demonstrated through this tool of surveillance. Western notions and ideologies of superior morality manifest within this very project. It is perhaps the first of many large scale, real-time mechanisms of world observation and surveillance.

The Satellite Sentinel project has shortened the distance between the outside world with access to the imagery and Sudan. Harvey's concept of the world shrinking because of technological advancements in communication, or the space-time continuum, is applicable to the situation in Darfur, but only for those who have access to this technology. George Clooney partnered with Google to create the Satellite Sentinel. The images recorded by the Satellite are analyzed by the organization, looking for signs of violence and destruction. The ability of people halfway around the world to observe an area of ongoing violence is characteristic of Harvey's space-time continuum theory. Information that would have taken days, weeks, or even months to transmit is now travelling instantaneously. This not only affects the process of receiving information (only on the end with the resources to access such profound technology) but also broadens the scope of interested parties or actors. Until the space-time continuum is equally

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accessible to all, the technology will continue to give the wealthy advantage over the poor or remote.

<center>Romanticism of Sudan's Violence</center>

Works exploring the violence in Darfur and broader Sudan run the risk of propagating a culture of terror. One scholar, Taussig, explores the culture of terror and the space of death (2002). His stated concern is with "the mediation of the culture of terror through narration—and with the problems of writing effectively against terror" (Taussig 2002:172). These two concepts, the culture of terror and space of death, are very important when looking at the issues of genocide and conflict in Darfur. According to Taussig, "The space of death is crucial to the creation of meaning and consciousness, nowhere more so than in societies where torture is endemic and where the culture of terror flourishes" (Taussig 2002:172). Many individuals are only aware of torture and the culture of terror through the writings and words of others, making their contributions of the utmost importance. Therefore, authors writing on Darfur and Sudan more broadly may paint the only picture some people have on this topic. The pieces describing and analyzing the culture of terror work to create and perpetuate the eroticization and romanticism of violence (Taussig 2002:173). However, silence on this topic does nothing but nourish and perpetuate cultures of terror through "rumor and fantasy woven in a dense web of magical realism" (Taussig 2002:173). To address this dilemma, Taussig points to Timerman stating explanations of the culture of terror cannot be either mystical pieces or standard rational explanations, they must tackle both. He claims "behind the search for profits, the need to control labor, the need to assuage logics of meaning—structures of feeling—whose basis lies in a symbolic world and not in one of rationalism" (Taussig 2002:174). In other words, when

confronting issues surrounding the culture of terror, one must take a twofold approach. Rationality must be a part of explorations of the culture of terror as well as symbolism.

Anthropologists and other social scientists must be weary of their role within the perpetuation or misinterpretation of the culture of terror and space of death. Many of the ethnographic works we see produced by the anthropological community often reflect the stories and myths of the participants. Taussig states, "it is in the coils of rumor, gossip, story, and chit-chat (that) ideology and ideas become emotionally powerful and enter into active social circulation and meaningful existence" (Taussig 2002:180). Therefore, it is important to acknowledge the existing rumors, gossip, stories and chitchat in order to understand the roots of the culture of terror.

Many horrifying stories circulate throughout Darfur. Of course, these stories are generally based on the witnessing of true atrocities and violence. Further analysis is needed to analyze the reasons behind this culture of terror. Rationality can be utilized to explain the violence as being in response to heightened tensions over commodities: the land and resources on it. A more romanticized approach would also be useful. The Janjaweed name is often translated to "devil on horseback," invoking a sense of mythological evil. Other translations include "unruly men on horses," "Arab* Militias," "jinn on horses," or even "horsemen brandishing JIM 3 machine guns" (El-Tom 2009:90). Although fear is perpetuated through the actions of this militia group, it is also perpetuated through the culturally created discourse surrounding them. These human beings are being identified by their actions of violence, given almost superhuman qualities within stories, gossip and rumors. In actuality, a former leader of Sudan, Sadiq Al Mahdi, is reported to have:

> Signaled to the Arab* groups that expanding their power base could go hand in hand with the national ideal or promoting Arab*-Islamic culture; that they could massacre

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thousands and thousands in their search for new wealth in an ethnic-cleansing fashion without facing the law; and that their leaders could maintain respectability and associate freely with the ruling elite. [El-Tom 2009:90]

The power attributed to the Janjaweed stems from symbolism in the form of calling them devils (thereby perpetuating their identity as mystical beings), very real instances of violence, and a political agenda based on the rationality that ethnic cleansing could lead to wealth and an Arab*-Islamic monoculture for the good of Sudanese Nationality.

Global Bystanders

Beyond internal analysis of violence, external forces must also be acknowledged for their influence. When conflicts emerge within the borders of one country, other countries often stand idly by, ignoring their possible connection or influence on the human rights violations. A lack of analysis exists regarding the "role of external global 'bystanders' including strong nation-states, and international and nongovernmental agencies, like the United Nations whose delays or refusals to intervene can aid and abet genocides at times when the tide could still be reversed" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2009:14). Global bystanders involved in the Darfur crisis that require further analysis include Britain, the United Nations, the United States, China, Chad and many others.

British Colonialism

The British colonialism experienced by Sudan has left a permanent impact on society and cultural identity. The hegemonic modes of power that exist in Sudan today are reminiscent of colonial structures established in the past. Processes and ideological modes of discourse are markedly altered by the European intrusion.

Europeans maintained this tool of domination over the subject of the Orient by juxtaposing their own culture against that of the Orient. In order to understand the Orient, which

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includes India and the Bible lands, one must also understand the Occident and its force or configurations of power (Said 1979:5). The creation of the colony's identity by the colonizer results in the mixture of both cultures passing as one single and unified entity. Sudan's current state is reflective of traditional Sudanese culture and the deep marks of the colonizers.

Said gives a chilling warning within his piece. He states his hope to "illustrate the formidable structure of cultural domination and, specifically for formerly colonized peoples, the dangers and temptations of employing this structure upon themselves or upon others" (Said 1979:25). This is precisely reflective of the policies in Sudan. One scholar, Khalid, describes the root causes of the violence in Darfur succinctly as quoted previously on page 37 of this thesis. Khalid claims the causes of the violence in Darfur are the central government in Khartoum and the "economic development paradigm" created by British colonialism (Khalid 2009:35).

The hegemony established by the British colonizer, and perhaps the Ottoman and Egyptian colonizers as well, continue today under the new ruling power. The acknowledgment of this root cause of violence is necessary in order to take the next step of dismantling the hierarchical and unequal structure within the Sudan government. Indeed, this process of eliminating the Orient and Occident altogether, even if internalized within an independent nation, is the admitted goal of Said, in attempting to "unlearn the inherent dominative mode" (Said 1979:28). Once the inherently unequal structures of power that began with colonialism are dismantled, more equal forms of organization and statehood can be realized.

China

China's involvement with the ongoing situations in Sudan works to create further complexities. China has had a great impact on the ongoing struggles of Darfur. China's interest in Sudan comes from the fact that "Sudan is China's fifth-biggest suppliers of imported oil, and

that relationship carries benefits," such as the fact that "China holds veto power in the UN Security Council" and "has said it will stand by Sudan against US efforts to slap sanctions on the country and in the battle to force Sudan to replace the African Union peacekeepers with a larger UN presence" (Wax 2006:B03). The nonprofit organization Human Rights First blames China for the Darfur situation. Their article claims, "craving energy to keep its economic miracle humming, Beijing has forged a strong partnership with the Sudanese government in Khartoum; Sudan's capital city and seat of government" (Human Rights First 2008:99). This statement makes it clear that a country reliant on oil is willing to forgo issues of human rights for the continued economic success, which sounds very familiar. Not only has China stepped in the way of a greater UN presence in Darfur, but also it has contributed to the arming of the nation. Individuals have reported seeing "Chinese weaponry, including grenade launchers and ammunition for assault rifles and heavy machine guns" (Human Rights First 2008:102). It is also reported that between the years of 2003 to 2006, "China sold over $55 million worth of small arms to Sudan," and that "since 2004, China has been the near-exclusive provider of small arms to Sudan, supplying on average 90 percent of Khartoum's small arms purchases each year" (Human Rights First 2008:102). The power of the UN Security Council was undermined by China, as China both used its veto power to block various resolutions that threatened economic sanctions and ignored the arms embargo. Most of the efforts put forth by the UN to stifle the conflict in Darfur have been thwarted by China. Though they are not directly engaging in the ground combat, their influence on international law and supply of weaponry has contributed to the genocide. However, holding China to such high standards requires the US and other nations that have helped arm human rights violators to be held to the same standards. Until the standards are universal, China cannot truly be held accountable for the Darfur situation.

U.S. Demonization of Arabs*

From the U.S. media perspective, Darfur is framed as a senseless act of violence from one group, Arab* Muslims, or the "Janjaweed," onto another, Black* Africans, or the "Zurqa*." Many attribute this oversimplification and misunderstanding of the conflict as a tactic of the U.S. to further demonize Arabs* in order to legitimize the War in Iraq and Afghanistan (de Waal 2009).

> If, in the confrontation between the Arabs* and the Israelis and Americans, Arabs* are cast as 'terrorists,' warranting preemptive military action and a range of other restrictions on their rights, now in the context of Africa, they are cast as 'genocidaires' and similarly cast beyond the moral pale and rendered subject to military intervention and criminal tribunals. [De Waal 2009:140]

The framing of the violence in Darfur, particularly as it pertains to the perpetrators, has political motives and implications. The political and economic motives within the public discourse surrounding Darfur must be recognized in order to sift through biases.

Conclusion

International politics may have worsened the conflict situation in Sudan or at least it may have obscured the real efforts to implement change within the region. China's insistence on protecting their fifth-largest oil supplier has resulted in the direct undermining of international efforts, such as economic sanctions and the arms embargo. The U.S.'s insistence that the situation in Darfur is genocide may very well have been a distraction for real efforts to stop the human rights violations, and a tool to further demonize Arab* or Muslims as an example to reinforce the principles perpetuated in the war on terror. To save lives, the international community must insist upon disengaging in the seemingly useless argument over the label of genocide and towards providing humanitarian aid and implementing policies.

When asked about the genocide debate, Ishak said, "In Darfur, focusing on the definition of genocide is splitting hairs. Let's focus on what's actually happening." While Ishak's statement resonates with the distinction between the genocide label and international intervention, the theories surrounding instances of genocide are still valuable when applied to ethnographic research. Making bold statements from afar without focusing on what is actually occurring in a region is problematic. The theories developed on genocide are helpful when coupled with an exploration of the reality of the violence. The realities of our cultural world exist only in the minds of people. Those who experienced the violence firsthand—making their stories of resistance, agency and identity vital to broader discussions of othering, dichotomization and dehumanization—can express this reality. The expression of this reality creates accessibility to the exploration of "what is actually happening." This chapter's discussion of the important elements of genocide—the creation of distinction and the destruction of the other—is explored further using firsthand accounts of specific instances of what actually happened in Sudan in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 5

CONSTRUCTING RACIAL REFERENCES: RESISTANCE,

AGENCY AND IDENTITY

This chapter explores the concepts of resistance, agency and identity as related to Sudan

within the Sudanese Diaspora here in the United States. I use three data sets to compare uses of

binary opposition within the discourse on the violence in Sudan. Interviews with members of the

Sudanese Diaspora working within the social advocacy realm represent the main facet of my data

set. At the suggestion of my interviewees, I will also explore a public YouTube video created by

their nonprofit organization. I include this particular text not only because of my interviewee's

suggestion, but also because it synthesized many themes and topics of discussion present in our

interactions quite well. Though the content of the video was edited, there was uniformity

between it and what was being said informally during interviews and group meetings. Since the

video was shared freely, it obviously represented importance to the group, not only as a source of

pride, but also as a portrayal of the group's consensus on the issues in Sudan. A final text to

analyze is a recent interview with George Clooney on the David Letterman show in which

Clooney explains his work in Sudan with emphasis on the surveillance project: Satellite Sentinel.

I chose this text because it ties together an important American figure aiding in humanitarian

efforts for Sudan with popular American culture. The video seemed to contain not only

Clooney's explanation of the situation in Sudan, but also the uninformed public represented

through Letterman. As all my fieldwork took place in the United States, bringing a representation

of the American public's position on Sudan is important. Though Clooney is famous in the

United States for his acting career, members of the Sudanese diaspora respect his efforts in

raising awareness and contributing time, effort and funding to their cause. He was often a topic

of discussion during group meetings. These three sets of text will be examined comparatively to analyze markers of affect and what these markers show about the situation in Sudan.

Of particular interest within this chapter is the framing of 'self,' in-group, or 'us' and the 'other,' out-group, or 'them' as is often seen during times of war and conflict. I chose various examples of this phenomenon to comparatively analyze. The use of contrasting entities is a "tactic of distinction" (Hodges 2011:66). As discussed in chapter three, the social construction of race is a tactic of distinction. If the violence in Sudan were of a purely racial nature, then the dichotomies constructed would consistently reflect the racial categories. Many of these dichotomies have been used as a means to explain exclusion, justify rebellion and clarify the need for agency. The overall focus of my thesis is the exploration of race within the violence in Sudan. The three parts of my data set—interviews, a nonprofit's YouTube video and Clooney's television interview—will be analyzed comparatively as discourses on the Sudanese conflict. I choose to focus on some of the themes that emerge within these explanations for the conflict. I segmented data, then constructed concordance lines (Hunston 2002:39) to analyze the usage of the dividing terms and explore their context using node words such as Arab*, black*, Nubia and Sudan. It was through the trends that emerged from this corpus linguistic approach that I chose the specific examples from texts. The stylistic choices (Irvine 2001) within my data set will be explored with particular concentration on defining what it means to be Sudanese (for example, using 'Nubia' to describe all of 'Sudan' as a personalized descriptive word). However real or fictional these polarizing divisions may be, their use and meaning within the Sudanese community is important because they are central to identity claims and in-group membership.

Identity Formation Through Language Use

Though my interviews took place in English, many interviewees complained about the various tactics of the Sudanese government that kept them from speaking their language of choice. "Sudan government's orientation," meaning the widespread use of Arabic, "courts the Arab* World and perceives Arabism as the edifice of Sudanese nationalism regardless of the fact that the majority of the Sudanese peoples are of an African or Afro-Arab origin" (El-Tom 2009:435). This use of language represents two aspects of the same ideological goal of the state: to appeal to the Arab* World and to assimilate the African or Afro-Arab subjects into a national Arab* Sudanese identity. The positioning of the Arabic language and Arab* identity as the ideal sets up a hierarchy with Arab* in the superior position and African in the inferior position. This hierarchical positioning of an Arabic identity was mentioned directly, or alluded to indirectly, within all of the datasets. Therefore, the dichotomy of Arab* identity versus other emerges as the most commonly used binary opposition for explaining the situation in Sudan.

Self, In-group, Us versus Them, Out-group, Other

Throughout my datasets, examples of self, in-group and us can be seen. Constructions of these groupings often utilize methodological camaraderie. On the other hand, examples of them, out-group and other use methods of distinction. Both sides of the conflict acknowledge the social function of these identity formations. The Sudanese centralized power in Khartoum under al-Bashir's regime uses these various methods as a means of subject formation and interpellation. The product is a particular kind of affective reference—a moral geography (Modan 2007:90) of Sudan (see example five on page 89 where Tanutamon says the Sudanese government claims the northern region of Sudan is "all Arab*" and therefore "good subjects" while Darfur, Nuba Mountains, South Sudan, Blue Nile reject Arabization and therefore are "bad subjects"). Those

opposing the exclusionary power and violence of Sudan's government acknowledge the racial, ethnic or religious binaries used, though not the binaries themselves, as a means to invoke international law through definitions of genocide. Genocide, as discussed in chapter four, is defined under international law from the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) within Article 2.[13] Therefore, many interviewees employ these Arab-African dichotomies or binary oppositions in order to invoke international law, hoping the international community will be moved to intervene on their behalf in Sudan. Making claims to the international community often requires engagement and knowledge of the neoliberal system and the accepted framework within neoliberal discourse. Refugees, or subjects co-opting a refugee voice, engage broader international bodies in attempt to exercise agency for the Sudanese population.

I determine the markers of affect within this dataset using Martin and White's definition of affect: "the means by which writers/speakers positively or negatively evaluate the entities, happenings and states-of-affairs with which their texts are concerned," as well as "the means by which they more indirectly activate evaluative stances and position readers/listeners to supply their own assessments" (Martin and White 2005:2). Many instances of affect within the interviews and videos attempt to position the audience to take an interest in the ongoing violence in Sudan. This is often done through attempts to invoke empathy for personal and group struggles as well as encouraging moral judgments about the "them" or "other." None of these binary oppositions are meant to be total. To approach them in a definitive manner would be problematic. The constructions of us versus them are simply a common trend observed when individuals and groups attempt to explain the situation in Sudan. Many of these dichotomies

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[13] Please refer to page 35 for the full definition of genocide.

have been used as a means to explain the exclusion and shame experienced in Sudan. Though all individuals construct these dichotomies, they do so in unique and diverse terms.

Table 5.1 Example One: Nafy's Use of Distinction

Speaker	
Nafy:	The same enemy is attacking us, but our situation in Darfur needs more immediate attention because it is an emergency state. We are not fighting back. Tapari says all of Sudan needs to work together because we all have the same problems, but his people are fighting back. My people are just being slaughtered.

Example One is from an interview with Nafy, a woman from Darfur working for Save Darfur. In this text, Nafy is explaining why she put forth most of her time towards Darfur specific issues, while other activists, such as Tapari, a man from South Sudan, advocated for a unified approach. The main problem faced by Sudanese, according to Nafy, is violence. Nafy constructs alignment between herself, representing the people of Darfur being slaughtered, and Tapari and his people from the South, through a common enemy, al-Bashir and the government of Sudan. The groups, Darfur and South Sudan, are connected through the tactic of adequation; their common enemy constructs socially recognized likeness (Bucholtz and Hall 2004:494). Both Darfuris and South Sudanese people are being "slaughtered." However, she also points out their distinctions. Nafy claims that more immediate attention and aid must be given to the people of the Darfur region. The justification she uses for this is the point that the people of Darfur are not creating any violence themselves; they are simply the victims of violence and as such are in an emergency state. Here, Nafy employs a tactic of distinction, or "social differentiation" (Bucholtz and Hall 2004:495), where the differences between Darfur and South Sudan are "highlighted and made salient" (Hodges 2004:66). On the other hand, according to Nafy, the people of the South are not in such a dire emergency state as they are fighting back. This distinction is important not only for the implications regarding humanitarian aid or military intervention, but also within the

smaller scale world of Sudanese social advocacy within D.C. While Nafy works to create distinction between the South and Darfur, others, such as Tapari and Tanutamon, work to create unity and oneness within the Sudanese Diaspora, believing the most good can be accomplished through working together. Nafy understands Tapari's attempt at creating social positioning and alignments between all members of the Sudanese Diaspora, regardless of their location of origin or particular regional affiliation. Nafy recognizes this attempt, approves the common enemy, but rejects the commonality in a unified solution to the Sudanese conflicts. This effectively affirms her belief that the region of Darfur uniquely requires immediate emergency attention.

Relevant to this explanation of the experience of Darfuris versus other Sudanese individuals is the concept of "bare life." Bare life is the life "of homo sacer (sacred man), who may be killed and yet not sacrificed" (Agamben 1998:8). Sovereignty is held by the "power and capacity to dictate who may live and who must die" (Mbembe 2003:11). According to Nafy, the people of Darfur, her people, are being reduced to bare life by the government of Sudan. She asserts that her people represent the homo sacer of the al-Bashir regime. Conversely, the lives of the South Sudanese have not been reduced to bare life as they are exercising sovereignty, or the employment of death, over the Sudanese troops from the North. Nafy's claim is the homo sacer of Sudan needs more immediate assistance as they are reduced to bare life, while the Southern Sudanese, though fighting against the same enemy, retains sovereignty as they have some control in the life and death of themselves.

Table 5.2 Example Two: Gamali's Use of Distinction

Speaker	
Gamali:	Africans are economically inferior compared to the Arabs, both economically and politically, meaning that an ordinary person certainly would not want to identify with an inferior culture. Therefore, a majority of the people are actually racing toward becoming an Arab. Since Arab is actually the dominant in terms of military and economic as well as education so the entire system in Sudan is oriented towards monopolizing the country's diversity and making it all an Arabic identity.

The second text example is from Gamali, a man from the Nuba Mountains region of Sudan. This particular excerpt is from a public YouTube video released by the nonprofit advocacy group Hear the Sudanese. Gamali, like Nafy, explains his notion of the problems in Sudan. However, Gamali places emphasis on the hierarchical exclusion of individuals claiming African identity. Gamali points not to physical violence, but the structural violence within Sudan, and the process of creating an exclusively Arab* Sudanese national identity. Structural violence stems from the existence of "social structures—economic, political, legal, religious, and cultural—that stop individuals, groups, and societies from reaching their full potential" (Farmer, Nizeye, Stulac and Keshayjee 2006:e449). What is unique about this passage is Gamali's lack of personal alignment. While most of the comments in the dataset had clear linguistic markers of personal affiliation, Gamali presents the dichotomy of Africans, inferior position, minority, weak, diversity against Arab*, ordinary persons, majority, dominant, monopoly on identity without including markers of "self," or "us." However, seeing as this video was produced by an organization pushing for the broader acceptance of the diverse Sudanese voice, the affiliation is implied.

Table 5.3 Example Three: Tanutamon's Use of Binary

Speaker	
Tanutamon	We don't want to be labeled as Arab Muslims. We are not Arabs. And if it come to lose our land our heritage, its easier for me to drop Islam itself and not lose my, my land and my heritage and my language.

The excerpt from my interview with Tanutamon gives a different representation to the binary. Tanutamon uses "we" for all of those Sudanese being mislabeled as Arab* Muslims when they do not identify as such. He continues to cite the importance of his land, heritage and

language, saying they are more important for him than maintaining his Muslim faith. Here, he switches to the singular self, "me" and "my," instead of the collective "we." Established here is his hierarchical formation of things he values in terms of his individual identity. Though he knows others do not wish to be categorized as Arab* Muslims, he does not claim to know if they would so easily drop their Islamic faith for the sake of their land, heritage and language as Tanutamon would. Here, Tanutamon contests the construction of identity based on religious affiliation and instead emphasizes heritage and land.

Table 5.4 Example Four: Clooney's Use of Binaries

Speaker	
Clooney	So part of what we're doing, part of what I'm doing, I'm renting out a satellite, basically, and I keep a camera on the border, basically where the North lines up troops—These guys are people who are charged with war crimes against humanity, they're not really… at one point I got… Omar Bashir said that I was spying on him and, you know, you can't please all the war criminals all the time… *Laughter*
Letterman	You got to try, though. You got to give it a shot.
Clooney	Yeah, give it your best shot. So I, basically, we watch on a daily basis, we have this Satellite Sentinel is what it's called, and every day we take pictures to keep an eye on, to keep it from just saying it's rebel in-fighting when there are tanks and helicopters and planes—that's not rebel in-fighting. We're trying to be able to help the U.N., convince them, to get a stronger mandate.
Letterman	Now, now when you say the two countries, for their protection, are we protecting the South from the North, is that what this is?
Clooney	Yes, we are. The North has interest in moving the borders further south to get more oil.

Including George Clooney's interview with David Letterman in my dataset was a very intentional choice. My interviews and the interviewee's YouTube video were framed with the U.S. nonprofit or advocacy group audience in mind. The Sudanese activists I have talked to encode (Hall 1980:52) their messages in a way that attempts to bring attention and support to the people in Sudan from those who understand the conflicts there and have the ability to make some valuable contribution to the cause. Letterman's goal is to provide entertainment to his television and in-studio audience. Clooney seems to recognize this goal and plays his role as an actor while

at the same time attempting to bring awareness to his cause. Their audience was very different, and therefore their messages were encoded and decoded differently. Though the interview came back to Clooney's advocacy work for and trips to Sudan numerous times, covering serious topics of violence and fear, the stories were told in a manner that encouraged laughter. Letterman acted as if knew very little regarding the situation in Sudan and assumed the audience did not have vase knowledge on the topic as well. Letterman asked Clooney to "give us a course, the important points, we need to understand about what's going on there and what your role has been." Clooney was not asked to delve deeply into the issues of the region, but to simply gloss over the major points that, apparently, the average viewer would not know.

Within Example Four is a sample of the constructed binaries of the Clooney interview to illustrate the various linguistic tools implemented to explain the situation in Sudan, and what his role has been. Clooney, unlike other individuals within my dataset such as Tanutamon, fumbles between the use of "I" and "we." This may be reflective of Clooney's knowledge that the interview is taking place because Letterman, and the rest of the audience, is interested in him as an individual. While the various topics of discussion may change, from advocacy work in Sudan to the upcoming release of the movie "The Ides of March," one thing has remained constant; the focus of the discussion is George Clooney. Regardless, Clooney's "I" means himself, while the "we" means, at points, the South and him, other advocates and the United States and him. On the other end of this constructed dichotomy sits the North, the North's troops, Omar Bashir and war criminals. Other linguistically constructed dichotomies within this example also include humanity versus war troops, and rebel in-fighting versus tanks, helicopters and planes.

Clear within this interview is Clooney's belief in the validity of international law and the International Crimes Court (ICC) through the proliferation of their labels. It is this body of

governance that determined "crimes against humanity" have occurred within Sudan, and deemed Omar al-Bashir a "war criminal." Clooney's use of these labels portrays his acknowledgement of their validity and the validity of the organization that produced them. Through his use of their labels, the authority of international law and the ICC is legitimated.

<div align="center">Moral Geography</div>

A common theme within the interviews and videos that comprise my data set is the construction of a moral geography. According to Modan, moral geography is "an interweaving of moral framework with a geographical community" (2007:90). Often during construction of moral geographies, there are constructions of who had rights to place and who belongs there (Leap 2011:189). The use of connecting morality to geographical space occurs often in reference to Sudan. This is especially true with the secession of the South from the North. When describing alignments of people in regard to their moral positioning on the violence in Sudan, geographical affiliations are commonly used.

Table 5.5 Example Five: Tanutamon's Moral Geography

Speaker	
Tanutamon	They force us to speak Arabic to Arabize the Nubians very fast because we are in the far north. They want to say, "The north of Sudan all are Arab."

Example five is from an interview with Tanutamon. Tanutamon explains the Sudanese state process of forcing the people of the north to speak Arabic in order to make the claim that the entire region is comprised of Arab* individuals. This moves a claim of language use into a claim of moral affiliations, such as being "pro-Khartoum." This short example is also a rare instance where Tanutamon uses the literal definition of Nubians instead of making the stylistic choice of using Nubian to mean Sudan.

Tanutamon often employed the term Nubia and Nubian to mean Sudan and Sudanese during our multiple interviews and interactions. Once he stated:

> But, the technique with doing all this is removing the Nubian from the center of their culture, destroying their language, their heritage, their culture. It's a removing the Sudanese, the Nubian, when I say Nubian I mean the whole country called Sudan now.

Tanutamon's use of "Nubian" represents a stylistic choice (Irvine 2001). Tanutamon's employment of Nubian to reference Sudan is not simply a linguistic code change used because of the social conditions and appropriateness, or code switching. He uses Nubian to convey ideological beliefs. After explaining his use of Nubian to mean Sudanese, as seen in the above quote, he unites all those outside of spaces of privilege. He explains the process as "Removing (us) from the center of their culture, and then we end up in the margin of Arab* culture." When using the interchangeable terms Nubian, Sudanese or Kush invokes the experience of marginalization. Later, after I asked whom Tanutamon meant when he used the term Kush. He explained Kush meant, "All of Sudan too, yes. When I say Kush I mean the whole of Sudan." Therefore, the use of code switching in this instance does not only contain notions of marginality, but of Sudanese authenticity. To Tanutamon, Kush, Nubian and Sudanese mean "all of the people of Sudan" excluding those in the privileged position of Arabs* or Arabized* Sudanese.

Tanutamon's heritage is an incredible importance facet of identity. His linguistic choice works to connect present Sudan to pre-colonial Nubian during the "peak of the black* civilization in North Africa." Using Nubia to describe all of Sudan becomes a personalized descriptive word. This linguistic tactic affirms Tanutamon's belief in what it means to be Sudanese. He places importance on his Nubian heritage while revoking the authority and power of the current Sudanese state.

Table 5.6 Example Six: Clooney's Moral Geography

Speaker	
Letterman	Now when you go to—do we call it The Sudan? Or North Sudan and South Sudan?
Clooney	It's South Sudan now.
Letterman	And Darfur is a region of South Sudan?
Clooney	No, Darfur is a region of the West. Of the west of Sudan. In the North. *Laughter*
Clooney	Enjoy!

Example Six, concerning moral geography, is from the Clooney interview on the Letterman show. In trying to further understand Clooney's groupings, as previously shown, Letterman looks for geographical clarification regarding the "us," or perhaps "good guys" and the "them" or perhaps "bad guys." The confusion that ensued is caused by Clooney's previous definition of the North as the aggressor's, "them" or "bad guys." Letterman seems to have previous knowledge that the Darfur region contains the innocent, or those "we" attempt to help. Darfur being in the North contradicts, in Letterman's mind, Clooney's explanation of the "North" as the aggressor, or villain.

An important segment of this video was the laughter that erupted after Clooney's explanation of the geography of Sudan. An assessment of the laughter is necessary, though a definitive answer of why it occurred may never be determined. The audience's reaction as laughter as well as Clooney's statement for the audience to "enjoy" moves this text beyond a simple statement of geography into a statement of moral geography. Laughing at the complexities of the regions of Sudan signifies, or may signify, the audience's belief in their minimal importance. Clooney's "Enjoy!" in response to the audience's reaction encourages the amusement. But enjoy what? What is the audience being told to find amusement in? Enjoy trying to understand the regional complexities of Sudan? Enjoy attempting to figure this out? Perhaps this was Clooney's way of acknowledging that his audience had minimal knowledge on this

topic, resulting in him abandoning his attempt at giving a further explanation. Perhaps he realized what he was saying was being received as absurd. The laughter at the complexities along with Clooney's abandonment of further explanation of the regions represents linguistic markers downplaying the significance of this information.

Jokes are important conversational tools. Humor is culturally specific and can often point an observer to deeper truths regarding social situations. According to Douglas, jokes are anti-rites that construct "an exhilarating sense of freedom from form in general" (1968:365). While rites impose "order and harmony… the joke disorganizes" meaning "the message of a standard rite is that the ordained patterns of social life are inescapable" while "the message of a joke is that they are escapable" (Douglas 1968:373). To take this approach to jokes is to reject their usefulness as a means of reifying the social norms of a culture. Others disagree with Douglas, claiming, "jokes often serve to reinscribe the very conventions they blatantly taunt" (Seizer 1997:63). However, this humor was not taunting conventions, but laughing at the complexity and apparent contradiction of the west being in the north. This view of humor reaffirms the notion that Letterman's audience's laughter reinscribes American cultural conventions. Laughter further illustrates the point that the presented information is unimportant; such was the case with the discussion of the complexities of Sudan and South Sudan's borders.

Beyond the use of humor and downplaying the importance of Sudanese borders, Clooney's voice is accepted as an authority on the situation in Sudan. Clooney represents an outsider perspective with the privilege of widespread respect for his opinions, both from his audience at the Letterman Show and the Sudanese diaspora members I interviewed. His position as a voice worth listening to may be attributed to his various trips to the region, his advocacy efforts and his wealthy celebrity status. While the television network and viewers privilege his

voice, he stumbles through his explanation of the situation in Sudan, contradicting his own

definition of the North and fumbling between the use of "I" and "we." This could be reflective of

his knowledge that the interview is meant to focus on him as an individual entity, so he attempts

to avoid references to himself as part of a larger group.

If the conflict were of a strictly racial nature, the dichotomies used by those explaining

the situation would reflect those socially constructed categories in a relatively uniform manner.

Instead, there is no uniform approach to the construction of these dichotomies. Each individual

defines these binaries in different terms and represents them in different ways. All make the 'us,'

'we,' 'in-group,' versus 'they,' 'them,' 'out-group' as well as insinuating an 'Arab*' versus other

distinction in order to seek empathy and support using their own individual terms. As a result,

there is no stable or single meaning attributed to these groupings by the dataset.

<u>Element of "Selling" Sudan</u>

After examining the specific linguistic choices used by people in my dataset, I realized

two larger trends. In a generalized sense, there is an element of "selling" the violence in Sudan to

the United Nations, the international community and the American public and an element of

unifying the marginalized 'other' within a shamed subject position. The element of "selling" ties

well into concepts and materials on neoliberalism. The "selling" of the situation in Sudan is

twofold. First, the element of "selling" is literal, as in the circumstances are being explained and

framed to a consumer or client in exchange for financial support. Many of these non-profit or

non-governmental organizations advocating for the Sudanese are constantly on the look out for

donations, grants and other funding opportunities. The second element of "selling" is more

metaphorical, in which the violence in Sudan is pitched to multiple members in hopes of

spreading awareness, thereby enlarging the chances of reaching people who can give

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humanitarian aid, political intervention or generalized support. It is through this reality that we can see just how deeply capitalism and consumerism invades societal structures.

<div align="center">
Subject Positioning and Identity Formation:
Shaming and the Shamed Subject
</div>

Binary opposition often occurs within the societal realm of identity and subject positioning. Althusser describes the process of subject positioning in a society as the interpellation or 'hailing' of that subject by the ideological state apparatus (ISA) through ideology (1971). This interpellation through ISAs of the individual into the ideology of the state represents the state power, or regulatory activity. Individuals become involved in their own regulation through the perpetuation of the state's ideology. Although involved in interpellation, the subject can respond in a multitude of ways. The commonly used trifecta, according to Pêcheux: go along with it or "good subject," reject it or "bad subject," or work it as "disidentification" (1975:156-158) This trifecta applies to my data, but I use a new category to describe the work of recognition and talkback. My framework draws on recent theorizing of shame.

The Sudanese state is spreading the ideology of Arabization and Islamization through a national Arab*-Islamic Project focused on the construction of Sudanese identity (El-Tom 2009:87). This Arab*-Islamic identity is not simply symbolic but "is a discourse through which the entire Sudan can be managed and ordered into specific social relations" (El-Tom 2009:89). 'Good subjects' within the Sudanese state accept the forced assimilation into an Arab* identity. This includes the exclusive use of the Arabic language, membership to the Islamic faith and claims to Arab* ancestry. However, some subjects may position themselves in this manner, but their claims can be denied by the state, especially in the case of claims to Arab* ancestry. These claims are not only denied as false, but also the individuals making the claim are often labeled as

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"backward" and "at odds with modernity" which the riverian Sudanese monopolize (El-Tom 2009:90). Another possible framework to distinguish 'good subjects' is simply those who accept Arabization and the power of the National Congress Party, or NCP, and acknowledging their marginalization within the system as Africans or inferior.

'Bad subjects' within the Sudanese state reject the national project of Arabization and Islamization. These subjects refuse to ideologically align with an Arab* identity and reject the Muslim faith. The easiest 'bad subject' examples are those that comprise the rebel groups fighting against the state, both physically and politically. Because of the nature of the Sudanese state's program, forced assimilation to create a unified Sudanese identity (Abusharaf 2009:201), many 'bad subjects' are killed in the homo sacer (Agamben 1997) sense.

'Disidentification subjects' work the imposed ideology and make it their own. Many Sudanese in this position accept some aspects of Arabization and/or Islamization while rejecting or altering others. For example, Tanutamon, an interviewee from northern Sudan, accepts the Muslim faith but rejects Arab* identity and uses the Arabic language but prefers Nubian. He is also striving to preserve his Nubian language, culture and heritage. Tanutamon, as a subject, exists in direct opposition to the Sudanese state's claim that all of northern Sudan is Arab*. However, he does not exist in the violent binary of national versus rebel groups and instead came to the U.S. for asylum and works as a human rights advocate.

Disidentification is an easy label to slap onto any individual not adhering directly to Pêcheux's categorical positionings. Pêcheux represents an expansion point in which the shamed subject can be inserted. There are diverse and infinite positions possible within the realm of subject formation. An individual's position within the world is "on the edge of emergence," meaning the process is continuous and ever changing (Ong 2006). The unstable construction of

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the 'self,' in-group, or 'us' and the 'other,' out-group, or 'them' distinction has made the stable construction of group identification through the shared experience of shame more apparent. The collective recognition of shame by the victims of the Khartoum regime's project of forced assimilation has manifested as a political response of these subjects. These individuals have recognized their position within the margin and have used their status as agency for their political motivations. The shamed subject recognizes the shamed self.

Shame is powerful not only as an emotion but as an outsider's tool for control. According to Munt, "if a wrongdoer doesn't display appropriate levels of shame, then that lends public permission for more righteous punishment to follow" (2008:4). Instances of shame riddle the recounts of interviewees' lives in Sudan. The individuals were often subjected to shame because of existing outside of the ideological norms perpetuated by the Sudanese state.

Examples of talkback to the interpellation entities of Sudan are numerous within the text. Good subjects in Sudan, according to the individuals I interviewed, are those that embrace an Arab* identity, adopt Islam and speak exclusive Arabic. Bad subjects, according to interviewees, resist the assimilation projects of Arabization and Islamization. However, in the spirit of moving beyond disidentification, I feel the widespread examples of shame within the texts points to the existence of a "shamed subject" position. According to Sally Munt, there is a political potential with shame that "can be radical, instigating social, political and cultural agency amongst the formerly disenfranchise," which occurs when you "no longer care that you are being shamed, particularly when horizontal bonds formed through communities of shame can be transmuted into collective desires to claim a political presence and legitimate self, that a new sense of identity can forge ahead and gain rights and protection" (Munt 2008:4). A shamed subject is an individual whose identity, which within my interviewee dataset often includes heritage and

language, is rejected by the outside, or external, entity attempting interpellation. Shame is something done to these subjects, not exclusively a property of the subject. Once the individual recognizes this external process of shame, the shamed subject recognizes they themselves are not a bad individual and move toward adopting a disidentified subject position. Shamed subjects that do not recognize shame as stemming from an external entity may accept interpellation and become a good subject. The entities projecting shame onto subjects are, themselves, shaming subjects. The texts support the notion that the Sudanese conflicts are affected by this clash of identity and what it means, or should mean, to be Sudanese. I will further explore the concept of the shamed subject and shaming subjects in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

RACIAL SUBJECTS AS SHAMED SUBJECTS

The constructed dichotomies present in the discourses of my data sets on the violence

within Sudan, as discussed in chapter five, do not possess uniform approaches to binary

opposition. They did, however, contain techniques of adequation. This form of socially

recognized likeness involved the shared experience of shame (Bucholtz and Hall 2004). Within

this chapter, I will explore the various accounts of shame represented within two data sets. The

first, and main, data set is comprised of interviews with members of the Sudanese Diaspora

working within the social advocacy realm. I chose this type of research material and method

because these people have more insight to the conflict in Sudan as they all spent a significant

portion of their life within the situation and region. I rely on their stories and opinions in order to

avoid privileging my own voice and the voices of those who impose an outsider position on

Sudan without long-term emersion or firsthand knowledge of the culture. The second dataset

comes from a public YouTube video created by the nonprofit organization that my interviewees

are a part of. I chose to use this material because it was purposefully put forth to the public to

explain marginalized Sudanese stories and synthesized their positions on the subject of violence.

Both of these texts are littered with the retelling of experiences of shame. After noticing this

trend, I decided to explore the experience of Sudanese shame further. This chapter explores the

experiences of shame—as told to me in person by this Sudanese individuals and publically

through the video—as well as the recognition of shame as an external interpellation technique by

the ideological state apparatuses (ISAs) resulting in their 'shamed subject' position (Althusser

1971).

Unification and Regulation Through Shame

As explored in chapter five, the various constructions of 'self,' in-group, or 'us' and the 'other,' out-group, or 'them' contain the Arab*/other distinction. No singular term captured the 'in-group' or 'us' claims to a shared group identity of those marginalized by the Sudan government, except perhaps 'indigenous' as used by Tanutamon.[14] However, according to multiple accounts during interviews and interactions, a shared experience of shaming bonded this geographically and culturally diverse group. The fractioning religious, tribal or regional identifiers were considered secondary to the experiences of exclusion, humiliation and embarrassment. These individuals were further unified by the shared recognition of the identity of the shamers. The shamers were uniformly described as being members of the state, or actors perpetuating the assimilation techniques of the state. As the state is framed as an Arabized* Muslim entity by those in positions of hegemony, the shamers are, too, identified as those attempting methods to assimilate others into an Arab* identity, such as the government, some elites and members of the media. These shamers, individuals perpetuating the program of assimilation, unified under the Arab* identity as a form of superior racial identity exist in juxtaposition to the shamers, who are racially not Arab*—that is, black*.

Theoretical approaches to shame differ in interpretation most broadly in defining shame as an emotion or as affect (Probyn 2004:330). The theoretical approaches to shame as an emotion "tend to privilege cognition" and denigrate "what the feeling body does in shame" (Probyn 2004:330). On the other hand, the theoretical approaches to shame as affect "are more interested or open to considerations of what happens in the body and its components such as the brain and

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[14] Though Tanutamon uses the term 'indigenous' to convey the shared group identity of the marginalized population of Sudan, those occupying positions of power and privilege also have claims to an indigenous identity and ancestry.

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nervous system" (Probyn 2004:330). The body's physiological reaction to shame is profoundly

significant, especially in populations that are experiencing widespread health disparities within

populations experiencing shame. Though the approach to shame as affect is an important field in

intellectual exploration, this chapter focuses on the cognitive or emotional approaches to the

feeling of shame or to the management of shaming. Health disparities within the region could,

and probably are, impacted by the central government's interpellation project of shame. That

future discussion involves the structural violence of shame more directly, while this piece

focuses on shame as an amalgamating entity. Acknowledging this fact, I wish to continue with

an exploration of individual accounts of shame and stated techniques for dealing with external

assimilation tools of shame.

Beyond distinctions of shame as emotion or affect, there also exists a breadth of

knowledge on the distinction between shame and guilt. This distinction can be postulated as an

issue of public (shame) versus private (guilt) (Gehm and Scherer 1988:74). Within the

anthropological realm, shame is "seen as arising from public exposure and disapproval of some

shortcoming or transgression," while guilt "is seen as a more 'private' experience arising from

self-generated pangs of conscience" (Tangney and Dearing 2002:14). Others further distinguish

shame as public and guilt as private, stating, "guilt is the inner experience of breaking the moral

code," while shame is "the inner experience of being looked down upon by the social group"

(Fossum and Mason 1986:vii). Shame becomes a tool of regulation. However, this distinction

may stem exist solely in the scholarly realm. Tangney, Marschall, Rosenberg, Barlow and

Wagner (1994) conducted a study that concluded shame and guilt occurred, at least as

descriptive words, in both experiences while alone and within the presence of others. However,

for the purpose of this paper, I will use the anthropological definition of shame, focusing solely

on the experience of shame as an emotion stemming from interactions with others—particularly with those perpetuating the interpellation efforts of the Sudanese state.

Oftentimes, my interviewees discussed experiencing shaming within the Sudanese school system and other ISAs. These discussions of shame, though containing descriptors of a personal emotion associated with recognition of difference or inadequacy, framed the experience of shame as emitting from an external force. The individuals discussing shame recognized a period in time where they altered their interpretation of the experience from an internalized emotion to an external tool of assimilation and destruction. The shame they felt was first blamed on their own interpretation if individual inadequacy, meaning they believed the shame stemmed from the self. Later, they realized the shame came from an external force. The targeted individual's recognition of shame as originating from an external force functions to unite them. The recognition leads to a collective group consciousness of a targeted shaming population. This unification of individuals as entities targeted for shame from an external entity creates the shamed subject position that makes up the category of discussion in this chapter.

The feeling of shame has a transmittable characteristic. Because "shame is an emotion that travels quickly, it has an infective, contagious property that means it can circulate and be exchanged with intensity" (Munt 2008:3). There is a "contagiousness of collective affects" that "exposes the breaches in the borders between self and other" (Gatens 1999:14). Shame does not exist on the individual level. Shame is always a relational phenomenon. The experience of shame, or act of partaking in shaming, works to affirm values of proper behavior and identity claims within a society. Shame is "immensely productive politically and conceptually in advancing a project of everyday ethics" (Probyn 2004:329). Ethical and deviant behavior can be recognized through the societal usage of shame and shaming.

Shame is often present in countries attempting assimilation. One trend of this particular interpellation tool is that where "histories of violent domination and occupation are found… lurking behind these dynamics of shame, and the same, although directly aimed at the minoritised group, also implicates the bestower" (Munt 2008:3). Shame works to create privilege and marginalization, or reaffirm these social hierarchies. Therefore, the experiences of shame as expressed and interpreted by members of my data set reflect interpellation techniques of Sudan aimed at creating good subjects or punishing deviant subjects. The interviewees recognize themselves as falling under the deviant, or bad subject categorization, within Sudan and, therefore, require shaming from external forces according to the societal norms as regulated by the central government of Sudan. The recognition of this process points to the ability of these individuals to make a distinction between what they themselves would categorize as ethical or deviant behavior versus what the Sudanese government believes to be good or bad behavior. This recognition and subsequent rejection of the morality postulated by the Sudanese government is an example of their talkback to the interpellation entities, solidifying their position as shamed subjects.

<div align="center">Shamed Subject Accounts in Sudan</div>

From my interviews with Sudanese individuals residing in Washington, D.C. as well as a public YouTube video created by some of these same individuals, I compiled various descriptions of the experience of shame. These examples illustrate the navigation of the participants through the terrain of shame as an interpellation technique. Present within these accounts is the recognition of shame as an external process as well as a culturally specific mechanism for regulation. Though all of these research participants demonstrate their belief in shame as a negative experience, they also utilize these experiences to create unity against the

shaming entities. Thus, all individuals discussing their common position as shamed subjects construct a contrary group identity to the perpetuated good subject of the Sudanese national government.

Table 6.1 Example One: Tapari's Explanation of Cultural Specificity

Speaker	
Kelly (Me)	Do you know anyone who works for the government of Sudan or believes in all of this? Do you know them well?
Tapari	These guys—this is what they do, most of these—when they come to the west. Somebody in… you'll find the same person there is a different person here.
Kelly (Me)	Oh, how so? How are they different?
Tapari	Well they try to adjust and try to fit in, you know. They try to fit in. But when they go back there then they go and come out talking crap, you know.

According to Tapari, trying to "fit in" in the United States involves not "talking crap." "Talking crap" represents the negative attitudes and behaviors that target those Sudanese individuals who do not claim an Arab* identity, or fit within the countries definition of a good subject. This includes a wide variety of personal insults that function to shame a non-conforming individual, or a bad subject (Pêcheux 1975:157). According to Tapari, this change from "talking crap" in Sudan to "adjusting" and "fitting in" in the United States transforms the individual into a completely different person. An individual, under these terms, becomes defined entirely by their attitudes and behaviors. The movement and place of a person dictates or transforms their behavior and attitude. Therefore, the space an individual occupies has the ability to change that person into someone else entirely. The use of "guys" to identify these individuals signifies male identities, meaning the people who work for "the government of Sudan" or those who "believe in all of this" are generally male individuals.

The notion of "fitting in" is deeply entrenched in the complex emotions of shame. Shame emerges from the "body's desire to fit in, just as it knows that it cannot" (Probyn 2004:328). This definition of shame constructs the experience as stemming from an internalized struggle with an

external environment. Though many instances of shame originate within an individual's understanding of not "fitting in," it relies heavily on external notions of what it means to "fit in." Therefore, the origin of shame comes first from external constructions of normalcy, which is then identified and processed within a singular person. In the terrain of individual identity, if one identifies with the abnormal, or queer, one is, based on societal standards, creating an identity requiring shame.

The shaming rules are culturally specific. Those who do the shaming in Sudan abandon this role while residing in the United States. The cultural parameters dictating the need to shame individuals who are behaving inappropriately or claiming an undesirable identity are specific to a country or region. The rules of shaming from one culture are abandoned when in a time or space that does not require their maintenance.

In addition to abandoning the role of Sudanese shamer, these individuals are navigating a new domain of shame. In the United States, the Arab* Muslim has been villainized in response to 9/11 to "aid the 'war on terror,' and to promote military intervention" (Hill 2007:28). To publically declare strong bonds of affiliation to this ideology as the supreme religious and ethnic affiliation is extremely suspicious according to new notions of terrorism. Therefore, the hierarchical forms of identity in Sudan, Arab* Muslim in the superior position, are inferior or suspicious in the United States.

Table 6.2 Example Two: Tanutamon's Experience of Shame

Speaker	
Tanutamon	I spoke about this, but I'll tell you also, psychological part of it. When I was a little boy, as I mentioned before, in the school they, they… They used to punish me speak, because I speak Nubian and I, a poor little boy, have no other language. I was… That's only the tool I communicate. I learn from my mom, my dad, my society everybody speak Nubian and then **they start lashing me in the school and calling me stupid names and all these things and bad names and all these things because I speak Nubian. That left a scar in my heart.** When I was in middle school I start questioning this faith itself. Not only the language. That's a reason put me in the early time, to

	adapt critical thinking. What is this faith? What is this language? Why if the God create us, or why we are the people, children of God, why he doing this to us? And then I learn little by little, this is not a God, this God is not fair. And I kept these questions in my heart because it was very difficult. One time I tried to bring it out to my teacher. I was in trouble.
Kelly (Me)	When you told them?
Tanutamon	Yes! Why God is doing this? Why is he punishing Nubians and why he refuse to understand the Nubian language, if this god is fair, he's supposed to understand everybody's language and this is not God, this is something else. **The teacher, in front of the students in the classroom, he says 'You have a devil in your brain. And you going to struggle all your life with this. You better don't think about these things.'** … But psychologically, yes**. I am injured inside. I've been humiliated. I've been punished. I've been looked down for no reason. Only because I'm a Nubian.** … **They making fun of about my language in front of the students. I carry a lot of—big scar in my heart.** But I don't revenge. I don't believe in revenge. But I believe in 'I should not give up.' I should stay, maintain, maintain, and fix my culture and bring out my heritage, my language and speak out about the destruction and who behind it. **And what technique they are using.**

Illustrated here is the intense shaming practice within the school system directed at those not speaking Arabic exclusively. The physical and public shame experienced by Tanutamon was on display for the entire academic community. Tanutamon's individual identity, as well as his group-identity, is entrenched in the Nubian language. The Nubian language was not only Tanutamon's only tool to communicate, but also represents an important bond between himself, his mother, his father and his society. He works to invoke sympathy for himself as a child through explaining his inability to acquiesce to the demands of his shamers. He only knew one language—Nubian—and yet he was punished for speaking it. Punishment, for the period in which he did not know any other language, was completely unavoidable. This situation was traumatic for Tanutamon and had a long-lasting negative effect on him, as indicated by the statement "that left a scar in my heart." The "they" of "they starting lashing me" represents unmarked members of the school community. From his earlier excerpt, it can be deduced that teachers and administrators represents the "they." The "they" also references agents of the larger

interpellation entity, involving all those that take part in the attempt to create a strictly Arab*
Sudanese national identity.

The punishment led to Tanutamon doubting aspects of his personal identity. He explains
here physical and psychological tactics of shaming. The experience left Tanutamon with a
permanent feeling of pain or a "scar on (his) heart." According to the clinical psychologist Helen
Block Lewis, the feeling of shame is described as an "acutely painful emotion that is typically
accompanied by a sense of shrinking or of 'being small' and by a sense of worthlessness and
powerlessness" (Tangney and Dearing 2002:18). Tanutamon's experience of shame was
contingent on the shaming administered by the teachers and administration within his school. His
feeling of having a scar on his heart resulted from the shaming techniques administered onto him
in attempts to force him to speak Arabic and adopt an Arabized* identity. This feeling of having
a scar, feeling worthless or powerless vanished once Tanutamon changed his beliefs regarding
the Nubian language and the motivations behind these techniques of shame.

The tactics of shaming and punishment Tanutamon experienced led to his questioning of
his language and, eventually, his religion. In middle school, he began questioning God as God
was used as a justification for forcing individuals to learn and use Arabic exclusively. He, along
with his classmates, was taught that God only understood Arabic and if they wanted to go to
heaven, they'd have to learn God's language. Tanutamon eventually rejected this justification, or
excuse, used by those perpetuating the interpellation techniques of the Sudanese state. His
reasoning stems from his belief that these actions were unjust, and God, according to him, is fair
and just. This rationalization led to his realization that this shame was coming from an external
human force in order to perpetuate very human goals and agendas.

Tanutamon rejects the use of religion as a reason to shame those individuals not using Arabic. He believed he was being punished for things he does not believe he should have been punished for. His statement of "if this God is fair, he's supposed to understand everybody's language and this is not God—this is something else" was made in the very arena of shame—the classroom. The response of Tanutamon's teacher is religious in nature. The teacher's explanation of Tanutamon's questioning the superiority of Islam and Arabic is that he has a "devil in his brain." The solution presented by the teacher is to simply "not think about this things."

Entrenched in this excerpt are elements of fairness and unfairness, a questioning of God, and critical thinking as a tool which led to the realization that this is an external technique of shaming, or as he says "technique" for the "destruction of his culture, heritage and language." At first, Tanutamon describes feeling like a "poor little boy." He then discusses his process of questioning the superiority of Arabic and Islam internally. The statement of "I kept these questions in my heart because it was very difficult" is followed up by one instance of expressing these questions to the external realm unsuccessfully. Bringing his internal questions external just for them to be rejected with continued religious logic fueled Tanutamon's continued questioning and intellectual journey. Shaming, as arising from "public exposure," occurred after Tanutamon voiced his concerns out loud to his classroom. He believes he has been "humiliated," "punished," and "looked down (on) for no reason." His ultimate conclusion is that his "culture," "heritage," and "language" are being purposefully destroyed through this "technique" of shame. This realization, as well as the element of who "they" are in the statement of "who (is) behind it," becomes of vital importance here in the unifications of those within the shamed subject position and those outside of it.

Table 6.3 Example Three: Tanutamon's Explanation of Widespread Shaming

Speaker	

Tanutamon	In the national TV and radio they make joke about the indigenous people who is still speaking their language. Because the people who running the state, they totally being Arabized*. They're speaking fluent Arabic. They don't have second language. So they don't allow people like us to speak, to have a joke in the TV. TVs run—by the way everything is—by the state there.

The interpellation tactic of shame can manifest in many forms. Within this excerpt, joking is expressed as a tool of shame. Those indigenous populations speaking their native language are being made fun of. The act of speaking a language other then Arabic leads to national perpetuated jokes and ridicule.

Ownership of language is referenced here through the use of "their." Tanutamon discusses the indigenous population's use of indigenous language as "their language," which sets up the concept of language ownership. As "their language" is the indigenous language here, Arabic becomes a language that is not "their," the indigenous', own. Arabic becomes a language not belonging to "them," or the indigenous. From this, perhaps Tanutamon is hinting at the point that even if the indigenous populations abandoned usage of "their own" languages in favor of Arabic, they will still not be considered inclusive within this Arab* identity. Arabic will never be "their language."

The reasoning given by Tanutamon for the jokes made on the Sudanese national television stem from the "totally Arabized*… people running the state's" inability to speak or understand any language other than Arabic. Their, the "totally Arabized* people running the state," inability to understand the indigenous languages is the reason the jokes are occurring.

The exclusion of indigenous ideology and identity in TV and "everything" speaks to the marginalization experienced by this population. According to this excerpt from my interview with Tanutamon, the state does not "allow people like us to speak" or "to have a joke in the TV." This information is quite relevant to the discussion of shame as access to outlets in which to

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express humor and comedy can rectify the effects of shaming. Comedy and "humor may be an

effective antidote to shame," in that it can normalize "individual shortcomings, thus placing them

in a more realistic perspective" (Tangney and Dearing 2002:176). Joking or talking with

individuals who share victimization through shame can transform "the defect" previously

"experienced as a private scourge" into a "shared problem" (Karen 1992:8). However, according

to Gessner and Tangney, there is "often a fine line between a friendly, inclusive, humorous joke

and a hurtful, mocking putdown" (Tangney and Dearing 2002:177). Having exclusive access to

Sudanese Television, the state has a monopoly over the media jokes, thus proliferating shame

through this public avenue. The voice of the indigenous becomes an ideological representation of

the flawed Sudanese.

Table 6.4 Example Four: Gamali's Retelling of Experience of Shame

Speaker	
<u>Gamali</u>	I did not believe it first hand, but the generation that is before me that attended schools in Nuba Mountains, they tell me not too long ago, people today who are 40 years old, they tell me that when they first began to go to school they were not named Arab names, for example Coco etc… but when they want to go and register them and raise them in these schools they were forced to have a second name and that name needed to be used in formal documentations. Students… to have a degree will have his name or her name in Arabic on that degree name, not the original name of the language. If any student were caught speaking his native tongue, actually there is a punishment either by lashes or some sort of punishment and one of the punishment is that a **teacher would draw a donkeys picture on a carton with a rope on both sides and if any student were caught speaking Nuba the teacher would take that picture, the donkey picture, and would hang it on their neck.** And that student is not supposed to remove that picture on his or her neck until another person speaks Nuba person speaks Nuba and then he will take it then and hang it on his brother or sister and therefore each student is forced not to speak it at all. And along the line they become a **stigma or ashamed** or **not a good thing** to communicate with these student's their Nuba and therefore they picked the language of Arabic as the main and the most prominent language.

These stories, from others, are so profoundly entrenched in experiences of shame and

marginalization that they sound unbelievable to Gamali. Gamali's point that this experience

happened to the generation before him functions as a distancing method between himself and the

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individual's who experienced these practices. He is not explicitly stating that he himself experienced these types of marginalizing shaming techniques, but that the experiences have been retold to him. He understands what happened to these individuals as well as why it happened.

The rejection of non-Arabic identities is symbolized through the school's elimination of non-Arabic names. The second, or Arabic, name is given legitimacy through its use on formal documentation such as degrees. Original name is rendered inadequate through the denial of a degree under its usage. The legitimization of Arabic names on official government documentation reinforces the interpellation entity's attempt to create a homogenous Arabic national Sudanese identity.

Within this excerpt are examples of both physical and psychological shaming. Physical shame occurs for speaking native tongue through the use of lashing. This functions to publically display the non-Arab* bodies requiring shame, making a clear distinction using both physical space and force. Psychological shame is indicated through the forced neck displace of a donkey. The donkey picture is used as a public shaming tool. The image of the donkey becomes symbolic of deviant behavior and the subsequent punishment. Group shame is transmitted through the exchange of the donkey pictures from one Nuba speaking person to another. The forced wear of the donkey pictures functions as a visible punishment as well as a symbolic means of muting the native, or indigenous, voice. The shaming interpellation entity, in this example, shames so thoroughly that other students are aware that they should not "communicate" with the shamed individuals. The community accepts the interpellation entity's labeling of the these non-Arab* speaking shamed subjects as "stigmatized" and "ashamed."

Shame functions to proliferate the structural violence in Sudan. The shaming methods dictated through research participant interviews illustrate the exclusion and marginalization of

non-Arab* individuals. Though the method of changing someone's name or discouraging them from speaking their native language may not seem particularly violent, the process leads to the neglect of all representations of the non-Arab* identity.

Table 6.5 Example Five: Gamali's Consequences of Shame

	EXAMPLE FIVE: Gamali's Consequences of Shame
Speaker	
Gamali	The donkey picture, this example that I just brought up, is one of the many, has worked negatively against African, if I take Nuba for instance because of my firsthand experience, has played a very negative role in diminishing that language and discouraging it as evolution as a language that is spoken by people and therefore people that we are to speak it and therefore as [Tanutamon] said earlier language is the container of the culture. So since people then are ashamed to speak their own language therefore they can also be **ashamed to practice their own traditional activities** let's say dances, let's say singing, let's say any whatever game that they play that **reflects their own identity and religions**.

According to Gamali, the oppression (and subsequent repression) of an individual's language leads to a negative snowball effect, impacting all other traditional activities. All activities associated with the non-Arab* identities—or (as Gamali states) the African or, more specifically, Nuban identity—are entrenched in shame. These practices should be normal activities that are part of one's life. Yet, physical manifestation or outward expression of a person's Nuban affiliation is met with negativity and deterrence. The act of practicing traditional activities becomes shameful. From Gamali's discussion, the only way to avoid the processes of shame is to abandon all practices that may identify a subject as a non-Arab*.

Conclusion: Moving from Identities of Shame to Collective Advocacy

Shame is a powerful regulatory tool. The practice and extension of shame can be used as a method to divide and concur a nation's population in order to maintain structural hegemony. The interpellation tool of "shame can incite a willful disintegration of collectivity," meaning "it

can cause fragmentation, splitting and dissolution in all levels of the social body, the community, and within the psyche itself" (Munt 2008:26). Within the discussions of shame with my research participants, I found that individuals seemed most targeted or susceptible to fractions during their childhood. The shaming interpellators target schools, further illustrating childhood vulnerability. Interviewees expressed an internalized emotion of shame at a young age and a subsequent epiphany of shame as emitting from an external source—the state—as they aged and evaluated their livelihoods and environments. All my research participants expressed frustration and anger at the fractioning attempts of the state, and used the shared experience of marginalization through shame and violence for unification and collectivity.

Though the "binary opposition of shame/pride" exists as an accepted model of "understanding contemporary social liberation movements," the emotion or experience of shame can also contain "positive effects" (Munt 2008:4). The "collective emotions" that arise through the experience of shame have to potential to "instigate social change" (Munt 2008:4). This often arises from no longer caring about being shamed, particularly "when horizontal bonds formed through communities of shame can be transmuted into collective desires to claim a political presence and a legitimate self, that new sense of identity can forge ahead and gain rights and protection" (Munt 2008:4). This unified group identity becomes powerful through the shared goals and collective objectives. The example of unifying the indigenous voice in Sudan within Tanutamon's interview is a perfect personification of Munt's concept of shame as a positive element of the human experience.

Tanutamon said the struggles of his people in the Nubian region of Sudan are the same as the struggles of people in Darfur, in the South, in the Nuba Mountains. The non-Arab* subjects are all being treated as "second class citizens" because they refuse to become "real humans" by

dropping their "culture and (their) heritage and (their) language." As discussed in chapter four, this is evidence of othering, dehumanization and the destruction of the other—important elements of Moshman's four-phase model of genocide (2011:918). The non-Arab* populations of Sudan are all trying to "protect (their) culture, identity, heritage and language." Through this explanation, the non-Arab* subjects of Sudan are united through their refusal to succumb to interpellation practices. The socially recognized sameness through shame has unified the widespread groups within the margins of Sudan. Shame becomes at once a tool to marginalize and a unifying subject position. Neglecting to be interpellated by the shaming entities has led to a powerful collective political force.

CONCLUSION

Violent practices of marginalization and exclusion are ongoing in Sudan according to the Washington, D.C. Sudanese diaspora members. Those maintaining privilege and establishing marginalization—generally the government of Sudan and some affiliated elites—use the element of race to construct distinction. The construction of marginalization and privilege can use any or all elements of human identity. The state-run project of constructing a national Sudanese identity privileges a homogenous Arab* population, or those participating in group claims to Arab* identity. This includes elements of racialization as well as religious, cultural and linguistic categorization.

The violence in Sudan has claimed many lives and displaced many individuals across the globe. Approaching the conflicts with oversimplified explanations as well as neglecting to engage members of the Sudanese populations is problematic. All instances of human interaction contain cultural complexities. The notion of what is wrong, what is right, what is appropriate or deviant as well as the proper responses are entrenched with culture. All rules and regulations of a society, whether explicitly stated or tacit, are conceived from an intersection of historical experiences, beliefs and ideals. Violence, and the cause or justification for violence, is no different. Many instances of violence are explained as defensive behaviors, justified retaliation, warranted punishment or preemptive strikes. Other times violence is seen as an offensive tool of hate, a senseless act or a method of extreme coercion. As is the trend with human behavior, it is near impossible for one instance of violence to be interpreted in a universal manner. As such, approaching situations like the violence in Sudan requires specific cultural knowledge. Though I firmly stick to my belief in the value of individual interviews and small group interactions with individuals who have first hand experience in a topic or region, I also acknowledge the probability that my very same methods and questions could be asked to a different group of

people and garner different responses resulting in very different conclusions. I plan to continue ethnographic research with Sudanese individuals across the globe. My next goal involves the Southern Sudanese refugees in Israel who face forced deportation as well as visiting Juba, South Sudan for a fact finding mission.

Throughout my experience in Washington, D.C. for graduate school I have enjoyed interacting with and assisting Sudanese nonprofit advocacy groups. I have thoroughly enjoyed hearing from so many different Sudanese individual about life in Sudan. Though all my interviewees seemed to hold their perspective home regions to an elevated level in terms of focus and importance, there were overall trends across all interviews and interactions. All research participants acknowledge the Sudan states project of violence in the name of forced assimilation, or Arabization. They also all referenced racial divisions used by the state, the privileged Arab* identity versus the other*, but did not construct them the same, pointing to the instability an unreliability of these state promulgated racial distinctions.

Although the individuals from regions who experienced time periods of particularly intense violence (Darfur and Nuba Mountains for example) referenced their region's emergency status, they still acknowledged a widespread project of violence by the Khartoum regime. These unstable shifting experiences or constructions of distinction (whether through race, region or religion) were nullified through shared group experiences of shame and violence—whether physical or structural. The occupation of the shamed subject position in Sudan led to the adequation, or the social construction of sameness, of these individuals. The shared experience of individuals within the marginalized subject position birthed a strong political group force. In essence, the recognition of power in numbers and a unified goal helped to move these people from occupying the margins to speaking from a privileged perspective.

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Although the genocide debate rages on in reference to the violence in particular regions of Sudan—Darfur, Nuba Mountains—a debate over linguistic word choice has proved itself useless. The theory that applying the term will invoke international law and force states to intervene and punish perpetrators is false. The ICC has charged president Bashir and fellow military leaders with crimes against humanity and they have yet to be detained. Though time and energy spent over the genocide label appears to be time wasted, genocide theories have proven useful in understanding steps of constructing dichotomies, dehumanization and denial. Further study is needed with the privileged populations of Sudan who proliferate dehumanization, violence and denial.

The Sudanese diaspora has not only been central to this paper, but to the continued efforts of the South Sudanese government. After South Sudan seceded from the North, members of the new South Sudan government visited Washington, D.C. to meet with various influential members of the United States government, nonprofit organizations, NGOs and the Sudanese diaspora communities. During a few of these meetings, the Sudanese governmental officials urged the Sudanese diaspora communities to remain engaged in the plight of the Sudanese people, but to stay residents of the countries where they were. The officials suggested those who wished could come back for visits to maintain strong ties between the country's population and the diaspora, but to keep living outside of South Sudan.

The statements made by those active in the South Sudan government reflect not only the desire to avoid the repatriation of a large population of individuals—most likely because South Sudan's government is still so young and fragile a large spike in the population growth before the appropriate systems are set into place may be detrimental to the country—but also the importance of nurturing the connection and communication between the South Sudanese and the

diaspora. One minister pointed to the lessons learned within the United States democratic government as being useful in forming the South Sudan constitution as well as the system of checks and balances. The Sudanese diaspora members were cited as being in the perfect position to take lessons from their current country and apply and pass along the knowledge to South Sudan. These statements further solidified the relevance and the importance of the various Sudanese diaspora voices in regards to their home.

<u>One Last Story</u>

The positive reinforcement I witnessed from the South Sudanese officials towards the Sudanese diaspora remaining vocal and involved in the affairs of Sudan and South Sudan occurred in stark contrast to the remarks of one United States Congressional Representative. Tapari's organization went through a period of reinvigoration with the addition of bright and enthusiastic summer interns, ready to help Hear the Sudanese. In an effort to give the individuals the "full Washington, D.C. internship experience," Tapari asked me to invite them to all meetings outside the office. A slew of such opportunities presented itself when the Bara community invited a prominent minister from South Sudan to the United States to meet with various members of the Sudanese diaspora communities in eight states. Capitalizing on the insider knowledge of his visit, Tapari invited the minister to come to Washington, D.C. He got the team working immediately on contacting interested parties to set up meetings with the minister.

As the organizer of the minister's visit to D.C., Hear the Sudanese set his two-day schedule, filling it with meetings with government officials, NGOs and other nonprofit organizations. The minister was not in D.C. on official governmental capacity. Therefore, all his meetings were relatively informal and certain topics were carefully avoided, as the minister was

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not speaking on behalf of the government. Everything he discussed was his own personal opinions and beliefs regarding the issues faced by the infant nation of South Sudan. Hear the Sudanese, as an organization dedicated to providing an outlet or platform for Sudanese individuals, was eager to hear what the minister had to say and did not attempt to argue, disagree with or alter his message in any way.

Every meeting started with a questioning of the minister's visit. He would tell the group that he had been to eight states and without fail one of the Americans in the group would make a joke about how that was even more than they had seen of the United States. After a few seconds of polite laughter, the minister would delve into a summary of the situation in South Sudan. He spoke with a deep voice, slowly and steadily making his points and opinions heard. Individuals within the meeting would nod occasionally while sporadically taking notes. Though there were long pauses between his sentences, his audience members waited for him to wrap up his entire speech before asking questions. It was rare that anyone broke his stream of speech.

The Hear the Sudanese team was particularly excited about a meeting with Representative Coyote, a historically strong advocate for the Sudanese people. He championed various bills benefiting the people of Sudan and had even taken a few trips to the region. Our organization had been in contact with members of his office in the past, keeping them informed on the latest news from Sudan and South Sudan. This meeting was unique because Representative Coyote himself agreed to meet with the minister and Hear the Sudanese. Generally, meetings in congressional offices occurred with congressional staffers, not the representatives themselves. Needless to say, the group was bursting with excitement. Many of the interns wanted to attend the meeting. While most of the meetings involved only one intern

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and either Dylan, the executive assistant, or I—as Hear the Sudanese did not want to overwhelm any fellow attendees—two interns and both Dylan and I attended the Coyote meeting.

As the minister, his aide and myself had attended every meeting we had not yet eaten that day. Having been to multiple meetings back-to-back, I breathed a sigh of relief to see some bagged nuts from the representative's state in a basket next to the waiting room chairs. I grabbed three bags and offered the minister and his aide two. After they accepted, I greedily dug into the third. The three of us sat in silence, enjoying the salt on our fingers while the interns pointed around the map on the wall, excitedly discussing their knowledge of Representative Coyote's district and political positions. One of them was a constituent and quietly admitted to meeting Representative Coyote while rallying for his opponent.

After finishing the nuts, the minister put his and his aide's empty bags on the desk of the office's receptionist. After a quick scan of the office, I could not spot a trashcan. I grabbed all three empty nut bags in one hand and took the opportunity to stretch my legs. I had been sitting quite a bit that day and needed the movement. After walking back down the long hall towards the trashcans near entrance of the building, I rejoined the group in the waiting room. The females in the group had all tied their hair back, up and off their neck. After feeling the heat of the office, I mimicked the move and wiped the sweat off my brow. I let out a sigh. The minister laughed and his aide said, "Ten degrees hotter and it might be as warm as we are used to in Juba."

"Well," I said, feeling self-conscious and wimpy, "I'm from chilly Michigan," hoping they would accept my lame excuse for being affected by the heat. Ninety-some degrees in thick suits made even the minister sweat, though he was leaned back looking peaceful and content in the wooden chair.

Tapari entered the office after taking on the task of parking the car he borrowed from his sister to chauffer the minister on his visit. Although parking in D.C. is generally accepted as impossible, Tapari bragged about having a parking angel and, sure enough, for most of our meetings he found ridiculously close spots. This time, he had not been so lucky, but arrived before Representative Coyote.

"They're not ready yet?" Tapari asked.

"Not yet," Dylan, his executive assistant explained, "there's a vote today."

Representative Coyote's office was filled with noises from the live broadcast on the house floor. The space felt cramped as row upon row of desks were filled to the brim with files, books and papers. Most of Coyote's team seemed to ignore the broadcast noise while typing away vigorously at their desktop computers.

After hearing our discussion, a woman peaked her head around her desk and said, "He's on his way back now."

The Capitol building was directly across the street, so we sat up straighter in our chairs, knowing he could walk in at any minute. Sure enough, moments later he breezed past us, past the rows of desks and through the open doorway to his office. I barely got a decent look of the man, but seeing his snow-white hair and his slightly hunched shoulders covered by a pale gray suit, I recognized Representative Coyote. The interns stirred, not sure if they should stand to follow or wait for a direct invitation. A woman in the back of the office stood immediately, following Representative Coyote with a pad of paper and a pen. The minister's sleepy eyes lifted, ready for the meeting.

The group was beckoned and ushered into Representative Coyote's office. The ornate furniture and open space was in stark contrast to the packed room next door. The female intern

from Coyote's constituency, Tapari and the minister's aide occupied a black leather couch. The male intern and Dylan took the two large leather chairs angled to compliment either side of the couch. Coyote took one of the freestanding chairs on the opposite side of the couch across a large wooden coffee table and angled the other for the minister to directly face him. The woman who had followed Coyote in left the room and came back with a chair for herself, next to Representative Coyote and the minister, and a chair for me, behind the minister blocking my view of Representative Coyote.

"There sure are a lot of you…" Representative Coyote said, sounding exasperated.

After being introduced by his aide, the minister dove into South Sudan's current transition to a new peaceful democratic nation. The minister explained the daunting challenges faced by the South Sudan government and people, particularly with regards to the North. During this part of the discussion, Representative Coyote nodded solemnly. His legs were crossed and his hand propped up his head with his index finger pointed upwards stretching and distorting his facial features. Though I did not have a full on view of Coyote, his eyes never seemed to leave the minister while he spoke.

The minister changed course and started discussing internal issues with South Sudan. Though the minister was expressing criticisms, the theme of his speech was to figure out what was best for South Sudan. At the mention of concern over possible corruption, Representative Coyote rose from his chair and walked over to his desk, cutting off the minister.

"Where is it…" he said as he started throwing around newspapers. He seemed to find whatever he was looking for and came back to his seat.

"Here," Representative Coyote handed the minister the newspaper. "Even in D.C. we have people in the government who steal."

Across the front page of the paper was a story about Kwame R. Brown, the former D.C. council chairman, who resigned because of bank fraud.

"New countries have to be patient," Coyote explained. He told the minister not to be too impatient and that all countries are messy and unorganized at first and it takes awhile for things to start running smoothly.

"We're all dealing with fallen people. It is not an easy process to transform from a dictatorship to a democracy," Coyote stated. "You live in a rough neighborhood," he said, referencing Sudan and the Bashir regime to the north.

"You Sudanese have a very interesting story," he emphasized, "it should really be made into a movie."

After being cut off in voicing his concerns regarding South Sudan, the minister remained quiet. He listened politely as Representative Coyote told him not to be too impatient and that what has happened to his people is good enough for a Hollywood production. His silence conveyed a disappointment, as I knew he had much more to say—at least compared to the topics he was able to cover in the previous and subsequent meetings.

"Alright!" Coyote exclaimed, clapping his hands together and raising to shake hands with the minister. "It was an honor to meet you, sir."

As Hear the Sudanese has regretted missing opportunities for photographs in the past, Dylan spoke up and asked if Representative Coyote would be willing to get his picture taken with the minister and the rest of the group.

"Sure," He said.

Everyone rose in unison.

I am not sure what sparked his subsequent outburst. Whether it was how many of us had attended the meeting, if there were too many Americans in a group claiming to be dedicated to the voices of the Sudanese or if it was Coyote's confusion to hear the minister's "impatience" with the South Sudan government's progress, but instantly Coyote's demeanor changed.

"Who are you people? I don't know you," Coyote said, taking a few steps back.

We all stood in stunned silence for a beat, and then Coyote said, again, "Who are you?" pointing at Tapari.

Tapari took a second to recover from the change. He tried going into the organization's mission statement and projects, but he fumbled and stammered through the explanation.

Coyote cut Tapari off, saying, "I don't know you."

Dylan stepped in and handed Representative Coyote a one-pager with the organization's mission, summary and goals. Coyote regarded the piece briefly and then said, "Advocacy… Do you even know what you're talking about? You can't speak for the Sudanese people. You'll end up doing more harm than good! I've been to Sudan. I've seen shrapnel in a woman's head. You can't talk for the Sudanese unless you've been to Sudan or South Sudan. When was the last time you were in Sudan?"

The accusatory tone effectively silenced and stilled the room. I had the urge to jump in and explain that the organization was not speaking for the Sudanese, but trying to give the Sudanese an outlet in which to voice their opinions and stories. However, Coyote did not seem interested in actually hearing any more about our organization as he dismissed the paper explaining the mission so quickly.

"I'm from South Sudan--" Tapari started to explain.

"When was the last time you were there?" Coyote cut him off.

Tapari explained that it had been years and Coyote threw up his arms in exasperation.

"Did you bleed on the battlefield? Are you a Lost Boy?" Coyote shot off.

"No," Tapari said. I silently urged him to tell Coyote that he was in constant contact with Sudanese individuals in Sudan, South Sudan, the Kenya and Chad refugee camps, Israel, Europe and North America. He remained silent.

"So, you're a U.S. citizen?"

"Yes," Tapari answered.

"Oh! Well! You're probably some rich guy with your cowboy hat in your tenth floor condo."

Dylan and I shared a look. Though I have heard stories of advocacy groups acquiring money through bribes by the Sudan government as well as the nonprofit-industrial complex, Dylan and I had spent an entire morning trying to pool $20 to get Tapari to an event in New York honoring the former Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal. Money was not something Tapari or the organization had in abundance. To watch a wealthy American politician accuse Tapari—who was from Sudan with sisters in refugee camps—of not knowing enough about Sudan to speak on the subject was absolutely insulting and an astonishing display of disrespect and entitlement.

Slowly Coyote started going down the line pointing at each of us. The interns had never been to Sudan or South Sudan. The minister's aide was originally from Sudan and had participated in the war. Coyote just nodded and said, "Well you're okay then."

When he got to Dylan she simply said "I'm twenty-one." I stifled a laugh at her blunt retort, knowing I was next. Once his aggressive finger was pointed in my direction I mentioned

the plans for a trip, citing our work researching, drafting and editing grant proposals. He waved

me off and said, voices dripping with sarcasm, "Yeah, planning a trip for the future."

"I don't know who you guys are. I don't want you to use my picture. Who knows what

you'll use it for?" Coyote said, explaining his paranoia.

"Minister," Coyote turned back to the minister who had remained a silent observer,

"You're always welcome back."

Then, to my horror, Representative Coyote snapped his legs together and gave us a

flamboyant salute. Being the closest to the door, I turned and walked out. The group followed me

quickly. Most of us had our heads hung. I noticed a few staffers watched us with their lips curled

in a tight smile.

The team remained silent until we were on an elevator to our next congressional meeting.

"I think he just didn't want to be seen as someone who cared more about foreign issues

than domestic ones," the intern from his constituency said. "He's very pro-American and caters

to that base."

"I think he just didn't want his picture to be taken and handled it really poorly," the other

intern said.

"He seemed very paranoid," Dylan said. "He just completely lost it. He could have

simply said 'No' to having his picture taken."

"I think the minister's message shocked him, and he thought we had something to do

with what the minister was saying," I said.

"Don't let it bother you too much," one intern advised, "then the bad guys win."

After shaking off the insulting meeting and driving to another, the minister pointed out of

the car window.

"Look!" he said excitedly, "Representative Coyote!"

We looked out the window at an older gentleman in a pale gray suit with white hair. We all burst out laughing, easing the tension.

Before the minister left D.C., he treated the group to dinner. After asking him how he enjoyed the visit, the Representative Coyote meeting came up again.

"It is important that we hear from our brothers and sisters outside of South Sudan," the minister said, validating Tapari's continued activism efforts.

"It just felt disrespectful, particularly to you, Tapari. But his logic didn't make sense," Dylan chimed in.

"Imagine how I feel!" Tapari explained. He then delved into he and Representative Coyote's shared history.

Tapari and Representative Coyote had not only spoken before, but had met on multiple occasions. During an event honoring Representative Coyote's efforts in Sudan, Tapari spoke. Tapari and a few Hear the Sudanese board members had met in Coyote's office. What Tapari told the group next made our jaws drop. Representative Coyote helped work with Tapari to get his sister out of the Kakuma refugee camp in northern Kenya. In an effort to get her out of the camp, Tapari asked Representative Coyote to write a letter on her behalf.

"And he did… or at least he signed it," Tapari clarified. The letter effectively began the process of getting his sister out of the Kakuma refugee camp, for which Representative Coyote has Tapari's extreme gratitude and appreciation.

Paranoia in the Sudanese activist community is not unwarranted. Many of my research participants reference the global tracking and bribery of political activists by the Government of Sudan. My interviewees believe this is done in order for the regime to acquire valuable

informants or to defeat any political opposition. It is rare for individuals who received bribes to come forth in an open and honest manner, making the scope and magnitude of this practice unknown. Scandals have also surfaced in the Sudanese activism community involving the unethical use of not-for-profit funds meant for charity goals and missions. Representative Coyote had every right to question Hear the Sudanese's background, structure and scope of services because of the possibility of corruption. However, the group was unprepared for his level of skepticism and his style of scrutiny.

Representative Coyote's message also speaks to the point of making brash assertions without adequate research. It is problematic to offer bold interpretations without conducting research at a single site. This is especially true with regards to issues involving race, as discussed in chapter three. There is a danger in applying ones own cultural interpretation of race onto another culture. This practice perpetuates misunderstanding and is wildly ethnocentric. As mentioned in chapter four, the genocide debate encompasses many outsiders application of theory without actually stepping in to intervene on the violence. The reality of Sudan speaks to the shallowness of theory. Theory is supremely valuable only with involvement within a research population or site, bringing the concepts out of the privileged realm of academia and into social advocacy.

<div align="center">The Right to Help</div>

Through denying the organization a picture, Representative Coyote brought up the larger discussion of the privileging or silencing of individual perspectives on the ongoing situations in Sudan. The imaginary wealth assigned to Tapari by Representative Coyote, the length of time it had been since his last trip to South Sudan and his lack of status as a soldier or Lost Boy worked to deny his authority on the topic, by Coyote's logic. Experience in the region, certain type of

suffering or recent witnessing of suffering must have occurred in order to be allowed to speak on the topic, by Representative Coyote's dialogue. The Minister and his aide had both participated in the war and Representative Coyote had recently visited the region. Coyote's reference to seeing a piece of shrapnel in a woman's head functions to give him credibility on the topic. Unmarked contributions to Coyote's authority on the topic are his position as a powerful politician and a well-known wealthy American.

Recognizing differences in experience and authority is important in any field. Maintaining credibility within an anthropological piece requires "weigh(ing) competing interpretations of the recorded evidence against what we know about how things work, both in general and under specific conditions" (Goodenough 2002:424). Therefore, accepting differing perspectives and voices in regard to the situation in Sudan is important; whether they come from individuals who suffered from the conflicts, witnessed the suffering from the conflicts, visited the region or extensively studied the situations. The most personalized experiences come from the Sudanese. It is important to note that outsiders often misread the situation in Sudan.

A common theme has arisen within the anthropological community: the notion of who has a right to study what. Although many times people may claim to be authorities on subjects they do not truly understand, to silence their voices completely is problematic. When lines are drawn dictating what issues can be discussed and by whom, many aspects of the world are left unexplored. This effectively promotes ignorance and stifles intellectual exploration. While I do think part of what Representative Coyote was saying is true, that it is very dangerous to be discussing an issue that one does not understand, or to co-opt the voices of another population, I also think his logic was flawed. If we start categorizing the individuals who can or cannot speak to certain issues, we start privileging and marginalizing voices. It is incredibly important to know

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our own positions in the world and to at least try to manage the effects our words and actions may have on others. However, no one person will ever know everything about another's position, opinion and experiences in the world. To make an arbitrary claim that there is some sort of requirement one must meet before being able to help keeps people from helping and turns something positive into something negative. The notion that only some have the right to participate in efforts of social justice will effectively stifle potentially helpful voices or assistance. While I personally do wish to go to Sudan and South Sudan, I have not yet been able to. However, I do not believe that fact should keep me from continuing to explore the issues of racialization, violence and genocide from afar and through the exploration of scholarly texts as well as qualitative interviews. If everyone was required to personally experience the issues with which they worked, my mother could no longer work with people with schizophrenia or muscular dystrophy, astronomers could no longer study far off galaxies and archaeologists could not study ancient civilizations long extinct.

In addressing humanitarian crises and participating in activism and social advocacy, it is important to accept criticism and be open to new methods and ways of thinking. Part of Representative Coyote's concerns resonated with me as a student of anthropology: listening to certain voices can tell us more about a culture than simply reading from a book of an armchair researcher. However, it is problematic to absolve someone of his or her right to work in a certain field or on a specific topic. We should be knocking down the boundaries of difference and distinction within the human species, not working to reinforce them.

Final Note

It was the generalized wish of the interviewees that the Government of Sudan be more accepting of a diverse population—linguistically, culturally and racially. References were made

to the acquisition of power by the Bashir regime. If the government had attained power in a legitimate manner, research participants believed there might not be such rampant paranoia regarding threats to the Bashir regime. Across the board, interviewees wished for a ceasing of both the assimilation project and the privileging of the Arab*-Islamic identity. This small sample of the Sudanese diaspora all suggested an end to the impunity from the international community would greatly reduce the deaths and violence in Sudan through the recognition of the multiple crises. The ongoing violence against women in Sudan as well as the emergent violence in the Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains regions begs further attention and examination.

The culturally constructed distinctions created by humans must always be accepted as complex realities. More often than not these created forms of difference are used for hegemonic purposes, especially when associated with positions of marginalization and privilege. The racialization of groups in Sudan to proliferate projects of violence and marginalization is believed, by research participants, to be caused by a concentration of wealth, power and resources. Perhaps one day all notions of culturally constructed difference will be met with scrutiny and dissected for their meaning and purpose in our material reality. We must no longer ignore the plight of our fellow humans.

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